TY  - JOUR
AU  - Kunreuther,Howard
AU  - Silvasi,Gabriel
AU  - Bradlow,Eric T.
AU  - Small,Dylan
TI  - Deterministic and Stochastic Prisoner's Dilemma Games: Experiments in Interdependent Security
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Technical Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 341
PY  - 2007
Y2  - August 2007
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/t0341
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/t0341.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Howard Kunreuther
Operations and Information Management
The Wharton School
University of Pennsylvania
3730 Walnut Street, 500 JMHH
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6366
Tel: 215/898-4589
Fax: 215/573-2130
E-Mail: kunreuther@wharton.upenn.edu

Gabriel Silvasi
The Wharton School
University of Pennsylvania
3730 Walnut Street, 500 JHMM
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6366
E-Mail: silvasig@wharton.upenn.edu

Eric T. Bradlow
The Wharton School
University of Pennsylvania
3730 Walnut Street, 761 JMHH
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6366
E-Mail: ebradlow@wharton.upenn.edu

Dylan Small
The Wharton School
University of Pennsylvania
3730 Walnut Street, 464 JMHH
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6366
E-Mail: dsmall@wharton.upenn.edu
AB  - This paper examines experiments on interdependent security prisoner's dilemma games with repeated play.  By utilizing a Bayesian hierarchical model, we examine how subjects make investment decisions as a function of their previous experience and their treatment condition.  Our main findings are that individuals have differing underlying propensities to invest that vary across time, are affected by both the stochastic nature of the game and even more so by an individual's ability to learn about his or her counterpart's choices.  Implications for individual decisions and the likely play of a person's counterpart are discussed in detail.
ER  -