TY  - JOUR
AU  - Ockenfels,Axel
AU  - Reiley,David
AU  - Sadrieh,Abdolkarim
TI  - Online Auctions
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 12785
PY  - 2006
Y2  - December 2006
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w12785
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w12785.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Axel Ockenfels
Department of Economics
University of Cologne
D-50923 Köln
Germany
E-Mail: ockenfels@uni-koeln.de

David H. Reiley, Jr.
Yahoo! 2GA-2
4401 Great America Parkway
Santa Clara, CA 95054
Tel: 520/621-6238
Fax: 408-349-2270
E-Mail: reiley@yahoo-inc.com

Abdolkarim Sadrieh
Faculty of Economics and Management
University of Magdeburg
Postbox 4120, 39016 Magdeburg, GERMANY
E-Mail: sadrieh@ww.uni-magdeburg.de
AB  - The economic literature on online auctions is rapidly growing because of the enormous amount of freely available field data. Moreover, numerous innovations in auction-design features on platforms such as eBay have created excellent research opportunities. In this article, we survey the theoretical, empirical, and experimental research on bidder strategies (including the timing of bids and winner's-curse effects) and seller strategies (including reserve-price policies and the use of buy-now options) in online auctions, as well as some of the literature dealing with online-auction design (including stopping rules and multi-object pricing rules).
ER  -