TY  - JOUR
AU  - Bartel,Ann P.
AU  - Thomas,Lacy Glenn
TI  - OSHA Enforcement, Industrial Compliance and Workplace Injuries
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 953
PY  - 1985
Y2  - July 1985
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w0953
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w0953.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Ann P. Bartel
Graduate School of Business
Columbia University
3022 Broadway, 623 Uris Hall
New York, NY  10027
Tel: 212/854-4419
Fax: (212) 316-9219
E-Mail: apb2@columbia.edu
AB  - This paper develops and tests a three-equation simultaneous model of OSHA enforcement behavior, industrial compliance and workplace injuries. The enforcement equation is based on the assumption that OSHA acts as a political institution that gains support through the transfer of wealth from firms to employees; the empirical results are largely consistent with this notion. Contrary to previous work, we find that OSHA enforcement efforts have, indeed, had a statistically significant impact on industrial compliance and, further, that this compliance has led to a statistically significant decrease in worker injuries. The point estimate of the elasticity of the lost workday rate with respect to the OSHA inspection rate is -.04.
ER  -