TY  - JOUR
AU  - Barro,Jason
AU  - Beaulieu,Nancy
TI  - Selection and Improvement: Physician Responses to Financial Incentives
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 10017
PY  - 2003
Y2  - October 2003
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w10017
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w10017.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Jason Barro
280 Beacon St . #54
Boston, MA 02116
Tel: 617/267-4139
Fax: 617/496-7167
E-Mail: jason.barro@post.harvard.edu

Nancy Beaulieu
22A Chandler Road
Boxford, MA  01921
Tel: 978-352-8048
E-Mail: nancydeanbeaulieu@yahoo.com
AB  - In this study we examine the effects of transferring physicians from a compensation system based on salary to a profit-sharing system. Consistent with theory, we find that the change has a large and significant effect on the quantity of services provided. In addition, we find a selection effect, where the least productive doctors leave the company and more productive doctors join.
ER  -