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MODELING COMPLEX DYNAMIC INTERACTIONS: THE ROLE OF INTERGENERATIONAL, COHORT, AND PERIOD PROCESSES AND OF CONDITIONAL EVENTS IN THE POLITICAL REALIGNMENT OF THE 1850s

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ABSTRACT

The aim of this paper is to break open the stochastic component of a major political change and to show that what seems like the product of purely chance events is the particular conjunction of processes, each of which is definable in a systematic way, that provide collectively a favorable context in which purely chance events operate. It is only in a particular context that the purely chance events became decisive in bringing about a particular political outcome. Section 1 emphasizes that Lincoln's margin of victory in 1860 was so small that any one of numerous chance events could have resulted in his defeat. Sections 2-4 outline the intergenerational, cohort, and period changes and events that created a context favorable for the political realignment of the 1850s. Section 5 describes the key chance events of 1855-1856, the absence of any of which could have prevented the formation of a major national Republican party in 1856, as well as the chance (or at least exogenous) events of 1857-1859, the absence of which could have led to splits in the Republican party that would have insured the victory of a proslavery candidate for the Presidency in 1860. Section 6 deals with the problems and advantages of turning the theory of the political realignment of the 1850s implicit in sections 2-5 into an explicit, testable mathematical model. Section 7 explains why it is impossible to produce a general theory of political realignments that would have significant predictive power.

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Much of Without Consent or Contract is concerned with the way that the victorious antislavery coalition of the 1850s came into being. The explanation put forward in that volume may be briefly summarized as follows: The coalition was the product of a cohort of religious radicals spawned by the Second Great Awakening. Their mysticism gave them the strength to reject the dominant ideology of their age and the fortitude to wage an unremitting, life-long struggle against odds that would have been daunting to any other group. Among their number were a handful of exceedingly talented politicians who had mastered the politics of their age. Their brilliant exploitation of the political opportunities of the next 30 years enabled them to change the political agenda on which the second party system had been constructed, and to build a winning political coalition on an antislavery program.

I have divided the various factors that contributed to the political realignment of the 1850s into four categories: intergenerational changes, which operated in the domains of demography, theology, and culture; cohort changes, which operated in the domains of ideology, political agendas, and politically destabilizing economic and institutional transformations; period changes, which were relatively short-term events such as business cycles and migration cycles; and conditional events which are purely chance occurrences, usually of short duration (generally occupying only a small fraction of a period) but which, in a particular context, have a critical influence. This paper is aimed at showing how these factors, changing at different rates and related to each other in complex ways, came together at a particular moment to make the victory of the

antislavery coalition possible.

The aim of this paper, then, is to break open the stochastic component of a major political change and to show that what seems like the product of purely chance events is the particular conjunction of processes, each of which is definable in a systematic way, that provide collectively a favorable context in which purely chance events operate. It is only in a particular context that the purely chance events became decisive in bringing about a particular political outcome.

The balance of this paper is divided into seven sections. Section 1 emphasizes that Lincoln's margin of victory in 1860 was so small that any one of numerous chance events could have resulted in his defeat. Sections 2-4 outline the intergenerational, cohort, and period changes and events that created a context favorable for the political realignment of the 1850s. Section 5 describes the key chance events of 1855-1856, the absence of any of which could have prevented the formation of a major national Republican party in 1856, as well as the chance (or at least exogenous) events of 1857-1859, the absence of which could have led to splits in the Republican party that would have insured the victory of a proslavery candidate for the Presidency in 1860. Section 6 deals with the problems and advantages of turning the theory of the political realignment of the 1850s implicit in sections 2-5 into an explicit, testable mathematical model. Section 7 explains why it is impossible to produce a general theory of political realignments that would have significant predictive power.

1. Conditional Events and Their Context

The breakup of the second American party system and the political realignment of the 1850s was the product of a series of specific conditional

events that occurred in a particular context. These conditional events included both occurrences that extended over a few years (such as cholera and other urban epidemics of the early 1850s) and incidents that were ephemeral both in the sense that they lasted only for short periods and that their direct impact on political behavior was relatively short lived (such as the caning of Charles Sumner, the Sack of Lawrence, and James Buchanan's veto of the Homestead Act). However, the political significance of these events was determined by the context in which they occurred. In another context they might not have occurred; or if they had occurred, their political significance might have been much different than they actually were.

It seems correct to emphasize the key role of ephemeral events because the net shift in Northern voters from the Whigs and Free Soilers in the election of 1852 to the Republicans in 1860 was very small. The Republican share of the Northern vote in 1860 was 51.9 percent, or just 1.7 percent greater than the Whig/Free Soil share in 1852 (see Table 1). Indeed, the margin of Lincoln's victory in 1860 was even narrower than the preceding figures suggest. A shift of just 25,069 votes from Abraham Lincoln to Stephen A. Douglas in New York or an even smaller shift of 18,234 votes in four other states (California, Illinois, Indiana, and New Jersey) would have thrown the vote into Congress where either Douglas or Breckinridge, the candidate of the slaveowning Southerners, would have been elected. Quite clearly, such small shifts in the electorate (hardly one-half of one percent) could have been brought about by numerous minor events of no particular political importance (except in their collective result) and that would have been buried in an avalanche of "more fundamental" explanations for Lincoln's defeat, if Lincoln had lost the election (Fogel 1989, 382).

It would, however, be a serious mistake to gauge the extent of the

Table 1

The Whig/Free Soil and Republican Share of the Northern Vote in the Presidential Elections of 1852 and 1860

Regions	Whig/Free Soil Percentage of the Vote in 1852	Republican Percentage of the Vote in 1860
New England	55.8	61.9
Middle Atlantic	49.1	54.1
Middle West	49.4	48.9
Far West	46.1	33.3
North	50.2	51.9

Sources and notes: The source is Fogel, Galantine, and Manning 1990, #69, Table 69.1. The regions are defined as follows:

NE: ME, NH, VT, MA, RI, CT
MA: NY, NJ, PA
MW: OH, MI, IN, IL, WI, IA, MO, MN
FW: CA, OR

political realignment of the 1850s by the small increase in the Republican (Whig/Free Soil) share of the popular vote between 1852 and 1860. Lurking behind this small shift in voter margins are three big and far-reaching changes. The first is a major change in the political constituencies of the Whig/Republican party and of the Democratic party. The second is the drastic change in the political agendas of these major political formations. The third is the replacement of the old nationalistic Whig leadership by a sectionalistic Republican leadership. Before considering these changes in greater detail, it is first necessary to consider the context within which these changes came about. This context was determined largely by complex interactions between intergenerational, cohort, and period processes.

2. Intergenerational Processes: The Development and Spread of Yankee Culture

By Yankee culture, I mean the culture that evolved in New England and its diaspora between 1630 and 1820. During these six generations New England (which experienced a considerable degree of political, religious, and cultural autonomy, and which was largely free of intrusions from outsiders) produced a reasonably well-defined Yankee culture and a fairly cohesive society. To say that this culture was "well-defined" and "cohesive" is not to suggest either that the culture was static or that it was embraced by all those who lived in New England and its diaspora. New England's religion, commerce, politics, and its other institutions and ideas evolved continuously, so much so that the Puritans of the 1630s and 1640s would surely have condemned the "New Divinity" of the 1820s. Yet whatever the differences within the Puritan tradition as it evolved, and between the seventeenth, eighteenth, and early nineteenth century manifestations of this tradition, the common features remain marked. Moreover, representatives

of the evolving Puritan tradition were at the center of New England's economic and political life during these six generations and deeply influenced it, even if they did not always dominate it.[1]

Many of the changes made the Yankee culture of the 1850s more suitable to the emergence of antislavery politics than the original Puritan culture would have been. Yet what was retained or carried over from Puritan culture was as important as the changes in creating the context for the political realignment of the 1850s. Chief among these persistent features is the strength of elitism in New England culture: the belief that a righteous minority, endowed with saving grace and steeped in education, understood God's will and had the obligation to bring His word to the unregenerate masses. A second persistent feature was the zealous dedication of this elite to their creed, a zealousness that revealed itself not only in strenuous self-analysis and unrelenting search of conscience, but in a determination to combat sin everywhere in the communities in which it became manifest. Another point of continuity was the determination to mobilize the power of the state for the service of God, originally by limitation of the electorate to the members of the Church, later on by mobilizing the electorate behind righteous policies and candidates. Yankee culture also retained the Puritan belief that New Englanders were a chosen people, brought to America to build a perfect church and a perfect society as preparation for the millennium, and that the struggle for perfection, individually and collectively, was the central task of their social order. Still another point of continuity was the determination to protect the vulnerable Yankee social order from contamination by corrupt external cultures and heretical philosophies spawned within their midst.

The gradual abandonment of the doctrine of predestination, more than any

other change in Yankee culture, facilitated the rise of antislavery politics and created a favorable context for the political realignment of the 1850s. This change in doctrine not only opened the Congregational and Presbyterian churches to many previously excluded from them, but elevated the ethic of benevolence to the center of the struggle for salvation.

So far I have focused on how both the persistent and the new aspects of New England theology contributed to the intellectual and cultural context for the political realignment of the 1850s. There is still the issue of how Yankee theology and culture became so influential throughout the entire North. The answer lies not in the power of Yankee clergymen to convert members of other religions to their creed but in demography--in the vital rates of those under the sway of Yankee theology. Not only were birth rates very high in New England during the eighteenth century, but mortality rates were exceedingly low by the standards of time, due in part to the high protein diet and the low density of the population (Fogel 1986). The life expectation that prevailed in New England between 1750 and 1820 would not again be achieved until the 1930s. The consequence was a rate of natural increase so rapid that in the absence of outmigration, New England's population would have multiplied by about twelvefold during these seven decades. The crowding of New England and the rise in land values spurred the exodus that prevented New England's garden from being turned into a Malthusian hell. Yankees swarmed into the western frontiers at the call of land companies set up in the Northern portions of New York, Pennsylvania, and Ohio, and later into Michigan, Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, and Wisconsin.

So by 1820 Yankees and their descendants, who accounted for hardly 5 percent of all the immigrants before that year, represented over 80 percent of the Northern population.[2] At first this vast exodus out of Southern New England

threatened to estrange the migrants from their Yankee cultural heritage. Out of reach of the established churches, many of them degenerated into lapsed Christians, baptized but no longer attending church or practicing religion at home. To overcome this grave threat, the Congregational and Presbyterian churches agreed to a "Plan of Union" in 1801 aimed at providing an effective ministerial response. Under this program thousands of clergy and lay missionaries were recruited to go forth as itinerant ministers serving far-flung congregations in the frontier areas.

3. Cohort Processes: Religious Ultraism, the Abolitionist Crusade, the New Migration, Overrapid Urbanization, and Changing Political Agendas

The Second Great Awakening is the name of the religious revival movement that swept the United States during the first half of the nineteenth century.[3] In the South the movement was characterized by the evangelical camp meeting, which sometimes attracted tens of thousands of rural folk to a "sacramental occasion" that moved hearers to "overpowering emotions" and often led to "seizures, convulsions and uncontrollable weeping."

The New England version of the Great Awakening was initially much more sedate and intellectual, less personal, less emotional, and less inwardly oriented. By the late 1820s, however, the revivalist movement promoted by the Congressionalists and Presbyterians began to rival the powerful emotional appeal of the Southern camp meetings.

The overarching figure in this phase of the Northern movement who, more than any other evangelical, "incarnated the aspiration and the philosophy of the revival" was Charles Grandison Finney. Finney was more than a charismatic figure. He projected a new conception of revivals, denying their miraculous nature, contending that success in conversions depended purely on the use of

proper methods and that anyone using them could obtain the desired results. His new methods included directions for sermons that cultivated a taste for the sensational. Prayer ran all day and sometimes through the night. Women and men prayed in small circles for the conversion of particular individuals, unrepentant sinners were singled out, "prayers became high leverage presses for enforcing community opinion upon stubbornly impenitent consciences," and an "anxious bench" was set up in front of the congregation on which seekers of faith were seated. These were all devices for producing a community-wide anxiety over the spiritual state of its inhabitants with the aim of developing a new conviction.

To Finney, salvation required "that the reborn became totally unselfish or totally altruistic." Their spirit had to be that of the reformer: they were "committed to "the universal reformation of the world," to the "complete and final overthrow" of "war, slavery, licentiousness, and all such evils and abominations." Although he was far from a radical in either religion or politics, one of the consequences of his campaigns was the emergence of "increasingly radical religious beliefs" that became known as "religious ultraism" and which spread throughout the western regions that Finney and his "holy band" evangelized.

The Abolitionist Crusade

One of the ultraist groups precipitated by Finney and his "holy band" during the early 1830s was a new abolitionist movement. Led by fervent evangelicals, the new abolitionists were repelled by the gradualist, compromising approach that had characterized the older antislavery movement and by the failure of the older abolitionists to break with the way that the slavery issue had been framed during the American Revolution. To leaders of the American Revolution and other enlightened men of goodwill throughout the Western World, the slavery

issue posed a profound dilemma. The root of the dilemma was the rationalistic doctrine of natural rights which linked freedom and justice with the inviolability of property and which was the philosophical platform of the American Revolution.

The escape from the dilemma was led by activists in the Second Great Awakening, many of them members of Finney's holy band or wealthy supporters of his crusade, men and women who were convinced that they were divinely inspired. They rejected out of hand the proposition that material gain or any other worldly consideration could justify the degree of domination which slavery gave one group over another. They condemned slavery as an extraordinary sin, a sin so corrupting that persistence in it, or complicity with it, infected every aspect of life and created an insurmountable barrier to both personal and national salvation.

This phase of American abolitionism began as a theological rather than as a political movement. The new abolitionists were originally a small sect within the evangelical churches that had developed a novel theological position. Proclaiming that no matter how good the treatment, slaveholding in and of itself was sinful, they called on the churches to expel all slaveholders who would not repent. It was only when the leadership of the principal evangelical churches refused to accept their doctrine that the main body of abolitionist leaders decided to go over the heads of church hierarchies. So they founded a "Christian party," which they called the Liberty Party, on the sole issue of the abolition of slavery. It was through this party that they hoped to win public support, at least in the North, for their theology which was based on the principle of disinterested benevolence.

Their first appeal for public support was a dismal failure. In the

presidential election of 1840, the Liberty Party received just three-tenths of one percent of the vote. That election made it clear that the abolitionists were an isolated sect not only within the churches from which they sprung, but even more so with the public at large, and that they could not forge a winning political coalition on the pure doctrine.

There were four steps in the transformation of the antislavery creed into an effective secular appeal. The first was the development of an indictment of Southern morality and culture. When they originally started out, the abolitionists thought they could bring an end to slavery by winning the churches of the South to their theological position. To persuade slaveholders to repent, the leaders of the American Anti-Slavery Society (AASS) began to proselytize the South with what, in the literature, is called "the great postal campaign." The frenzy of the Southern backlash to this attempt convinced the abolitionists that the South was lost, that the immediate issue was no longer the freeing of the slaves, but preventing the North from being contaminated by the sin of slavery. So they issued their indictment of the South in order to shake up the North; to make the North realize that the South was a hell on earth and it was the hell that would befall them if the South were not isolated.

The nature of the indictment of the South was shaped by the response to the abolitionist appeal within the evangelical churches of the North. When the abolitionists called on the Northern Methodists, Baptists, Presbyterians, and Congregationals for official condemnation of slaveholding as a sin, the response, over and over again, was that it was only mistreatment of slaves that was a personal sin--that although slavery was social sin it became a personal sin only when masters abused their slaves. To counter that position, abolitionists argued that force was like alcohol: it was intoxicating. Anyone who was ensnared by

the desire for absolute power was bound to be brutal. Their elaboration of that theme went a long way toward transforming Northern perceptions of the South. The Southerners were brutal not only to slaves but to each other. Southerners were also an erotic people and a lazy people. They combined their lust for power with a passion for violence and for pagan pleasures.

The second step in the transformation of the abolitionist appeal was development of constitutional rationalizations for federal action against slavery. Beginning about 1844 some abolitionists tried to argue that the Constitution was really an antislavery document. However, William Lloyd Garrison and Wendell Phillips argued that the Constitution was saturated with the infection of slavery. So they called on the North to secede, to cease living under a constitution that bound Northerners legally to accept this morally corrupt system. Other abolitionists realized that they could not get elected by running against the Constitution. So they developed an argument that could win popular support for antislavery politics. They admitted the Constitution did enjoin the government from interfering in slavery in any way, but redefined the meaning of noninterference. Noninterference meant not only that the Federal government was prohibited from doing any injury to slavery, but also from doing anything to support it. Here was an argument that deftly shifted the onus of anti-Constitutionalism from the abolitionists to the slaveholders. It was not the abolitionists who were trying to undo the Constitution in order to get rid of slavery. It was the slaveowners who were undoing the Constitution by illegally using the federal government to protect and extend slavery.

From the constitutional argument the abolitionists went on to the theory of the "Slave Power" conspiracy. The "Slave Power" slogan implied not just the unconstitutional use of the federal government to protect and promote the interests of slaveowners, but a more far-reaching plot against American freedom,

that was aimed ultimately at the complete subjugation of free people. The plot was unfolding in a series of steps which began with the seizure of the federal government by slaveowners immediately after the ratification of the Constitution. It then progressed toward the suppression of the democratic rights of Northerners to free speech, free assembly, free press, and free elections. The final stage, some argued, would be the reduction of free whites to slavery--not a metaphoric slavery but a literal one. The foundation for the political conspiracy was the three-fifths clause of the Constitution which gave slaveholders political power far beyond their number. As a result the North had been reduced to the position of a "conquered province."

From the Slave Power conspiracy the abolitionists finally passed over to their most effective argument in the struggle to realign Northerners into a winning antislavery coalition: that was the charge that Northerners were victims of an economic conspiracy by the Slave Power, a conspiracy aimed at using the federal government to enhance the wealth of slaveowners at the expense of the farmers and workers of the North. With the political argument alone the abolitionists and their allies could not get, at their peak, more than 12 percent of the Northern vote. It was finally discovering an effective economic argument that permitted them to forge a winning antislavery coalition. Despite all of their rhetorical ingenuity, however, the economic arguments did not catch on in the North until 1854.

The Destablizing Effects of Massive Immigration

It has long been known that the Northern population grew very rapidly between 1820 and 1860 and that a vast upsurge in immigration played a major part in that process. However, the absence of data on place of birth in the censuses before 1850 and the failure of the published censuses of 1850 and 1860 to reveal

place of birth by age, sex, and occupation has made it difficult to unravel the independent contributions of immigration and natural increase to the growth of the labor force. The drawing of samples from the manuscript schedules of the 1860 census has clarified some issues. As it turns out, foreigners were 30 percent of the urban population (37 percent in cities with 10,000 or more persons), 41 percent of the nonagricultural adult male labor force of the North, and 55 percent of that labor force in the Northern cities of more than 10,000 persons. So foreign-born competition for jobs was much greater than is implied by the published census report that 18 percent of the Northern population was foreign-born.

There was also great variation in immigrant pressure on labor markets over time, because immigrants arrived in waves. The crest of the antebellum wave was reached in 1854, after which immigration rates declined sharply. The impact of these waves on labor markets is illustrated by New York City. In 1855 more than three-quarters of that city's labor force was foreign-born, but just five years later the foreign-born share had declined to 61 percent.

So the timing of immigration and the distribution of immigrants over space are very important for understanding the economic distress suffered by native Northern labor during the last two decades of the antebellum era, and of the political realignments stimulated by this distress. It is also important to differentiate between those new native entrants into both the labor force and the electorate who were children of recent immigrants (and hence, mostly Irish or German Catholics and German Lutherans) and children of native parents (largely Protestants of British descent).

The significance of these distinctions for the changing composition of the Northern male labor force between 1820 and 1860 is revealed by Table 2. Here,

persons and their descendants who entered the country up to 1820 are designated "Old Americans," while arrivals from 1820 and their descendants are designated "New Americans." Table 2 indicates that in the absence of migration the rate of natural increase of the Northern labor force during the antebellum era was about 2.8 percent per annum, which is a high rate of natural increase in the labor supply by current U.S. standards. The combination of exceptionally high immigration rates and high natural rates greatly increased the Northern competition for jobs. Between 1820 and 1860 the labor supply of New Americans increased at a rate of over 6 percent per annum, which nearly doubled the number of new jobs that had to be created in the North during the antebellum era. That rate was often too high to sustain, with the consequence that labor markets frequently became glutted.

The heavy influx of immigrants between 1820 and the early 1850s also had far reaching effects on the nature of the American electorate and on political alignments in the North. Table 3, which is based on a simulation model described elsewhere (Fogel, Galantine, and Manning 1990), presents estimates of the number of naturalized adult males and foreign-born voters at each presidential election between 1824 and 1860. The key feature of this table is the explosive addition of foreign-born voters between 1852 and 1860, a lagged consequence of the enormous expansion of immigration between 1846 and 1854. As a consequence, the share of Northern voters who were foreign-born rose from under 10 percent in 1840 to over 25 percent in 1860, with over two-thirds of the increase coming during the last 8 years of the antebellum era.

Table 3 does not reveal the full shift in the ethnic composition of the Northern electorate. It is necessary to distinguish not only between foreign-born and native voters but to distinguish among native voters. The native voters

Table 2

The Division of the White Male Labor Force of the North into "Old Americans" and "New Americans", 1820-1860 (in thousands)

Year	1 Male Old Americans	2 Northern Male Labor Force	3 Male New Americans	4 Column 3 as a % of Column 2
1. 1820	931	1,155	224	19.4
2. 1830	1,289	1,654	365	22.1
3. 1840	1,742	2,452	710	29.0
4. 1850	2,247	3,641	1,394	38.3
5. 1860	2,779	5,137	2,338	45.5

Notes and Sources: See Fogel, Galantine and Manning (1990), #60, especially Tables 60.5, 60.6, and 60.9.

Table 3
An Estimate of the Number of Foreign-Born Voters and Naturalized Adult Males at Each Presidential Election from 1824 to 1860, By Year of First Presidential Election Following Naturalization

First Presidential Election Following Naturalization	Number of Naturalized Males Age 21 or Older (in thousands)									
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
	1824	**1828**	**1832**	**1836**	**1840**	**1844**	**1848**	**1852**	**1856**	**1860**
1. 1820 or earlier	149	143	136	129	122	107	95	78	60	46
2. 1824	10	10	9	8	8	7	6	5	3	3
3. 1828		10	10	9	8	8	7	6	5	3
4. 1832			15	14	13	12	11	10	9	7
5. 1836				31	29	27	25	23	20	18
6. 1840					64	60	56	52	48	42
7. 1844						96	91	85	78	72
8. 1848							111	105	98	91
9. 1852								147	139	130
10. 1856									316	298
11. 1860										492
12. Total naturalized in all U.S.	159	163	170	191	244	317	402	511	776	1202
13. Total naturalized in North	137	140	147	165	210	273	346	440	669	1036
14. Estimated number of naturalized males who voted in North.	37	82	83	99	175	223	266	342	592	904

Sources: See entry #69 in Fogel, Galantine, and Manning (1990) for details on the construction of this table.

of native parents (i.e. third or greater generation Americans) probably voted much differently from immigrants (first generation) and their children (second generation). What is at issue is less a matter of the speed of acculturation as religious affiliations and ethnic origins. In the 1850s, third and greater generation whites in the North were overwhelmingly (93 percent) descended from British and other North European nationalities and were overwhelmingly reformed evangelical Protestants (Fogel et al. 1978; Gaustad 1962). Second-generation whites in the 1850s, however, were largely of Irish and German ancestry and were mainly Catholic and Lutheran.

The implications of these demographic changes for the political realignment of the 1850s are spelled out in Table 4, which presents estimates of the ethnic distribution of Northern voters for the Democrats in 1852 and 1860. It shows that the percentage of the Democratic vote that came from second generation voters remained constant while the percentage coming from "Old Americans" (third or greater generation) declined precipitously. In 1852 over 62 percent of the Democratic votes came from voters who were third generation or greater. By 1860 the votes that the Democrats received from these Old Americans had dwindled so much that they accounted for less than 40 percent of the party's support. While it is true that the Democratic party of the North continued to draw most of its votes from natives, about one-third of these natives were descended mainly from Irish and German stock and were religiously more Catholic and Lutheran than reformed evangelical. The Democratic party of the North had lost the contest for the allegiance of the Old Americans.

The Destabilizing Effects of Overrapid Urbanization

In the 1820s both the North and the South were agrarian societies with a white population overwhelmingly of British origin, and they were in the midst

Table 4

An Estimate of the Ethnic Composition of the Democratic Vote in 1852 and 1860

Ethnicity	1852		1860	
	Number (thousands) (1)	Percentage (2)	Number (thousands) (3)	Percentage (4)
1. Naturalized	207	17.3	620	39.1
2. Natives of Foreign-born parents	240	20.1	343	21.6
3. Natives of native parents	749	62.6	624	39.3
4. Totals	1,196	100.0	1,587	100.0

Sources: See entry #69 in Fogel, Galantine, and Manning (1990) for details on the construction of this table.

of an evangelical religious revival. North and South celebrated the countryside, preferring a society of farmers and merchants organized around villages and towns to a society based on manufacturing industries and organized around large cities. It was commonly argued that the countryside with its yeoman class "guaranteed the safety of property" and propagated "a due sense of independence, liberty, and justice." But large cities of "the European pattern" polarized society, creating both extreme "wealth and luxury" and extreme "misery and vice." Such cities bred an "alienated poor" who could be turned into mobs bent on the destruction of liberty and "well balanced government."

Altogether there were only 61 cities in 1820, and barely 7 percent of the entire population lived in them. Since the urban share of the population was slightly less in 1820 than in 1810, unchecked urban growth did not appear to be a menace. There were only six large cities in America at the time, if one defines "large" as 25,000 or more inhabitants, and half of these were in the South.

Although economic growth after 1820 did not change the fundamental relationship between the cities and the countryside in the South, the change in the Northern cities was a veritable revolution in culture. Not only did the urban population of the Northeast expand at an unprecedented rate during the last four decades of the antebellum era, but nearly half that population was concentrated in just two cities. By 1860 Philadelphia's population exceeded a half million and New York's was close to a million. Such large cities made possible or promoted certain elements of high culture--music, literature, and theater--and were showcases for some of the most spectacular aspects of the new technology of the age, especially in transportation, communication, and commerce.

Yet it was not the achievements of these and other large cities but the

severe new problems they posed that were foremost in American thought at the time. Philadelphia, New York, and other large cities were perceived as threats to social order; as breeders of disease, crime, violence, and moral decay; and as threats to American religious freedom and to popular democracy. Between 1790 and 1850 Northern life expectancies declined by 25 percent, and the decline in New York, Philadelphia, and other large cities was twice as great. Life expectancy at birth in New York and Philadelphia during the 1830s and 1840s averaged just 24 years, six years less than that of Southern slaves.

By the 1830s the deep poverty and class conflicts or urban life appeared as threatening to the stability of American society as to those of Europe. The vast new cities of the nation were plunged into a new kind of urban politics, which not only attracted professional politicians but created large new bureaucracies, required huge budgets, and provided new opportunities for personal enrichment. The struggle for control of these governments transformed local politics, bringing to the fore parties intent on repressing "the rabble," while other parties became the champions of "the rabble." The cities also became a focus of radical politics, both on the left and on the right, with new ideas of socialism introduced into American life by foreign immigrants, especially those from Great Britain and Germany.

It was not socialism, however, but ethnicity and religion that became the principal basis for urban politics in the late antebellum era. During the late 1830s and early 1840s nativist parties became powerful enough to contend for political control in the major cities of the Northeast. From the mid-1840s on in Philadelphia, Boston, and New York, ethnic politics became the foremost basis for the formation of coalitions and the fulcrum of the struggle for power. Although the principal leaders of the Whig and Democratic parties, at the national level as well as at local levels, initially sought to keep ethnic issues

out of national politics, just as they sought to avoid the slavery issue, they were ultimately unsuccessful. In both cases the issues bubbled up from below, and the failure of the leaders to adapt to them quickly enough ultimately led to the destruction of the second American party system.

4. Period Processes: The Hidden Depression of 1848-1855 and the Breakup of the Second American Party System

As I have already mentioned, despite all of their rhetorical skills, antislavery leaders were unable to make much of an impact on Northern politics with their economic attacks on slavery before 1854. In that year a sudden turn around was brought on by the "hidden depression" of 1848-1855 and the political revolt of Northern workers. While nearly all of the major economic interests of the North benefited from rapid economic growth during 1843-1857, there was one class, constituting about a sixth of the labor force, and representing about 25 percent of the Northern electorate, that experienced as severe a depression as any major section of the American population has ever experienced. That class was the native-born white artisans and the petty shopkeepers that served them. The source of their depression was a tremendous wave of immigration into the North during the decade ending in 1854. The total immigration during this decade exceeded the total population of nine of the 16 Northern states in 1850.

The immigrants piled mainly into the large Northern cities. Indeed, these cities became large because immigrants were piling into what a few years earlier had been small cities. This inflow created terrible excess supplies of labor, terrible downward pressure on real wages, and terrible deskilling. Although precise measurement of the combined effects of the various infringements on the real wages of native-born craftsmen must await the completion of research still in progress, the average decline between 1848 and 1855 was probably in the range

of 25 to 50 percent. In other words, native-born mechanics and tradesmen suffered one of the most severe economic disasters in American history, rivaling, if not exceeding, the economic blow suffered by urban labor during the Great Depression of the 1930s. In one respect, the "hidden" depression of the antebellum era was far worse than the visible depression of the 1930s. The economic disaster of the antebellum era coincided with a wave of devastating epidemics, which were particularly severe in the North and were closely related to the surge in immigration and the accelerated pace of urbanization that began in the 1820s.

Political Responses to Glutted Labor Markets

Native workers fought back against their immiseration in a variety of ways. One response was to organize strikes to protect their wages and to stave off the deskilling maneuvers of their employers. The peak of strike activity came during 1853-1854 when about 400 strikes were initiated, covering most of the major trades in cities throughout the North. Labor militancy spilled over into the political arena. One type of political action was the formation of single-issue organizations which pressed for relief from city councils and state legislatures.

The two major parties did not know how to cope with the political upsurge of the nativist workers. The Whig party could not respond because it was the party of the farmers, the landlords, the merchants, and the manufacturers, and all these classes benefitted from rapid urban growth. The Northern Democrats could not respond to the revolt of the nativist craftsmen because they were then what they are now: deeply rooted in the ethnic communities. So a spontaneous nativist political movement arose which broke away from the two major parties and then coalesced into a new party called the Know-Nothings. It was in this pool of nativist workers who were detached from their normal political

connections that the abolitionists fished. The abolitionists in the early 1850s were operating through Free Soil Party, a minor party, which on the eve of the Know-Nothing eruption, was at its lowest point since 1848.

One other critical point needs to be mentioned. From the early 1820s until 1853, the Democrats had been the principal promoters of a free land or cheap land policy on the part of the Federal government, while Whigs were the principal opponents of this policy. In the 32nd Congress (1853-1854) the Democrats from the South Atlantic states suddenly switched from their position in the previous Congress where they voted nine to one for cheap land, to nine to one against it. The sudden turn in the position of the Southern Democrats did not result from a crisis in the Southern economy. The stimulus was purely political. They saw the "hordes" of foreigners who were pouring into the North as an immediate threat to the Southern grip on the federal government, because the foreign-born population and their underaged children added to the Congressional contingent and the electoral count of the North.

That switch hit the left wing of Northern Democrats like a thunderbolt. Cheap land had, for a decade, been their chief demand and it was especially dear to radical labor leaders, who were shaken from their traditional Democratic affiliations by two events in the Spring of 1854. First, Southern members of Congress with the aid of Senator Stephen A. Douglas (IL) and other Northern Democrats passed the Kansas-Nebraska Act which permitted slaveholders to occupy lands in that territory which had previously been closed to them. At the same time the Southern Democrats voted against a homestead bill and threatened to oppose all such measures in the future. These twin developments gave credence to the charge that the planters really wanted to move into the North and have their slaves compete against free labor. Fear that the already glutted Northern

labor markets were about to be inundated by a flood of slaves produced a series of mass protest meetings organized by labor leaders who, until 1854, had been anti-abolitionist.

The Last Yankee Migration Cycle

Internal as well as external migration took place in waves. The last wave of the New England exodus into the Middle Atlantic and Midwest states was a crucial factor in the political realignment of the 1850s. That wave began about 1840, after the sharp decline in New England's natural rate of increase. It was precipitated by a massive increase in shipments of grain and animal products from the Midwest to the East. This competition devistated farmers up and down the Connecticut River valley who left Vermont, Massachusetts, and Connecticut in droves. The relative number of these new migrants was not very large. As Table 5 indicates, New Englanders who moved West after 1840 represented hardly 3 percent of the population in the 9-state region that formed the Yankee diaspora. Nevertheless, because they voted overwhelmingly Republican (on the order of 9 to 1) in the elections of 1856 and 1860, these Yankee migrants played a critical role. Had they remained in New England, they would merely have added to the lopsided Republican majority in that region (see Table 1). But the same votes cast in the diaspora provided the margin of victory for Lincoln in New York, Illinois, and Wisconsin.

5. Events: The Struggle for Control of the Political Breakaway

Between late 1853 and the election of 1856 the antislavery forces led by the Free Soilers were in a pitched battle for control of the political breakaway. During most of 1854 and 1855 it was the Know-Nothings who had the upper hand. Their most striking victory over the Free Soilers took place in the Massachusetts

Table 5

The New England Presence in the Yankee Diaspora in 1860 Relative to Lincoln's Margin of Victory

	State	All persons born in New England	All Males age 21 or over born in New England	Lincoln's margin over the Democrats
1.	Illinois	66,093	26,628	9,564
2.	Indiana	9,802	5,404	11,229
3.	Iowa	25,040	10,365	14,250
4.	Michigan	38,106	18,279	22,618
5.	New Jersey	8,682	4,052	4,523
6.	New York	177,981	89,507	50,136
7.	Ohio	53,386	29,384	32,973
8.	Pennsylvania	25,555	14,088	72,636
9.	Wisconsin	54,338	33,440	20,201
10.	Column totals	458,983	231,147	229,084
11.	Total population in 9 states	15,060,782	---	---
12.	Lincoln's vote in the 9 states	---	---	1,476,835

Source: Fogel, Galantine, and Manning 1990, Table 69.9.

elections for local and state offices in 1854. That contest resulted in a thumping defeat for the Republicans who were unable to win a single seat, and in virtually a clean sweep for the Know-Nothings. Other direct contests between the Republicans and the Know-Nothings in the 1854 elections and again in 1855 led to similar one-sided victories for the Know-Nothings.

Despite this string of lopsided losses, the Free Soilers did gain predominance over the breakaway forces, and they did so with a suddenness that was dazzling. The turnabout came in fewer than six months. At the end of 1855 the Know-Nothings seemed to have the upper hand in the struggle for the control of the breakaway in all of the key Northern states, with the Free Soilers dominant only in Vermont, Iowa, Wisconsin, and Michigan. Six months later, the Republican party had jelled as a national political party under the influence of the Free Soilers. The Know-Nothings, on the other hand, were split. The antislavery faction, representing the bulk of the Northern Know-Nothings, was absorbed by the Republicans, while the rest joined with Southern Know-Nothings to form the American party that nominated Millard Fillmore (conservative Whig and ex-President) to oppose the Republican candidate, John C. Frémont. Although Republican leaders had to maneuver adroitly to placate their Know-Nothing constituency, the control of the party remained with the men who were committed to antislavery policy as the overriding principle of the Republican coalition.

Ironically, this sudden turn in events was due to the spectacular successes of the Know-Nothings during 1853, 1854, and early 1855. Their startling electoral victories transformed the nativist coalition from a grassroots movement led by amateurs, mainly journeymen, artisans, petty shopkeepers, and some second-rank professionals, to a powerful political machine that threatened to take command not only of local and state governments but of the national government.

Northern professional politicians of all of the parties ran for cover by joining the order. Professional politicians in the South, almost exclusively Whigs, also rushed into the Know-Nothing party. As their constituents, outraged by the stand of Northern Whigs on Kansas-Nebraska, deserted the party in droves, Southern Whigs seized on the Know-Nothings as a vehicle for regrouping in a new national party. By the mid-1850s virtually the entire Southern Whig party was regrouped into Know-Nothing organizations and was prepared to join with their Northern allies to contest for the presidency in 1856.

In June 1855, the National Council of the Know-Nothings met in Philadelphia to draw up a platform on which the Order could mount a presidential campaign. After a long struggle between Northern and Southern delegates, the council adopted a plank that placated the Southerners. The 12th section of the platform "accepted as final the existing legislation on slavery (i.e., the Fugitive Slave and Kansas-Nebraska Acts), recommended against congressional interference in the territories, and condemned further agitation of the slavery question." Many Northern delegates were outraged and bolted. Some reconvened at a conference in Cleveland where they formed a Know-Something party on a program that endorsed both antislavery and anti-Catholicism. Most Northern state councils deplored the pro-Southern action of the National Council but waited to see what action would be taken at the national convention called for Philadelphia in February 1856. When that convention reaffirmed the 12th section of the platform and nominated Millard Fillmore, a Cotton Whig, as its candidate for president, most of the remaining Northern leaders bolted and, together with the Know-Somethings, formed the North American party, determined to field a Northern nativist candidate committed to antislavery.

Although the split of the Know-Nothings provided the opportunity for Free

Soilers to take command of the political breakaway, it was the tactical brilliance of such dedicated foes of slavery as Henry Wilson and Salmon P. Chase that realized the opportunity. Wilson correctly assessed the power of the nativist appeal in Massachusetts and led many of the state's Free Soilers into the Know-Nothing party. Once there, they worked assiduously to elevate the antislavery militancy of Know-Nothings. Wilson united the Massachusetts delegation to the 1855 meeting of the National Council behind the proposition that unless the party committed itself to a moderate antislavery stand, it would be better to split the party. Chase, the most brilliant of the Free Soil tacticians, was able to construct a Republican Party in Ohio that combined Free Soilers and Know-Nothings. The Know-Nothings agreed to accept a moderate antislavery program and to make him the gubernatorial candidate of the party, but he had to accept nativists in the other eight slots of the state ticket.

The Republican victory in Ohio was the only bright spot in the otherwise dismal election results for Free Soilers in 1855, since they lost in every other major Northern state. Capitalizing on the Ohio victory, Chase, together with leaders of four other states in which the Republicans had won or made credible showings, issued a call for a preliminary national Republican convention on February 22, 1856, in Pittsburgh. The timing could hardly have been better since the convention came just after Republicans and Know-Nothings had combined to elect Nathaniel Banks (a Democrat from Massachusetts who had joined the Know-Nothings but was, by 1856, a covert Republican) as Speaker of the House and it coincided with the second split of the Know-Nothings in less than a year (at the American national convention in Philadelphia).

The contest for the Speaker of the House, which extended from December 3, 1855 to February 2, 1856, was a critical aspect of the campaign to organize a

national, or at least a North-wide, Republican party. It was apparent at the beginning of the 34th Congress that pro-administration Democrats could be denied the Speakership because of the large number of Know-Nothings in the House. The problem for Republican strategists was twofold: to organize the diverse anti-administration men behind a single candidate and to keep control of that coalition in the hands of the Republicans. To accomplish the second objective it was necessary to split the Know-Nothings into pro- and anti-Southern factions, for otherwise the anti-administration forces in the House would be united around a national nativist party. By adroitly playing the antislavery issue and by putting forth Banks, a former Democrat and a popular Know-Nothing, the Republicans were able to rally enough anti-administration Democrats and Northern Know-Nothings to beat the candidate of the Pierce Democrats and Southern Know-Nothings by three votes.

It was in the course of that protracted battle for the Speakership that a potential coalition for an antislavery party was initially formed at the congressional level. At the outset the group committed to the formation of the Republican party and without allegiance to the Know-Nothings represented just 30 to 35 members in a House of 234. However, congressional promoters of the Republican party were able to win support of about 75 Northern Know-Nothings, nearly half of whom were persuaded to join in the formation of a new national party on an anti-Nebraska program. The protracted contest over the Speakership called public attention to the sectional struggle for power and pushed the conflict between the North and South to the center of congressional politics. Moreover, the split in the ranks of the Know-Nothings prevented the American party from organizing the House, putting control instead in the hands of the Republican party which, through Banks, occupied key committee posts. So the

Republicans, rather than the Know-Nothings, were able to set the political agenda for the 34th Congress.

It was on the foundation of the newly forged congressional coalition that the preliminary Republican convention in Pittsburgh established a national party machinery and issued a party platform that focused on the principle that the territories were to be forever free. Making their political objective the overthrow of the Democrats, the delegates set June as the date for the main national convention (which nominated John C. Frémont to head their ticket), and they appealed for the support of all those of antislavery sentiment, including Whigs, Democrats, and Know-Nothings. By the end of the June convention, it was clear that the Republican party had jelled. The great antislavery coalition, long sought by the political abolitionists, was finally a reality.

The split in the Know-Nothing movement and the tactical brilliance of key Free Soil leaders were two of the four elements that permitted the Republican party to emerge triumphant in the struggle for control of the political breakaway. The third was a set of favorable developments that greatly improved labor market conditions in the North and thus reduced the conflicts over jobs between natives and immigrants, reduced the pressure on urban housing, and reduced the heavy burden of foreign pauperism. The most critical of these developments was the sharp drop in annual immigration, from a peak of 427,000 in 1854 to less than half that figure in 1856 (by 1858 the number was down to less than a third of the peak). The sharpest drop was among the Irish, who were the principal nemesis of the nativists. By 1858 Irish immigration had declined to levels below those of the early 1840s. At the same time the Northern economy recovered from the long recession of 1853-1855. Still another fortunate turn took place in consumer prices, especially food, which declined sharply in 1856, ending a decade-long inflation. The economic relief provided by this combination

of events permitted Northeastern and Midwestern workers to focus their minds on the significance of the bloody civil war in Kansas provoked by the efforts of slaveowners to seize lands that rightfully belonged to free labor.

Acts of Southern violence against Northerners, especially those in May 1856, were the fourth element in the compound that gave the Republicans control over the political breakaway. One of the acts took place in Kansas where the pro- and antislavery forces had been engaged in a bitter struggle for control of the state since the middle of 1854. That conflict turned into a "bloody armed clash" that included the burning of the headquarters of the antislavery forces in Lawrence. On the eve of the "Sack of Lawrence," Senator Charles Sumner (R. MA) delivered a searing indictment of Democratic policies in Kansas. Called "The Crime against Kansas," this speech, which stretched over two days, was filled with personal invectives against leading Democratic members of the Senate, including Andrew P. Butler (SC). Butler was absent from the chamber during Sumner's speech but Preston S. Brooks, a relative and a member of the House from South Carolina, brooded over the insults to his aged kinsman and to his state. Determined to teach Sumner a lesson, Brooks entered the Senate chamber after it adjourned on May 22 and delivered a series of blows to Sumner's head and shoulders with his cane. The assault, which lasted for nearly a minute, left the Massachusetts Republican "unconscious and bleeding profusely."

These two events traumatized the nation. Although the May violence cost the Democrats some of their Northern support, its most important political effect was on the struggle between the Know-Nothings and the Republicans for control of the political breakaway. As late as February 1856 that control still seemed to rest with the Know-Nothings. But the May violence decisively shifted the balance to the Republicans by turning the attention of Northerners from the key

Know-Nothing issue (the papal conspiracy to subvert American institutions) to the key Republican issue (the Slave Power conspiracy to subvert Northern liberties and economic welfare)--from a foreign menace to a Southern menace.

Despite the enormous inroads of the Republicans into the Know-Nothing constituency, Frémont lost in 1856. Nevertheless, his vote was so large that the Republican party had emerged as the leading party in the North, although its Northern margin was not yet large enough to offset the Democratic majority in the South. The Republicans also were in a strong position in the House, despite the fact the Democrats elected 118 members to the Republicans' 92. By forming a coalition with the American party, they could block Democratic legislation. The election also devastated the Know-Nothing party in the North, with Frémont drawing three votes for every one received by Fillmore. The Republican party was clearly in control of the Northern political breakaway.

Consolidating Republican ranks, however, posed considerable problems. It was difficult to hold both the North American Know-Nothings (who deserted the Fillmore Know-Nothings because they wanted to fight both the Pope and the Slave Power) and the Germans (who were willing to belong to an anti-Papist party and an anti-Irish party but not to an anti-German party or a temperance party). That the Republicans managed to surmount these and other difficulties is evident by their victory in 1860. The antislavery coalition had finally gained control of the presidency, but its grasp on power, as I have previously noted, was precarious.

Insights into the nature of the Republican victory are provided by Table 6, which relates the Republican vote in 1860 to the principal Northern political constituencies in the election of 1852, the last national election preceding the political breakaway. It shows that the Republican victory turned on the party's

Table 6

The Estimated Distribution of the Vote for Lincoln*
With Respect to the Political Constituencies
of the North in 1852

Part A

Region****	Lincoln's vote (in thousands), by political constituency**			
	Free Soil	Whigs	Democrats	Total Vote***
New England	68	171	58	297
Middle Atlantic	44	568	77	689
Midwest	118	634	75	827
Far West	---	45	---	45
The North	233	1418	210	1858

Part B

	Percentage distribution of the vote in each region and for the North, by constituency			
New England	23	58	20	100
Middle Atlantic	6	82	11	100
Midwest	14	77	9	100
Far West	---	100	---	100
The North	12	76	11	100

*Does not include Lincoln's vote in DE, MD, KY, and VA

**New voters are distributed among the 1852 constituencies.

***Components may not sum to line and column totals because of rounding

****Regions are defined as follows: NE: ME, NH, VT, MA, RI, CT
MA: NY, NJ, PA
MW: OH, MI, IN, IL, WI, IA, MO, MN
FW: CA, OR

Sources: See entry #69 in Fogel, Galantine, and Manning (1990) for details on the construction of this table.

capacity to draw both the Free Soil and Whig constituencies into its fold. Together they accounted for 89 percent of Lincoln's Northern vote. Although about 9 percent of Northern ex-Whigs voted for Lincoln's opponents, the Republicans gained about 17 percent of the Northern constituency of the Democrats. The net effect of the Whig defections and the Democratic additions was to raise the Republican share from a combined Free Soil plus Whig share of 50.2 percent in 1852 to a Republican share of 51.9 percent in 1860. Given the closeness of Lincoln's victory, even this small numerical gain was important.

However, the main aspect of the Republican realignment of Northern voters, most of whom were already opposed to the Slave Power in 1852, is that they were radicalized in the process. Two events prepared the way and were probably necessary conditions for the radicalization. First, the Whigs had to be destroyed as a national party. That condition was largely fulfilled between 1853 and 1855 when, under the pressure of growing Southern nationalism, the majority of Southern Whigs left the party, seeking a more viable vehicle in which to continue the struggle for power within their home states. Second, the Whig party machinery in the North, still largely in the hands of a minority of conservatives (who had placed the accommodation of their Southern allies above antislavery principles), had to be disrupted. That condition was satisfied by the political successes of the Know-Nothings during 1853, 1854, and 1855, which reduced the Whig party to shambles in nearly all of the Northern states.

Analysis of election data suggests that the Free Soilers were much more successful in catching ex-Whigs than ex-Democrats. In the Massachusetts and New York elections of 1854, for example, the Know-Nothings drew their support from Whigs and Democrats in roughly equal numbers. However, by 1860 ex-Whig supporters within the Republican party outnumbered the ex-Democrats by roughly

7 to 1. It thus appears that the Republicans were able to capture about half of the Democrats but virtually all of the Whigs who strayed into the Know-Nothing party.

Since a large proportion (about two-fifths) of Republican voters were former Know-Nothings, it is no surprise that Republican appeals often linked Catholicism and slavery as twin despotisms. Despite such rhetoric, the Republican party did not officially embrace nativism or anti-Catholicism since to do so would have alienated not only some of their Democratic supporters but also ex-Whigs within the party who had remained aloof from the Know-Nothings and who shunned crude appeals to bigotry.

Party leaders were divided on the policies needed to placate both constituencies, not only on religious issues but also on economic ones. For a time leaders of the Republican party became almost as badly divided on the causes and cures of the panic of 1857 as the Whigs and Democrats had been on the same issues during the 1830s and 1840s.

The Republican party was not wrecked by the panic of 1857 and by 1860 it had lured most of the former Know-Nothings into its ranks. However, neither outcome was inevitable. The party was able to maintain its hold on its diverse constituencies partly because of fortunate events over which it had no control. One of the most critical of these was the sharp drop in immigration after the middle of 1854 which remained at low levels throughout the balance of the decade. Another was the swift, powerful recovery from the panic. If 400,000 extra immigrants had piled into the North during 1857-1858, urban unemployment rates would have doubled. It is doubtful that party leaders could have continued to suppress the nativist impulses of so many of its members if immigration had returned to the 1854 rate, or if the panic of 1857 had produced an extended

depression. If, under such circumstances, the party would have resisted pressures for a more militant stand on nativist issues, some of the former Know-Nothings would surely have bolted. If the party would have conceded these demands, some of the Germans and the more conservative Whigs would have been alienated. Only relatively small defections were needed to deny power to the antislavery coalition in 1860.

6. The Problem of Modeling Complex Dynamic Interactions

I now turn to the central issue of this paper, which is how to model the complex interactions of the processes and events that produced an antislavery coaltion powerful enough to win control of the presidency in 1860. What I have presented so far is not much different from a conventional historical narrative. I have divided my material into intergenerational, cohort, period, and event categories, suggesting that these divisions have important analytical implications but have yet to demonstrate the case. Formal models were used to generate the estimates presented in a number of the tables. But the output of these models has so far been used only as relevant data in unfolding my story. How do we go from that story to an appropriate formal model? Why is formal modeling of the explanation for the victory of antislavery coalition a useful enterprise? Do the categories into which I organized the narrative materials have a particular analytical purpose or are they merely one of a number of convenient devices for organizing a considerable amount of material?

I begin with the last question. The categories do have an analytic purpose. They are designed to show that in explaining the formation and victory of the antislavery coalition, history matters. In other words, the political realignment of the 1850s was a path-dependent process in which developments and events that preceded the realignment had a large effect on the likelihood that

the realignment would take place.[4] I have already pointed up the effect of such chance events as the Sack of Lawrence and the caning of Sumner in giving the Republicans the upper hand in the struggle for control of the political breakaway. If the posse in Lawrence had peacefully disbanded, if Butler had restrained his impulse to teach Sumner a lesson, and if the rate of immigration into the North had grown between 1854 and 1856 at the same rate as during the preceding decade (instead of falling by half), the Know-Nothings might have retained or even enhanced their command of the political breakaway. Under these circumstances the American party rather than the Republicans might have emerged from the 1856 election as the principal opposition to the Democrats, or Fillmore might even have won, as many practical politicians in 1855 thought was likely.

We are dealing with a process in which each realization of a preceding opportunity affected the likelihood that a subsequent development or event would occur. The long Puritan development in New England, the extraordinary Yankee presence in the diaspora, the intensification of Calvinist zeal during the Second Great Awakening, and the highly emotional twist that Finney imparted to the Northern revival helped to produce numerous elitist groups that campaigned with a fervor and determination that only those who believed they were divinely inspired and were emotionally charged could have sustained.

How dependent subsequent events were on the combination of intergenerational and cohort processes can be illustrated by considering what might have happened if the British had won the American Revolution. The line of argument developed in the preceding sections is based on the implicit premise that no massive castastrophe would have interfered with the continued domination of New England culture by the Puritan legacy. But a British victory would have made that scenario highly unlikely. Congregational, Presbyterian, and Baptist

ministers, who were leaders in the Revolutionary cause, would, along with their secular counterparts, no doubt have been hung for treason. The dissenting churches, which were established in New England, would no doubt have been disestablished, and the Anglican church raised up in its place. The Church of England, operating through the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel (S.P.G.), had had substantial successes in opening Anglican churches in the Middle Colonies and New England during the half century proceeding the Revolution (Gaustad 1962). There can be little doubt that it would have seized on the post-war, anti-treason hysteria to close down the traitorous churches and to insure the hegemony of the Anglican church.

Other than noting that a British victory would have greatly affected the subsequent train of events, and made the scenario unfolded in the previous sections highly unlikely, it is difficult to say very much about the details of a new scenario. No doubt the Anglican influence would have expanded greatly and the dissenting influence would have been diminished. The constitutional situation would also have been much different, as would popular politics, given the British disfranchisement of all but the upper classes. How such developments would have affected the success of the British antislavery forces is quite unclear. It was difficult enough to commit Parliament to provide £20,000,000 to compensate the West Indian slaveholders. To award American slaveholders the same 50 percent cash compensation on the value of their slaves would have raised the total bill to the British taxpayers for emancipation to over £100,000,000. Even William Wilberforce and Thomas F. Buxton might have blanched at so large a figure, equal to British GNP for about 4 months (the entire current U.S. debt is equal to about 5 months of GNP). If the British drive for emancipation had been throttled, or possibly defeated, it is difficult to see how a British-

dominated America would have been able to overthrow the Slave Power.

How then would one go about modeling such behavior? The path model displayed in Figure 1 helps to answer that question. Figure 1 is based on the account sketched in sections 2-5. In this diagram the intergenerational, cohort, and period processes as well as the conditional events, have been classified in categories that bear on the political realignment of the 1850s. For example, the square boxes show the main branching points in the evolution of evangelical thought in New England and its impact on the cohort that precipitated the new abolitionist and other ultra-reformist movements. The main branching points in the development of the new abolitionist movement are shown as circles within squares. The rectangles represent key intergenerational, cohort, and period effects that strengthen the foes of the antislavery movement. The triangles show the factors that promoted the nativist movement. Diamonds represent period processes, such as business and migration cycles, that affect both the political and ideological outcomes. The capsules are conditional political events. The color of the lines indicates the process category to which particular events belong. Green represents intergenerational, blue cohort, and yellow period processes. Red lines show the causal effects of conditional events.[5]

Although Figure 1 attempts to depict in graphic form the causal relationships sketched in the previous sections of the paper, and although it points up the complexity of some of the causal paths, including various feedback processes, it is far from complete (due partly to the limitations of page size and the thickness of the lead). I have, for example, left out plausible branches (such as the British defeat of the Revolution) which might have precluded most of the subsequent developments depicted in Figure 1. Only the branches that facilitated the political realignment of the 1850s are shown. Similarly, because

Figure 1

A PATH MODEL OF DYNAMIC INTERACTIONS LEADING TO THE VICTORY OF THE ANTISLAVERY COALITION



Figure 1 (continued)

Symbols Used in Figure 1

 = percursors and promoters of Whig & Free Soil parties

 = percursors and promoters of Democrats

 = abolitionists and their parties

 = Whigs

 = Democrats

 = nativist movement

 = conditional political events

 = migration and business cycles

Color Code

Colors indicate processes to which particular transition points apply: green = intergenerational; blue = cohort; yellow = period; and red = conditional events

of my emphasis on the North, the Southern components of the model, and their feedback on developments in the North, are only barely suggested.[6]

The path model depicted in Figure 1 could not have been constructed without the enormous amount of historical research that has gone into the political realignment of the 1850s since World War II. That body of work provides both the chronology and other facts that have to be rationalized by the model and an array of theories ranging from the nature of Puritanism and the relationships between religious revivals and radical social reform to epidemiological theories regarding the contribution of nutrition, urbanization, and immigration to the killer epidemics of the antebellum era. Since the theories overlap and some are inconsistent with others, Figure 1 could not have been constructed merely by taking over these theories en masse. An inital selection had to be made from both the theories and the facts embodied in the historical literature, since many alleged facts are also inconsistent with each other.

Figure 1 is the outcome of a substantial amount of such winnowing, based on extensive investigations of both the theories and the facts. Since some of the theories were more implicit than explicit, it was often necessary to guess at the variables implied by particular verbal accounts and to supply the functional relationships between variables. Where particular functional forms were already specified, my colleagues and I provisionally adopted them; otherwise, we initially adopted the simplest functional forms consistent with the implicit theories.

In pursuing and modifying the provisional specifications we followed what I have described elsewhere as the "full information" approach to hypothesis testing, in which provisional hypotheses are gradually modified by the accumulation of empirical evidence (Fogel 1982; Fogel, Galantine, and Manning

1990, ■■-■■). The key issue in choosing the provisional hypotheses is not the degree of belief in them, but their efficiency in directing one to the bodies of data needed to determine how to modify the initial model by adding or deleting variables, by changing the functional forms of key equations, or by altering the relationship of the submodels to each other. The basic model sketched in this paper is the outcome of such a process, described in more detail elsewhere, which has extended over many years. Nevertheless, the model is still far from adequately explored.[7]

It is quite clear from what I have said so far that the exploration of such a model requires more than the specification of the variables that should enter each of the submodels, the lines of causation, and a limited specification of characteristics of the equations that define the submodels and their interrelationships. The theory of the realignment sketched so far depends critically on the magnitudes of key variables and parameters, not just on their signs. The model also involves complex interactions between variables, some of which are endogenous in each period, others of which are largely functions of their path but also have limited endogenous components in each period, and still others of which are fixed in any given period but may change in varying ways in later periods. The model involves discontinuities, irregular feedback systems, and asymmetric responses to random shocks. The period equations, which change rapidly, are embedded in intergenerational and cohort sets of equations that change very little from one period to another. The types of behavior incorporated in the model cross interdisciplinary lines by providing interactive cultural, political, economic, demographic, and biomedical components. Moreover, the empirical implementation of the model is exceedingly difficult because of the very large number of variables and the numerous equations, and because of the poor quality of much of the data.

In the past such a model would have been too complicated to manipulate.

As long as theoretical models were restricted to a class of functions that required such properties as homogeneity, differentiability, or continuity, models of the complexity I have described were beyond reach. These properties, as well as linearization, were imposed on models in order to reduce the difficulty of obtaining analytical solutions and to obtain terms that lent themselves to simple interpretations. Yet the celebration of these properties, which reflect the standards of precomputer age, are virtues only in a world in which more complex equation systems and numerous empirical restrictions are too cumbersome to manage analytically.

Have we reached the point where such complicated, many-sided properties and numerous empirical restrictions can be incorporated in formal models? I believe we have. The software now available for computers permits the development of simulation models based on far more complex equation systems than can be handled analytically. Linearization, differentiability, continuity, and homogeneity are no longer necessary properties. Numerous empirical constraints can be introduced and easily modified, as analysis may require. Various alternative functional forms can be considered in order to assess the sensitivity of results to functional forms. Graphics can be employed to interpret the meaning of complex terms that cannot be reduced to elasticities or other simple coefficients that have long been the workhorses of social science theories. By visualizing surfaces and observing how they change as components of the model change, it is possible to develop locally valid approximations to complex behavior that can be manipulated analytically, if desired.

Certain structural features of the model also facilitate the estimation and manipulation of the model. Chief of these is that most of the components of the model are recursive and that both Markov and time-dependent stochastic

processes (Feller 1957, ch. 15, 17), in which the probability of moving from one state to another is dependent on the path, provides a suitable analytical framework for the representation of the components model. These two features make it possible to estimate particular components of the model independent of the other components, and then to use simulation techniques to assemble the components into a consistent unified model.

It is possible, for example, to construct transition (or party persistency) matrices such as that shown in Table 7, which presents the estimated probabilities that persons in various political categories in 1852 in 8 Northern states would vote for particular parties in 1856. This transition matrix was in turn estimated from ecological regressions of the form given by equation (1).

$$(1) \quad R_{56} = \delta_0 + \delta_1 W_{52} + \delta_2 D_{52} + \delta_3 FS_{52} + \delta_4 IF_{52} + \delta_5 IN_{52}$$

where:

R_{56} = the Republican vote in 1856 as a percentage of total eligible voters in that year

δ_0 = the estimated proportion of non-voters in 1852 who voted Republican in 1860

W_{1852} = the Whig vote in 1852 as a percentage of the total eligible to vote

D_{1852} = the Democratic vote in 1852 as a percentage of the total eligible to vote

FS_{1852} = the Free Soil vote in 1852 as a percentage of the total eligible to vote

IF_{1852} = the net increase in foreign-born eligible to vote between 1852 and 1860

IN_{1852} = the net increase in native-born eligible to vote between 1852 and 1860

Table 7

Estimated Voting Transition Probabilities for 8 Northern States
Between the 1852 and 1856 Presidential Elections
(in percent)

Voting categories in 1852	---------Voting categories in 1856--------- Republican (1)	Democrat (2)	American (3)	Not Voting (4)	Σ cols.1-4 (5)
1. Whig	69.6	0.0	23.5	6.9	100.0
2. Democrat	21.0	79.0	0.0	0.0	100.0
3. Free Soil	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0
4. Ineligible	26.3	37.7	15.8	20.2	100.0
5. Not Voting	8.8	18.5	13.7	59.0	100.0

Sources: Computed from Fogel, Galantine, and Manning 1990, Table 69.12.

The factors that influenced the transition probabilities can be estimated from such equations as (2):

$$(2) \quad W_r = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 Y + \alpha_2 I + \alpha_3 P + \alpha_4 R + \alpha_5 E + \alpha_6 G + \alpha_7 U + \alpha_8 K + \alpha_9 F$$

where:

W_r = the percentage of Whigs in 1852, and still alive in 1856, in a given electoral district who voted Republican in 1856

Y = the percentage of Yankees and their descendants

I = the percentage of Congregationals

P = the percentage of Presbyterians

R = the percentage of Roman Catholics

E = the percentage of Irish

G = the percentage of Germans

U = the unemployment rate among native artisans

K = an index of support for the Know-Nothings during 1853-1855

F = an index of the intensity with which Finney evangelized the district during the 1820s and 1830s

It is obvious that if equations (1) and (2) could be implemented empirically, they could provide useful information about the issues under discussion in this paper. Estimated cross-sectionally on the counties or townships in each of the states in the Yankee diaspora, one could determine how much of Frémont's vote came from Yankees. Including variables for Congregationals and Presbyterians (while holding Yankees constant), could show whether Congregationals and Presbyterians were more likely to vote for Frémont than other Yankees. Similarly, the coefficients on the variables F and K would indicate how important direct carryovers from the Finney crusade and the nativist rebellion were. The usefulness of the other variables is also apparent.

There are, of course, numerous difficulties in estimating these equations.

The place of birth is not given at the county or township level in the published federal census of 1850 and 1860. Nor is the ancestry of persons born within the state given. The first problem can be resolved by drawing samples from the manuscript schedules of the 1860 census (which do give place of birth). However, since place of birth of parents and more distant ancestors is not given, these manuscript schedules will not identify persons of New England ancestry born within the state or born out-of-state but not in New England. To identify ancestry, one might have to undertake the tedious task of linking individuals to genealogies or exploiting quasi-genealogical information in local histories. Such investigations might reveal that information on persons born in New England is sufficient because of a strong correlation between birth in New England and persons born in the state but of New England ancestry. Such a correlation is suggested by migration studies which reveal a high propensity for interstate migrants to settle in places where they have relatives and friends (Vickery 1968). It is also suggested by regressions such as (1) which have been estimated for 1856 and 1860. In Pennsylvania in 1856, for example, Y accounts for much of the variation in Frémont's vote even though the number of New England-born voters was a small percentage of Frémont's total vote (Gienapp 1987, 438 and 548; Fogel, Galantine, and Manning 1990, entry #69).

Still another problem of implementation relates to the religious variables. The variable P is intended to identify Presbyterians of the New England variety. However, many Presbyterians in a state such as Illinois migrated from the South and reflected Southern rather than Yankee culture. That problem could be addressed by adding the interaction term $Y \times P$, although the device might be too crude to affect the necessary separation (as would be the case if Southern Presbyterians settled in counties with large numbers of New Englanders of other

denominations).

It is quite clear that numerous theoretical and empirical problems must be overcome if the model sketched in this paper is to be constructed and tested. The solutions to these problems require much closer cooperation than we have so far had between theorists and empiricists, between traditional historians and cliometricians. Three decades ago theorists and empiricists tended to inhabit different worlds. That was partly because the empirical testing of theories in the social sciences was extremely expensive. Before the advent of high speed computers, the testing of a theory that implied a five or six variable equation against a data set with a few hundred observations was a major enterprise and the calculation of the same equation on thousands of observations was too costly to be considered.

In that age the test of an hypothesis was, of necessity, limited to the characterization of behavior in simple equations with only a few terms. Emphasis tended to be placed on the signs rather than on the magnitudes of variables. Even in the case of coefficients in which the magnitude was critical, such as elasticities, it was the sign of the log that became the focus of attention. In that age, testing of an hypothesis was really the last step of hypothesis formulation. Despite the rhetoric in which they were reported, such tests were not aimed at establishing the superiority of a newly proposed hypothesis over other serious contenders. They were usually limited to showing that certain signs predicted by a model were consistent with available evidence. Since the signs of other, often conflicting, models were also consistent with the available evidence, these tests did not determine which of the competing models was best, or if any of the competing models represented an adequate basis for interpreting the specified behavior. Indeed, it was understood that these tests were

superficial and hence, did not establish the empirical validity of the models but only provided an initial boundary between the plausible and implausible ones.

It is easier to suggest the kind of formal model that is needed to test and develop the story told in the preceding sections than to construct such a model, to estimate its parameters, and to investigate the consistency of the implications of the model with critical facts. In pursuing this goal some caveats need to be kept in mind. First, formulation of the model depends critically on a deep knowledge of the history that underlays the model. It is traditional history that must identify the key variables, suggest the linkages between them, specify key exogenous processes and random events. Without such a narrative the key issues to be investigated, the key variables to be included in a formal model, the equations needed to capture the relationships between the variables, and the interactions between equations and exogenous processes and events, at moments of time as well as over time, cannot be specified. In other words, traditional history is not only a critical source of evidence, but the foundation for a valid formal model. Bad or inadequate traditional history is bound to produce bad or inadequate formal models.

Second, there is no necessary conflict between static equations (such as equations (1) and (2) and dynamic models of the type indicated by Figure 1. Quite the contrary, a wide variety of period-specific and place-specific regressions such as equation (1) are needed not only to identify key variables at a point in time and space, but changes in key variables over time and space as well as shifts in the structure of equations and subsets of models. Quite clearly, it is impossible to identify simultaneously all of the relationships implied in Figure 1. It is by estimating equations for different places and times that the dynamic aspects of the more complex overall model can be

identified. The numerous components of the total model, built in this manner, can then be integrated into a simulation model. Such complex simulation models are, as I have indicated, made possible by the enormous advances in computer software and the drastic decline in the cost of computer processing. I believe that use of simulation techniques to integrate numerous submodels is far superior to building a dynamic model for the whole antebellum period under the restriction that the model has to be simple enough to permit its direct estimation. That restriction is bound to yield superficial glosses that are highly misleading.

Although simulation models are the backbone of demography, they are rarely used by quantitative political historians and polymetricians and they are also underutilized by social and economic historians and by econometricians. The great virtue of these models is that they bring together, into a unified and logically consistent framework, the submodels that quantitative investigators frequently employ on a piecemeal basis. By so doing they indicate whether or not these submodels are really consistent with each other and, if not, also indicate what changes in the submodels can make them consistent. This unified and internally consistent framework is also a powerful instrument for evaluating patchy data. It often reveals that a data series (or some part of it) that seems reasonable on the surface is highly misleading because the series has implications that contradict known facts or has other unacceptable features. Simulations also reveal that certain quantitative submodels need not be estimated with precision because no plausible alterations in the output of that submodel could significantly alter the key results of the overall model.

Third, a model such as that depicted in Figure 1 will involve components that cannot be subjected to rigorous quantitative tests. A case in point is the contention that the Sack of Lawrence and the caning of Sumner were critical

events in shifting control over the political breakaway from the Know-Nothings to the Republicans. That point could have been tested rigorously. if exit polls had been conducted during the presidential election of 1856. Then voters who signified that they had voted Republican could have been asked which party they had intended to support in February of 1856 and whether the Sack of Lawrence and the caning of Sumner had affected their preferences. Unfortunately, such quantitative information is not available and I can see no way of obtaining equivalent information. The importance attached to these events stems from comments made by a few, well-placed politicians, and is beyond decisive quantitative confirmation. However, equations such as (1) and (2) can be used to investigate the exact timing of the shift from a Know-Nothing to a Republican predominance of the breakaway, thus providing indirect evidence which may provide limited support for, or contradiction of, the political significance of these violent events (cf. Baum 1978).

Finally, even if the major components of the model can be subjected to rigorous statistical tests, the model as a whole is too large and too elaborate to be verified by standard econometric procedures. Even if every component of the model is correct, the integrated model may be wrong because the components have not been put together properly. The most important test of the integrated model is not in its capacity to "predict" the behavior it was designed to "predict," but in its capacity to "predict" (or explain) other important features of the political realignment. The successful development of a model such as that shown in Figure 1 is not the end of work on the political realignment of the 1850s, but the beginning of a new phase in which additional issues are probed with the aid of the model. It is quite likely that such extensions will reveal defects in the model and suggest needed modifications. That iterative process

will not come to an end until all of the implications of the model have been probed and the data available to evaluate the implications have been exhausted.

7. The Impossibility of A General Theory of Political Realignments With Significant Predictive Power

Despite my belief that it is possible to develop a persuasive theory of the political realignment of the 1850s (or any other past realignment), I do not believe that it is possible to develop through historical studies a general theory of political realignments with significant predictive power. Those who believe that valid historical explanations are equivalent to predictions may view the last sentence as inconsistent. However, in fields such as meteorology or aeronautics that asymmetry is reconfirmed almost daily. The U.S. Weather Bureau and the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), for example, often provide precise explanations for events that could not have been predicted (i.e. to which a non-trivial probability could have been attached before they occurred). The fact that any particular crash is adequately explained does not mean that NTSB is capable of predicting when, where, or under what circumstances the next crash will occur. So, too, with political realignments.

There are two basic reasons why history cannot provide a theory of political realignments with significant predictive power. The first is obvious from a consideration of Figure 1. Lincoln's election was the end product of a very long chain of events. Even if the ex-ante probability of an outcome favorable to his election has been 0.8 at each of the branching points and allowing for well over 100 key branching points, the probability of predicting the election of Lincoln at the beginning of the process would have been far less than one in a billion. Moreover, for many intervening events (such as the victory of the American revolutionaries or the premature death of William H.

Harrison and his replacement by a proslavery vice president), the ex-ante probabilities were far less than 0.8, many were far less than 0.5. Even for a much shorter chain of transition points, such as those between the Compromise of 1850 and the election of 1860, the product of the ex-ante probabilities would yield an extremely low number.

Second, the most that history can provide is a knowledge of past processes. Even if the transition matrices that governed the past are properly estimated, the equations used to estimate the elements of such matrices may not hold for the future. To put it in a more formal language, the structural equations that governed the intergenerational, cohort, and period process, as well as the stochastic distributions of conditional events, may be changing (usually are changing) in ways that are difficult to predict.

The preceding points do not imply that historical studies fail to supply useful generalizations or guides to policy makers, but only that such generalizations and policy prescriptions fall far short of a general theory of realignments. The historical studies of the NTSB provide a number of useful generalizations (crashes are more likely in landings and takeoffs than in mid flight, certain weather conditions greatly increase the risk of a crash, etc.) and produce specific policy prescriptions (reinforcement of the wings of Lockheed Electras, optimal periods for part replacements, etc.). History also produces useful generalizations and prescriptions about political realignments: religious awakenings are a major factor in political realignments; polarizations in Congress usher in partisan realignments; parties that do not respond to underlying shifts in electorates fare poorly, etc. (McLoughlin 1977; Clubb, Flanigan, and Zingale 1980). Some of these generalizations are so well accepted that they now seem trite, but that is only after long debates and careful

evaluation of the historical evidence. The usefulness of history does not depend on the capacity to produce general theories of political realignments with significant predictive power.

NOTES

1. The argument put forward in this section is based largely on Parrington 1930; Miller 1938, 1949, 1953, 1956, and 1965; Sweet 1944; Gaustad 1957 and 1962; Morgan 1963 and 1966; Waltzer 1965; Bailyn 1967, 1986; Bailyn 1977 et al.; Bushman 1967; Tillich 1968; Demos 1970; Greven 1970 and 1977; Lockridge 1970; Rutman 1970; Henretta 1973; Ahlstrom 1975; McLoughin 1978; Hambrick-Stowe 1982; Davis 1977 and 1984; Essig 1982; Drescher 1986. Cf. Fogel 1989, ch. 7-10 and the sources cited there.

2. Bailyn et al. 1977, 53; Fogel, Galantine, and Manning 1990, Table 60.2 and entry #69. The estimated proportion of persons of New England descent in these states in 1820 may seem too high because many persons living in Illinois and Indiana were descended from Louisiana slaveholders who had migrated up the Mississippi River before 1790 (Berwanger 1971). However, these two states only had 6 percent of the population of the eight-state region in 1820. The bulk of Yankees in the diaspora lived in the three Middle Atlantic states and in Ohio.

3. Unless otherwise indicated, sections 3-5 are based on Fogel 1989, ch. 8-10, and the sources cited there.

4. See North's paper in this volume and the sources cited there on path-dependent processes. Cf. Arthur 1990; David 1990.

5. The division between intergenerational and cohort factors is determined by the object of the analysis. If I were trying to explain the political realignment of the 1930s, what are called cohort events here, might be part of the intergenerational processes that set the context for that outcome. In that case the key cohort events are those that shaped the perspectives and behavior of the agents of the realignment of the 1930s, such as the creedal and ethical changes in the mainline churches spawned by the Third Great Awakening.

6. Less inbred than the North because its low rate of natural increase required heavy immigration to sustain the growth of the Southern population before 1800 (Galenson 1981; Levy 1989), and far more dependent on servile labor, more French than British in its international orientation, a distinctive Southern culture had emerged well before the Southern nationalistic movement of the 1850s. (Parrington 1930, 1 and 2; Robinson 1979; Sydnor 1948; Craven 1953; Freehling 1966; Matthews 1977 and 1980; McCardell 1979; Oakes 1982; Wyatt-Brown 1982; Genovese and Fox-Genovese 1986). Cohort and period factors in the South were also much different from those in the North. Although both regions suffered from businceess cycles only those of 1819-1820 and 1837-1843 were similar in their regional impact. The northern recession of 1826-1828 was a depression in the South that lasted through 1831 and the severe recession of 1857-1858 in the North coincided with one of the South's most vigorous booms. The impact of immigrants on labor markets, so devastating to native artisans in the North during the 1850s, was much more confined in the South. The impact of the cholera epidemic of 1849-1850 was far more severe in the North than in the

South. Political events were also asymmetric. The Whig loss in the presidential elections of 1852 was far more destabilizing to the Whig party in the South than in the North (Fogel 1989, chs. 3, 9, and 10; Yasuba 1962).

7. Fogel 1989; Fogel, Galantine, and Manning 1990, parts VIII and IX.

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