TY  - JOUR
AU  - Roth,Alvin E.
AU  - Sonmez,Tayfun
AU  - Unver,M. Utku
TI  - Efficient Kidney Exchange: Coincidence of Wants in a Structured Market
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 11402
PY  - 2005
Y2  - June 2005
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w11402
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w11402.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Alvin E. Roth
Department of Economics
Stanford University
579 Serra Mall
Stanford, CA 94305
Tel: 650/725-9147
E-Mail: alroth@stanford.edu

Tayfun Sonmez
Boston College
Department of Economics
140 Comm. Ave.
Chestnut Hill, MA, 02467
E-Mail: tayfun.sonmez@bc.edu

Utku Unver
Boston College
Department of Economics
140 Comm. Ave.
Chestnut Hill, MA, 02467
Tel: 617-5522217
E-Mail: unver@bc.edu
AB  - Patients needing kidney transplants may have willing donors who cannot donate to them because of blood or tissue incompatibility. Incompatible patient-donor pairs can exchange donor kidneys with other such pairs. The situation facing such pairs resembles models of the "double coincidence of wants," and relatively few exchanges have been consummated by decentralized means. As the population of available patient-donor pairs grows, the frequency with which exchanges can be arranged will depend in part on how exchanges are organized. We study the potential frequency of exchanges as a function of the number of patient-donor pairs, and the size of the largest feasible exchange. Developing infrastructure to identify and perform 3-way as well as 2-way exchanges will have a substantial effect on the number of transplants, and will help the most vulnerable patients. Larger than 3-way exchanges have much smaller impact. Larger populations of patient-donor pairs increase the percentage of patients of all kinds who can find exchanges.
ER  -