@techreport{NBERw0953,
 title = "OSHA Enforcement, Industrial Compliance and Workplace Injuries",
 author = "Ann P. Bartel and Lacy Glenn Thomas",
 institution = "National Bureau of Economic Research",
 type = "Working Paper",
 series = "Working Paper Series",
 number = "953",
 year = "1985",
 month = "July",
 URL = "http://www.nber.org/papers/w0953",
 abstract = {This paper develops and tests a three-equation simultaneous model of OSHA enforcement behavior, industrial compliance and workplace injuries. The enforcement equation is based on the assumption that OSHA acts as a political institution that gains support through the transfer of wealth from firms to employees; the empirical results are largely consistent with this notion. Contrary to previous work, we find that OSHA enforcement efforts have, indeed, had a statistically significant impact on industrial compliance and, further, that this compliance has led to a statistically significant decrease in worker injuries. The point estimate of the elasticity of the lost workday rate with respect to the OSHA inspection rate is -.04.},
}