

## **Criminal Recidivism after Prison and Electronic Monitoring\***

Rafael Di Tella  
*Harvard Business School*

and

Ernesto Schargrodsky  
*UTDT*

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### **Abstract**

We study the arrest rates of individuals released from prison and that for those formerly under electronic monitoring. We exploit the fact that electronic monitoring in Argentina is assigned to prisoners by judges with highly different preferences: Some regularly assign prisoners to electronic monitoring while others never do so. Importantly, the assignment of judges is exogenous to prisoners' characteristics. We find that those 'treated' with electronic monitoring have marginally lower arrest rates following their release than former prisoners treated in standard jails. Offenders who went through the electronic monitoring program have an approximately 8% lower recidivism than offenders who went to prison. Moreover, among inmates under electronic monitoring, recidivism rates are actually lowest for those that by-passed jail by going directly from the police station to electronic surveillance. Offenders with a previous criminal record should probably be excluded from the electronic monitoring system as their evasion and recidivism rates are high.

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\* Rafael Di Tella, Harvard Business School, Soldiers Field Rd, Boston MA02163, US, [rditella@hbs.edu](mailto:rditella@hbs.edu). Ernesto Schargrodsky, UTDT, Saenz Valiente 1010, Buenos Aires, Argentina, [eschargr@utdt.edu](mailto:eschargr@utdt.edu). We thank Juan Marcos Wlasiuk for excellent research assistance. We thank Marcelo Lapargo for generous conversations and comments that improved our understanding of the legal system. We thank Fernando Diaz, Julio Quintana, Sergio Buffa, Martín Canepa, José Castillos, and Marcelo Acosta for generous help.

## **I. Introduction**

The overwhelming majority of convicted criminals are sent to prison. Given that prisons often involve inhumane treatment of inmates, and/or are expensive to build and run, and/or possibly contribute to the conversion of inmates into ‘hardened’ criminals, it is unsurprising that alternatives to the use of prisons have been tried out. One of the more intriguing alternatives to incarceration is electronic monitoring.<sup>1</sup> ‘Tagging’, as is also sometimes called, involves fitting prisoners with an electronic device (on the ankle or wrist) that can be monitored remotely, so that the employees from the correctional facility can at regular intervals verify whether the individual is violating a set of pre-established conditions through electronic contact. The most common condition is to stay at home, although in some cases a provision for attending work or school is included.<sup>2</sup> The application of this program in the US has often been linked to an increased punitiveness of the penal system, as it has been applied to former inmates who would have otherwise been on lower supervision (e.g, parole supervision), a phenomenon sometimes called ‘net widening’.

Although more than 250,000 people in the US and Europe have been ‘treated’ with electronic monitoring, there is extremely limited evidence that can be used in an evaluation of the benefits of this approach. Of particular relevance is previous work which has found little evidence of differential recidivism of inmates treated with electronic monitoring versus incarceration. In a recent review Renzema and Mayo-Wilson (2005) consider ‘All available recidivism studies that included at least one comparison group between the first impact study in 1986 and 2002 were considered for the review. ... the authors conclude that applications of Electronic Monitoring as a tool for reducing crime are not supported by existing data.’ A similar conclusion is reached in the review by Aos, et al (2006), who “*find that the average electronic monitoring program does not have a statistically significant effect on recidivism rates.*” but “*expect, however, that the average electronic monitoring program is typically used to offset the*

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<sup>1</sup> See, for example, the discussions in Morris and Tonry (1990) and Payne and Gainey (1998).

<sup>2</sup> A variant, which is not yet widely used, is to perform the monitoring part continuously through a global positioning system (GPS).

*costs of more expensive resources to process the sanctions of the current offense. That is, we find that an average electronic monitoring program costs about \$1,236 per offender. The alternative to electronic monitoring, however, is most often increased use of jail time, and we estimate this to cost \$2,107 per offender.”*<sup>3</sup>

Theoretically, the effect of electronic monitoring on ulterior recidivism is ambiguous. On the one hand, deterrence theory suggests that spending time under electronic monitoring rather than incarceration might make low punishment salient, implying a positive relationship at the individual level, besides general deterrence reductions (see, for example, Sherman, 1993). On the other hand, several theories point out to a negative relationship. For example, social learning suggests that electronic monitoring could reduce the proportion of expert/hardened criminals, or reduce the perception that society is ‘mean’ and ‘deserving of the crime it receives’. In particular, imprisonment might be criminogenic through harsh prison conditions (Chen and Shapirto, 2007) or peer effects (Bayer et al, 2008) that are not present under electronic monitoring. It could also reduce stigmatization following incarceration (see, for example, Schwartz and Skolnick, 1962). Moreover, those on electronic monitoring can improve their skills (social, applied or cognitive) and improve their labor market prospects, reducing their expected recidivism.

Of course, there are several different potential costs and benefits of electronic monitoring. But even if one focuses exclusively on the rate of recidivism, an econometric evaluation of the causal effects is clouded by at least two problems, one of which can be called a problem of selection and the second a problem of ‘differential risk of the target population’. The problem of selection refers to the fact that, at least one criterion for the granting of electronic monitoring to an inmate is her/his risk or recidivism. Thus, low post-release recidivism of a population of former inmates treated with electronic monitoring could simply reflect the success of the program at the selection stage if the objective was to target low risk offenders. Alternatively, if the

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<sup>3</sup> A full cost benefit study of electronic monitoring programs needs to develop a metric to evaluate the gap that inevitably develops between intended and actual punishment of convicted criminals.

target was high risk offenders (who would receive continued surveillance) then similar recidivism rates between those on electronic monitoring and the base population is consistent with a negative effect on recidivism.

The problem of the ‘differential risk of the target population’ refers to the fact that a large part of the electronic monitoring programs have been applied to low risk populations, such as drunk drivers. The failure to detect a negative effect of electronic monitoring on ulterior recidivism could simply reflect that this population is at very low risk of crime in general and that the control population receives a very light treatment (short prison sentences with good prison conditions). Alternatively, it is applied to very high risk population, at the end of their sentences, where electronic monitoring substitutes freedom. In that case, their performance (e.g., program completion and recidivism) is compared with former inmates that are freed. Again, electronic monitoring can be expected to have an effect on offenders with intermediate risk.

In this paper we study the effect of substituting incarceration for electronic monitoring on recidivism in the Province of Buenos Aires, Argentina. We measure recidivism through re-arrest data on all former inmates treated with electronic monitoring since the program’s inception in the late 1990’s. As a benchmark, we take a group of former inmates of similar observable characteristics treated with incarceration. We find a negative and significant correlation between electronic monitoring and arrest rates.

In order to deal with the ‘selection problem’ outlined above, we use two approaches. First, we exploit the fact that some judges (often called ‘*garantistas*’) frequently send offenders to electronic monitoring whereas other judges (often called ‘*mano dura*’) never do so. The assignment of judges is exogenous to prisoners’ characteristics. Whenever a person is detained by the police, she/he is assigned to the judge (*Juez de Garantías*) who was on duty on that day. Instrumenting with judicial district and court variables to capture these differences in judges’ preferences reveals a negative effect of electronic monitoring on later re-arrest rates. This institutional feature also guarantees

that electronic monitoring is applied to inmates that have committed relatively serious crimes, thus addressing the problem that we call 'low risk target population'. Second, within the group that is treated with electronic monitoring, some are treated for longer periods of time because there is an insufficient number of electronic bracelets to fit all the prisoners that qualify. Within those that receive electronic monitoring, we find that the proportion of total time under supervision that they spend under electronic monitoring relative to that spent in jail is negatively associated with later re-arrest rates. Also within the group of inmates under electronic monitoring, we find that recidivism rates are actually lowest for those that by-passed jail by going directly from the police station to electronic surveillance.

One problem with previous work that appears common is that electronic monitoring has been applied to low risk population. For example, Courtright et al (1997) compares recidivism for DUI (driving under the influence) offenders treated with electronic monitoring versus those receiving jail sentences. The recidivism rates in the 445 days following release were extremely low for both groups (and the difference was not significant). The paper of Gainey et al (2000) finds some evidence of lower recidivism amongst offenders who spend time under electronic monitoring, but the effect is not robust to the inclusion of control variables. Typical participants in this program include persons sentenced for driving under the influence, habitual traffic offenses, failure to pay child support, offenders with serious medical conditions (AIDS, TB and disabilities) as well as first-time felony larceny and other property crimes.

The problem of selection is also common in published work in the field. For example, previous work on recidivism following different lengths of incarceration finds little difference in recidivism rates (for a review, see Song and Lieb, 1993, and the discussion in Gainey et al, 2000), although the problem of dealing with the potential correlation between length of incarceration and inherent dangerousness of the criminal seems

extremely difficult, particularly in countries with reasonably developed/homogenous legal systems.<sup>4</sup>

Similarly, papers analyzing the effect of electronic monitoring find it hard to control for the possibility that inmates treated with prison might be inherently more dangerous and likely to commit crimes (see, for example, the discussion of previous work in Renzema and Mayo-Wilson, 2005). Interestingly, papers that look at re-arrest rates of people with different lengths of time on electronic monitoring (but that are all treated) suffers less from this criticism. The fragility of the results in Gainey et al (2000) is thus particularly disappointing. Renzema and Mayo-Wilson (2005) review the literature and find only two studies with random assignment and with recidivism as the dependent variable, including Petersilia and Turner (1990). Unfortunately they describe several limitations in these studies (including incomplete administration of the program) and conclude that they do not help in the evaluation of electronic monitoring. It is worth pointing out that the sign of the bias introduced by selection problems depends on the nature of the program. For example, Finn and Muirhead-Steves (2002) describe the application of electronic monitoring to violent offenders who would otherwise have been released in Georgia, US. It compares it with a group of violent offenders who were released and finds no difference in recidivism rates. Given that this is a case of net widening, the selection problem has the opposite sign: those selected for continued supervision are potentially at a higher risk of recidivism, so the similarity in recidivism rates is consistent with positive effects of electronic monitoring.

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<sup>4</sup> Perhaps the most famous random assignment study is the Milwaukee Domestic Violence Experiment, described in Sherman et al (1990). It showed lower frequency of violence by the same suspects after each case leading to a randomized police intervention (where one treatment was at least one night in jail and other treatments included standard Miranda-style script warning). Iyengar (2006) illustrates the difficulties in interpretation in experiments of this kind by showing that states that pass mandatory arrest laws experience large increases (up to 60%) in rates of intimate partner homicides. It seems the experiment did not replicate the certainty aspect of the arrest laws, which changed the behavior of the criminals. Perhaps by their nature, experiments with the legal system must operate under the public's radar screen, making the incentive effects of changes in the legal system hard to detect with the experimental approach.

It is worth mentioning other characteristics of our study that help in the interpretation of our results. The first is that electronic monitoring in Argentina seems to be associated with the objective of lessening the punishment. Indeed, ‘*garantista*’ judges often complain about the conditions of imprisonment in Argentina, echoing condemnations by human rights groups. In other words, the counterfactual for the group under electronic monitoring is incarceration. This is to be contrasted to the problem of ‘net widening’ in the US, whereby the application of electronic monitoring affects a population that would have been released had the electronic monitoring been unavailable. Second, electronic monitoring in Argentina does not complement other programs (education, anger management, etc) as a requisite, something that facilitates the interpretation of our treatment. The evidence from the US systematically refers to concomitant programs, where electronic monitoring is only one the treatments received (see, for example, Bonta et al, 2000, and the description in Gainey et al, 2000).

Section II describes the implementation of electronic surveillance in the Province of Buenos Aires. Section III describes our data and empirical strategy. Section IV presents our basic set of results, while Section V concludes.

## **II. Electronic Monitoring in Argentina**

The Province of Buenos Aires has been the first district in Latin America implementing an electronic surveillance system for the custody of inmates. The Province of Buenos Aires is the most populated province of Argentina, with a population of almost 15 million people, about 37.9% of the population of the country. It is also the province with the largest population of inmates. The Penitentiary System of the Province of Buenos Aires currently hosts a population of approximately 25170 inmates, which represents 41.5% of the total imprisoned population of the whole country.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> The imprisonment rate of the Province of Buenos Aires (188 per hundred thousand population) is higher than the country’s rate (156). As a reference, consider that these rates are 737 for the US, 262 for Chile, 211 for Brazil, 198 for Mexico, 193 for Uruguay, 107 for Canada, 85 for France and 93 for Germany.

The system of electronic monitoring in the Province of Buenos Aires started in December of 1997. At its inception, electronic monitoring was granted to the old and terminally ill, with the objective of allowing them to spend their final days with their families and under house arrest. Over time the coverage shifted towards individuals under criminal indictment awaiting trial. By 2003, all new entries to the program were in this category. Indeed, Argentine legislation only allows electronic monitoring as a reduction in the severity of punishment to those awaiting trial. Given the slow functioning legal system, this period can be substantial. Up until April 2007, more than 1,280 detainees received electronic surveillance. Table 1 shows that the pattern of crimes for detainees under electronic monitoring appears similar to those of the general prisoner population.

The electronic monitoring system consists of a bracelet worn in the ankle of the inmate. The bracelet transmits a signal to a receptor installed in the inmate's house. The receptor has a battery in case there is an electric stoppage. If the signal is interrupted, manipulation is detected, or vital signs are not received, the receptor sends a signal to the service provider through a telephone line. The provider tries to investigate the reason for the signal and, whenever necessary, reports to the penitentiary system which sends a patrol unit to the inmate's house. The contractor is the South American representative of a leading international provider. The fee paid by the provincial government in May 2007 was \$32 (about U\$10) per month. The Buenos Aires Penitentiary Service has a small office (employing fewer than 20 employees) that is in charge of the administration of this program. The cost of the telephone line that is used is borne by the detainee.

An important factor is how the monitoring surveillance system is allocated. The surveillance program is relatively small, with a capacity of handling 300 detainees simultaneously. When a detainee requests through her/his lawyer the transfer to the surveillance system, it is basically a discretionary decision of the judge in charge of the detainee to deny or approve the benefit. The assignment of judges is exogenous to prisoners' characteristics. Whenever a person is detained by the police, she/he is



assigned to the judge (*Juez de Garantías*) who was on duty in that judicial district on that day. Duty turns last for one or two weeks and are assigned by a lottery.<sup>6</sup> If there are no available equipments, then the detainee is incorporated into a waiting list that oscillates between 70 and 100. As explained below, we exploit the assignment of judges as a source of exogeneity in our study.

### **III. Data and Empirical Strategy**

We aim to compare the effect of electronic monitoring versus jail imprisonment on criminal recidivism. Our data source is the administrative records from the Penitentiary system of the Province of Buenos Aires. For the definition of our sample, we first consider all the men released (or evaded) from the system from January 1, 1998 through October 23, 2007. Given that the involvement in criminal activity tends to be a youth phenomenon (Freeman, 1996), we focus on men below 40 years of age (born after January 1, 1957). This comprises a total penitentiary population of 43618 men.

From this population, we first consider all the detainees that were released (or evaded) from electronic monitoring. Excluding the inmates that passed away, those that went back to prison because of misconduct or receiving a sentence, the sick, those characterized as dangerous prisoners, and those with missing data on the specific type of crime, birth date, detention date, release date, judicial district and court, gives a monitoring surveillance group of 454 inmates. Table 2 shows the pattern of crimes for this population, indicating that many of them are prosecuted for serious offenses.

For the definition of the comparison prison group, we start by using the same criteria: excluding the inmates that passed away, those that went back from electronic monitoring to prison because of misconduct or receiving a sentence, the sick, those characterized as dangerous, and those with missing data on the specific type of crime, birth date,

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<sup>6</sup> A potential problem is that criminals could find out who is the judge on duty on a given day and decide their criminal behavior based on that information. In practice, we were explained this does not occur. Eventually, this could only apply to extremely sophisticated criminals and not to the common criminal population.

detention date, release date, judicial district and court. We then took the following matching criteria. For each prisoner released from electronic monitoring, we identified all those jail prisoners with similar age (+/- 6 months), similar imprisonment date (+/- 6 months), similar imprisonment length (+/- 20 percent), same type of crime, same number of previous imprisonment, who had never in electronic monitoring, and with similar judicial status (condemned or under process). Finally, from the matching group identified for each prisoner, we randomly chose three jailed prisoners. This procedure gave us a comparison group of 1362 prisoners, with a total database of 1816 inmates.

We compare the recidivism rate of the electronic monitoring and jail population running the following regression model:

$$\text{Recidivism}_i = \alpha + \beta \text{ ElectronicMonitoring}_i + \lambda_i x_i + \varepsilon_i \quad (1)$$

where *Recidivism<sub>i</sub>* is a dummy variable that indicates whether inmate *i* went back to detention in the Province of Buenos Aires after his release; *Electronic Monitoring<sub>i</sub>* is a dummy variable that indicates whether inmate *i* was under electronic monitoring in the detention episode under study; *x<sub>i</sub>* is a set of controls including age, age square, time since release, time since release square, detention time, detention time square, previous detention, nationality, a set of dummies for each type of crime; and a set of year dummies indicating the year of release.

An obvious concern with this strategy is that the allocation of inmates to electronic monitoring versus jail is not random. In order to address this selection problem, we exploit an instrumental variable strategy. As mentioned above, the assignment to electronic monitoring or jail detention is made by the judge on duty at the day of detention in each case. There is a large heterogeneity among judges in the use of electronic surveillance detention. This heterogeneity is basically based in ideological differences between *garantistas* and tough-hand (*mano dura*) judges. This heterogeneity can be observed across judicial districts (which share their Courts of Appeals), but also

within districts. As the allocation of judges within districts is exogenous to the detainees, and as we can confidently also take as exogenous to them the predominant characteristics of the judicial district they are, we can use both judicial districts and courts as exogenous variables affecting the allocation to imprisonment system.

Tables 3a, 3b and 4 illustrate the validity of our instruments. The third and fourth columns of Table 3a indicate the percentage of the population under electronic monitoring and jail imprisonment for each of the 19 judicial districts for every type of crime for our sample population of 1816 inmates. There are large differences. The two districts with the largest numbers of detainees seem quite different. San Martin, for example, represents 30.8% of the inmates under electronic monitoring, but only 7.3% of the jail population. Instead, Lomas de Zamora represents 6.2% of the electronic monitoring population, but 13.5% of the jail population. Moron, Mercedes, and La Plata are also relatively tough-hand districts. The table also shows heterogeneity among courts of the same district. There are 201 courts in our sample, approximately 10 per judicial district. The comparison between the last two columns of Table 3a shows that there are districts where some courts send no prisoners to electronic monitoring whereas other judges send 50%, 88%, or up to 90% of the detainees to electronic surveillance. Table 3b repeats the analysis for the total penitentiary population of 43618 men and shows a similar degree of heterogeneity.

Table 4 also shows a large heterogeneity in assignment to electronic monitoring across judicial districts for the two most common types of crime: robbery and aggravated robbery. The judges in the judicial districts of San Martin and Quilmes assign large percentages to electronic monitoring, whereas La Plata, Lomas de Zamora, Mar del Plata, and Mercedes are the tough-hand districts. We exploit this heterogeneity using two set of dummies. First we use a set of judicial district dummies, and then also a set of court dummies. In addition, we also show some specifications in which we restrict attention to detainees that have been released from electronic monitoring, but exploring the effect of spending in jail at least one day (relative to going directly from a police

station to electronic monitoring), and the percentage of time under electronic monitoring relative to total detention time.

#### **IV. Results**

A simple test of means suggest differences in recidivism between the electronic monitoring and the jailed population. The recidivism rate is 25.1% for the inmates released from prison, whereas it drops to 17.4% for the electronic monitoring releases. Our first results are presented in Table 5. The first column shows a negative effect of electronic monitoring on recidivism controlling for the type of crime. This result is not altered in columns (2) to (4) by the incorporation of age and nationality controls, previous imprisonment, time since release, time under arrest, and year dummies for the time of release. The result also survives to an alternative measure of recidivism that considers as a new crime those inmates that evaded from electronic monitoring and were re-arrested. As nobody evaded jail, but some inmates evaded from electronic monitoring, the effect is smaller (but still significant) under this specification. The results are also robust to a Probit specification.

This first specification does not address potential selection bias as the allocation of electronic monitoring might not be exogenous to inmate characteristics. We address this issue with our instrumental variable strategy. As discussed above, there are large differences in the preferences of judges on the allocation of electronic monitoring. In Table 6 we instrument *Electronic Monitoring* with a set of dummy variables for the judicial district and the court. The main result of our paper is the negative and significant coefficient of the electronic monitoring variable in this regression suggesting a negative effect of this imprisonment system on recidivism. The control variables suggest a higher recidivism for those with a previous criminal record, a recidivism rate that gradually falls from the time of release, a decrease with age, and an increasing function of the time under arrest. The first four columns use judicial district dummies as instrumental variables. The second four columns instrument with court dummies. Moreover, judicial

district dummies are included in the last two regressions in order to control for potential geographic differences in the re-arrest rates of the criminal population.

Tables 7 and 8 repeat the structure of Tables 5 and 6, but using a different variable to capture the effect of electronic monitoring. Instead of a dummy, we consider the proportion of time under electronic monitoring relative to total detention time (the variable equals zero for the jailed inmates). The instrumental variable results in Table 8 confirm the lower recidivism rates for inmates under electronic monitoring.

In Tables 9 and 10 we additionally address the selection concerns by focusing exclusively on the inmate population assigned to electronic monitoring. First using OLS regressions, and then with our IV strategy, in Table 9 we explore the effect of electronic monitoring using the proportion of detention time under this system relative to total detention time. Although the sample size is much smaller, the results still suggest a reduction in recidivism associated to longer proportion of time under electronic surveillance. The statistical significance is similar, but the coefficients are smaller, when court dummies (rather than judicial district dummies) are used as instruments.

A similar picture is provided by Table 10. The variable of interest is now a dummy which equals 1 for those inmates that went directly to electronic monitoring from the police station when they were arrested, without passing through a jail. The results again suggest an association between being in jail and posterior recidivism, even restricting our attention to inmates that eventually qualified for electronic monitoring and using our IV strategy. Again, the statistical significance is similar, but the coefficients are smaller, when court dummies are used as instruments in Table 10.

A potential concern regarding these results is that, because our measure of recidivism is re-arrest rates, electronic monitoring could affect the probability of apprehension for a similar level of commission of new crimes. This would be problematic if inmates previously under electronic monitoring have lower apprehension rates than those

previously in jail. Learning in prison might suggest a different direction of bias if peer effects help criminal activity. Moreover, the police have more information on the inmates previously under electronic monitoring, which could help apprehension.

Finally, in Table 11 we wonder about the possibility of improving the design of the system. Under a linear or a Probit specification, we analyze how the variables that were observable to the judge at the time of the allocation decision predict recidivism or evasion from electronic monitoring.<sup>7</sup> The results show that previous imprisonment is a significant predictor of both recidivism and evasion. Offenders with a previous criminal record should probably be excluded from the electronic monitoring system as their evasion and recidivism rates are high.

## **V. Conclusions**

Electronic monitoring is an increasingly popular form of surveillance, with over 250,000 offenders in the US and Europe having passed through the system over the last few years. Unfortunately, there is very little evidence about its effects. Although cost effective (electronic monitoring is cheap relative to prison), there is for example no evidence about a negative effect on recidivism (see, for example, Renzema and Mayo-Wilson, 2005). There are several problems with previous estimates, however. For example, if the judicial system is reasonable, the assignment of electronic monitoring to an offender should be correlated to the offender's risk of evasion and recidivism. Interestingly, with a punitive judge electronic monitoring is typically assigned to dangerous criminals, who would have otherwise been freed (called 'net widening'). In contrast, with a non-punitive judge, electronic monitoring typically substitutes prison.

In this paper we study the performance of an electronic monitoring program in Argentina, where it is used to substitute for imprisonment. One advantage of the institutional setting we study is that in Argentina electronic monitoring is a benefit that

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<sup>7</sup> 18% of the population under electronic monitoring evaded from the system. There is no evasion from jail in our sample.

only some judges grant as a response to inhumane prison conditions and not because the offender is perceived to be at low risk of recidivism. Given that there is a limited number of electronic bracelets, people who qualify for the program are restricted in their access and experience differing lengths into the program. Thus, we can also restrict attention only to individuals who received electronic monitoring, and check that those that spent a longer proportion of time in prison have higher recidivism rates. Among inmates under electronic monitoring, recidivism rates are actually lowest for those that by-passed jail by going directly from the police station to electronic surveillance. We find that offenders who went through the electronic monitoring program have an approximately 8% lower recidivism than offenders who went to prison. Offenders with a previous criminal record should probably be excluded from the electronic monitoring system as their evasion and recidivism rates are high.

Our results, combined with the reduced pecuniary and prison costs of monitoring relative to prison suggest the use of electronic monitoring devices as an alternative to imprisonment is worth of further exploration and expansion. A full cost benefit analysis should also consider potential welfare costs of victims who observe a lower punishment of their aggressors, the possibility of evasion, and the potential weakening of deterrence effects.

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Table 1  
Type of crime for the electronic monitoring and prison population as of March 7, 2007

TYPE OF OFFENSE	ELECTRONIC MONITORING (*)		PRISON POPULATION (*)	
	#	%	#	%
HOMICIDE	42	14,0	1,898	14,6
ATTEMPED HOMICIDE	15	5,0	266	2,0
OTHER SERIOUS CRIMES	24	8,0	384	3,0
SEXUAL OFFENCES	15	5,0	801	6,2
LARCENY, ROBBERY AND AGRAVATED ROBBERY	165	55,0	8,431	64,9
DRUGS	4	1,3	44	0,3
OTHER MINOR CRIMES	35	11,7	1159	8,9
NOT SPECIFIED	0	0,0	595	4,6
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>300</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>12,983</b>	<b>100</b>

Table 2

Main crime for Inmates released from Electronic Monitoring		
	Freq.	Percent
Aggravated robbery	247	54.41
Attempted aggravated robbery	16	3.52
Robbery	36	7.93
Attempted robbery	29	6.39
Homicida	36	7.93
Attempted homicida	8	1.76
Larceny / Attempted larceny	7	1.54
Carrying / using waepons	24	5.29
Sexual offenses	13	2.86
Other minor crimes	25	5.51
Other serious crimes	13	2.86
Total	454	100.00

Table 3a

Percentage of the population under electronic monitoring or prison for each judicial district (for every type of crime for our sample population of 1816 inmates)

JUDICIAL DISTRICT	Number of Courts in Judicial District	Electronic Monitoring	Prison Population	Min % in EM	Max % in EM
AZUL	5	0,9	0,9	-	-
BAHIA BLANCA	9	1,5	3,7	0	14
DOLORES	8	0,4	2,1	-	-
JUNIN	4	2,6	0,7	-	-
JUSTICIA FEDERAL	8	0,0	0,8	-	-
LA MATANZA	14	9,5	7,1	0	50
LA PLATA	16	2,4	8,4	0	50
LOMAS DE ZAMORA	24	6,2	13,5	0	33
MAR DEL PLATA	14	2,2	4,7	0	33
MERCEDES	11	0,9	8,1	0	19
MORON	20	4,2	7,2	0	50
NECOCHEA	4	3,3	0,0	-	-
PERGAMINO	2	2,4	0,1	-	-
QUILMES	12	13,4	8,5	6	90
SAN ISIDRO	18	4,4	6,7	0	40
SAN MARTIN	18	30,8	7,3	13	88
SAN NICOLAS	4	0,0	2,4	-	-
TRENQUE LAUQUEN	3	0,0	0,7	-	-
ZARATE CAMPANA	7	2,0	1,6	-	-
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>201</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>100</b>

Notes: The third and fourth columns indicate the percentage of the population under electronic monitoring, prison and total, respectively, in our sample for each judicial district. The fifth column indicates, only for those districts with at least five courts with at least five detainees each, the court with the lowest percentage of detainees assigned to electronic monitoring. The last column indicates, only for those districts with at least five courts with at least five detainees each, the court with the highest percentage of detainees assigned to electronic monitoring.

Table 3b

Percentage of the population under electronic monitoring or prison for each judicial district (for every type of crime for the total inmate population of 43618 inmates)

JUDICIAL DISTRICT	Number of Courts in Judicial District	Electronic Monitoring	Prison Population	Min % in EM	Max % in EM
AZUL	12	0,9	1,3	0	3
BAHIA BLANCA	17	1,5	2,8	0	5
DOLORES	11	0,4	2,8	0	1
JUNIN	9	2,6	0,7	0	10
JUSTICIA FEDERAL	36	0,0	0,7	0	0
LA MATANZA	22	9,5	5,9	0	3
LA PLATA	25	2,4	6,3	0	1
LOMAS DE ZAMORA	33	6,2	10,6	0	4
MAR DEL PLATA	19	2,2	6,2	0	10
MERCEDES	19	0,9	6,0	0	1
MORON	25	4,2	8,0	0	4
NECOCHEA	5	3,3	0,0	0	100
PERGAMINO	5	2,4	0,3	0	15
QUILMES	18	13,4	6,5	0	16
SAN ISIDRO	27	4,4	6,8	0	3
SAN MARTIN	27	30,8	7,5	0	100
SAN NICOLAS	11	0,0	2,1	0	0
TRENQUE LAUQUEN	7	0,0	0,7	0	0
ZARATE CAMPANA	10	2,0	1,5	0	17
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>338</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>100</b>

Notes: The third and fourth columns indicate the percentage of the population under electronic monitoring, prison and total, respectively, in our sample for each judicial district. The fifth column indicates, only for those districts with at least five courts with at least five detainees each, the court with the lowest percentage of detainees assigned to electronic monitoring. The last column indicates, only for those districts with at least five courts with at least five detainees each, the court with the highest percentage of detainees assigned to electronic monitoring.

Table 4  
Percentage of the population under electronic monitoring or prison for each judicial district for robbery and aggravated robbery

JUDICIAL DISTRICT	ROBBERY		AGGRAVATED ROBBERY	
	Electronic Monitoring	Prison Population	Electronic Monitoring	Prison Population
AZUL	0,0	0,5	1,1	0,8
BAHIA BLANCA	0,0	4,2	0,8	3,0
DOLORES	0,0	2,8	0,4	2,0
JUNIN	0,0	0,0	2,6	1,0
JUSTICIA FEDERAL	0,0	0,9	0,0	0,5
LA MATANZA	5,6	8,4	10,2	7,2
LA PLATA	5,6	9,8	2,3	9,1
LOMAS DE ZAMORA	7,0	11,2	4,5	12,8
MAR DEL PLATA	0,0	10,7	2,3	3,4
MERCEDES	0,0	7,4	1,5	8,3
MORON	2,8	6,5	5,3	7,6
NECOCHEA	0,0	0,0	4,9	0,0
PERGAMINO	4,2	0,0	1,9	0,0
QUILMES	21,1	8,4	9,8	8,8
SAN ISIDRO	2,8	6,0	5,6	6,6
SAN MARTIN	22,5	3,7	37,2	9,0
SAN NICOLAS	0,0	0,0	0,0	2,8
TRENQUE LAUQUEN	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,9
ZARATE CAMPANA	0,0	0,9	1,5	1,9
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

Notes: For robbery and aggravated robbery, the table shows the percentage of the population under electronic monitoring, prison and total, respectively, in our sample for each judicial district.

<b>Table 5 – Electronic Monitoring and Recidivism (OLS and Probit regressions)</b>						
	1	2	3	4	5	6
Electronic monitoring=1	-0.08*** (3.36)	-0.08*** (3.75)	-0.08*** (3.59)	-0.07*** (3.51)	-0.04** (2.01)	-0.31*** (3.60)
Aggravated robbery=1	0.24 (0.97)	0.17 (0.72)	0.27 (1.21)	0.25 (1.12)	0.25 (1.08)	5.09*** (3.19)
Attempted aggravated robbery=1	0.25 (1.03)	0.18 (0.74)	0.26 (1.15)	0.24 (1.06)	0.23 (1.01)	5.05*** (3.15)
Robbery=1	0.34 (1.38)	0.26 (1.08)	0.30 (1.33)	0.29 (1.26)	0.28 (1.20)	5.20*** (3.24)
Attempted robbery=1	0.34 (1.40)	0.26 (1.09)	0.32 (1.40)	0.30 (1.31)	0.29 (1.26)	5.26*** (3.27)
Homicide=1	0.22 (0.89)	0.19 (0.79)	0.26 (1.16)	0.24 (1.06)	0.26 (1.12)	5.00*** (3.10)
Attempted homicide=1	0.25 (0.98)	0.22 (0.91)	0.32 (1.39)	0.32 (1.38)	0.31 (1.32)	5.39*** (3.31)
Larceny / Attempted larceny=1	0.26 (1.02)	0.21 (0.83)	0.28 (1.18)	0.27 (1.15)	0.26 (1.08)	5.19*** (3.20)
Carrying/using weapons=1	0.27 (1.07)	0.22 (0.91)	0.37 (1.60)	0.35 (1.53)	0.35 (1.50)	5.55*** (3.44)
Sexual offenses=1	0.09 (0.34)	0.10 (0.43)	0.23 (1.00)	0.20 (0.87)	0.22 (0.92)	4.65*** (2.83)
Other minor crimes=1	0.22 (0.89)	0.23 (0.95)	0.28 (1.23)	0.27 (1.18)	0.26 (1.11)	5.19*** (3.22)
Other serious crimes=1	0.36 (1.43)	0.35 (1.42)	0.47** (2.00)	0.45* (1.92)	0.44* (1.83)	5.80*** (3.57)
Age		-0.00** (2.29)	-0.00*** (3.23)	-0.00*** (3.18)	-0.00*** (3.24)	-0.00** (2.44)
(Age) <sup>2</sup>		0.00 (1.57)	0.00** (2.43)	0.00** (2.38)	0.00** (2.41)	0.00 (1.57)
Argentine=1		-0.02 (0.28)	-0.01 (0.18)	-0.02 (0.28)	-0.02 (0.24)	-0.14 (0.54)
# of previous imprisonment		0.19*** (9.32)	0.17*** (8.72)	0.16*** (8.48)	0.17*** (8.86)	0.58*** (8.06)
Time since release			0.00*** (5.20)	0.00 (0.28)	0.00 (0.31)	0.00 (0.78)
(Time since release) <sup>2</sup>			-0.00** (1.99)	0.00 (0.73)	0.00 (0.58)	0.00 (0.02)
Time under arrest (prison or ME)			0.00*** (2.91)	0.00*** (2.96)	0.00** (2.51)	0.00*** (3.02)
(Time under arrest (prison or ME)) <sup>2</sup>			0.00 (0.89)	0.00 (0.95)	0.00 (0.82)	0.00 (0.93)
Year dummies	no	no	no	yes	yes	Yes
Observations	1816	1816	1816	1816	1816	1816

**Notes:** OLS Regressions in columns 1 to 5. Probit regression in column 6. The year dummies indicate the year of release from prison or electronic monitoring. The dependent variable is whether the inmate went back to prison for a new crime at the Province of Buenos Aires penitentiary system after release. The fifth column treats the evasion from electronic monitoring as a new crime. Absolute values of t (or z) statistics are in parentheses. \* Significant at 10%; \*\* significant at 5%; \*\*\* significant at 1%.

**Table 6– Electronic Monitoring and Recidivism (IV regressions)**

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Electronic monitoring=1	-0.13** (2.42)	-0.11** (2.22)	-0.10** (2.09)	-0.10** (2.11)	-0.11*** (2.91)	-0.10*** (2.83)	-0.11** (1.91)	-0.10** (1.89)
Aggravated robbery=1	0.25 (1.02)	0.18 (0.75)	0.28 (1.23)	0.26 (1.14)	0.18 (0.75)	0.26 (1.15)	0.36 (1.52)	0.31 (1.38)
Attempted aggravated robbery=1	0.26 (1.05)	0.18 (0.75)	0.26 (1.16)	0.25 (1.08)	0.18 (0.75)	0.25 (1.08)	0.34 (1.46)	0.29 (1.27)
Robbery=1	0.35 (1.43)	0.26 (1.11)	0.31 (1.35)	0.29 (1.28)	0.26 (1.11)	0.29 (1.29)	0.43* (1.83)	0.35 (1.52)
Attempted robbery=1	0.36 (1.45)	0.27 (1.12)	0.32 (1.43)	0.31 (1.34)	0.27 (1.12)	0.31 (1.34)	0.42* (1.79)	0.35 (1.53)
Homicide=1	0.23 (0.95)	0.20 (0.82)	0.27 (1.18)	0.25 (1.09)	0.19 (0.82)	0.25 (1.09)	0.36 (1.52)	0.30 (1.30)
Attempted homicide=1	0.26 (1.02)	0.23 (0.94)	0.33 (1.41)	0.33 (1.40)	0.23 (0.94)	0.33 (1.41)	0.42* (1.71)	0.39 (1.65)
Larceny / Attempted larceny=1	0.27 (1.07)	0.21 (0.86)	0.28 (1.20)	0.28 (1.17)	0.21 (0.86)	0.28 (1.18)	0.34 (1.39)	0.32 (1.34)
Carrying/using weapons=1	0.28 (1.14)	0.23 (0.94)	0.38 (1.63)	0.36 (1.56)	0.23 (0.94)	0.36 (1.57)	0.43* (1.80)	0.43* (1.83)
Sexual offenses=1	0.10 (0.40)	0.11 (0.46)	0.24 (1.03)	0.21 (0.90)	0.11 (0.46)	0.21 (0.90)	0.30 (1.25)	0.25 (1.08)
Other minor crimes=1	0.24 (0.95)	0.24 (0.99)	0.29 (1.26)	0.28 (1.22)	0.24 (0.99)	0.28 (1.22)	0.42* (1.75)	0.34 (1.44)
Other serious crimes=1	0.38 (1.50)	0.36 (1.46)	0.48** (2.03)	0.46* (1.95)	0.36 (1.46)	0.46* (1.96)	0.55** (2.27)	0.53** (2.24)
Age		-0.00** (2.30)	-0.00*** (3.24)	-0.00*** (3.18)	-0.00** (2.30)	-0.00*** (3.18)	-0.00** (2.35)	-0.00*** (2.94)
(Age) <sup>2</sup>		0.00 (1.57)	0.00** (2.44)	0.00** (2.39)	0.00 (1.57)	0.00** (2.39)	0.00 (1.59)	0.00** (2.16)
Argentine=1		-0.02 (0.25)	-0.01 (0.17)	-0.02 (0.25)	-0.02 (0.26)	-0.02 (0.25)	-0.02 (0.28)	-0.02 (0.38)
# of previous imprisonment		0.19*** (9.34)	0.17*** (8.73)	0.16*** (8.49)	0.19*** (9.35)	0.16*** (8.51)	0.17*** (8.46)	0.16*** (8.04)
Time since release			0.00*** (5.18)	0.00 (0.27)		0.00 (0.27)		0.00 (0.51)
(Time since release) <sup>2</sup>			-0.00** (1.98)	0.00 (0.71)		0.00 (0.71)		0.00 (0.45)
Time under arrest (prison or ME)			0.00*** (2.92)	0.00*** (2.98)		0.00*** (2.98)		0.00*** (2.69)
(Time under arrest (prison or ME)) <sup>2</sup>			0.00 (0.89)	0.00 (0.96)		0.00 (0.96)		-0.00 (0.95)
Year dummies	no	no	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes
Judicial district dummies	no	no	no	no	no	no	yes	yes
Observations	1816	1816	1816	1816	1816	1816	1816	1816

**Notes:** IV Regressions. In the first four columns the instruments are a set of dummy variables indicating the judicial district. The instruments are highly significant in the first stage. In the last four columns the instruments are a set of dummy variables indicating the court. The instruments are highly significant in the first stage. The year dummies indicate the year of release from prison or electronic monitoring. The dependent variable is whether the inmate went back to prison for a new crime at the Province of Buenos Aires penitentiary system after release. Absolute values of t statistics are in parentheses. \* Significant at 10%; \*\* significant at 5%; \*\*\* significant at 1%.

<b>Table 7 - Electronic Monitoring and Recidivism</b> <b>(OLS and Probit regressions using Percentage of Time under Electronic Monitoring)</b>						
	1	2	3	4	5	6
Percent of imprisonment under EM	-0.07*** (3.29)	-0.06*** (3.19)	-0.05** (2.38)	-0.04** (2.27)	-0.03* (1.69)	-0.44*** (3.72)
Aggravated robbery=1	0.23 (0.95)	0.16 (0.69)	0.26 (1.17)	0.24 (1.08)	0.25 (1.07)	5.10*** (3.20)
Attempted aggravated robbery=1	0.25 (1.01)	0.17 (0.72)	0.26 (1.13)	0.24 (1.04)	0.23 (1.00)	5.06*** (3.15)
Robbery=1	0.33 (1.35)	0.25 (1.05)	0.29 (1.29)	0.28 (1.22)	0.27 (1.19)	5.21*** (3.25)
Attempted robbery=1	0.34 (1.37)	0.25 (1.07)	0.31 (1.36)	0.29 (1.27)	0.29 (1.25)	5.27*** (3.28)
Homicide=1	0.21 (0.85)	0.18 (0.74)	0.25 (1.11)	0.23 (1.01)	0.25 (1.10)	5.00*** (3.10)
Attempted homicide=1	0.24 (0.95)	0.22 (0.89)	0.32 (1.35)	0.32 (1.34)	0.31 (1.30)	5.39*** (3.31)
Larceny / Attempted larceny=1	0.25 (1.00)	0.20 (0.81)	0.27 (1.14)	0.26 (1.11)	0.26 (1.07)	5.21*** (3.22)
Carrying/using weapons=1	0.26 (1.04)	0.21 (0.87)	0.36 (1.55)	0.34 (1.47)	0.34 (1.48)	5.57*** (3.45)
Sexual offenses=1	0.08 (0.31)	0.10 (0.39)	0.22 (0.96)	0.19 (0.82)	0.21 (0.90)	4.65*** (2.84)
Other minor crimes=1	0.21 (0.86)	0.22 (0.92)	0.27 (1.17)	0.26 (1.12)	0.25 (1.08)	5.21*** (3.23)
Other serious crimes=1	0.35 (1.38)	0.33 (1.36)	0.45* (1.93)	0.43* (1.84)	0.43* (1.80)	5.80*** (3.58)
Age		-0.00** (2.18)	-0.00*** (3.08)	-0.00*** (3.04)	-0.00*** (3.15)	-0.00** (2.28)
(Age) <sup>2</sup>		0.00 (1.45)	0.00** (2.29)	0.00** (2.25)	0.00** (2.32)	0.00 (1.42)
Argentina=1		-0.02 (0.25)	-0.01 (0.18)	-0.02 (0.27)	-0.01 (0.23)	-0.12 (0.44)
# of previous imprisonment		0.18*** (9.08)	0.16*** (8.49)	0.16*** (8.25)	0.17*** (8.72)	0.55*** (7.80)
Time since release			0.00*** (5.20)	0.00 (0.24)	0.00 (0.27)	0.00 (0.79)
(Time since release) <sup>2</sup>			-0.00** (2.00)	0.00 (0.81)	0.00 (0.64)	0.00 (0.01)
Time under arrest (prison or ME)			0.00*** (2.71)	0.00*** (2.76)	0.00** (2.37)	0.00*** (2.79)
(Time under arrest (prison or ME)) <sup>2</sup>			0.00 (0.82)	0.00 (0.88)	0.00 (0.77)	0.00 (0.88)
Year dummies	no	no	no	yes	yes	yes
Observations	1816	1816	1816	1816	1816	1816

**Notes:** OLS Regressions in columns 1 to 5. Probit regression in column 6. The continuous variable "Percent of imprisonment under EM" indicates the percentage under electronic monitoring of the total time under the penitentiary system of the Province of Buenos Aires (equals zero for the inmates not assigned to electronic monitoring). The year dummies indicate the year of release from prison or electronic monitoring. The dependent variable is whether the inmate went back to prison for a new crime at the Province of Buenos Aires penitentiary system after release. The fifth column treats the evasion from electronic monitoring as a new crime. Absolute values of t (or z) statistics are in parentheses. \* Significant at 10%; \*\* significant at 5%; \*\*\* significant at 1%.



**Table 8 - Electronic Monitoring and Recidivism**  
**(IV regressions using Percentage of Time under Electronic Monitoring)**

	1	2	3	4	5	6
Percent of imprisonment under EM	-0.21*** (3.24)	-0.18*** (2.86)	-0.13** (2.20)	-0.13** (2.20)	-0.14*** (3.29)	-0.10** (2.29)
Aggravated robbery=1	0.26 (1.04)	0.19 (0.78)	0.28 (1.24)	0.26 (1.16)	0.18 (0.76)	0.26 (1.13)
Attempted aggravated robbery=1	0.26 (1.05)	0.18 (0.77)	0.27 (1.17)	0.25 (1.08)	0.18 (0.75)	0.25 (1.07)
Robbery=1	0.35 (1.43)	0.27 (1.13)	0.31 (1.35)	0.30 (1.28)	0.26 (1.11)	0.29 (1.26)
Attempted robbery=1	0.36 (1.45)	0.28 (1.15)	0.33 (1.43)	0.31 (1.34)	0.27 (1.13)	0.30 (1.32)
Homicide=1	0.23 (0.92)	0.20 (0.82)	0.27 (1.18)	0.25 (1.09)	0.19 (0.80)	0.24 (1.06)
Attempted homicide=1	0.27 (1.04)	0.24 (0.97)	0.33 (1.42)	0.33 (1.41)	0.23 (0.95)	0.33 (1.39)
Larceny / Attempted larceny=1	0.28 (1.09)	0.23 (0.90)	0.29 (1.21)	0.28 (1.18)	0.22 (0.88)	0.27 (1.15)
Carrying/using weapons=1	0.29 (1.17)	0.24 (1.00)	0.38 (1.63)	0.36 (1.56)	0.23 (0.96)	0.35 (1.53)
Sexual offenses=1	0.10 (0.41)	0.12 (0.49)	0.24 (1.03)	0.21 (0.89)	0.11 (0.46)	0.20 (0.86)
Other minor crimes=1	0.25 (0.99)	0.25 (1.05)	0.29 (1.27)	0.29 (1.23)	0.24 (1.01)	0.27 (1.19)
Other serious crimes=1	0.38 (1.48)	0.36 (1.46)	0.47** (1.99)	0.45* (1.92)	0.35 (1.43)	0.45* (1.89)
Age		-0.00** (1.97)	-0.00*** (2.82)	-0.00*** (2.78)	-0.00** (2.04)	-0.00*** (2.89)
(Age) <sup>2</sup>		0.00 (1.24)	0.00** (2.03)	0.00** (2.01)	0.00 (1.31)	0.00** (2.11)
Argentine=1		-0.01 (0.09)	0.00 (0.06)	-0.01 (0.13)	-0.01 (0.14)	-0.01 (0.19)
# of previous imprisonment		0.18*** (8.72)	0.16*** (8.22)	0.16*** (7.98)	0.18*** (8.86)	0.16*** (8.11)
Time since release			0.00*** (5.08)	0.00 (0.11)		0.00 (0.16)
(Time since release) <sup>2</sup>			-0.00** (1.98)	0.00 (0.86)		0.00 (0.84)
Time under arrest (prison or ME)			0.00** (2.39)	0.00** (2.42)		0.00** (2.57)
(Time under arrest (prison or ME)) <sup>2</sup>			0.00 (0.70)	0.00 (0.75)		0.00 (0.81)
Year dummies	no	no	no	yes	no	yes
Observations	1816	1816	1816	1816	1816	1816

**Notes:** IV Regressions. The continuous variable "Percent of imprisonment under EM" indicates the percentage under electronic monitoring of the total time under the penitentiary system of the Province of Buenos Aires (equals zero for the inmates not assigned to electronic monitoring). In the first four columns the instruments are a set of dummy variables indicating the judicial district. The instruments are highly significant in the first stage. In the last two columns the instruments are a set of dummy variables indicating the court. The instruments are highly significant in the first stage. The year dummies indicate the year of release from prison or electronic monitoring. The dependent variable is whether the inmate went back to prison for a new crime at the Province of Buenos Aires penitentiary system after release. Absolute values of t statistics are in parentheses. \* Significant at 10%; \*\* significant at 5%; \*\*\* significant at 1%.

**Table 9 - Electronic Monitoring and Recidivism only for Inmates under Electronic Monitoring, using Percentage of Time under Electronic Monitoring**

	1	2	3	4	5	6
Percent of imprisonment under EM	-0.04* (1.68)	-0.03 (1.27)	-0.01 (0.29)	-0.50*** (3.17)	-0.44*** (2.71)	-0.16 (0.95)
Aggravated robbery=1	-0.14 (0.96)	-0.18 (1.29)	-0.08 (0.58)	-0.16 (0.82)	-0.19 (1.03)	-0.08 (0.57)
Attempted aggravated robbery=1	-0.04 (0.24)	-0.09 (0.51)	0.01 (0.08)	-0.10 (0.44)	-0.11 (0.51)	0.01 (0.03)
Robbery=1	0.13 (0.82)	0.08 (0.52)	0.08 (0.52)	0.07 (0.34)	0.05 (0.26)	0.07 (0.46)
Attempted robbery=1	-0.12 (0.74)	-0.15 (0.99)	-0.09 (0.58)	-0.15 (0.71)	-0.17 (0.83)	-0.10 (0.63)
Homicide=1	-0.16 (1.01)	-0.17 (1.14)	-0.07 (0.44)	-0.27 (1.24)	-0.26 (1.28)	-0.08 (0.53)
Attempted homicide=1	-0.16 (0.83)	-0.16 (0.83)	-0.02 (0.11)	-0.17 (0.65)	-0.16 (0.66)	-0.04 (0.19)
Carrying/using weapons=1	-0.12 (0.75)	-0.15 (0.97)	-0.01 (0.08)	-0.13 (0.60)	-0.13 (0.62)	-0.03 (0.19)
Sexual offenses=1	-0.21 (1.21)	-0.18 (1.01)	-0.05 (0.31)	-0.26 (1.07)	-0.20 (0.89)	-0.07 (0.37)
Other minor crimes=1	-0.13 (0.79)	-0.13 (0.83)	-0.06 (0.41)	-0.13 (0.60)	-0.10 (0.50)	-0.07 (0.42)
Other serious crimes=1	-0.22 (1.23)	-0.20 (1.15)	-0.06 (0.33)	-0.30 (1.25)	-0.25 (1.12)	-0.09 (0.50)
Age		0.00 (1.32)	0.00 (1.39)		0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.44)
(Age) <sup>2</sup>		0.00 (1.07)	0.00 (1.14)		0.00 (0.23)	0.00 (0.26)
Argentine=1		0.03 (0.24)	0.17 (1.21)		0.16 (0.85)	0.18 (1.26)
# of previous imprisonment		0.13*** (3.86)	0.11*** (3.26)		0.05 (0.98)	0.08* (1.73)
Time since release			0.00 (0.61)			0.00 (0.10)
(Time since release) <sup>2</sup>			0.00 (0.44)			0.00 (0.74)
Time under arrest (prison or ME)			0.00 (1.03)			0.00 (0.13)
(Time under arrest (prison or ME)) <sup>2</sup>			0.00 (0.63)			0.00 (0.03)
Year dummies	no	no	Yes	no	no	yes
Observations	454	454	454	454	454	454

**Notes:** The continuous variable "Percent of imprisonment under EM" indicates the percentage under electronic monitoring of the total time under the penitentiary system of the Province of Buenos Aires. First three columns show OLS regressions. Last three columns show IV regressions where the instruments are a set of dummy variables indicating the judicial district. The year dummies indicate the year of release from prison or electronic monitoring. The dependent variable is whether the inmate went back to prison for a new crime after release. Absolute values of t statistics are in parentheses. \* Significant at 10%; \*\* significant at 5%; \*\*\* significant at 1%.

**Table 10 - Electronic Monitoring and Recidivism only for Inmates under Electronic Monitoring, using the Transfer to Electronic Monitoring without passing by a jail**

	1	2	3	4	5	6
No Jail=1	-0.05 (1.43)	-0.04 (1.02)	0.01 (0.34)	-0.59*** (3.91)	-0.54*** (3.37)	-0.33* (1.93)
Aggravated robbery=1	-0.14 (0.96)	-0.18 (1.30)	-0.08 (0.58)	-0.16 (0.94)	-0.20 (1.19)	-0.07 (0.47)
Attempted aggravated robbery=1	-0.04 (0.25)	-0.09 (0.51)	0.01 (0.09)	-0.10 (0.50)	-0.12 (0.58)	0.02 (0.10)
Robbery=1	0.12 (0.79)	0.08 (0.50)	0.08 (0.52)	0.04 (0.22)	0.01 (0.08)	0.06 (0.38)
Attempted robbery=1	-0.11 (0.71)	-0.15 (0.96)	-0.09 (0.58)	-0.10 (0.53)	-0.12 (0.65)	-0.07 (0.42)
Homicide=1	-0.15 (1.00)	-0.17 (1.13)	-0.07 (0.44)	-0.24 (1.24)	-0.23 (1.24)	-0.06 (0.35)
Attempted homicide=1	-0.17 (0.88)	-0.17 (0.87)	-0.02 (0.09)	-0.27 (1.12)	-0.25 (1.10)	-0.08 (0.38)
Carrying/using weapons=1	-0.12 (0.72)	-0.15 (0.94)	-0.01 (0.08)	-0.08 (0.39)	-0.07 (0.37)	0.01 (0.06)
Sexual offenses=1	-0.22 (1.22)	-0.18 (1.01)	-0.05 (0.30)	-0.28 (1.30)	-0.21 (1.03)	-0.05 (0.29)
Other minor crimes=1	-0.11 (0.71)	-0.12 (0.77)	-0.07 (0.42)	0.00 (0.00)	0.02 (0.09)	0.01 (0.04)
Other serious crimes=1	-0.21 (1.20)	-0.20 (1.13)	-0.05 (0.32)	-0.23 (1.09)	-0.19 (0.91)	-0.06 (0.33)
Age		-0.00 (1.38)	-0.00 (1.46)		-0.00 (0.79)	-0.00 (0.42)
(Age) <sup>2</sup>		0.00 (1.13)	0.00 (1.21)		0.00 (0.49)	0.00 (0.21)
Argentine=1		0.03 (0.24)	0.17 (1.21)		0.15 (0.87)	0.17 (1.10)
# of previous imprisonment		0.13*** (3.84)	0.11*** (3.34)		0.06 (1.19)	0.06 (1.36)
Time under arrest (prison or ME)			0.00 (1.16)			-0.00 (0.99)
(Time under arrest (prison or ME)) <sup>2</sup>			-0.00 (0.71)			0.00 (0.67)
Time since release			0.00 (0.63)			0.00 (0.71)
(Time since release) <sup>2</sup>			0.00 (0.43)			0.00 (0.13)
Year dummies	no	no	yes	no	no	Yes
Observations	454	454	454	454	454	454

**Notes:** The dummy variable "No Jail" equals 1 for those inmates that went directly to electronic monitoring since their detention (without passing by a jail), and 0 otherwise. First three columns show OLS regressions. Last three columns show IV regressions where the instruments are a set of dummy variables indicating the judicial district. The instruments are highly significant. The year dummies indicate the year of release from prison or electronic monitoring. The dependent variable is whether the inmate went back to prison for a new crime after release. Absolute values of t statistics are in parentheses. \* Significant at 10%; \*\* significant at 5%; \*\*\* significant at 1%.

<b>Table 11 – Evasion and Recidivism based on Previous Observables for Inmates under Electronic Monitoring</b>				
	1	2	3	4
Aggravated robbery=1	-0.18 (1.29)	-0.68 (1.33)	0.01 (0.08)	0.08 (0.12)
Attempted aggravated robbery=1	-0.08 (0.50)	-0.34 (0.55)	-0.08 (0.43)	-0.28 (0.38)
Robbery=1	0.08 (0.53)	0.17 (0.30)	0.01 (0.05)	0.08 (0.12)
Attempted robbery=1	-0.15 (0.98)	-0.53 (0.92)	-0.04 (0.26)	-0.12 (0.18)
Homicide=1	-0.17 (1.10)	-0.68 (1.18)	0.03 (0.22)	0.16 (0.24)
Attempted homicide=1	-0.16 (0.83)	-0.63 (0.81)	-0.14 (0.71)	
Carrying/using weapons=1	-0.16 (0.98)	-0.56 (0.94)	0.03 (0.19)	0.16 (0.24)
Sexual offenses=1	-0.17 (1.00)	-0.69 (0.97)	0.09 (0.52)	0.40 (0.56)
Other minor crimes=1	-0.13 (0.84)	-0.48 (0.80)	-0.11 (0.65)	-0.64 (0.84)
Other serious crimes=1	-0.20 (1.13)	-0.79 (1.11)	0.18 (0.98)	0.67 (0.94)
Age	0.00 (1.42)	0.00 (1.36)	0.00 (1.02)	0.00 (0.89)
(Age) <sup>2</sup>	0.00 (1.17)	0.00 (1.10)	0.00 (0.81)	0.00 (0.67)
Argentine=1	0.02 (0.18)	0.13 (0.20)	-0.12 (0.84)	-0.47 (0.92)
# of previous imprisonment	0.14*** (4.06)	0.50*** (3.93)	0.11*** (3.10)	0.39*** (3.07)
Observations	454	454	454	446

**Notes:** The dependent variable in the first two columns is whether the inmate went back to prison for a new crime after release. The dependent variable in the last two columns is whether the inmate evaded from monitoring. The regressors are only variables observable to the judge at the time of decision over monitoring surveillance. Columns 1 and 3 show OLS regressions. Columns 2 and 4 show Probit regressions. Absolute values of t statistics are in parentheses. \* Significant at 10%; \*\* significant at 5%; \*\*\* significant at 1%.