TY  - JOUR
AU  - Rebelo,Sergio
AU  - Vegh,Carlos A.
TI  - When Is It Optimal to Abandon a Fixed Exchange Rate?
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 12793
PY  - 2006
Y2  - December 2006
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w12793
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w12793.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Sergio Rebelo
Northwestern University
Kellogg School of Management
Department of Finance
Leverone Hall
Evanston, IL  60208-2001
Tel: 847/467-2329
Fax: 847/491-5719
E-Mail: s-rebelo@northwestern.edu

Carlos A. Vegh
Department of Economics
Tydings Hall, Office 4118G
University of Maryland
College Park, MD 20742-7211
Tel: 301-405-3546
Fax: 301-405-3542
E-Mail: vegh@econ.bsos.umd.edu
AB  - The influential Krugman-Flood-Garber (KFG) model of balance of payment crises assumes that a fixed exchange rate is abandoned if and only if international reserves reach a critical threshold value. From a positive standpoint, the KFG rule is at odds with many episodes in which the central bank has plenty of international reserves at the time of abandonment. We study the optimal exit policy and show that, from a normative standpoint, the KFG rule is generally suboptimal. We consider a model in which the fixed exchange rate regime has become unsustainable due to an unexpected increase in government spending. We show that, when there are no exit costs, it is optimal to abandon immediately. When there are exit costs, the optimal abandonment time is a decreasing function of the size of the fiscal shock. For large fiscal shocks, immediate abandonment is optimal. Our model is consistent with evidence suggesting that many countries exit fixed exchange rate regimes with still plenty of international reserves in the central bank's vault.
ER  -