

WORKING PAPER SERIES

PIECE RATE VS. TIME RATE:
THE EFFECT OF INCENTIVES ON EARNINGS

Eric Seiler

Working Paper No. 879

NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, INC.



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April 1982

I would like to thank Richard Freeman, Lawrence Summers, Bert Bernheim, and David Ellwood for their continued support and valuable suggestions. Additionally, many participants of the March 2, 1979, NBER Conference on Alternate Modes of Compensating Workers offered valuable contributions. Research for this project was funded by Grant No. 79-2-7 from the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation. The research reported here is part of the NBER's research program in Labor Studies. Any opinions expressed are those of the author and not those of the National Bureau of Economic Research.

ABSTRACT

Piece Rate vs. Time Rate
The Effect of Incentives on Earnings

This paper presents a detailed examination of the effect of piece rates and other forms of incentive compensation on individual employee earnings. The study examines the impact of incentives on the earnings of over 100,000 employees in 500 firms within the footwear and men's and boys' clothing industries.

Two distinct incentive effects are observed. First, incentive workers' earnings are more dispersed than identical time workers' earnings within both firms and occupations. This greater variance is maintained with the addition of controls for heterogeneity of individual characteristics between the two sectors. Second, incentive workers receive an earnings premium, in part to compensate for the greater variation in their income, and partially as a result of an incentive-effort effect. The incentive earnings premium averages 14%, controlling for individual characteristics, occupational classification, and individual firms. Subsequent decomposition of the incentive-earnings premium reveals that the compensating differential for variation in earnings accounts for a minority of the incentive earnings premium. This supports the view that increased effort by incentive employees leads to relatively greater earnings.

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The existence of alternative methods of wage payment facilitates the study of the relationship between individual motivation, compensation, and productivity. Piece-rate and incentive wage payment plans are designed to induce additional employee effort, increase production and, as a result, compensation.

Previous studies¹ of incentive schemes provide relatively unambiguous evidence of wage premiums to piece-rate workers, often as high as 20 percent, and demonstrate productivity gains in incentive firms approaching 40 percent.² For instance, Pencavel (1977) found a 7 percent incentive wage premium in a study of 183 male punch-press operators in Chicago, controlling for schooling, experience, race, and union status. Additionally, the dispersion of wages, captured by the standard deviation of the natural log of hourly earnings, is significantly larger for incentive workers.³

The current study seeks to evaluate the incentive-earnings relationship on a much larger scale by studying the impact of incentives on the earnings of over 100,000 employees in 500 firms within two United States manufacturing industries.

The central thesis is that there is a significant relationship between incentive remuneration and the mean and dispersion of earnings among identical individuals. Greater dispersion in incentive worker income is the result of fluctuations in individual output, while an incentive wage premium is partially a direct incentive-effort effect and partially a compensating differential for the risk of variation in income.

The paper is divided into four sections. Section I examines the extent of various incentive payment systems in the United States. Both the current extent of piecework and changes over time are reviewed. In

Section II, a model is constructed that isolates the special qualities of an incentive employment contract and analyzes the effects of incentives on remuneration. Section III examines these hypotheses within two 'four digit' industries. Within certain data imposed limitations, the incentive-dispersion effect and the incentive wage premium are calculated. In Section IV, the results are summarized and suggestions for future research are offered.

I. The Extent of Incentive Payment

An accurate assessment of the extent of incentive wage payments is difficult to make. The benchmark figure in most labor economics textbooks is that 30 percent of workers in manufacturing receive their basic wages, at least in part, in the form of piece-rate, bonus or commission earnings.⁴ Wholesale and retail trade have incentive⁵ proportions of 5 and 10 percent, respectively. Few, if any, public employees or clerical workers are compensated on an incentive basis. Finally, the 1959 Census of Agriculture estimates that 23 percent of farm labor is compensated on the basis of incentive payment.⁶

The accuracy of these measures and comparability of statistics within broad industrial groups is suspect. A more disaggregate estimate of the extent of incentives is provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics in the Industry Wage Surveys, which cover one-third of the 14.5 million production and related workers in the United States.

Table 1, column (1), presents a compilation of the percentage of incentive workers per industry gathered from 50 Industry Wage Surveys of the period 1972-1976. Overall, slightly more than 25 percent of the 4.5 million production workers are covered by some type of incentive system. One striking feature is the tremendous variation in the percentage of incentives

Table 1

THE EXTENT OF INCENTIVE PAYMENT
IN SELECTED U.S. MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES

Industry	(1) % Incentive 1972-1976	(2) % Piece rate only 1972-1976	(3) % Incentive 1963-1968	(4) Compound Percentages Change per Year
Meat packing (1963-74)	18	4	30	-4.54
Prepared meat (1963-74)	6	3	8	-2.58
Flour (1967-72)	1	-	2	-12.94
Candy (1965-75)	11	5	25	-7.88
Cigars (1967-72)	45	45	57	-4.62
Synthetic & Cotton textiles (1965-75)	28	28	31	-1.01
Wool textiles (1966-75)	21	14	23	-1.00
Textile dyeing (1965-76)	10	6	11	-0.86
Women's hosiery (1967-73)	62	62	70	-2.00
Men's hosiery (1967-73)	58	57	65	-1.88
Children's hosiery (1967-73)	65	65	70	-1.28
Men's & boys' suits & coats (1967-76)	73	71	74	-0.15
Men's & boys' shirts (1964-74)	75	72	81	-0.77
Work clothing (1968-72)	80	80	82	-0.62
Household furniture (1965-74)	17	7	18	-0.63
Corrugated Boxes (1964-76)	25	6	36	-2.99
Paperboard Containers (1964-70)	12	3.5	16	-4.68
Industrial Chemicals (1965-71)	1	-	5	-23.53
Synthetic Fibers (1966-76)	2	1	8	-12.94
Paints (1965-76)	0	0	1	-
Fertilizers (1966-71)	0.5	-	1	-12.94
Misc. Plastic (1964-74)	5	3	13	-9.11
Leather tanning (1968-73)	44	35	53	-3.65
Footwear (1968-75)	74	73	70	+0.82
Glass containers (1964-75)	13	1	38	-9.29
Pressed & blown glass (1964-75)	32	7	36	-1.06
Structural clay (1964-75)	22	16	28	-2.17
Basic iron & steel (1967-72)	79	-	66	+3.66
Iron & steel foundries (1967-73)	22	11	24	-1.44
Fabricated Structural Steel	8	3	-	-
Machinery-non electrical (1966-75)	12	5	17	-3.80
Motor Vehicles (1963-73)	1	-	2	-6.70
Motor Vehicle parts (1963-74)	27	16	31	-1.25

between industries, even at the 'two-digit' level. For example, the extent of incentives in meat-packing (18%) greatly exceeds that of prepared meat (6%); also pressed and blown glass (32%) has over twice as much incentive payment as glass containers (13%). In column (2), piece rates are shown to be the most common form of incentive payment, rather than bonuses or commissions, especially in those industries that are over 50 percent incentive.⁷

A comparison of column (3) with column (1) demonstrates the almost universal decline in reliance on incentive compensation over a time period of 5 to 11 years, depending on the industry chosen. This decline is quantified in column (4) in terms of compound percentage change per year. Only two industries, footwear and basic iron and steel, have increases in the percentage of incentive workers. Because of the large size of basic iron and steel (over 400,000 production workers) this increase is sufficient to hold the average reduction in the reliance on incentives in all selected industries to 2 percent over the 10-year period. The increase in basic iron and steel is mostly due to the increased coverage of the basic collective bargaining agreement of the United Steelworkers of America.⁸ Overall, the recent data indicates a steady decline in the extent of incentive compensation in U.S. manufacturing. While the data does not indicate the cause of the decline, the decrease may be due to a greater reliance on time methods in newer establishments, the closing of some older incentive establishments, and an actual change in the method of compensation for some workers.⁹

II. Theoretical Examination of the Effect of Incentive Payments on Earnings

Consider two classes of workers: incentive workers, whose earnings are dependent on individual output and time workers, whose earnings are solely a function of hours worked. While retention and promotion decisions may depend on individual performance, the day to day earnings of time workers are independent of their own output and effort. Furthermore, time workers' incomes are insensitive to the vagaries of the production process and short-run fluctuations of demand.

Formally, introduce a random variable θ , with mean equal to 1 and variance of σ_θ^2 . This variable explicitly introduces factors beyond the control of a worker into the production function. Let e denote individual effort yielding a production function:

$$(2.1) \quad X = X(e, \theta)$$

With a multiplicative production specification, the wages of incentive workers and time workers are:

$$(2.2) \quad W_{\text{incentive}} = P \cdot e \cdot \theta ; \quad W_{\text{time}} = T$$

where P is a linear piecerate and T is the rate of compensation per hour.

In a competitive economy, market forces require $\bar{W} = \bar{P} = \bar{T}$ when P and T are measured in identical units. A log normal earnings distribution yields the following decomposition of variance in compensation:

$$(2.3) \quad \text{Var}(\ln W_i) - \text{Var}(\ln W_t) = \text{Var}(\ln \theta) + \text{Var}(\ln e) + 2 \cdot \text{Cov}(\ln e, \ln \theta)$$

if the right hand side of (2.3) is positive the variance of incentive workers' earnings will exceed that of time workers. While $\text{Var}(\ln \theta) \geq 0$, and $\text{Var}(\ln e) \geq 0$ the sign of the covariance term is ambiguous.

One one hand, it is possible that individuals adjust their effort systematically in an inverse relationship to fluctuations in risk. Thus, $2 \cdot \text{Cov}\{\ln(\theta)\ln(e)\}$ could offset any variance in earnings. This occurs when piece workers withhold effort, especially in periods of high potential output, to avoid a downward adjustment of the piece rate.¹⁰ Increased effort may also be employed to compensate for potentially low compensation in difficult periods. Often, peer pressure results in the withholding of effort to protect less productive employees. Conversely, peer pressure may operate to encourage employees who would normally shirk responsibility.

On the other hand, for many workers, effort decisions are independent of risk with $2 \cdot \text{Cov}\{\ln(e)\ln(\theta)\} = 0$, and for some $2 \cdot \text{Cov}\{\ln(e)\ln(\theta)\}$ is positive. The latter is true for individuals who work especially hard when the opportunity for gain per unit of effort is greatest. It is unlikely that intentional effort adjustments systematically compensate for variation due to risk for all incentive workers. Additionally, many effort decisions are reached a priori and could not be used to compensate for adverse states of nature. It is doubtful that the covariance between risk and effort compensates for both $\text{Var}(\ln(e)) > 0$ and $\text{Var}(\ln(\theta)) > 0$; thus $\text{Var}(\ln W_i) > \text{Var}(\ln W_t)$.

The second hypothesis is that there exists a direct positive effect of incentive payments on the compensation of employees. Two separate factors lead to this conclusion. Under the assumption that workers are risk averse $\text{Var}(\ln W_i) > \text{Var}(\ln W_t)$ implies that $w_i > w_t$. This is similar to a compensating differentials model where the unfavorable condition is the existence of risk. Employee risk aversion, even combined with a risk neutral employer implies a wage premium for a group characterized by greater variance in earnings.

The second factor is independent of the dispersion hypothesis and is the effect often attributed to incentive schemes. The pecuniary effect of incentive implies $e_i > e_t$ which would directly yield $w_i > w_t$, which can be formally¹¹

shown as follows: assume identical utility functions with constant relative risk aversion and constant elasticity of marginal utility of income. The expected utility for workers by method of wage payment can be defined as:

$$(2.4) \quad E(U_i) = E\{(W_i)^a (e_m - e_i)^b (\sigma_\theta^2)^{-c}\} \text{ and } E(U_t) = E\{(W_t)^a (e_m - e_t)^b\}$$

where e_m is the maximum bound on human effort and e_t is the numeraire.

From (2.2) substitutes for W_i and W_t are obtained, yielding:

$$(2.5) \quad E(U_i) = p^a E(\theta^a) e_i^a (e_m - e_i)^b (\sigma_\theta^2)^{-c} \text{ and } E(U_t) = T^a (e_m - 1)^b$$

Incentive workers will choose a level of effort that maximizes their expected utility.

Setting $\partial E(U_i)/\partial e_i = 0$ in (2.5) yields $e_i = (a/(a+b)) \cdot e_m$.

The incentive wage premium is found by setting $E(U_i) = E(U_t)$ in (2.4).

A logarithmic transformation with algebraic manipulation yields:

$$(2.6) \quad \ln(W_i) - \ln(W_t) = (c/a) \ln(\sigma_\theta^2) + (b/a) \{\ln(e_m - 1) - \ln(e_m - e_i)\}$$

It is easy to see the effect of effort on earnings. If $e_i > e_t$ then $e_i > 1$ and $(b/a) \{\ln(e_m - 1) - \ln(e_m - e_i)\} > 0$. Thus the partial effect of increased effort due to incentives is a positive earnings premium.

Finally, the model decomposes the incentive-earnings effect into its two expected components, a compensating differential for risk $((c/a) \cdot \ln(\sigma_\theta^2))$ and the effort effect.

III. The Effects of Incentive Payments on Employee Compensation

A. Description of the Data Set

Two separate Industry Wage survey data sets provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics are used to investigate the hypotheses. The surveys

used are: (1) Footwear, April 1975, and (2) Men's and Boys' Suits and Coats, April 1976. Within each industry information is provided on an individual and firm by firm basis. For all production workers within the scope of the Bureau of Labor Statistics survey¹², data exists on individual hourly earnings, method of wage payment, sex, detailed occupation, and a numerical code for the firm.

The second segment of the data consists of characteristics that are common to all members of a given firm. Those used in this analysis include geographic region, community size, firm size, major product produced by the firm, method of production, proportion of supervisory personnel employed by the firm, and union status. A firm is considered to be unionized if labor-management contracts cover a majority of its production workers. Little distortion occurs here since in unionized firms, union contracts usually apply to all production workers.¹³ The type of incentive scheme, whether individual or group, is provided for each firm. In the two industries to be studied, almost every incentive-paid worker is compensated on the basis of individual piecework. Table 2 lists the means and standard deviations of the important variables in the analysis; in each industry, the information is provided for the entire sample and then for the incentive-paid workers and the time-paid workers separately.

In both industries, the great majority of workers are paid on an incentive basis. It is possible that the earnings effects of incentive payments operate differently in predominantly incentive industries as opposed to predominantly time-paid industries. If so, the generality of conclusions from this data must be limited.

The greatest strengths of this data are the large number of observations and the detailed disaggregation of occupations. Since all analysis occurs within two specific industries, both four-digit industries under the Standard Industrial Classification coding system, the usual loss

Table 2

SELECTED VARIABLE MEANS AND (STANDARD DEVIATIONS)
FROM B.L.S. INDUSTRY WAGE SURVEYS:

FOOTWEAR AND MEN'S & BOYS' SUITS & COATS

<u>Variable</u> (Sample)	<u>Footwear</u>			<u>Men's and Boy's Suits and Coats</u>		
	<u>Full</u>	<u>Incentive</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>Full</u>	<u>Incentive</u>	<u>Time</u>
(1) Proportion of Incentive Workers	.74 (.44)	-	-	.82 (.38)	-	-
(2) Number of Production Workers per Firm	428.0 (344.1)	423.2 (312.7)	431.0 (422.1)	652 (841.2)	675.9 (742.9)	444.2 (772.5)
(3) Proportion Male	.33 (.47)	.29 (.45)	.43 (.49)	.21 (.41)	.16 (.36)	.42 (.47)
(4) Proportion Unionized	.47 (.50)	.49 (.50)	.40 (.49)	.80 (.40)	.81 (.37)	.73 (.44)
(5) Proportion Urban (1)	.41 (.49)	.37 (.48)	.52 (.50)	.76 (.43)	.76 (.42)	.76 (.42)
(6) Proportion of Supervisory Personnel (2)	.07 (.04)	.06 (.04)	.07 (.04)	.07 (.05)	.07 (.04)	.02 (.15)
(7) Proportion of Workers covered by minimum and maximum rates of compensation (3)	.38 (.49)	.39 (.49)	.37 (.48)	.36 (.48)	.38 (.49)	.27 (.44)
Number of Production Workers	79425	58691	20734	42252	34651	7601
Number of Firms		306			228	

(1) Urban is defined as falling within a standard metropolitan statistical area.

(2) Non-production, non-clerical employees.

(3) This variable is on a firm by firm basis.

of information stemming from the blunt aggregation of records into two-digit industry dummies does not occur. Moreover, since the occupational classifications are industry specific they are far more detailed than is usually the case.

There are two important limitations in the data. First, the traditional human capital and demographic variables such as schooling, experience, age and race are omitted. This makes it difficult to isolate the causation of earnings effects, as discussed below. Second, many employees are not covered by a detailed occupational group. Instead, they are lumped into a large diverse occupational group.¹ This nonspecified group constitutes 61 percent of the sample in footwear and 23% in men's and boys' suits and coats. Subsequent analysis will be performed with and without inclusion of the unspecified occupational group. When the results are sensitive to this omission both will be reported.

B. Initial Analysis of the Earnings Hypothesis

The frequency distributions of log hourly earnings are plotted in Figure I. Dotted lines denote footwear, solid lines designate men's and boys' suits and coats. In both industries, the dual hypothesis is visually confirmed: the distributions of the wages of incentive groups are flatter, implying higher dispersion, and their means are higher. In footwear, these effects are quite pronounced, with the bulk of time-rated workers compensated within a more narrow and lower range. In men's and boys' suits and coats, the differences are much less noticeable as the incentive-paid workers exhibit only a slightly more disparate earnings profile than the time-compensated employees.

The substantial overlapping of the distributions supports the compensating differential segment of the earnings effect. If the two dis-

tributions were distinct, the hypothesis that $W_i > W_t$ in part to compensate for $\text{Var}(W_i) > \text{Var}(W_t)$ would be weakened. The overlap in the frequency distributions demonstrates that both the effort effect and the compensation effect could account for the incentive earnings effect.

While the comparison of means is relatively unambiguous, quantitative comparison of dispersion requires the choice of an appropriate metric to describe inequality. Several statistics can be used to analyze the extent of income inequality.¹⁴ These include the coefficient of variation in earnings, the Gini Coefficient, the standard deviation of the logarithm of earnings, and earnings' quartiles. Each of these statistics weights variance differently depending on its location in the distribution. In this work, the standard deviation of the natural log of earnings is used. Since the standard deviation of the natural logarithm weights differences in the lower end of the income distribution more heavily than those in the upper end, it is likely to underestimate the inequality between incentive and time compensation. This is due to minimum wage laws and to minimum guarantees present in many incentive wage plans, which decrease dispersion in the lower end of the distribution. The graphical analysis demonstrates the inequality to be greatest in the upper tails; thus, by devaluing such inequality, this metric is biased downward.

Table 3 supports the visual results found in Figure I. First, in terms of dispersion, $\text{Var}(W_i) > \text{Var}(W_t)$ in both industries. The differences in the standard deviation of log earnings are 0.72 and 0.22 in footwear and men's and boys' suits and coats. The greater differences in footwear is consistent with the graphical analysis.

The differences in mean log earnings for the two industries are .122 and .141 respectively. These differences approximate the percentage incentive earnings premium in each sample. Additionally, the differences

FIGURE 1 FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTIONS OF
EARNINGS BY METHOD OF WAGE PAYMENT

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


TABLE 3 COMPARISON OF MEAN AND STANDARD DEVIATION
OF LN HOURLY EARNINGS AMONG PRODUCTION WORKERS BY INDUSTRY

	FOOTWEAR			MEN'S & BOYS' SUITS & COATS		
	Observations	Mean Ln Earnings	Stan.Dev. Ln Earn.	Observations	Mean Ln Earnings	Stan.Dev Ln Earn.
(1) Incentive	58691	1.096	.272	34651	1.369	.304
(2) Time	20734	.974	.200	7601	1.228	.282
(3) Differences		.122	.072		.141	.022
(4) t-ratio for means		68.31*	-		38.91*	-
(5) F-ratio for standard deviation		-	1.85*		-	1.16*

*significant at the 1% level

Source: B.L.S. Industry Wage Surveys

in dollar/hour earnings are 0.41 and 0.57 respectively, certainly a meaningful differential in compensation. In footwear, for example, the difference in favor of incentive workers is \$16.00 per week and over \$800.00 per year. Thus, at the aggregate level the data confirm the theoretical hypothesis of Section II.

C. Analyzing the Incentive Effect - Specification Issues and Selection Bias

The central methodological problem is isolating the observed dispersion and earnings effects directly due to the method of wage payment from those due to other factors related to payment systems. Even at the four-digit industry level, there are potential areas of correlation between incentive payments and other institutional factors. These are addressed by examining frequency distributions within detailed occupational categories, specific firms, major product groups, and collective bargaining status. Within sufficiently narrowed cells, the likelihood of spurious correlation diminishes.

Omitted factor bias is a potential problem in the B.L.S. data since most human capital variables are absent. These include age, education, experience, job tenure, and race. The magnitude of the bias depends on the correlation between incentive payment and the missing factors and on the relative importance of the missing factors in explaining wage differentials. In the Pencavel study, the inclusion of schooling, experience, job tenure, race, and union status in the regression analysis reduced the gross piece rate wage premium of 8.8 percent to a controlled effect of 7 percent, a relatively small reduction. A similar reduction in the Industry Wage Survey sample still would yield incentive earnings effects of 9.7 percent and 11.2 percent in footwear and men's clothing, instead of the observed 12.2 percent and 14.1 percent earnings' premiums. Furthermore, the use of detailed cells is likely to capture much of the variance

in the missing characteristics.

Self-selection bias on the part of the firm and/or the individual is also a potential problem. This bias could affect the hypothesis by systematically varying the distribution of an omitted explanatory variable between the two wage payment systems, or it could operate by changing the risk aversion or effort level mix between the two groups.

First, consider the selection bias on the part of the firm. It is unlikely that a firm would want to hire a highly motivated or unusually able individual on an incentive basis. Since such an individual's productivity is high without incentives, the firm would unnecessarily reward the high production on a piece rate basis that it would costlessly enjoy on a time rate basis. Thus, it is difficult to explain the incentive-earnings effect with the argument that firms merely choose 'better' workers for employment on an incentive basis.

The firm may contribute to the greater dispersion of earnings among piece rate employees through its selection process. When a risk-averse firm is unsure of an individual's actual productive capacity, it is more likely to hire that individual on an incentive basis. This is the converse of the risk-spreading argument employed in the basic model. It is therefore possible that the observed difference in dispersion is due to the selection, by the firm, of individuals with a more diverse productivity capacity.

Selection bias on the part of the individual poses difficult problems as well. An individual who is inherently hard-working is better off under an incentive scheme even though the incentive has little or no effect on his productivity. The empirical significance of individual self-selection will be examined by comparing the incentive earnings effect at different levels of aggregation. Some support for a self-selection hypothesis would exist if the incentive-earnings effect falls as aggre-

gation decreases. Hard-working individuals will seek out industries, occupations, firms and, finally, specific tasks within a firm, which reward their excess effort. Successive dummy controls should pick up an increasing share of the incentive-earnings effect if the self-selection view is valid.

It is reasonable to assume that both self-selection and incentive-earnings effects occur simultaneously for many individuals. Inherently hard-working individuals who choose work partially on the basis of the form of remuneration are likely to feel a pecuniary incentive effect and adjust their efforts accordingly. It would be unrealistic to assume that the bulk of an observed incentive-earnings effect was the function of self-selection on the part of the individuals.

Individual self-selection is unlikely to be a major factor in increasing the dispersion of incentive workers' wages. Individuals with low or variable expected productivity are more likely to prefer time payment, all else equal. Therefore, while self-selection on the part of individuals might explain a higher mean earnings for incentive workers, it is unlikely to explain a distribution that has a greater variance.

The final specification issue concerns the appropriateness of cross-section earnings dispersion as the proxy for the relative riskiness of different jobs. While time series data might better capture riskiness, especially in a permanent income context, the following argument supports the cross-section proxy. The relevant compensating differential is that faced by the marginal worker. Consider a new employee unsure of how his own abilities will interact with the production process of the firm. Furthermore, he does not know if he will have competent supervision or materials that are easy to work with. For such an employee the perceived risk is well proxied by the existing dispersion of earnings in the firm. Finally, since new employees are more likely to have relatively short

planning horizons, critiques of this proxy based on a permanent income view are less worrisome.

D. Decomposition of the Effects of Incentive Payments on Employee Compensation

The analysis of the dispersion of earnings effects of incentive payments within detailed subsamples supports the dual hypothesis that $\text{Var}(W_i) > \text{Var}(W_t)$ and $W_i > W_t$. In Table 4, individual and firm-specific characteristics are presented to decompose the dual hypothesis for the two industries. The left hand side of Table 4 presents the frequency distribution ($\sigma W_i - \sigma W_t$) of log earnings for occupation, major product, method of production and regional subsamples. A compilation of significant differences is shown to the right of the frequency distribution for each category.

In the footwear industry, the dispersion hypothesis is confirmed for most categories at a magnitude of .05 to .10. Within 25 detailed occupational categories (see Table 8 for a list of occupations), no case exists where σW_t is significantly greater than σW_i , while 20 out of the 23 occupational groups with $\sigma W_i > \sigma W_t$ demonstrate significance at the 5 percent level. The incentive-dispersion hypothesis is also supported within major product groups (defined in Appendix A) and within broad geographic regions. Finally, within males, females, urban, and unionization categories, the differences in dispersion are significant, at least at a magnitude of .05.

Consistent with the aggregate statistics of Table 3, these results show that the difference in dispersion of earnings between incentive and time workers is narrower in men's and boys' suits and coats than it is in footwear. $\sigma W_i > \sigma W_t$ in only 11 of the detailed occupations compared to 20 in footwear.

In the remaining demographic categories, two exceptions are found. First, within the clothing union sector, $(\sigma W_i - \sigma W_t)$ is equal to 0.003 with an F-ratio of 1.018. The small difference indicates that the

incentive dispersion effect is not substantial among unionized workers. The second exception is in the male group, where $(\sigma W_i - \sigma W_t)$ is equal to $-.008$, with the F-ratio of $\sigma^2 W_t / \sigma^2 W_i = 1.06$. Thus, the dispersion hypothesis is not true among males in the clothing sample, although the reason for this is not clear. The occupational mix among males may be sufficiently different between incentive and time workers to overcome the incentive dispersion effect.

The right-hand portion of Table 4 analyzes the differences in the means of log earnings in a similar manner. The cross-tabulation analysis indicates that $W_i > W_t$ for almost every sub-category in both industries. This is consistent with the aggregate results in Table 3 which demonstrate a significant incentive-earnings effect.

In footwear there is no instance where $W_t > W_i$ in any category at the 5 percent level. Within occupational categories, 23 out of 25 detailed occupations have significantly higher incentive earnings. The usual difference in the mean of log hourly earnings ranges from 0.1 to 0.2 which is consistent with the 12 percent earnings effect found in the entire sample. Similar results are found within the major product, regional and demographic categories.

In men's and boys' suits and coats there are even stronger results. Within detailed occupations 22 out of 23 occupations contained significant positive incentive earnings effects. Within major product categories, only those time workers producing boys' separate tailored coats earn significantly more than incentive paid workers. Method of production, regional, and demographic categories all contain significant incentive earnings effects.

The hypotheses are further examined within firms that employ both wage payment systems. 291 out of 306 footwear establishments and 112 out of 228 men's clothing producers have dual payment systems. The dis-

Table 4.

DISPERSION AND EARNINGS EFFECTS WITHIN DETAILED SUBSAMPLES

Subgroup	#Groups	(OWTOWT)										5% F-test σ ₁ ² >σ ₂ ² ;σ ₁ ² >σ ₁ ²										5% t-test w ₁ >w _t ; w _t >w ₁										
		-.1-.05		-.05-0		0 0-.05		.05-.1		.1+		-1-0		0 0-.1		.1-.2		.2-.3		.3+												
Footwear																																
1. Occupation	25	0	2	0	0	3	11	9	20	0	2	0	3	11	8	1	1	23	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2. Major Product	14	0	0	0	0	0	12	2	14	0	0	1	5	6	1	1	1	13	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
3. Method of Production	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
4. Region	4	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	4	0	0	0	0	4	1	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
5. Union	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
6. Nonunion	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
7. Urban	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
8. Men	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
9. Women	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Men's and Boy's Suits and Coats																																
1. Occupation	23*	0	4	0	0	12	5	2	11	0	0	0	5	7	8	3	3	22	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2. Major Product	7*	0	1	0	0	5	1	0	6	0	0	1	2	3	0	0	4	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
3. Method of Production	5	0	0	0	0	4	1	0	5	0	0	0	1	2	2	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
4. Region	4	0	0	0	2	2	0	0	2	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
5. Union	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
6. Nonunion	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
7. Urban	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
8. Men	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
9. Women	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Men's and Boy's Suits and Coats

1. Occupation	23*	0	4	0	12	5	2	11	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2. Major Product	7*	0	1	0	5	1	0	6	0	0	0	0	1	2	3	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
3. Method of Production	5	0	0	0	4	1	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	0	2	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
4. Region	4	0	0	2	2	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
5. Union	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
6. Nonunion	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
7. Urban	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
8. Men	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
9. Women	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

*Groups without observations in both samples are included

persion in earnings is wider among incentive workers in 88 percent of the footwear firms and 51 percent of the men's clothing firms. These differences are significant in 81 percent and 40 percent of the firms, respectively. Time earnings are significantly more dispersed than incentive earnings in only 8 percent and 23 percent of the firms in each industry. The earnings hypothesis is supported strongly within firms as well. In footwear, 85 percent of the firms have higher mean-incentive earnings than mean-time earnings. In 73 percent of all firms, $W_i > W_t$ at the 5 percent level of significance while W_t is significantly greater than W_i in only 7 percent of the firms. In clothing, incentive earnings exceed time earnings in 80 percent of all cases; 58 percent of all firms have significantly higher incentive earnings while only 12 percent have significantly higher time earnings.

After examining the dual hypothesis at the occupational and firm levels through cross-tabulations, the final step is to look within occupations inside of firms. In most cases at this level of disaggregation, a cell is empty for one of the methods of payment.

In footwear 135 firms contain 190 occupations employing dual methods of wage payment. In 59 percent of these, $\sigma W_i > \sigma W_t$, and in 73 percent $W_i > W_t$. At the 5 percent level of significance, $W_i > W_t$ in 48 percent of the cells, while $W_t > W_i$ in 10 percent of the cases.

In men's clothing, 66 firms contain 123 occupations with both methods of wage payment. $\sigma W_i > \sigma W_t$ in 69 percent of the occupations, while $W_i > W_t$ in 83 percent. For the earnings effect, significance is reached in 68 percent of the cells for $W_i > W_t$, and 5 percent for $W_t > W_i$. These detailed cross-tabulations indicate additional support for both hypotheses.

E. Regression Analysis of Dispersion

Multiple regression analysis separates the variance in log earnings explained by the measured characteristics from the variation due to the residual. Variance can be created between the effects of the measured characteristics in two ways. First, if incentive workers had different characteristics than time workers, the variance and covariance of the characteristics would vary between the two samples which could result in different variances for W_i and W_t . Secondly, incentive systems could alter the effect that the measured characteristics have on the earnings of workers, thus affecting the variance. Additionally, incentive payments could alter the variance due to the residual. A complete exposition of the following method of dispersion analysis is presented by Freeman (1978) and is partially outlined here. Initially, separate earnings equations are estimated in the form:

$$(4.1) \quad \ln W^i = \hat{a}^i + \sum_T \hat{b}_j^i X_j^i + \hat{e}^i$$

$$(4.2) \quad \ln W^t = \hat{a}^t + \sum_T \hat{b}_j^t X_j^t + \hat{e}^t$$

where X_j is the j^{th} measured determinant of earnings with coefficient \hat{b}_j . Let i and t act as superscripts for the incentive and time sectors respectively. If the variance in earnings stems from the greater risk borne by incentive workers, as this hypothesis asserts, most of the differential variation should be found in the residual.

Table 5 presents the results for both industries. The first two columns list the mean and standard deviations of the explanatory variables for incentive and time workers for each industry. The dependent variable in each case is the log of hourly earnings. As expected, most of the difference in dispersion is found in the residual as measured by the standard error of estimate.

Table 5

REGRESSION ESTIMATES OF THE IMPACT OF INDIVIDUAL
CHARACTERISTICS ON LN HOURLY EARNINGS AND THE STANDARD ERROR
ESTIMATES AMONG PRODUCTION WORKERS BY METHOD OF PAYMENT

21

Explanatory Variables	Footwear				Men's and Boy's Suits and Coats			
	Mean + Standard Deviation Incentive Time		Dependent Variable Log Hourly Earnings Incentive Time		Mean + Standard Deviation Incentive Time		Dependent Variable Log Hourly Earnings Incentive Time	
1) Male	.29 (.45)	.43 (.49)	.113 (.003)	.105 (.002)	.16 (.36)	.43 (.49)	.190 (.005)	.166 (.006)
2) Union	.49 (.50)	.40 (.49)	.042 (.003)	.068 (.003)	.81 (.37)	.74 (.44)	.204 (.004)	.163 (.009)
3) Size of Firm (Log)	5.83 (.66)	5.73 (.82)	.017 (.002)	.043 (.002)	6.12 (.89)	5.41 (1.19)	.036 (.002)	.004 (.004)
4) Proportion of Supervisors in Firm	.06 (.04)	.07 (.04)	.491 (.026)	.773 (.029)	.07 (.04)	.08 (.06)	.576 (.038)	.595 (.057)
5) Urban	.37 (.48)	.52 (.50)	.061 (.003)	.004 (.003)	.76 (.42)	.76 (.43)	.026 (.004)	.080 (.009)
6) Occupational, Region, Product Dummies			40				35	
R ²			.230	.292			.337	.401
SEE			.239	.169			.248	.220

Table 6

ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECT OF DIFFERENT CHARACTERISTICS
ON THE DIFFERENCE IN THE STANDARD DEVIATION OF THE LN
OF HOURLY EARNINGS BETWEEN INCENTIVE AND TIME WORKERS

	Footwear	Men's and Boys' Clothing
1) Initial Difference in Stan. Dev.	.072	.022
2) Difference after Correcting for Different Characteristics.		
a) Using Incentive Wage Equation	.066	.044
b) Using Time Wage Equation	.063	.042
3) Difference due to Different Equations		
a) Incentive Characteristics as Weights	.013	.038
b) Time Characteristics as Weights	.001	.029
4) Difference due to Different Residuals	.070	.028

line 1: See Table 3.

line 2: From equation 4.3.

line 3a: $\sum_j (\hat{b}^i)^2 \sigma^2(x_j^i) + \sum_{jk} \hat{b}_j^i \hat{b}_k^i \sigma(x_j^i x_k^i) - [\sum_j (\hat{b}^t)^2 \sigma^2(x_j^t) + \sum_{jk} \hat{b}_j^t \hat{b}_k^t \sigma(x_j^t x_k^t)]$

line 3b: Substitute t for i. and i for t in line 3a.

line 4: See Table 5.

It is then possible to examine whether the difference in dispersion is due to heterogeneity by estimating the variance that would exist if incentive workers had the characteristics of time workers, and conversely. This can be done by substituting the variance/covariance of the X's of one group for those of the other. Formally, the difference in variation of earnings due to the difference in the characteristics of the samples is shown by:

$$(4.3) \quad \sum_j (\hat{b}_j)^2 (\sigma^2(X_j^i) - \sigma^2(X_j^t) + \sum_j \sum_k \hat{b}_j \hat{b}_k \sigma(X_j^i X_k^i) - \sigma(X_j^t X_k^t))$$

with the \hat{b} 's taken consistently from either (4.1) or (4.2).

These calculations are presented in Table 6. Line 1 repeats the observed difference in variation found in Table 3. Line 2a provides $(\sigma W_i - \sigma W_t)$ with incentive characteristics, while line 2b provides the same differential assuming the workers exhibit the time characteristics. The results are quite significant. In footwear, the difference in $(\sigma W_i - \sigma W_t)$ drops slightly from that observed in the aggregate (.072) to either .066 or .063. In men's clothing, $(\sigma W_i - \sigma W_t)$ rises from an observed .022 to either .042 or .044 after adjustments. In both industries the differences remain significant. What is most interesting is that the greater dispersion in the characteristics of time workers was actually masking the incentive dispersion effect in the mens' clothing industry.

After controlling for heterogeneity, it is possible to examine whether the incentive effect operates through the measured characteristics or the residual. The magnitude of the incentive effect on variation caused by measured characteristics, controlling for differences in the variance/covariance of the characteristics of the two samples, is found by comparing the variation in earnings explained by the incentive wage equation

with incentive characteristics to the variation in earnings explained by the time equation with incentive characteristics, as reported in line 3a. The difference in the standard deviation of log earnings is .013 in footwear and .038 in mens' clothing. Line 3b presents the differences using time characteristics, .001 and .029, respectively. In both industries, the estimated difference due to a difference in the effect of the regression coefficients is larger for the incentive characteristics. Overall, these results demonstrate that incentives operate to increase dispersion by augmenting the coefficients of the measured characteristics.

Finally, line 4 isolates the effect of incentives on the residual. In footwear, the impact through the residual dwarfs the effect through measured characteristics, while in men's and boys' clothing they are evenly split. This suggests that the cause of the incentive dispersion effect varies between industries.

F. Regression Analysis of the Earnings Effect

In this section, a standard earnings function is estimated with the addition of an incentive variable to capture the effect of incentives on earnings.

Let I be a dichotomous variable indicating the existence of incentive payment with coefficient \hat{b}_1 . Let X_j denote the j^{th} determinant of log earnings (W), with coefficient \hat{b}_j , $j = 2, j$, with residual \hat{e} . This yields a simple regression equation:

$$(4.4) \quad \ln W = \hat{a} + b_1 I + \sum_j \hat{b}_j X_j + \hat{e}$$

Table 7 presents the regression analysis of this equation for footwear and men's and boys' suits and coats. Control variables are employed similar to those used in the preceding analysis of dispersion. For footwear, two separate equations are reported due to the large size of the undifferentiated occupational category. Thus, column (1A) reports

regression results for the entire sample, while column (1B) only includes those workers who are in the detailed occupational categories.

The results are as expected, demonstrating a strong incentive earnings effect even with extensive regional, occupational, and production dummy control variables. In the entire sample of footwear production workers, the incentive earnings effect is 13.2 percent. Within men's and boys' suits and coats, the effect is 14.5 percent. Both effects are statistically significant. On the whole, the results are insensitive to changes in the specification of dummy control groups, including the deletion of the undifferentiated occupational group as shown in column (1B). As might be expected, the R^2 increases from .257 to .311, since the sample no longer contains a large, diverse, occupational group. The incentive coefficient in the reduced footwear sample rises to .171. This refutes the argument that the incentive effect is correlated with omitted occupational dummies in equation 1A.

Overall, these regressions¹⁵ show that $W_i > W_t$ by nearly 14 percent in both industries. The belief in the incentive effect would be strengthened if it were larger for those tasks where effort is likely to have a larger effect on output and thus earnings. Therefore, all else equal, it is expected that those occupations that require skill, especially in the form of speed, and those that are not machine paced, are more likely to contain an incentive effect of large magnitude.

This hypothesis is examined by interacting incentive wage payment with occupational categories. Let \hat{c}_k be the coefficient for the k^{th} occupational group and \hat{d}_k be the coefficient of the interaction between incentives and the k^{th} occupation; (4.4) becomes:

$$(4.5) \quad \ln W = \hat{a} + \hat{b}_1 I + \sum_k \hat{c}_k O_k + \sum_k \hat{d}_k O_k I + \sum_j \hat{b}_j X_j + \hat{e}$$

REGRESSION ESTIMATES OF THE EFFECT
OF INCENTIVE PAYMENTS ON LOG HOURLY EARNINGS

COEFFICIENT (STANDARD ERROR) AND NUMBER OF DUMMIES

<u>Explanatory Variables</u>	<u>Footwear</u> ¹		<u>Men's and Boy's Suits and Coats</u>
	(1A)	(1B)	(2)
1. Incentive	.132(.002)	.171(.005)	.145(.003)
2. Union	.047(.002)	.058(.003)	.195(.004)
3. Male	.118(.002)	.134(.004)	.188(.004)
4. Ln (Size)	.027(.001)	.006(.002)	.030(.002)
5. SMSA	.046(.002)	.042(.003)	.027(.004)
6. Proportion of Supervisors	.581(.021)	.348(.034)	.614(.031)
7. Proportion covered by minimum and maximum rates	.002(.002)	-.004(.005)	.009(.003)
8. Proportion of men per firm	.027(.008)	.033(.013)	-
9. Regions	3	3	3
10. Occupations	24	23	24
11. Major Product	13	13	7
12. Method of Production	-	-	4
<hr/>			
13. N(Observations)	79425	30891	42252
14. Dependent variable log earnings mean (S.D.)	1.06(.261)	1.11(.279)	1.34(.305)
15. R ²	.257	.311	.355
16. SEE	.225	.232	.245

¹

(1B) - excludes all workers not employed in a selected occupation as determined by the B.L.S.

The incentive-earnings effect in occupation k is equal to $(\hat{b}_1 + \hat{d}_k)$.

Table 8 ranks the occupations of each industry on this basis. In both industries, it appears that the incentive-earnings effect is greatest in those occupations where effort should matter the most.

In footwear, those occupations involving greater skill and relying on manual as opposed to machine labor, enjoy the largest incentive effects. For example, edge setters and trimmers who exhibit a 31 percent differential are primarily engaged in "shaping and polishing the edge of the sole of the shoe by holding it against the hot iron of the edge setting machine".¹⁶ Treers, (30 percent), "clean and finish shoes by removing spots and discolorations and rub uppers with hot irons to smooth wrinkles". Whole shoe cutters, hand, (26 percent), "cut vamps and uppers of shoes from skins or hides with a hand knife".

Those occupations with little incentive differential include heel seat attachers-machine (9 percent), who "operate a machine to cut out a piece around the outer margin of the heel seat; and nail heels to shoes by machine". Platform cover lasters actually have a negative incentive effect (-3 percent) for a task consisting of operating a machine to smooth platform covers or wrappers around the platform.

In men's and boys' suits and coats the ranking of the incentive differential yields similar observations. Packers (40 percent) "place finished garments in shipping containers and seal the containers". Pressers (32 percent) "perform the final pressing operations by means of hand pressing irons or pressing machines". A sewer, hand (28 percent), "performs various finishing sewing operations by hand such as stitching edges". There are some exceptions. Janitors, for example, have a relatively large incentive premium (25 percent) in clothing, though they command only 9 percent in footwear.

Decomposition of Incentive Effects
By Occupational Categories

<u>Footwear</u>		<u>Men's and Boy's Suits and Coats</u>	
<u>Occupation</u>	<u>%Incentive-earnings Effect</u>	<u>Occupation</u>	<u>%Incentive Effect</u>
1) Edge trimmers and setters	31%	1) Packers	40%
2) Treers	30	2) Underpressers	32
3) Sewers (hand)	29	3) Pressers	32
4) Assemblers for pullover	27	4) Stock clerks	31
5) Cutters whole shoe (hand)	26	5) Sewers, hand	28
6) Repairers	23	6) Lasters and collar setters (hand)	26
7) Cutters whole shoe (machine)	23	7) Fitters	25
8) Cutters lining (machine)	21	8) Janitors	25
9) Shankers, vulcanizers sole attachers	21	9) Thread trimmers and basting pullers	19
10) Inseamers, jointers	20	10) Sewing machine operators, coats	16
11) Pulling and lasting machines	18	11) Cutters and markers	16
12) Bottom scourers	18	12) Shapers	13
13) Roughers and rounders	16	13) Sewing machine operators, trousers	13
14) Pasters and skivers	15	14) Work distributors	12
15) Stitchers	13	15) Non-classified	12
16) Thread lasters	13	16) Finishers, hand	12
17) Top stitchers and vampers	13	17) Spreaders	11
18) Heal, seat and toe lasters	13	18) Inspectors	11
19) Slipstitchers	13	19) Pairers and turners	11
20) Fancy Stitchers	13	20) Cutters, lining	10
21) Non-classified	13	21) Cutters, cloth	8
22) Heal seat attachers	9	22) Buttonhole and button sewers, hand	8
23) Floor boys, janitors, inspectors, mechanics	9	23) Markers	6
24) Bed machine operators	5	24) Repairman	5
25) Platform cover lasters	-3	25) Tailors	4

So far the analysis of the incentive earnings effect has controlled for diverse individual and occupational characteristics. A further question can be examined: does the incentive effect operate on individuals, or are certain firms, those predominantly utilizing incentive payments, more likely to remunerate at a higher level?

The ideal way to control for firm effects would be to utilize firm dummies. Let \hat{f}_k represent the coefficient on the k^{th} firm F . Equation (4.4) would then resemble:

$$(4.6) \quad \ln(W) = \hat{a} + \hat{b}_1 I + \sum_j \hat{b}_j X_j + \sum_k \hat{f}_k F + \hat{e}$$

It is, of course, impractical to include over 200 firm dummies in a regression estimation. An alternative will yield an unbiased estimate of b_1 controlling for the firm effects. The technique consists of subtracting from each individual variable the mean of the firm for that variable.

$$(4.7) \quad \ln(W) = \hat{a} + \hat{b}_1 (I_i - \bar{I}) + \sum_j \hat{b}_j (X_{ij} - \bar{X}) + \hat{e}$$

In footwear, the coefficient for intra-firm incentive payments is .129 which closely compares to the coefficient of .132 found in the regression results of Table 7. For men's clothing, the intra-firm effect is .154 while the preliminary least squares coefficient is .146. Therefore, controlling for firm effects does not significantly alter the magnitude of the incentive effect. The conclusion is that the incentive-earnings effect operates within firms in about the same fashion that it operates between firms. Furthermore, as discussed at the end of Section III, the absence of a decrease in the incentive-earnings effect at successive levels of disaggregation provides support for the incentive-earnings

hypothesis when contrasted with an individual self-selection theory.

G. Decomposition of the Incentive-Earnings Effect

The model in Section II decomposes the incentive-earnings effect into two parts: a compensating differential due to risk and an effort effect where:

$$(4.8) \quad \ln(W_i) - \ln(W_t) = (c/a)\ln(\sigma_0^2) + (b/a)\{\ln(e_m - 1) - \ln(e_m - e_i)\}$$

The decomposition of the earnings premium relies on the use of within-firm variance in earnings as a proxy for the true σ_0^2 faced by individuals.

Further, in an effort to control for the variance in occupation and ability, etc., that exists within firms, $\ln(\sigma_i^2) - \ln(\sigma_t^2)$ is employed as a proxy for the variance due to risk alone. Thus, to test the effect of risk on earnings, the mean earnings premium for each firm is regressed on the difference in variance for that firm:

$$(4.9) \quad E(\ln W_i - \ln W_t) = \hat{a} + \hat{b} (\ln(\sigma_i^2) - \ln(\sigma_t^2)) + \hat{e}$$

In footwear, only 3.3 percent of the incentive earnings premium is a result of the greater variance in earnings, while 6.0 percent of the premium in clothing is explained by the compensating differential hypothesis. In both industries the coefficient of the variance term was significant with the expected sign. The failure of the compensating differential hypothesis to explain a large share of the earnings premium supports a view that much of the premium is due to increased effort by incentive workers. Such a view should be tempered with an understanding that other factors, unrelated to effort, are also captured by the residual.

In each industry, (4.9) was tested separately for each of 11 occupation subgroups, as shown in Table 9. The results are largely consistent

with the industry-wide estimations. The major exception is that, in

both industries, the premium due to risk ranged from 25 to 50 percent in some occupational categories. It is possible that the true compensation due to risk is better captured at decreasing levels of aggregation.

The dominance of the effort earnings hypothesis is consistent with a view that the primary difference between time and incentive payment is the motivational force of incentives which dominates the compensation due to the disutility of risk. Two factors may have reduced the observed compensating differential. First, many firms provide minimum wage guarantees¹⁸ to their employees in both industries. Additionally, the minimum wage laws create a floor for many footwear employees. The impact is a reduction in risk to the worker with a concomitant reduction in compensation for such risk. Second, the inadequacy of cross-section data in capturing variation due to risk may result in the bulk of the differential being found in the residual.

Table 9

	<u>Footwear</u>	<u>Men's and Boys' Suits and Coats</u>
Total Occupations	11	11
$\hat{b} > 0$	11 (7*)	10 (6*)
$\hat{b} < 0$	0	1 (0*)
$0 < \bar{R}^2 \leq .1$	7	9
$.1 < \bar{R} < .3$	1	0
$.3 < \bar{R}$	3	2

(*) Significant at 5% level

IV. Conclusions and Future Implications

The preceding empirical analysis of two 'four-digit' manufacturing industries confirms the theoretical hypothesis that incentive workers experience higher, more dispersed earnings than time workers. The greater the dispersion of incentive earnings is observed controlling for heterogeneity in the labor force between the two sectors. A positive incentive-earnings effect of approximately 14 percent exists both within and between firms, controlling for detailed occupational categories. It is suggested that the incentive-earnings effect is in part a compensating differential for the greater risk borne by piece rate workers and is in part a pure effort effect.

Since 25 percent of manufacturing employees receive some form of incentive compensation, the strong incentive-earnings effect suggests that method of wage payment should be included in analyses of earnings whenever possible. Studies of sex and race discrimination as well as the analysis of the union earnings effect could make use of this additional structural parameter.

Ultimately, the greatest potential for incentive data is in the study of determinants of productivity. By its very nature, incentive earnings information yields a measure of individual output. An ideal data set would include both the individual's hourly earnings and a description of his piecerate or bonus plan. With this information, individual productivity could be compared and analyzed without complete reliance on the qualitative evaluations of supervisory personnel.

Appendix A

Major Products and Methods of Production

Code

Footwear - Major Products

Men's Goodyear-welt dress shoes	1
Men's Goodyear-welt work shoes	2
Men's cement-process shoes	3
Women's cement-process, conventional-lasting shoes	4
Women's cement-process, slip-lasting shoes	5
Women's Goodyear-welt shoes	6
Women's Littleway shoes	7
Misses' and Children's cement process, conventional lasting	8
Misses' and Children's Goodyear-welt shoes	9
Misses', Children's and infants' stitchdown shoes	10
Leather footwear with vulcanized sole	11
Leather footwear with injection molded sole	12
Moccasins	13
Other	14

Men's and Boys' Suits and Coats - Major Products

Men's suits	1
Men's Separate Tailored Coats	2
Men's Overcoats	3
Boy's Suits	4
Boy's Separate Tailored Coats	5
Boy's Overcoats	6
Uniforms (non-athletic)	7
Suit vests	8
Other	9

Men's and Boys' Suits and Coats - Method of Production

Regular shop	1
Regular shop, cutting done elsewhere	2
Regular shop, sewing done elsewhere	3
Cutting shop	4
Contract shop	5

FOOTNOTES

1. See Marriott, Mangum, Bush, Cox, Pencavel, and Kennedy among others.
2. Mangum, p.84.
3. σ in $W_i = .188$; σ in $W_t = .107$.
4. This is based on 1945 B.L.S. surveys of 56 manufacturing industries. Similar magnitudes were found in 8 non-manufacturing industries.
5. Cox, p.54, proportion incentive.
6. U.S. Commerce Department, Census of Agriculture, Volume II, 1959, p.304.
7. The major exception is basic iron and steel which employs group bonuses in addition to a guaranteed hourly additive.
8. Bush, p.75.
9. Cox, p.53.
10. See Mangum, p.176; Kennedy, p.118 and Section IV.
11. Of course, this is a simplified model which assumes all incentive systems to be homogenous. Van Dusen Kennedy had isolated 25 major forms of incentive plans by 1945, including those with bonuses, minimum guarantees, and maximum ceilings. In each case, the wage specification in (2.2) must be altered to reflect the idiosyncracies of the specific plan.
12. Summaries and tabulations of these studies are found in B.L.S., bulletins 1946 and 1962, respectively. In each case, the Bureau studies over 70 percent of the eligible firms containing over 80 percent of eligible workers. There is a sample selection bias favoring large firms. Controlling for the number of production workers per firm should help account for this bias.
13. Freeman, p.23.
14. See Atkinson and a discussion by Freeman.
15. (4.4) uses in hourly earnings for the individual earnings analysis. Data on fringe benefits exist for each firm, and a ln total compensation variable was constructed for inter-firm analysis. The incentive effect is .163 in footwear and .135 in clothing, for total compensation.
16. B.L.S. job descriptions are excerpted.
17. A further test of the compensatory differential hypothesis consists of regressing $\ln W_i$ on $\ln \sigma_{ei}^2$ without standardizing for W_t or σ_t^2 . In both industries, the coefficient on σ_i^2 is positive and significant in every occupational category.
18. This information is based on discussions with employers and union officials.

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