Recruiting Team

National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

Cambridge, MA

## Dear Recruiting Professionals:

I am writing to apply for the Postdoctoral Fellowship in Digitization at the National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc., which is posted on the American Economic Association website. Currently, I am a Ph.D. candidate in Economics at the University of Florida and I expect to graduate in the summer of 2016.

I have built up strong analytical and econometric skills through my Ph.D studies. My research lies in the field of industrial organization; specifically, I conduct research on Internet and two-sided markets to examine market structures and pricing strategies. I am also interested in antitrust issues related to two-sided markets. My research is further extended to incorporate consumer behavior, such as search and bargaining behaviors.

Over the course of my PhD studies, I have worked on three main projects. First, in my job market paper "Search on a Business-to-Consumer Online Market: An Explanation for Price Dispersion and Implications to Firm Pricing Strategy," I collect posted and transaction price data from Tmall.com, a Chinese business-to-consumer website, and find evidence contrary to the traditional thoughts on market structure and Internet search behavior. Consumer do not actively engage in pure price searching and an increase in the number of firms do not necessarily lead to lower prices. This paper was presented in the *Marketing Science* 2015 in Baltimore, MD. Second, I have extended a standard Hotelling model to incorporate an intermediate platform to test firms' entry decisions and pricing strategies. In the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, the platform optimally serves part of the market resulting in a coexistence of retail and intermediary sales. Loyal consumers can be harmed if a firm enters an inefficient platform. I presented these papers at Marketing Science 2014 in Atlanta, GA. Third, I have coauthored a number of papers that deal with antitrust issues in the e-book market, buyer cartels, and professional football licensing. One paper studies buyer cartels and proves that sellers are injured even if they purchase from non-conspirators when a partial cartel exist. Another examines the anticompetitive potentials in trademark licensing of professional football insignia. I presented these two papers at the 90<sup>th</sup> Western Economic Association Meeting in Honolulu. I am working on another paper that studies the implications of a recent antitrust case filed in the European Union. I presented this paper at the 85<sup>th</sup> Southern Economic Association Meeting in New Orleans, LA.

My future research plans include continuing to focus on Internet two-sided markets. Currently, I have two research topics in mind. First, I intend to investigate the incentives and market structure of a rising sales strategy known as group purchasing, prevalent in companies such as Groupon, LivingSocial, and Eversave. Group purchasing analyses usually focus on the antitrust aspect where buyers form a cartel to suppress prices. The group purchasing websites, however, are intermediate platforms that allow consumers to receive group purchasing prices without actually

forming a group. This seems to be beneficial for both sellers and consumers as sellers can achieve large sales and consumers can obtain lower prices. It is interesting to understand the mechanism behind this intermediary and see whether this is sustainable long term. Due to the popularity of group purchasing organizations in China, price and quantity data can be collected to conduct empirical analyses.

I am also interested in studying online Auctions; in particular, if consumers behave differently in online Auctions. Quibids, an online auction website, uses a slightly different auction mechanism, where consumers pay a fixed amount for each bid and the bidding can proceed infinitely if there are consumers placing bids within 10 seconds of the previous bid. This is a slight modification of penny auctions where the time limit is exogenous; however, on Quibids, the time limit is endogenous on the number of new entrants. This variation, however, creates substantial risk for the participants. It will be interesting to find out how equilibrium price changes in this different setting and to collect data and empirically test the results.

With rigorous economic and research training, I am very excited to submit my application to the National Bureau of Economic Research. Enclosed is my curriculum vitae. Please do not hesitate to contact me if any further information is needed. Thank you for your consideration.

Sincerely,

Wenche Wang Department of Economics University of Florida PO Box 117140 Gainesville, FL, USA, 32611 +1-(352)-392-1060