@techreport{NBERw10679,
 title = "Credible Commitment to Optimal Escape from a Liquidity Trap: The Role of the Balance Sheet of an Independent Central Bank",
 author = "Olivier Jeanne and Lars E.O. Svensson",
 institution = "National Bureau of Economic Research",
 type = "Working Paper",
 series = "Working Paper Series",
 number = "10679",
 year = "2004",
 month = "August",
 URL = "http://www.nber.org/papers/w10679",
 abstract = {An independent central bank can manage its balance sheet and its capital so as to commit itself to a depreciation of its currency and an exchange-rate peg. This way, the central bank can implement the optimal escape from a liquidity trap, which involves a commitment to higher future inflation. This commitment mechanism works even though, realistically, the central bank cannot commit itself to a particular future money supply. It supports the feasibility of Svensson's Foolproof Way to escape from a liquidity trap.},
}