TY  - JOUR
AU  - Figueriedo,John M. de
TI  - The Timing, Intensity, and Composition of Interest Group Lobbying: An Analysis of Structural Policy Windows in the States
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 10588
PY  - 2004
Y2  - June 2004
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w10588
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w10588.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
John M. de Figueiredo
The Law School
Duke University
210 Science Drive
Durham, NC 27708
Tel: 919-613-8513
E-Mail: jdefig@law.duke.edu
AB  - This is the first paper to statistically examine the timing of interest group lobbying. It introduces a theoretical framework based on recurring  structural policy windows' and argues that these types of windows should have a large effect on the intensity and timing of interest group activity. Using a new database of all lobbying expenditures in the U.S. states ranging up to 25 years, the paper shows interest group lobbying increases substantially during one of these structural windows in particular--the budgeting process. Spikes in lobbying during budgeting are driven primarily by business groups. Moreover, even groups relatively unaffected by budgets lobby more intensely during legislative budgeting, consistent with the theory that these interests are attempting to have legislators attach (de)regulatory riders to the budget bills. Overall, the paper demonstrates that these structural policy windows largely determine lobbying expenditures.
ER  -