

ANDREY SIMONOV

<http://home.uchicago.edu/~simonov/>
asimonov@chicagobooth.edu ◊ +1 (773) 710 7268

HIGHLIGHTED INFO

University of Chicago, Booth School of Business
Ph.D. Student, 4th year, Quantitative Marketing

August 2012 - 2017 (expected)

Coursework (selected):

Price Theory 1,2,3,
Empirical Analysis 1,2,3
Advanced Industrial Organization 1,2,3
Advanced Quantitative Marketing
Economics of Communication

Research Intern

Microsoft Research, NYC (worked with Justin Rao)

June - October 2014
June - September 2015

Teaching Assistant for Empirical Analysis-3 (Ph.D. core)

taught by Derek Neal, Ali Hortacsu and Lars Hansen
Department of Economics, The University of Chicago

Spring 2014

Teaching Assistant

Marketing Strategy (MBA and EMBA) (taught by Pradeep Chintagunta)
Pricing Strategies (MBA and EMBA) (taught by Jean-Pierre Dube)
Booth School of Business, The University of Chicago

Winter, Spring, Fall 2015
Spring, Summer 2014
Spring, Summer 2015

WORKING PAPERS

(1) Competition and Crowd-out for Brand Keywords on Sponsored Search
with Chris Nosko and Justin Rao

WORK IN PROGRESS

(2) Censorship and Switching Costs in Online News Markets

(3) Public Information and Firm Behavior in the Advertising Market
with Justin Rao

(4) Search Advertising Auction with Dominant Advertiser
with Eliot Li and Justin Rao

(5) Initial Conditions and Structural State Dependence
with Jean-Pierre Dubé, Günter Hitsch and Peter Rossi

STATEMENT ON RESEARCH INTEREST

My current research interests can be separated into two large groups:

- Online advertising. In (1) (reference to work above) we are looking at the influence of own and competitors' advertising on brand's traffic on sponsored search. The work uses a series of large-scale experiments to estimate the effect of own brand search advertisement on brand keywords with and without competitors present. We find that own brand advertisement does not deliver many incremental clicks when it is the only ad shown (due to organic link of the website being right below the ad), but serves as an effective defensive mechanism when competitors are present. (4) builds on this result to design a mechanism that will allocate advertisements more effectively by allowing own brand to remove competitors' ads. There is more work to do regarding the results in (1): right now the paper focuses solely on search for brand keywords, where the organic link is on top of the page. It is interesting to examine the case of non-brand search, where organic result of one of the advertisers is in lower positions. I plan to explore this topic further.

(3) takes a different angle and examines the role of information in advertisers behavior: once the firm learns that own brand advertisement is not effective, does it react? How does this reaction differ when it gets new information from public source versus from the internal experiment? etc. Our results show that companies react less to information coming from own experimentation than to public information, which suggests the existence of principal-agent problem at the level of marketing managers responsible for search advertising. I note that it is still work in progress, so results are very preliminary.

- Media economics. My interests are centered on online news industry and its interaction with the government. In (2) I am looking at the role of censorship in the Russian online news market. Russian online news market has both government controlled players and independent players. Government controlled media cannot report on a certain number of topics; thus, the 'quality' of news of independent players should be higher than of news of government players, and one would expect government news outlets to lose market share to independent players. This does not happen, and there are two main demand-side explanations for this: (a) consumers have switching costs (i.e. accumulated loyalty, search costs, etc), so it is hard for them to switch from government media, (b) consumers of government news outlets have preference which align with government news reporting, so consumers do not care about censored news. I use textual data for top 48 online news outlets in Russia and browsing data for a period of two years to disentangle between these two reasons. It is important to understand consumer behavior i.e. because different reasons have very different policy implications: if one was to liberalize online news media in Russia and remove censorship, in case of (a) government controlled outlets will change the slant and start reporting previously censored topics, whereas in case of (b) government controlled outlets will continue to ignore censored news as their readers do not care about those news. I am also able to examine how much government can suppress people from getting relevant political information in an environment where information is available on some websites, which gives a measure of media power of the government.

There is a number of other interesting topics in online news market I do not focus on in (2), i.e. (a) other aspects of government influence on the news market such as propaganda and (b) the degree to which news outlets can persuade the readers. These are the topics I plan to explore later on.

(2) is my dissertation work. I do not have a formal committee yet; my current advisors are Jean-Pierre Dubé, Pradeep Chintagunta, Matthew Gentzkow, Günter Hitsch and Chris Nosko. I am planning to propose the dissertation topic in winter and defend it some time in the 5th year.