How Much Should We Trust Differences-in-Differences Estimates?

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Abstract

Most Difference-in-Difference (DD) papers rely on many years of data and focus on serially correlated outcomes. Yet almost all these papers ignore the bias in the estimated standard errors that serial correlation introduces. This is especially troubling because the independent variable of interest in DD estimation (e.g. the passage of law) is itself very serially correlated, which will exacerbate the bias in standard errors. To illustrate the severity of this issue, we randomly generate "placebo laws" in state-level data on female wages from the Current Population Survey. For each law, we use OLS to compute the DD estimate of its "effect" as well as the standard error for this estimate. The standard errors are severely biased: with about 20 years of data, DD estimation finds a significant "effect" at the 5% level for up to 45% of the placebo laws.

Two very simple techniques can solve this problem for large sample sizes. The first technique consists in collapsing the data and ignoring the time-series variation altogether; the second technique is to estimate standard errors while allowing for an arbitrary covariance structure between time periods. We also suggest a third technique, based on randomization inference testing methods, which works well irrespective of sample size. This technique uses the empirical distribution of estimated effects for placebo laws to form the test distribution.

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1 Introduction

Difference-in-Difference (DD) estimation has become an increasingly popular way to study causal relationships. DD estimation consists of identifying a specific intervention or "treatment" (often the passage of law). One then compares the difference in outcomes after and before the intervention for groups affected by it to this difference for unaffected groups. For example, to identify the incentive effects of social insurance, one might first isolate states that have raised unemployment insurance benefits. One would then compare changes in unemployment duration for residents of states raising benefits to residents of states not raising benefits. The great appeal of DD estimation comes from its simplicity as well as its potential to circumvent many of the endogeneity problems that typically arise when making comparisons between heterogeneous individuals.¹

Obviously, DD estimation also has its drawbacks. Most of the debate around the validity of a DD estimate revolves around the possible endogeneity of the laws or interventions themselves.² Sensitive to this concern, researchers have developed a set of informal techniques to gauge the extent of the endogeneity problem.³ In this paper, we address an altogether different problem with DD estimation. We assume away biases in estimating the intervention's effect and instead focus on possible biases in estimating the *standard error* around this effect.

DD estimates and standard errors for these estimates most often derive from using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) in repeated cross-sections (or a panel) of data on individuals in treatment and control groups for several years before and after a specific intervention. Formally, let Y_{ist} be the outcome of interest for individual i in group s (such as a state) at time t and T_{st} be a dummy for whether the intervention has affected group s at time t. One then typically estimates the following regression using OLS:

$$Y_{ist} = A_s + B_t + c X_{ist} + \beta T_{st} + \epsilon_{it}$$

$$\tag{1}$$

where A_s and B_t are fixed effects for the states and years and X_{ist} represents the relevant individual

¹See Meyer (1994) for an overview.

²See Besley and Case (1994). Another prominent concern has been whether DD estimation ever isolates a specific behavioral parameter. See Heckman (1996) and Blundell and MaCurdy (1999). Abadie (2000) discusses how well control groups serve as a control.

³Such techniques include the inclusion of pre-existing trends in states passing a law, testing for an "effect" of the law before it takes effect, or using information on political parties to instrument for passage of the law (Besley and Case 1994).

⁴For simplicity of exposition, we will often refer to interventions as laws, groups as states and time periods as years in what follows. Of course this discussion generalizes to other types of DD estimates.

controls. The estimated impact of the intervention is then the OLS estimate $\hat{\beta}$. Standard errors around that estimate are OLS standard errors after accounting for the correlation of shocks within each state-year (or s-t) cell.⁵

In this paper, we argue that the estimation of equation 1 is in practice subject to a possibly severe serial correlation problem. While serial correlation is well-understood, it has been largely ignored by researchers using DD estimation. Three factors make serial correlation an especially important issue in the DD context. First, DD estimation usually relies on fairly long time series. Our survey of DD papers, which we discuss below, finds an average of 16.5 periods. Second, the most commonly used dependent variables in DD estimation are typically highly positively serially correlated. Third, and an intrinsic aspect of the DD model, the treatment variable T_{st} changes itself very little within a state over time. These three factors reinforce each other to create potentially large mis-measurement in the standard errors coming from the OLS estimation of equation 1.

To assess the extent of this bias, we examine how DD performs on placebo laws, where state and year of passage are chosen at random. Since these laws are fictitious, a significant "effect" at the 5% percent level should be found only 5% of the time. In fact, we find dramatically higher rejection rates of the null hypothesis of no effect. For example, using female wages as a dependent variable (from the Current Population Survey) and covering 21 years of data, we find a significant effect at the 5% level in as much as 45% of the simulations.⁶

We propose three different techniques to solve the serial correlation problem.⁷ The two first techniques are very simple and work well for large enough sample sizes. First, one can remove the time-series dimension by aggregating the data into two periods: pre- and post-intervention. Second, one can allow for an arbitrary covariance structure over time within each state. Both of these solutions work well when the number of groups is large (e.g. 50 states) but fare poorly as

⁵This correction accounts for the presence of a common random effect at the state-year cell level. For example, economic shocks may affect all individuals in a state on an annual basis (Moulton 1990; Lang 2000). Ignoring this grouped data problem can lead to an under-statement of the standard error. In most of what follows, we will assume that the researchers estimating equation 1 have already accounted for this problem, either by allowing for appropriate random group effects or, as we do, by collapsing the data to a higher level of aggregation, such as state-year cells.

⁶Similar magnitudes arise in data manufactured to match the CPS distributions and where we can be absolutely sure that the placebo laws are not by chance picking up a real intervention.

⁷Other techniques fair poorly. Simple parametric corrections which estimate specific processes (such as an AR(1)) fare poorly because even long time series (by DD standards) are too short to allow precise estimation of the auto-correlation parameters and to identify the right assumption about the auto-correlation process. On the other hand, block bootstrap fails because the number of groups (e.g. 50 states) is not large enough.

the number of groups gets small. We propose a third (and preferred) solution which works well irrespective of sample size. This solution, based on the randomization inference tests used in the statistics literature, uses the distribution of estimated effects for placebo laws to form the test statistic.

The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. In section 2.2, we review some simple econometrics of auto-correlation and survey existing DD papers to assess the relevance of the auto-correlation problem in this context. In Section 3, we examine how DD performs on placebo laws. Section 4 discusses possible solutions. In Section 5, we draw implications for the existing literature. We conclude in Section 6.

2 Auto-correlation and Standard Errors

2.1 Review

It will be useful to first quickly review exactly why serial correlation poses a problem for OLS estimation. Consider the OLS estimation of equation 1, and denote V the vector of independent variables and α the vector of parameters. Assume that the error term is $E[\epsilon] = 0$ and $E[\epsilon \epsilon] = \Omega$. The true variance of the OLS estimate is given by:

$$var(\hat{\alpha}) = \sigma_{\epsilon}^{2} (V'V)^{-1} V \Omega V (V'V)^{-1}$$
(2)

while the OLS estimate of the variance is:

est
$$\operatorname{var}(\hat{\alpha}) = \sigma_{\epsilon}^2 (V'V)^{-1}$$
 (3)

To make these two expressions easier to compare, let's consider a simple uni-variate time-series case where we are regressing y_t on v_t with T periods of data. Suppose that the error term u_t follows an AR(1) process with auto-correlation parameter ρ and that the independent variable v_t follows an AR(1) with auto-correlation parameter $\lambda \geq 0$. In this special case, equations 2 and 3 can be simplified to:

$$var(\hat{\alpha}) = \frac{\sigma_{\epsilon}^2}{\sum_{t=1}^T v_t^2} (1 + 2\rho \frac{\sum_{t=1}^{T-1} v_t v_{t+1}}{\sum_{t=1}^T v_t^2} + 2\rho^2 \frac{\sum_{t=1}^{T-2} v_t v_{t+2}}{\sum_{t=1}^T v_t^2} + \dots + 2\rho^{T-1} \frac{v_1 v_T}{\sum_{t=1}^T v_t^2})$$

and

est
$$\operatorname{var}(\hat{\alpha}) = \frac{\sigma_{\epsilon}^2}{\sum_{t=1}^T v_t^2}$$

As $T \to \infty$, the ratio of estimated to true variance equals $\frac{1-\rho\lambda}{1+\rho\lambda}$.

These formulas make transparent three well known facts about how serial correlation biases OLS estimates of standard errors. First, positive serial correlation in the error term ($\rho > 0$) will cause an under-statement of the standard error while negative serial correlation will cause an overstatement. This is intuitive: positive serial correlation means that there is less information in each new year of data than OLS assumes. Second, the magnitude of the bias also depends on how serially correlated the independent variables is. In fact, when the independent variable is not serially correlated ($\lambda = 0$), there is no bias in the estimated standard errors. This second point is important in the DD context, where the intervention variable T_{st} is in fact very serially correlated. Indeed, for affected states, the intervention variable typically equals 0 period after period until one year where it turns to 1 and then stays at 1. In other words, the variable "whether a law was passed by state s by time t" varies little over time within a state, thereby exacerbating any serial correlation in the dependent variable. Finally, the magnitude of the problem depends on the length of the time series (T). All else held constant, as T increases, the bias in the OLS estimates of the standard errors worsens.

2.2 A Survey of DD Papers

This quick review suggests the relevance of a serial correlation problem for existing DD papers depends on three factors: (1) the typical length of the time series used; (2) the serial correlation of the most commonly used dependent variables; and (3) whether any corrective procedures are being undertaken to deal with serial correlation.

Since these factors are inherently empirical, we collected data on published DD papers. We identified all DD papers published in 6 journals between 1990 and 2000: the American Economic Review, the Industrial and Labor Relations Review, the Journal of Political Economy, the Journal of Public Economics, the Journal of Labor Economics, and the Quarterly Journal of Economics. We classified a paper as "DD" if it met two following criteria. First, the paper must focus on

specific interventions. For example, a paper that regressed wages on unemployment rates would not qualify as DD (even though it might suffer from serial correlation issues as well). Second, the paper must use units unaffected by the law as a "control." We found 92 such papers. For each of these papers, we determined the number of time periods in the study, the nature of the dependent variable, and the technique(s) used to estimate standard errors.

Table 1 summarizes the results of this exercise. We start with the lengths of the time series. 69 of the 92 DD papers used more than 2 periods of data. 4 of these papers used more than 2 periods but collapsed the data into two effective periods: before and after. Table 1 reports the distribution of time periods for the remaining 65 papers. 8 The average number of periods used is 16.5 and the median is 11. More than 75% of the papers use more than 5 periods of data. As we will see in the simulations below, lengths such as these are more than enough to generate serious under-estimation of the standard errors. 9

The most commonly used variables in DD estimation are employment and wages.¹⁰ Eighteen papers study employment and thirteen study wages. Other labor market variables, such as retirement and unemployment also receive a lot of attention, as do health outcomes. Most of these variables are clearly highly auto-correlated. Just to cite one example, Blanchard and Katz (1992) in their survey of regional fluctuations find strong persistence in shocks to state employment, wages and unemployment. It is interesting to note that first-differenced variables, which might have a tendency to exhibit negative auto-correlation (and thereby *over-state* standard errors) are quite uncommon. In short, the bulk of DD papers focus on outcomes which are likely positively serially correlated.

What do these 65 papers papers do about serial correlation? The vast majority of papers do not address the problem at all. Only five papers explicitly deal with it. Of these 5, 4 use a parametric AR(k) GLS-based correction. As we will see later, this correction does very little in the way of adjusting standard errors. The other one allows for arbitrary variance-covariance matrix within state, one of the solutions we will suggest in Section 4.

Two additional points are worth noting. First, it is interesting that 80 of the original 92 DD

⁸When a paper used different time lengths, we only recorded the minimum length.

 $^{^{9}}$ A period here is whatever unit of time is used. The very long time series in the data, such as the 51 or 83 at the 95^{th} and 99^{th} percentile arise because several papers use monthly or quarterly data.

¹⁰When a paper studies more than one variable, we record all the variables used.

papers have a potential problem with grouped error terms as the unit of observation is more detailed than the level of the variation. Only 36 of these papers deal with it, either by clustering standard errors or by aggregating the data. Second, several informal techniques are used for dealing with the possible endogeneity of the intervention variable. For example, 3 papers include a lag dependent variable in equation 1, 7 include a trend specifically for treated states, 15 plot graphs of some form to examine the dynamics of effect, 3 examine whether there is an effect before the law, 2 see if the effect is persistent, and 11 formally attempt to do triple-differences (DDD) by finding another control group. How these informal techniques interact with the serial correlation problem is unclear. We return to this issue in Section 5.

In summary, our review suggests that serial correlation is likely an important problem for many existing DD papers and that this problem has been poorly addressed to date.

3 Over-Rejection in DD Estimation

While the survey above shows that most DD papers are likely to report under-estimated standard errors, it does not tell us how serious the problem is in practice. To assess magnitudes, we turn to a specific data set, a sample of women's wages from the Current Population Survey (CPS).¹²

We extract data on women in their fourth interview month in the Merged Outgoing Rotation Group of the CPS for the years 1979 to 1999. We focus on all women between 25 and 50 years old. We extract information on weekly earnings, employment status, education, age, and state of residence. The sample therefore constructed contains a little less than 900,000 observations. We define wage as log(weekly earnings). Of these 900,000 women in the original sample, a little more than 300,000 report strictly positive weekly earnings. This generates (50*21=1050) state-year cells with each cell containing on average a little less than 300 women with positive weekly earnings.

The correlogram of the wage residuals is informative. We estimate first, second and third auto-correlation coefficients of the residuals from a regression of the logarithm of wages on state and year dummies (the relevant residuals since DD includes these dummies). The auto-correlation coefficients are obtained by a simple regression of the residuals on the corresponding lagged residuals. We are

¹¹For example, the effect of state level laws is studied using individual level data.

¹²The CPS is one of the most commonly used data sets in previous DD papers.

therefore imposing a common auto-correlation parameters for all states. The estimated first order auto-correlation is 0.51, and is strongly significant. The second and third order auto-correlation are high as well (.44 and .33 respectively), and decline much less rapidly than we would expect if the residual was following an AR(1) process.¹³

3.1 Placebo Interventions

To quantify the bias induced by serial correlation in the DD context, we randomly generate "laws", which affect some states and not others. We first draw a year uniformly at random between 1985 to 1995.¹⁴ Second, we select exactly half the states (25) at random and call them "affected" by the law. The intervention variable T_{st} is then defined as a dummy variable which equals 1 for all women that live in an affected state after the intervention date, and 0 otherwise.

We can then estimate DD (equation 1) using OLS on these placebo laws. The estimation generates an estimate of the laws' "effect" and of its standard error. To understand how well DD performs we can repeat this exercise a large number of times, each time drawing new laws at random. If DD provides an appropriate estimate for the standard error, we would expect that we reject the null hypothesis of no effect ($\beta = 0$) exactly 5% of the time when we use a t-cutoff level of 1.96.¹⁵

This exercise tells us about Type I error. Note that a small variant also allows us to assess Type II error, or power. After constructing the placebo intervention, T_{st} , we can replace the outcome in the CPS data by the outcome plus T_{st} times whichever effect we wish to simulate. For example, we can replace $\log(\text{weekly earnings})$ by $\log(\text{weekly earnings})$ plus Tst*.02 to generate a true .02 log point (approximately 2%) effect of the intervention. By repeatedly estimating DD in this data

¹³Solon (1984) points out that in panel data, when the number of time periods is fixed, the estimates of the auto-correlation coefficients obtained using a simple OLS regression are biased. Using Solon's generalization of Nickell's (1981) formula for the bias, the first order auto-correlation coefficient of 0.51 we estimate in the wage data, with 21 time periods, would correspond to a true auto-correlation coefficient of 0.6 if the data generating process was AR(1). However, Solon's formulas also imply that the second and third order auto-correlation coefficients would be much smaller than the coefficients we observe if the true data generating process was an AR(1) process with an auto-correlation coefficient of 0.6. To match the estimated second and third order auto-correlation parameters, the data would have to follow and AR(1) process with an auto-correlation coefficient of 0.8.

¹⁴We choose to limit the intervention date to the 1985-1995 period to ensure having enough observations prior and post intervention.

¹⁵One might argue that the rejection rate could be higher than 5% as we might accidentally be capturing some real interventions with the randomization procedure. However, we will show later on that data manufactured to track the variance structure of the CPS also produces rejection rates approximating those in the CPS.

(with new laws randomly drawn each time), we can assess how often DD finds an effect when there actually is one. ¹⁶

3.2 Basic Rejection Rates

The first row of Table 2 presents the result of this exercise when performed in the CPS micro data, without any correction for grouped error terms. We re-estimate equation 1 as described above for at least 200 independent draws of placebo laws. The control variables X_{ist} include 4 education dummies (less than high school, high school, some college and college and more) and a quartic in age as controls. We report the fraction of simulations in which the absolute value of the t-statistic was greater than 1.96, i.e. the fraction of simulations where the null hypothesis of no intervention effect was rejected at the 5% level.

The first column of row 1 shows the results of this exercise in the unaltered micro CPS data. Here, even though there is no true effect of the placebo laws, we find that the null of no effect is rejected a stunning 67.5% of the time. Thus, in this setup, DD is over-rejecting by a factor of thirteen.¹⁷ The second column of this row performs a similar exercise but on the CPS data altered to contain a 2% effect (we added $.02 * T_{st}$ to the data). We find that, in this case, we reject the null hypothesis of no effect in 85.5% of the cases.

A first important reason for this gross over-rejection has already been pointed out by Lang (2000), who applies the general argument of Moulton (1990). The estimation above does not account for correlation within state-year cell; it does not allow for aggregate year-to-year shocks that affect all the observations within a state. In other words, OLS assumes that the variance matrix for the error term is diagonal while in practice it might be block diagonal, with a constant correlation coefficient within each state and year cell. As noted earlier, while 80 papers suffer from this problem, only 36 correct for it.

To properly account for such shocks, one can assume that there is a random effect for each

¹⁶In this case, we will count only correct rejections, i.e. the number of DD estimates that are significant and positive.

¹⁷The average of the estimated coefficients $\hat{\beta}$ was 0. Thus while OLS overestimates standard errors, the estimated coefficients are unbiased.

state-year cell in equation 1 and instead estimate:

$$Y_{ist} = A_s + B_t + cX_{it} + \beta T_{st} + \nu_{st} + \epsilon_{it} \tag{4}$$

where ν_{st} are group random effects. Row 2 reports rejection rates when we allow for state-year random effects using the *cluster* command in STATA. We continue to find a 44% rejection rate.¹⁸

In row 3, we take a more drastic approach to solve this problem. We aggregate the data into state-year cells to construct a panel of states over time. To aggregate, we first regress log weekly earnings on the controls (education and age) and form residuals. We then compute means of these residuals by state and year. This leaves us with 50 times 21 state-year cells in the aggregate data. Using this aggregate data, we estimate:

$$\bar{Y}_{st} = \alpha_s + \gamma_t + \beta T_{st} + \theta \bar{X}_{st} + \epsilon_{st}$$
(5)

where the bar above the variables refers to the aggregation.

If the correlation within state-year cells were the only reason for over-rejection, aggregation ought to fully solve the problem, since it would make the variance-covariance matrix for the error term diagonal. Row 3 displays the results of multiple estimations of equation 5 for placebo laws. The rejection rate of the null of no effect is slightly lower here than when we simply cluster the micro data. However, it still remains very high. In about 44% of the simulations, we reject the null hypothesis of no effect.¹⁹

These magnitudes suggest that failing to account for serial correlation when computing standard errors generates a dramatic bias. As we saw in equation 2.1, one important factor in the DD context is the serial correlation of the intervention variable T_{st} itself. In fact, we would expect the un-corrected estimates of the standard errors for the intervention variable to be consistent in any variation of the DD model where the intervention variable is not serially correlated. To illustrate this point, we construct a different type of intervention variable. As before, we randomly select

¹⁸The "cluster" command in STATA allows for different intra-cluster correlations. We also tried to apply the correction procedure suggested in Moulton (1990). That procedure forces the intra-cluster correlation to be same across clusters and, therefore, may perform better in finite samples, especially when the number of cluster is small (if in fact the assumption of a constant correlation is a good approximation). The rate of rejection of the null hypothesis of no effect was not statistically different under the Moulton technique, possibly reflecting the fact that the number of clusters is large in this application.

¹⁹One might worry that the aggregation process, while it deals with the clustering problem, introduces heteroskedasticity in the data. The results in Table 2 are however unaffected if we use standard heteroskedasticity-correction techniques.

half of the states to form the treatment group. However, instead of randomly choosing one date after which all the states in the treatment group are affected by the law, we randomly select 10 dates between 1979 and 1999. The law is now defined as 1 if the observation relates to a state that belongs to the treatment group at one of the 10 intervention dates, 0 otherwise. In other words, the intervention variable is now repeatedly turned on and off, with its value yesterday telling us nothing about its value today, and thereby eliminating the serial correlation in T_{st} . In row 4, we see now that the null of no effect is rejected only 6% of the time in this case. Removing the serial correlation in the law removes the over-rejection. This strongly suggests that the bias in the standard errors is due to serial correlation, rather than other properties of the error terms.

In rows 5 and 6, we examine how rejection rates vary as we modify the number of affected states. When 12 states or 36 states are affected, the rejection rates are 39% and 43% respectively.

The placebo laws so far have been constructed in such a way that the intervention variable affects all treated states in the same year. In row 7, we create placebo laws such that the date of passage can differ across treated states. We randomly choose half of the states to form the treatment group but now randomly choose a passage date separately for each state (uniformly drawn between 1985 and 1995) in the treatment group. The T_{st} variable is still defined to equal 1 if state s has passed the "law" by time t, and 0 otherwise. The rejection rates continue to be high in this case, with the null of no effect being rejected about 35% of the time.

One might still worry at this point that factors other than serial correlation give rise to these overly high rejection rates. Perhaps we are by chance picking up on actual laws (or other relatively discrete changes). Or perhaps other features of the wage data, such as state specific trends or other characteristics of the distribution of the error term, give rise to the over-rejection. To directly address all of these problems, we replicate our analysis in manufactured data. Specifically, we generate data whose variance structure in terms of relative contribution of state and year fixed effects matches the empirical variance decomposition in the CPS. The data is normally distributed and follows an AR(1) process whith an auto-correlation parameter ρ . By construction, we therefore know there are no ambient trends and that the laws truly have no effect in the manufactured data. Yet, in row 8, where we assume that ρ equals .8, we find a rejection rate roughly equal to what we found in the CPS, 37%.

3.3 Magnitude of Effects

These excess rejection rates are stunning, but they might not be so problematic if the estimated "effects" for the placebo laws are economically insignificant. We examine the magnitudes of the "statistically significant" intervention effects in Table 3. Using the aggregate data, we perform 200 independent simulations of equation 5 for placebo laws defined such as in row 3 of Table 2. Table 3 reports the empirical distribution of the estimated effects $\hat{\beta}$, when these effects are significant. Not surprisingly, this distribution appears quite symmetric: half of the false rejections are negative and half are positive. On average, the absolute value of the effects is roughly .02, which corresponds roughly to a 2 percent effect. Nearly 60% fall in the 1 to 2 % range. About 30% fall in the 2 to 3% range, and the remaining 10% are larger than 3%.

These magnitudes are especially large considering that DD estimates are often represented as elasticities.²⁰ For example, suppose that the law under study corresponds to be a 5% increase in the child-care subsidy. An increase in log earnings of .02 would correspond to a .4 elasticity. Similarly, in many DD estimates, the affected group is often only a fraction of the sample, implying that a 2% effect would actually be a much larger effect on the actual group.²¹

To summarize, our findings suggest that the standard errors from the OLS estimation of equations 1 grossly understates the true standard errors around the treatment effect, even after one accounts for group data effects in the micro data. In other words, reporting simple DD estimates and their standard errors without accounting for serial correlation will generate many spurious results.²²

3.4 Varying Serial Correlation

How does over-rejection vary with the serial correlation in the dependent variable? We address this question in two different ways. First, we use other outcome variables in the CPS as left-hand side

²⁰The DD estimates are normalized using the magnitude of the change in the policy variable of interest.

²¹For example, when studying the effects of changes unemployment insurance benefits on job search, one would examine the full sample of the unemployed, not only those who actually took up the program. This use of all people *eligible* for a program rather than all recipients is often motivated by an attempt to avoid the endogeneity caused by selective take-up. See, however, Heckman et. al. (1998) for a critical discussion of this choice.

²²Mapping these findings to the existing literature on DD requires more care. In practice, researchers also apply a set of informal techniques in order to assess endogeneity. For example, they may check that the "law" had no effect before it was passed. How these techniques interact with the over-rejection rates we just discussed is unclear. We will return to this point in Section 5.

variables. Second, we experiment with various auto-correlation parameters in the manufactured data.

The first part of Table 4 estimates equation 5 on employment rate, average weekly working hours and change in log wages, as well as the original log weekly earnings. As before, the table displays the rejection rate of the null hypothesis of no effect in 200 independent simulations with random draws of the intervention variable, both in raw data and in data altered to create a 2% effect of the intervention. We also report in Table 4 estimates of the first, second and third order auto-correlation coefficients for each of these variables. As we see, the false rejection problem diminishes with the serial correlation in the dependent variable. As expected, when the estimator of the first-order auto-correlation is negative (as it is the case for change in log wages), we find that the conventional standard errors tends to underestimate the precision of the estimated treatment effect.

The second part of Table 4 uses manufactured data. The error structure is designed to follow an AR(1) process. As before, the manufactured data has the same number of states and years as the CPS data and is constructed so that the relative importance of state effects, year effects and the error term in the total variance matches the variance composition of the wage data in the CPS. Not surprisingly, the false rejection rates increase with the auto-correlation parameter in the AR(1) process. There is exactly the right rejection rate when there is no auto-correlation. But even at moderate levels, such as .2 or .4, rejection rates are already two to four times as large as they should be. As noted earlier, with an AR(1) parameter of 0.8, the rejection rate using the standard OLS formula is close to what we observe in the CPS data. And again, when the auto-correlation is negative, there is under-rejection.

3.5 Varying the Number of States and Time Periods

The stylized exercise above focused data with 51 states and 21 time periods. Many DD papers use fewer states (or treated and control units), either because of data limitations or a desire to focus only on comparable controls. For similar reasons, several DD papers use fewer time periods. In Table 5, we examine how the over-rejection rate varies with these two important parameters. As before, we use the CPS as well as manufactured data to analyze these effects. We also examine

rejection rates when we have added a treatment effect to the data.

Rows 1-4 and 10-13 show that varying the number of states does not change the extent of over-rejection. Rows 5-9 and 14-18 vary the number of years. As expected, the extent of over-rejection decreases with the number of years. But it does so at a surprisingly slow rate. For example, even with only 7 years of data, the over-rejection rate is 16% in the CPS or more than three times too large. Around 70% of the DD papers in our survey use at least that many periods. With 5 years of data, the rejection rate varies between 8% (CPS data) and 17% (manufactured data). When T=50, the rejection rate rises to nearly 50% in the manufactured data.

4 Solutions

4.1 Parametric Methods

A first natural solution to the serial correlation problem would be to specify the auto-correlation structure for the error term, estimate its parameters, and use equation (2) to estimate true standard errors. We implement several variations of this basic correction method in Table 6.

Row 2 performs the simplest GLS correction, wherein an AR(1) process is estimated in the data.²⁴ This technique does little to solve the serial correlation problem: the rejection rate is still 34.5%. The failure here is in part due to the under-estimation of the auto-correlation coefficient. As is well understood, with short time-series the OLS estimation of the auto-correlation parameter is biased downwards. In the CPS data, OLS estimates a first-order auto-correlation coefficient of only 0.4. Similarly, in the manufactured data where we know that the auto-correlation parameter is .8, a parameter of only .62 is estimated (row 7). If we impose a first-order autocorrelation of .8 in the CPS data (row 3), the rejection rate goes down to 12.5%, a clear but only partial improvement.

Another problem with such GLS correction may be that we have not correctly specified the auto-correlation process. As noted earlier, an AR(1) does not fit the correlogram of wages in CPS.

²³In the CPS data, we vary the number of states by randomly selecting some states and discarding others. In both types of data, we continue to treat exactly half the states.

 $^{^{24}}$ Practically, this can be implemented using the xtgls command in Stata. Computationally, this command first estimates the first order auto-correlation coefficient of the residual by regressing the residual on its lag, and then use this estimated coefficient to form and estimate of the variance-covariance matrix of the residual. The matrix is block diagonal, with a matrix of the form Ω (in equation 2) in each block. The results are the same whether or not we assume each state has its own auto-correlation parameter.

In rows 8 and 9, we use the manufactured data to see the effect of such mis-specification of the autocorrelation process. In row 8, we generate data according to an AR(2) process with $\rho_1 = .55$ and $\rho_2 = .35$. These parameters were chosen because they match well the estimated first, second and third auto-correlation parameters in the wage data when we apply the formulas to correct for small sample bias given in Solon (1984). We then use a GLS estimation, assuming that the error term follows an AR(1) process. The rejection rate rises significantly with this mis-specification of the auto-correlation structure (30.5%).

In row 9, we use a process that even better fits the time-series properties of the CPS data: the sum of an AR(1) (with auto-correlation parameter 0.95) and a white noise (the variance of the white noise is 13 % of the total variance of the residual).²⁵ When trying to correct the auto-correlation in this data by fitting an AR(1), we reject the null in about 39% of the case, close to what we found for the CPS data in row 2.

However, attempting to correct for the auto-correlation by specifying different processes does not look like a plausible option. In rows 4 and 5, we correct the standard errors by imposing the specific AR(2) and AR(1) plus white noise processes that we have seen match fairly well the CPS data. The rejection rates remain high.²⁶

4.2 Block Bootstrap

An alternative correction method we experiment with is block bootstrap (Efron, 1994). Block bootstrap is a variant of bootstrap which maintains the auto-correlation structure by keeping all the residuals of a state together. We implement block bootstrap as follows. We first estimate equation 1 and compute residuals. This gives a vector of residuals ϵ_i for each state. We then draw for each state a new residual vector from this distribution (with replacement). Adding this residual back to the original predicted value gives us a new outcome variable Y_{it}^1 . We then estimate equation 1 for this outcome. By repeatedly sampling from the residual distribution of ϵ_i , we can form different Y_{it}^k and repeat this exercise to estimate a sequence of $\hat{\beta}_k$. The distribution of these

²⁵Note that an AR(1) plus white noise seems a priori a very reasonable process for the CPS data. Indeed, even if the wage follows an AR(1) in the population, the repeated cross-section in the CPS implies that a non-persistent sampling error is added to the error term each year.

²⁶Similar results hold if we estimate the parameters of the processes, as in row 2, rather than impose them.

parameters then gives us a test statistic.

The results of the block bootstrap estimation are reported in Table 7. They are not encouraging. The rejection rates are hardly affected in the CPS data (row 2) and stay high in the manufactured data as well (row 3). The problem appears to be the small number of "blocks" or states. In row 4, when we allow for 400 states (and 200 states passing the law), block bootstrap delivers a close to correct rejection rate. Since very few applications in practice can rely on that many groups, block bootstrap does not appear to be a realistic solution to the serial correlation problem.

4.3 Empirical Variance-Covariance Matrix

Both the most parametric and the most non-parametric method seem to fail because of lack of data: there are not enough time periods for the GLS correction, and not enough states for block bootstrap. However, the parametric techniques we tried above did not make use of the fact that we have a large number of states that can be used to estimate the auto-correlation process in a flexible way. Specifically, suppose that the auto-correlation process is the same in all states. In this case, if the data is sorted by states and (by decreasing order of) years, the matrix of variance covariance of the error term is block diagonal, with 50 identical blocks of size T by T (where T is the number of time periods). Each of these block is symmetric, and the element (i, i+j) is the correlation between ϵ_i and ϵ_{i-j} . We can therefore use the variation across the 50 states to estimate each element of this matrix, and use this estimated matrix to compute standard errors from equation 2. This is equivalent to treating the problem as a system of T equations (1 for each year), with 50 data points (one for each state) in each year. We implement this technique in Table 8. The rejection rate we obtain (in 200 simulations) is 7.75% in the CPS (row 2) and 10% in the manufactured data (row 9), a significant improvement over the two previous methods.

This correction method however has important limitations in practice. First, as the number of states drops, the rejection rates start to increase (rows 4, 6 and 8). A second obvious issue is that this method does not deliver consistent estimates of the standard error if the data generating process is not the same across all states. Finally, the technique has low power. In column 2 of row 2, we see that the rejection rate is only 8.5% when a true 2% effect is associated with the laws.

4.4 Arbitrary Variance-Covariance Matrix

This procedure can be generalized to an estimator of the variance covariance matrix which is consistent in the presence of any correlation pattern within states over time. Of course, we cannot consistently estimate each element of the matrix Ω in this case, but we can use a generalized White-like formula to compute the standard errors. This estimator for the variance-covariance matrix is given by:

$$V = (X' * X)^{-1} \left(\sum_{j=1}^{n_c} u'_j * u_j \right) (X' * X)^{-1}$$

where n_c is the total number of states, X is matrix of independent variables and u_j is defined for each state to be:

$$u_j = \sum_{t=1}^{T} e_{jt} * x_{jt}$$

where the summation is over all elements in the state, e_{jt} is the residual for observation in t (of that state) and x_{jt} is a row vector of dependent variables (including the constant).²⁷ This estimator of the variance-covariance matrix is consistent as the number of states tends to infinity.

The results for this estimation procedure are shown in Table 9. Despite its generality, the arbitrary variance-covariance matrix does quite well. The rejection in the unaltered CPS data is 6% (row 2, column 1). Moreover, the procedure has relatively high power compared to what we found in Table 8 (row 2, column 2). Again, however, rejection rates increase significantly above 5% when the number of groups declines (15% with 6 states, 8.5% with 10 states).

4.5 Ignoring Time Series Information

Another possible solution to the serial correlation problem is to simply ignore the time series component in the estimation and when computing the standard errors.²⁸ To do this, one could simply average the data before and after the law and run equation 1 on this averaged outcome variable as a panel of length 2. The results of this exercise are reported in Table 10. The rejection rates are approximately correct now at 6%. Moreover, the power of .295 in row 2 is quite high relative to other techniques.

²⁷This is implemented in a straightforward way by using the cluster command in STATA and choosing entire states (and not only state-year cells) as clusters.

²⁸It could still be used for specification checks, such as verifying that there is no "effect" prior to the law or no trends in the treatment group.

Taken literally, however, this solution will work only for laws that are passed for all the treated states at the same time. If states pass the law at different times, "before" and "after" are no longer the same and are not even defined for states that never pass the law. One can however slightly modify the technique in the following way. First, one estimates a regression of Y_{st} on state fixed effects, year dummies and any covariates one might care about. Then one takes the residual of this, keeping only the treatment states. Now, the average of the residual is taken for all the treated states for before and after their law. The simple difference of these averages before and after estimates the treatment effect and the standard error is the standard error in this subset of states. This procedure does as well as the simple aggregation (row 3 vs. row 2) for laws that are all passed at the same time. It also does well when the laws are staggered over time (row 4).

The downside of this procedure (both raw and residual aggregation) is that it does poorly when the number of states is small. With 20 states, residual aggregation has a rejection rate of 9.5%, nearly twice too large. With only 6 states, the rejection rate is as high as 31.5%. The extent of over-rejection in fact appears to increase faster in this case than in the clustering method presented above.

4.6 Randomization Inference

We have so far isolated two procedures that appear to do fairly well when the number of states is sufficiently large. In this section, we present an estimation technique that does well irrespective of the sample size. The principle behind the test is simple, and motivated by the simulation exercises carried out throughout this paper. To compute the standard error for a specific experiment, we propose to compute DD estimates for a large number of randomly generated placebo laws and to use the empirical distribution of the estimated effects for these placebo laws to form significance test for the true law.²⁹

This test is closely related to the randomization inference test (or Fisher's exact test), discussed in the statistical literature (see Rosenbaum (1996) for an overview of this test and its applications). Before laying out the test in more details, it will be useful to give a simple, motivating illustration of the way randomization inferences testing works. Suppose we have outcome data (such as days

²⁹The code needed to perform this test is available from the authors upon request.

worked that winter) on individuals, half of whom have received a flu shot. Define Y_i to be the outcome and T_i be the indicator for flu shot receipt, both for individual i. Suppose that the we make the hypothesis that the treatment effect is constant:

$$Y_i = a_i + \theta T_i$$

Now, let us assume that the flu shot was in fact random so that a_i is orthogonal to T_i . To estimate the effect of the shot, we could take the difference in mean outcomes between those receiving the shot and those not receiving it. Call this estimator $\hat{\theta}(T_i, Y_i)$. How can we test hypotheses about this parameter? We would use the OLS estimate of the standard error but this estimates rests on strong assumptions, such as homoskedasticity, normal distribution of the error and independence between observations. Instead, to test whether the coefficient is different from 0, one can use the fact that under the null of no effect, people in the treatment and control are statistically the same. One can, therefore, generate a set of placebo interventions \tilde{T}_i and estimate the "effect" of these placebos. Repeated estimation will give us a distribution of effects for such placebos. We can then observe where the original estimate $\hat{\theta}$ lies in this distribution to construct a confidence interval for the test.

For example, to form a two-tailed test for whether the initial estimate is significantly different from 0 at the 5% level, we would use the 2.5% and 97.5% values in the distribution $\hat{\theta}(T_i, Y_i)$ as our cut-off value. The intuition behind this test is quite simple. Since the flu shot is assumed to be random, we can generate other truly random, zero-effect shots and see what estimates these produce in the data we have. Notice the advantages of this procedure. We are making no assumptions about the error term (except for the randomness of the flu shot itself). It need not be homoskedastic, normal or even independent across individuals. Further, this test does not rest on any large sample approximation: it is therefore valid for any sample size. We could test other hypotheses in the same way: if we want to test whether the estimate is different from θ_0 , we first form $Y_{i0} = a_i - \theta_0 T_{i0}$, to make the treatment and the control comparable under the null, and we apply the same technique to the transformed data.³⁰

The statistical inference test we propose for the DD model derives naturally from this example.

³⁰Therefore, one can use the same technique to form entire confidence intervals.

To form the estimate of the law's effect, we estimate by OLS the usual aggregate equation:

$$\bar{Y}_{st} = \alpha_s + \gamma_t + \beta T_{st} + \theta \bar{X}_{st} + \epsilon_{st}$$

We then generate a placebo law that affect 25 randomly chosen states in a random year, P_{st} and estimate via OLS:

$$\bar{Y}_{st} = \alpha_s + \gamma_t + \gamma P_{st} + \theta \bar{X}_{st} + \epsilon_{st}$$

Repeating this procedure many times for random placebo laws produces a distribution of $\hat{\gamma}$. Define G(.) to be this distribution and $\hat{\gamma}$ to be the random variable drawn from this distribution. To test the hypothesis that our estimate is statistically different from 0, we simply need to ask where $\hat{\beta}$ lies in the G(.) distribution. For example, to form a two-tailed test of level p, we would simply identify the $\hat{\gamma}$ at the $\frac{p}{2}$ lower and upper tail of the distribution and use these values as cutoffs for the confidence interval. As before, note that we have not used any information about the error term. Instead, we have relied solely on the random assignment of the laws.³¹

In Table 11, we assess how well this procedure performs in the aggregated CPS data as well as in manufactured data with a known auto-correlation structure. Again, we randomly generate intervention variables. For each randomly generated intervention T_{st} , we construct the test statistic for a 5% cutoff. We perform 200 independent draws of T_{st} . For each of these draw, we perform 400 draws of P_{st} to construct the distribution $G(\hat{\gamma})$.

We see that the basic randomization inference procedure leads us to reject the null hypothesis of no effect in 6% of the simulations (row 2, column 1). Notice that the procedure also seems fairly powerful, leading to rejecting in 23% of the cases when there is an effect (row 2, column 2).

There is an additional assumption behind this test, namely the requirement that we know the exact statistical process determining which units get treated (e.g. in the flu shot example, the statistician know that half of the sample was randomly selected to get the treatment). In practice, we will not know the true process by which laws are generated. If a particular law took place in 1988, and we are estimating its effect, should we assume when generating the placebo laws that the law could only have been passed in 1988, that it could have been passed at any random time

³¹The theoretical justification for this test rests on the proof of the validity of using the randomization distribution. These tests use the strong assumption of randomization of the treatment to map out the distribution of the test statistic. The only difference in our case is that state laws are not random unconditionally, but instead that they are random conditional on the state fixed effects and year dummies.

between 1971 and 2000, etc.? Rows 3 to 5 consider the effect of using different (and simpler) assumptions about the law generating process. Each row allows the laws for the test distribution to lie in a different window around the actual law date. In row 3 for example, we assume that it lies in a 5 year window centered on the actual date. In row 4, we assume a 3 year window. In row 5, we force the placebo laws to occur in the same year as the actual laws; in other words, we only change around which states were affected by the laws. As can be seen, both in terms of type I and type II errors, all the procedures produce very similar results. 3233

The next few rows repeat the exercise but use smaller and smaller number of states. Even with as few as 6 states, the procedure is producing exactly the right rejection rates.

To summarize, Table 11 makes it clear that, of all the techniques we have considered, randomization inference performs the best. It removes the over-rejection problem and does so independently of sample size. Moreover, it appears to have power comparable to that of the other tests. Although randomization inference testing is well known in statistics, it is largely ignored in the econometrics literature. Difference in differences estimation, which deals with small effective sample size, and complicated error distribution, seems a particularly fertile ground for the application of this testing technique.

5 Implications for Existing Papers

This paper has highlighted an important problem with DD estimation and proposed several solutions to deal with it. But what does this imply for the existing stock of papers which use the DD estimation technique but do not explicitly correct for serial correlation? We have already seen that most of these papers use long time series and variables which are likely quite auto-correlated. One possibility, however, is that some of the informal techniques used in these papers might indirectly help alleviate the auto-correlation problem.

As we noted earlier, researchers have developed a set of diagnostic tests that are often per-

³²Similar problems may arise in determining how many states were affected. If we see 25 states out of 50 affected, was the process one in which each state had a 50% iid chance of being affected or was it one in which exactly 25 states will be affected? Simulations which vary this additional element show that the results are not affected by which selection process is assumed (even if it differs from the actual process).

³³It is also worth noting that while these results tell us that in simulations, using incorrect approximations do not make a difference, this may not be a general theoretical result.

formed in conjunction with the estimation of equations 1 or 5. These tests are meant to assess the endogeneity of the interventions, something that is not a problem in our setup, as we construct random interventions that are by definition exogenous. It is possible that these tests may incidentally lessen the auto-correlation problem. In Table 12, we report rejection rates when we perform the OLS estimation of equations 1 and 5 in combination with several commonly used diagnostic techniques.³⁴ We concentrate on 3 data sets: micro CPS wage data (with clustering of the error term by state-year cell), aggregate CPS wage data, and manufactured data where the error term follows an AR(1) process with an autocorrelation parameter of 0.8.

The first diagnostic test looks for pre-existing "effects" of the law. We reject the null hypothesis of no effect only if the estimated coefficient is statistically significant under OLS and if there is no statistically, same-signed, significant effect of the intervention one year prior to the law. This diagnostic test implies only a small reduction in the rejection rate (.335, .320 and .325).

The second diagnostic test examines persistence of the effect. We reject the null hypothesis of no effect if the estimated coefficient is statistically significant under OLS and the effect persists three years after the intervention date. Again, this does not lead to a significant reduction in the rejection rate in any of the datasets.

The third test looks for pre-existing trends in the treatment sample. We perform a regression in the pre-period and estimate whether there is a significant time trend in these years for the difference between control and treatment states). Under this test, we reject the null of no effect if the OLS coefficient is statistically significant and if there is no statistically significant pre-existing treatment trend or a treatment trend of opposite sign of the intervention effect. The rejection rates are lower under this test but stay above 20%.

Finally, the last test consists in allowing for a treatment specific trend in the data. Under this test, we reject the null if the OLS coefficient is significant and stays significant and of the same size after controlling in the regression for a yearly trend interacted with the treatment dummy. This diagnostic test leads to a bigger reduction in the rejection rate, especially in the aggregate data (.105, .070, .150).

³⁴Of course, we can only study the formal procedures which people use. One can always argue that informal procedures (such as looking at the data) will lead one to avoid the serial correlation problem. Such a claim is by construction hard to test using simulations. The only way to defend it would be go back to the original papers and submit them to the procedures discussed above.

How are we to interpret this evidence? Any stringent criterion will reduce the rejection rate, but how are we to assess whether the reduction is sensible? In other words, does the addition of a treatment trend test reduce the over-rejection rate by dealing with the auto-correlation problem? To examine this, we investigate the marginal rejection rate of the randomization inference test, conditional on passing the treatment trend diagnostic test. Specifically, we ask what is the odds that, having passed the trend test, an intervention would fail the randomization inference test. We find that only 26 % of the simulations that pass the trend test pass the randomization inference test in the CPS aggregate data. Hence, it appears that controlling for a treatment trend reduces the rejection rate but not in a way that seriously alleviates the serial correlation problem.³⁵ The results in Table 12 therefore confirm that the existing stock of DD papers is very likely affected by the estimation problem discussed in this paper.³⁶

6 Conclusion

Our results suggest that, because of serial correlation, DD estimation as it is commonly performed grossly under-states the standard errors around the estimated intervention effect. While the bias induced by serial correlation is well understood in theory, the sheer magnitude of this problem in the DD context should come as a surprise to most readers. Since a large fraction of the published DD papers we surveyed report t-statistics around 2, our results suggest that the findings in many of these papers may not be as precise as originally thought to be and that far too many false rejections of the null hypothesis of no effect have taken place.

We propose three solutions to deal with the serial correlation problem in the DD context. Collapsing the data into pre- and post- periods or allowing for an arbitrary covariance matrix within state over time have been shown to be simple viable solutions when sample sizes are sufficiently large. Alternatively, a simple adaptation of the randomization inference testing techniques developed in the statistics literature appears to fully correct standard errors irrespective of sample

³⁵For comparison, we also computed the marginal rejection rate of the randomization inference test, conditional on passing the OLS test in manufactured i.i.d data. Consistent with expectations, we found that more than 85% of the simulations that passed the OLS test also passed the randomization inference test.

³⁶We have attempted variants on these diagnostic tests, such as changing what constitutes an "effect" in the preperiod or what constitutes a trend. We have also attempted all the tests together. The results were qualitatively the same.

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Table 1: Survey of DD Papers^a

Number of DD papers	92	
	69	
Number with more than 2 periods of data		
Number which collapse data into before-after	4	
Number with serial correlation problem	65	
Number with some serial correlation correction	5	
GLS	4	
Arbitrary variance-covariance matrix	î	
V C C C		
Distribution for papers with more than 2 periods	$\mathbf{A}\mathbf{v}\mathbf{e}\mathbf{r}\mathbf{a}\mathbf{g}\mathbf{e}$	16.5
	Percentile	Value
	1%	3
	5%	3
	10%	4
	25%	5.75
	50%	11
	75%	21.5
	90%	36
	95%	51
	99%	83
	0070	00
Informal manipulations of data	Number	
Informal manipulations of data Graph time series of effect.	$\begin{array}{c} \mathbf{Number} \\ 15 \end{array}$	
Graph time series of effect	15	
Graph time series of effect See if effect persists	$\frac{15}{2}$	
Graph time series of effect See if effect persists Examine lags of law to see timing of effect	$\begin{array}{c} 15 \\ 2 \\ 2 \end{array}$	
Graph time series of effect See if effect persists Examine lags of law to see timing of effect DDD	15 2 2 11	
Graph time series of effect See if effect persists Examine lags of law to see timing of effect DDD Include trend specific to passing states	15 2 2 11 7	
Graph time series of effect See if effect persists Examine lags of law to see timing of effect DDD Include trend specific to passing states Explicitly include lead to look for effect prior to law	15 2 2 11 7 3	
Graph time series of effect See if effect persists Examine lags of law to see timing of effect DDD Include trend specific to passing states	15 2 2 11 7	
Graph time series of effect See if effect persists Examine lags of law to see timing of effect DDD Include trend specific to passing states Explicitly include lead to look for effect prior to law Include lag dependent variable	15 2 2 11 7 3 3	
Graph time series of effect See if effect persists Examine lags of law to see timing of effect DDD Include trend specific to passing states Explicitly include lead to look for effect prior to law Include lag dependent variable Number which have clustering problem	15 2 2 11 7 3 3 80	
Graph time series of effect See if effect persists Examine lags of law to see timing of effect DDD Include trend specific to passing states Explicitly include lead to look for effect prior to law Include lag dependent variable	15 2 2 11 7 3 3	
Graph time series of effect See if effect persists Examine lags of law to see timing of effect DDD Include trend specific to passing states Explicitly include lead to look for effect prior to law Include lag dependent variable Number which have clustering problem Number which deal with it	15 2 2 11 7 3 3 80	
Graph time series of effect See if effect persists Examine lags of law to see timing of effect DDD Include trend specific to passing states Explicitly include lead to look for effect prior to law Include lag dependent variable Number which have clustering problem Number which deal with it Most commonly used variables	15 2 2 11 7 3 3 80 36	
Graph time series of effect See if effect persists Examine lags of law to see timing of effect DDD Include trend specific to passing states Explicitly include lead to look for effect prior to law Include lag dependent variable Number which have clustering problem Number which deal with it Most commonly used variables Employment	15 2 2 11 7 3 3 80 36	
Graph time series of effect See if effect persists Examine lags of law to see timing of effect DDD Include trend specific to passing states Explicitly include lead to look for effect prior to law Include lag dependent variable Number which have clustering problem Number which deal with it Most commonly used variables Employment Wages	15 2 2 11 7 3 3 80 36	
Graph time series of effect See if effect persists Examine lags of law to see timing of effect DDD Include trend specific to passing states Explicitly include lead to look for effect prior to law Include lag dependent variable Number which have clustering problem Number which deal with it Most commonly used variables Employment	15 2 2 11 7 3 3 80 36	
Graph time series of effect See if effect persists Examine lags of law to see timing of effect DDD Include trend specific to passing states Explicitly include lead to look for effect prior to law Include lag dependent variable Number which have clustering problem Number which deal with it Most commonly used variables Employment Wages	15 2 2 11 7 3 3 80 36	
Graph time series of effect See if effect persists Examine lags of law to see timing of effect DDD Include trend specific to passing states Explicitly include lead to look for effect prior to law Include lag dependent variable Number which have clustering problem Number which deal with it Most commonly used variables Employment Wages Health/Medical Expenditure Unemployment	15 2 2 11 7 3 3 80 36	
Graph time series of effect See if effect persists Examine lags of law to see timing of effect DDD Include trend specific to passing states Explicitly include lead to look for effect prior to law Include lag dependent variable Number which have clustering problem Number which deal with it Most commonly used variables Employment Wages Health/Medical Expenditure	15 2 2 11 7 3 3 80 36	
Graph time series of effect See if effect persists Examine lags of law to see timing of effect DDD Include trend specific to passing states Explicitly include lead to look for effect prior to law Include lag dependent variable Number which have clustering problem Number which deal with it Most commonly used variables Employment Wages Health/Medical Expenditure Unemployment Fertility/Teen Motherhood Insurance	15 2 2 11 7 3 3 80 36 18 13 8 6 4 4	
Graph time series of effect See if effect persists Examine lags of law to see timing of effect DDD Include trend specific to passing states Explicitly include lead to look for effect prior to law Include lag dependent variable Number which have clustering problem Number which deal with it Most commonly used variables Employment Wages Health/Medical Expenditure Unemployment Fertility/Teen Motherhood	15 2 2 11 7 3 3 80 36	

[&]quot;Note: Data comes from a survey of all articles in six journals between 1990 and 2000: American Economic Review; Industrial Labor Relations Review; Journal of Labor Economics; Journal of Political Economy; Journal of Public Economics; and Quarterly Journal of Economics. We define an article as "Difference-in-Difference" if it: (1) examines the effect of a specific interventions and (2) uses units unaffected by the intervention as a control group.

Table 2: DD Rejection Rates for Placebo Laws^a

Data	Law Type	Technique	_	on Rate				
No Effect 2% Effect A. REAL DATA								
CPS micro	25 states, one date	OLS	.675	.855				
CPS micro	25 states, one date	Cluster	(.027)	(.020)				
CPS aggregate	25 states, one date	OLS	(.029) .435	(.025) .72				
CPS aggregate	Serially uncorrelated laws	OLS	(.029)	(.026) .895				
CPS aggregate	12 states, one date	OLS	(.014)	(.018)				
CPS aggregate	36 states, one date	OLS	(.029)	(.027) .668				
CPS aggregate	25 states, multiple dates	OLS	(.028) .48 (.029)	(.027) $.71$ $(.026)$				
B. MANUFACTURED DATA								
AR(1), $\rho = .8$	25 states, one date	OLS	.373	.725 (.026)				

^aNote:

^{1.} Each cell represents the rejection rate of the null hypothesis of no effect (at the 5% significance level) on the intervention (law) variable for randomly generated placebo interventions. Number of simulations for each cell is at least two hundred.

^{2.} CPS data are data for women between 25 and 50 in the fourth interview month of the Merged Outgoing Rotation Group for the years 1979 to 1999. Dependent variable unless otherwise specified is log weekly earnings. Data are aggregated to state-year level cells. Manufactured data are data generated so that the variances match the CPS variances. The ρ refers to the auto-correlation parameter in manufactured data.

^{3.} All regressions also include, in addition to the intervention variable, state fixed effects, year fixed effects and demographic controls for education and age.

^{4.} Standard errors are in parenthesis and computed using the number of simulations.

^{5. &}quot;Effect" specifies whether an effect of the placebo law has been added to the data.

Table 3: Magnitude of DD Estimates a CPS Aggregate Data

	No 1 Positive	Effect Negative	2% I Positive	Effect Negative
Rejection Rate	.18	.17	.715	.0075
Average Coefficient	(.022) $.02$	(.022) 02	(.026) $.026$	(.005) 017
Fraction of effects < .01	0	0	0	0
in (.01,.02]	(.000) .59	(.000) $.58$	(.000) .33	(.000) 1
in (.02,.03]	(.028)	(.028)	(.027)	(.000.)
in (.03,.04]	(.027)	(.026)	(.028)	(.000)
> .04	(.016) .014 (.007)	(.019) 0 (.000)	(.021) $.12$ $(.019)$	(000.) 0 (000.)

^aNote:

^{1.} The positive (negative) columns report results for estimated effects of interventions which are positive (negative).

^{2.} CPS data are data for women between 25 and 50 in the fourth interview month of the Merged Outgoing Rotation Group for the years 1979 to 1999. Dependent variable is log weekly earnings. Data are aggregated to state-year level cells.

^{3.} All regressions also include, in addition to the intervention variable, state fixed effects, year fixed effects and demographic controls for education and age.

^{4.} Standard errors are in parenthesis and computed using the number of simulations.

Table 4 Varying Auto-correlation^a

Data and Dependent Variable		Technique	Rejecti	on Rate
	A DEAT TAK	T) A	No Effect	2% Effect
	A. REAL DA	LA.		
CV 77 CV	ρ_1, ρ_2, ρ_3			
CPS agg, Log wage	.509, .440, .332	OLS	.435	.72
CPS agg, Employment	470 410 0 <i>0</i> 27	OT C	(.029)	(.026)
Cr 5 agg, Employment	.470, .418, .367	OLS	.415	.698
CPS agg, Hours worked	.151, .114, .063	OLS	(.028)	(.010)
or o agg, morrod	.101, .114, .005	OLIS	.263 $(.025)$.265 $(.025)$
CPS agg, Changes in log wage	046, .032, 002	OLS	(.029)	.978
	., ,		(.000)	(.009)
			(1227)	(1000)
В. М	ANUFACTURE	D DATA		
	Ox.			
AR(1)	$ \begin{array}{c} \rho_1\\0 \end{array} $	OLS	.053	.783
· · ·	Ť	020	(.013)	(.024)
AR(1)	.2	OLS	.123	.738
			(.019)	(.025)
AR(1)	.4	OLS	.19	.713
			(.023)	(.026)
AR(1)	.6	OLS	.333	.700
A TD (4.)			(.027)	(.026)
AR(1)	.8	OLS	.373	.725
AR/1)	4	OTG	(.028)	(.026)
AR(1)	4	OLS	.008	.7
			(.005)	.026)

 $[^]a$ Note:

- 1. Each cell represents the rejection rate of the null hypothesis of no effect (at the 5% significance level) on the intervention variable for randomly generated interventions. Number of simulations for each cell is at least two hundred.
- 2. CPS data are data for women between 25 and 50 in the fourth interview month of the Merged Outgoing Rotation Group for the years 1979 to 1999. Dependent variable unless otherwise specified is log weekly earnings. Data are aggregated to state-year level cells. Manufactured data are data generated so that the variances match the CPS variances.
- 3. All CPS regressions also include, in addition to the intervention variable, state fixed effects, year fixed effects and demographic controls for education and age.
- 4. Standard errors are in parenthesis and computed using the number of simulations.
- 5. The variables ρ_i refer to the estimated auto-correlation parameters of lag i.

Table 5 Varying N and T^a

	Ν	\mathbf{T}	Rejection rate No Effect	Rejection rate 2% Effect
			A. REAL DA	ATA
CPS aggregate	50	21	.435	.72
			(.029)	(.026)
CPS agg	20	21	.36	.53
			(.028)	(.029)
CPS agg	10	21	.425	.525
			(.029)	(.029)
CPS agg	6	21	.45	.433
Olan or			(.029)	(.029)
CPS agg	50	11	.29	.675
en en			(.026)	(.027)
CPS agg	50	7	.16	.63
ana			(.021)	(.028)
CPS agg	50	5	.08	.503
ana			(.016)	(.029)
CPS agg	50	3	.0775	.39
CDC	* 0	~	(.015)	(.028)
CPS agg	50	2	.073	.315
			(.015)	(.027)
		в. 1	MANUFACTUR	ED DATA
$AR(1), \rho = .8$	50	21	.35	.638
(-), [-	~ 0		(.028)	(.028)
$AR(1), \rho = .8$	20	21	.35	.538
-(/) /			(.028)	(.029)
$AR(1), \rho = .8$	10	21	.3975	.505
, , , ,			(.028)	(.029)
$AR(1), \rho = .8$	6	21	.393	.5
			(.028)	(.029)
$AR(1), \rho = .8$	50	11	.335	.588
			(.027)	(.028)
AR(1), $\rho = .8$	50	5	.175	.5525
			(.022)	(.029)
AR(1), ρ =.8	50	3	.09	.435
			(.017)	(.029)
AR(1), $\rho = .8$	50	50	.4975	.855

1. Each cell represents the rejection rate of the null hypothesis of no effect (at the 5% significance level) on the intervention variable for randomly generated interventions. Number of simulations for each cell is at least two hundred.

(.029)

(.020)

- 2. CPS data are data for women between 25 and 50 in the fourth interview month of the Merged Outgoing Rotation Group for the years 1979 to 1999. Dependent variable unless otherwise specified is log weekly earnings. Data are aggregated to state-year level cells. Manufactured data are data generated so that the variances match the CPS variances. The parameter ρ measures the auto-correlation.
- 3. All CPS regressions also include, in addition to the intervention variable, state fixed effects, year fixed effects and demographic controls for education and age.
- 4. Standard errors are in parenthesis and computed using the number of simulations.
- 5. N refers to the number of states used in the simulation and T refers to the number of years. When the CPS data is used, we randomly drop states or years to fulfill the criterion.

^aNote:

Table 6: Parametric Solutions^a

Data	Technique	Estimated ρ	Rejecti No Effect	$rac{ ext{on rate}}{2\% ext{ effect}}$
		A. REAL DAT	CA.	
CPS agg	OLS		.435 (.029)	.72 (.026)
CPS agg	Standard $AR(1)$ correction	.368	.345 (.027)	.705 (.026)
CPS agg	AR(1) correction imposing ρ =.8		.12 (.019)	.4435 (.029)
CPS agg	AR(2) correction imposing $\rho_1 = .55$ and $\rho_2 = .35$.228 (.024)	.5725 (.029)
CPS agg	$AR(1)$ + White Noise $\rho = .95$ and n/s=.13		.335 (.027)	.638 (.028)
	B. MA	NUFACTURE	D DATA	
AR(1), ρ =.8	OLS		.373 (.028)	.765 (.024)
$AR(1),\rho=.8$	Standard AR(1) correction (xtgls)	.622	.205 (.023)	.715 (.026)
AR(2), $\rho_1 = .55$ $\rho_2 = .35$	Standard AR(1) correction (xtgls)	.444	.305 (.027)	.625 (.028)
AR(1)+ white noise $\rho = .95$, noise/signal=.13	Standard AR(1) correction (xtgls)	.301	.385 (.028)	.4 (.028)

 $[^]a\mathrm{Note}$:

- 1. Each cell represents the rejection rate of the null hypothesis of no effect (at the 5% significance level) on the intervention variable for randomly generated interventions. Number of simulations for each cell is at least two hundred.
- 2. CPS data are data for women between 25 and 50 in the fourth interview month of the Merged Outgoing Rotation Group for the years 1979 to 1999. Dependent variable unless otherwise specified is log weekly earnings. Data are aggregated to state-year level cells. Manufactured data are data generated so that the variances match the CPS variances. An AR(1) + white noise process is the sum of an AR(1) plus an iid process, where the auto-correlation for the AR(1) component is given by ρ_i and the relative variance of the components is given by the noise to signal ratio (n/s).
- 3. All CPS regressions also include, in addition to the intervention variable, state fixed effects, year fixed effects and demographic controls for education and age.
- 4. Standard errors are in parenthesis and computed using the number of simulations.

Table 7 Block Bootstrap^a

Data	Technique	\mathbf{N}	Rejecti	on rate
			No Effect	2% Effect
	I	A. CP	S DATA	
CPS aggregate	OLS	50	.435 (.029)	.72 (.026)
CPS aggregate	Block Bootstrap	50	.35 $(.028)$.60 (.027)
	B. MAN	UFAC	CTURED DA	ATA
AR(1), ρ =.8	OLS	50	.38 (.028)	.735 (.025)
	Block Bootstrap	50	.285 (.026)	.645 (.028)
$AR(1),\rho=.8$	OLS	400	.415 (.028)	1 (.000)
	Block Bootstrap	400	.075 (.015)	.98 (.008)

^aNote:

- 2. CPS data are data for women between 25 and 50 in the fourth interview month of the Merged Outgoing Rotation Group for the years 1979 to 1999. Dependent variable unless otherwise specified is log weekly earnings. Data are aggregated to state-year level cells. Manufactured data are data generated so that the variances match the CPS variances.
- 3. All CPS regressions also include, in addition to the intervention variable, state fixed effects, year fixed effects and demographic controls for education and age.
- 4. Standard errors are in parenthesis and computed using the number of simulations.

^{1.} Each cell represents the rejection rate of the null hypothesis of no effect (at the 5% significance level) on the intervention variable for randomly generated interventions. Number of simulations for each cell is at least two hundred.

Table 8: Empirical Variance-Covariance Matrix^a

Data	Technique	N	No Effect	2% Effect
		A. R	EAL DATA	
CPS agg	OLS	50	.435 (.029)	.72 (.026)
CPS agg	Empirical variance	50	.0775 (.015)	.085 (.016)
CPS agg	OLS	20	.36 (.028)	.53 (.029)
CPS agg	Empirical variance	20	.0825 (.016)	.08 (.016)
CPS agg	OLS	10	.425 (.029)	.525 (.029)
CPS agg	Empirical variance	10	.0825 (.016)	.0975 (.017)
CPS agg	OLS	6	.45 (.029)	.433 (.029)
CPS agg	Empirical variance	6	.165 (.021)	.1825 (.022)
	в. ма	NUF	ACTURED 1	DATA
AR(1), rho=.8	Empirical variance	50	.105 (.018)	.16 (.021)

^aNote:

- 1. Each cell represents the rejection rate of the null hypothesis of no effect (at the 5% significance level) on the intervention variable for randomly generated interventions. Number of simulations for each cell is at least two hundred.
- 2. CPS data are data for women between 25 and 50 in the fourth interview month of the Merged Outgoing Rotation Group for the years 1979 to 1999. Dependent variable unless otherwise specified is log weekly earnings. Data are aggregated to state-year level cells. Manufactured data are data generated so that the variances match the CPS variances.
- 3. All CPS regressions also include, in addition to the intervention variable, state fixed effects, year fixed effects and demographic controls for education and age.
- 4. Standard errors are in parenthesis and computed using the number of simulations.

Table 9: Arbitrary Variance-Covariance Matrix^a

Data	Technique	# States	Rejection No Effect	on Rate 2% Effect	
		A. REA	L DATA		
CPS agg	OLS	51	.435 (.029)	.72	
CPS agg	Cluster	51	.06 (.014)	(.026) .27 (.026)	
CPS agg	OLS	20	.36 (.028)	.53	
CPS agg	Cluster	20	.0625	(.029) .1575 (.021)	
CPS agg	OLS	10	.425	.525	
CPS agg	Cluster	10	(.029) .085 (.016)	(.029) .1025 (.018)	
CPS agg	OLS	6	.450	.433	
CPS agg	Cluster	6	(.029) .15 (.021)	(.029) .1875 (.023)	
	B. MANUFACTURED DATA				
AR(1), ρ =.8	Cluster	50	.045 (.012)	.275 (.026)	
AR(1), ρ =0	Cluster	50	.035 (.011)	.74 $(.025)$	

 $[^]a$ Note:

- 1. Each cell represents the rejection rate of the null hypothesis of no effect (at the 5% significance level) on the intervention variable for randomly generated interventions. Number of simulations for each cell is at least two hundred.
- 2. CPS data are data for women between 25 and 50 in the fourth interview month of the Merged Outgoing Rotation Group for the years 1979 to 1999. Dependent variable unless otherwise specified is log weekly earnings. Data are aggregated to state-year level cells. Manufactured data are data generated so that the variances match the CPS variances.
- 3. All CPS regressions also include, in addition to the intervention variable, state fixed effects, year fixed effects and demographic controls for education and age.
- 4. Standard errors are in parenthesis and computed using the number of simulations.

Table 10 Ignoring Time Series Data^a

CPS agg Federal OLS 50 .435	.72 (.026) .295 (.026) .210 (.024) .335 (.027) .53 (.029) .188 (.023) .193 (.023)
CPS agg Federal OLS 50 .435 (.029) Federal Simple Aggregation 50 .060 (.014) Federal Residual Aggregation 50 .053 (.013) Staggered Residual Aggregation 50 .048 (.012) .048 (.012) .060 CPS agg Federal OLS 20 .36 (.028) .060 (.014) (.028) Federal Simple Aggregation 20 .060 (.014) (.014) (.014) (.014) Federal Residual Aggregation 20 .073 (.017) Staggered Residual Aggregation 20 .073 (.015) (.029) CPS agg Federal OLS 10 .425 (.029) (.015) (.015) Federal Residual Aggregation 10 .078 (.015) (.015) (.017) (.015) (.017) (.017) (.018) (.018) (.018) (.018) (.018) (.018)	(.026) .295 (.026) .210 (.024) .335 (.027) .53 (.029) .188 (.023) .193 (.023)
Federal Simple Aggregation 50 .060 .014 .014 .014 .015	(.026) .295 (.026) .210 (.024) .335 (.027) .53 (.029) .188 (.023) .193 (.023)
Federal Simple Aggregation 50 .060 (.014) Federal Residual Aggregation 50 .053 (.013) Staggered Residual Aggregation 50 .048 (.012) CPS agg Federal OLS 20 .36 (.028) Federal Simple Aggregation 20 .060 (.014) Federal Residual Aggregation 20 .095 (.017) Staggered Residual Aggregation 20 .073 (.015) CPS agg Federal OLS 10 .425 (.029) Federal Simple Aggregation 10 .078 (.015) Federal Residual Aggregation 10 .095 (.017) Staggered Residual Aggregation 10 .095 (.017) Staggered Residual Aggregation 10 .095 (.017) Staggered Residual Aggregation 10 .103 (.018) CPS agg Federal OLS 6 .450 (.029) (.029)	.295 (.026) .210 (.024) .335 (.027) .53 (.029) .188 (.023) .193 (.023)
CPS agg Federal OLS 10 .425 .6015	(.026) .210 (.024) .335 (.027) .53 (.029) .188 (.023) .193 (.023)
Federal Residual Aggregation 50 .053 (.013) (.013) (.013) (.013) (.013) (.012) (.012) (.012) (.012) (.012) (.012) (.012) (.012) (.012) (.012) (.012) (.012) (.012) (.012) (.014) (.028) (.014) (.014) (.014) (.014) (.014) (.015) (.015) (.015) (.015) (.015) (.015) (.015) (.015) (.015) (.015) (.015) (.015) (.015) (.017) (.015) (.017) (.017) (.017) (.018) (.018) (.018) (.018) (.018) (.018) (.018) (.029) (.210 (.024) .335 (.027) .53 (.029) .188 (.023) .193 (.023)
Staggered Residual Aggregation 50 .048 .012 .048 .012 .015 .048 .012 .015 .028 .029 .0	(.024) .335 (.027) .53 (.029) .188 (.023) .193 (.023)
Staggered Residual Aggregation 50 .048 (.012) (.012) (.012) (.012) (.012) (.012) (.012) (.012) (.012) (.012) (.028) (.028) (.028) (.028) (.028) (.014) (.014) (.014) (.014) (.017) (.017) (.017) (.015) (.015) (.015) (.015) (.015) (.015) (.015) (.015) (.015) (.015) (.017) (.017) (.017) (.017) (.017) (.018) (.018) (.018) (.018) (.018) (.018) (.029) (.335 (.027) .53 (.029) .188 (.023) .193 (.023)
CPS agg Federal OLS 20 .36 (.028) Federal Simple Aggregation 20 .060 (.014) (.014) Federal Residual Aggregation 20 .095 (.017) (.017) Staggered Residual Aggregation 20 .073 (.015) (.015) (.015) CPS agg Federal OLS 10 .425 (.029) (.029) (.017) Federal Simple Aggregation 10 .078 (.015) (.015) (.015) (.017) Federal Residual Aggregation 10 .095 (.017) (.017) (.017) (.018) (.018) (.018) (.018)	(.027) .53 (.029) .188 (.023) .193 (.023)
CPS agg Federal OLS 20 .36 Federal Simple Aggregation 20 .060 Federal Residual Aggregation 20 .095 (.014) (.014) (.017) (.017) Staggered Residual Aggregation 20 .073 (.015) CPS agg Federal OLS 10 .425 (.029) (.029) (.015) (.015) (.015) (.015) (.017) (.017) (.017) (.017) (.017) (.018) (.018) (.018) (.018) (.029)	.53 (.029) .188 (.023) .193 (.023)
Federal Simple Aggregation 20 .060 .060 .014) (.014) (.014) (.014) (.014) (.017) (.017) (.017) (.015) (.015) (.015) (.015) (.015) (.015) (.015) (.015) (.015) (.015) (.015) (.015) (.015) (.015) (.015) (.015) (.017) (.017) (.017) (.017) (.018) (.018) (.018) (.018) (.018) (.018) (.018) (.029)	(.029) .188 (.023) .193 (.023)
Federal Simple Aggregation 20 .060 Federal Residual Aggregation 20 .095 (.017) (.017) (.017) (.017) Staggered Residual Aggregation 20 .073 (.015) (.015) (.015) (.029) Federal Simple Aggregation 10 .078 Federal Residual Aggregation 10 .095 (.017) (.017) (.017) (.018) CPS agg Federal OLS 6 .450 (.029) (.029) (.029) (.009)	.188 (.023) .193 (.023)
CPS agg Federal Residual Aggregation 20 .095 .017) (.017) (.017) (.017) (.015) (.015) (.015) (.015) (.015) (.029) (.015) (.029) (.017) (.015) (.017) (.017) (.017) (.017) (.017) (.018) (.018) (.018) (.018) (.018) (.018) (.029) (.0	(.023) .193 (.023)
Federal Residual Aggregation 20 .095 (.017) (.017) (.017) Staggered Residual Aggregation 20 .073 (.015) (.015) (.015) (.015) CPS agg Federal OLS 10 .425 (.029) (.029) (.015) (.015) Federal Residual Aggregation 10 .095 (.017) (.017) (.018) CPS agg Federal OLS 6 .450 (.029) (.029) (.009)	.193 (.023)
Staggered Residual Aggregation 20 .073 .015 .017 .017 .017 .017 .017 .017 .018 .0	(.023)
Staggered Residual Aggregation 20 .073 (.015) (.015) (.015) (.015) (.015) (.015) (.015) (.029) (.029) (.029) (.015) (.015) (.015) (.015) (.017) (.017) (.017) (.018) (.018) (.018) (.018) (.018) (.029)	
Staggered Residual Aggregation 20 .073 (.015) (.015) (.015) (.015) (.015) (.015) (.029) (.029) (.029) (.015) (.015) (.015) (.015) (.015) (.017) (.017) (.017) (.018) (.018) (.018) (.018) (.018) (.029)	
CPS agg Federal OLS 10 .425 Federal Simple Aggregation 10 .078 Federal Residual Aggregation 10 .095 Staggered Residual Aggregation 10 .103 CPS agg Federal OLS 6 .450 CPS agg Federal OLS 6 .450 (.029) (.029) (.029)	.210
CPS agg Federal OLS Country	(.024)
CPS agg Federal OLS Country	.525
Federal Simple Aggregation 10 .078 (.015) (.015) (.015) (.015) Federal Residual Aggregation 10 .095 (.017) (.017) (.018) (.018) (.018) (.018) CPS agg Federal OLS 6 .450 (.029) (.029) (.029)	(.029)
CPS agg Federal OLS CPS	.095
Federal Residual Aggregation 10 .095 (.017) (.017) (Staggered Residual Aggregation 10 .103 (.018) (.018) (CPS agg Federal OLS 6 .450 (.029) ((.017)
Staggered Residual Aggregation 10 (.017) (.018) (.018) (.018) (.018) (.029)	.198
Staggered Residual Aggregation 10 .103 (.018) (.018) (CPS agg Federal OLS 6 .450 (.029) ((.023)
CPS agg Federal OLS 6 $.450$ (.029)	.223
(.029)	(.024)
(.029)	.433
was to be a second of the seco	(.029)
Federal Simple Aggregation 6 .130	.138
1 00 0	(.020)
The state of the s	.388
00 0	(.028)
	.335
00 0	.027)
B. MANUFACTURED DATA	.021)
$AR(1), \rho=.8$ Federal Simple Aggregation 50 .050	.243
(.013)	.025)
Federal Residual Aggregation 50 .045	.235
(.012)	.024)
Staggered Residual Aggregation 50 .075	.355
(.015)	.028)
A Wind Co. No. on the second of the control of the	.713
	.026)
were at the control of the control o	.773
	.024)
CN: A man and a second control of the control of th	.860
(.018)	

a Noto

^{1.} Each cell represents the rejection rate of the null hypothesis of no effect (at the 5% significance level) on the intervention variable for randomly generated interventions. Number of simulations for each cell is at least two hundred.

^{2.} CPS data are data for women between 25 and 50 in the fourth interview month of the Merged Outgoing Rotation Group for the years 1979 to 1999. Dependent variable unless otherwise specified is log weekly earnings. Data are aggregated to state-year level cells. Manufactured data are data generated so that the variances match the CPS variances. All CPS regressions also include, in addition to the intervention variable, state fixed effects, year fixed effects and demographic controls for education and age. Standard errors are in parenthesis and computed using the number of simulations.

		nizat	$ion Inference^a$	
Data	${f Technique}$	N	Rejection rate	Rejection rat
			No Effect	2% Effect
CDC	O + C		PS DATA	
CPS agg	OLS	51	.435	.72
CPS agg	Randomization Inference	m nj	(.029)	(.026)
Or 5 agg	Randomization inference	51	.065	.235
CPS agg	RI 5 year window	5 1	(.014)	(.024)
Or 5 ags	iti ə year window	51	.06	.23
CPS agg	RI 3 year window	51	(.014) $.06$	(.024) $.23$
	The ory cent will down	0.1	(.014)	(.024)
CPS agg	RI same year	51	.04	.24
00		0.	(.011)	(.025)
			(1011)	(.020)
CPS agg	OLS	20	.36	.53
			(.028)	(.029)
CPS agg	Randomization Inference	20	.045	.1
			(.012)	(.017)
CPS agg	RI 5 year window	20	.04	.125
			(.011)	(.019)
CPS agg	RI 3 year window	20	.065	.095
and the same			(.014)	(.017)
CPS agg	RI same year	20	.045	.115
			(.012)	(.018)
CPS agg	OLS	10	40"	*0*
OI 5 agg	OLS	10	.425	.525
CPS agg	Randomization Inference	10	(.029) .055	(.029)
01 5 466	16mGomzagon interence	10	(.013)	.115
CPS agg	RI 5 year window	10	.055	(.018) $.095$
	To your military	*()	(.013)	(.017)
CPS agg	RI 3 year window	10	.05	.125
	u		(.013)	(.019)
CPS agg	RI same year	10	.07	.115
			(.015)	(.018)
CPS agg	OLS	6	.450	.433
W			(.029)	(.029)
CPS agg	Randomization Inference	6	.04	.07
~~~			(.011)	(.015)
CPS agg	Randomization Inference	6	.035	.065
020	77.0		(.011)	(.014)
CPS agg	RI 3 year window	6	.03	.06
CDC	TOT	0	(.010)	(.014)
CPS agg	RI same year	6	.055	.07
	TR TATAN	፲፻፲፮፡ ‹	(.013) C <b>TURED DATA</b>	(.015)
AR(1), rho=.8	Randomization Inference	50 FAC	.04	.25
(1), 1110-10	remachination inicience	00	.04	.20

^aNote:

(.011)

(.025)

^{1.} Each cell represents the rejection rate of the null hypothesis of no effect (at the 5% significance level) on the intervention variable for randomly generated interventions.

^{2.} CPS data are data for women between 25 and 50 in the fourth interview month of the Merged Outgoing Rotation Group for the years 1979 to 1999. Dependent variable unless otherwise specified is log weekly earnings. Data are aggregated to state-year level cells. Manufactured data are data generated so that the variances match the CPS variances. All CPS regressions also include, in addition to the intervention variable, state fixed effects, year fixed effects and demographic controls for education and age. Standard errors are in parenthesis and computed using the number of simulations.

Table 12: Effect of Informal Tests^a

Data:	CPS Micro (Clustered)	CPS Agg	Manuf. Data AR(1), $\rho = .8$
$Ho: \beta = 0$ Rejected if:			
OLS coef significant (OLS)	.411	.360	.345
	(.031)	(.034)	(.034)
OLS+No effect before the law	.335	.320	.325
	(.030)	(.033)	(.033)
OLS+Persistence of effect	.359 $(.031)$	.325 (.033)	.305 (.033)
OLS+No treatment specific trend in pre-period -	.258	.205	.235
	(.028)	(.029)	(.030)
OLS+Coef significant with treatment specific trend (TREND)	.105	.070	.150
	(.020)	(.018)	(.025)
Randomization inference given rejection with TREND	*****	.264 (.028)	_

^aNote:

^{1.} Each cell represents the rejection rate of the null hypothesis of no effect (at the 5% significance level) on the intervention variable for randomly generated interventions. Number of simulations for each cell is at least two hundred.

^{2.} CPS data are data for women between 25 and 50 in the fourth interview month of the Merged Outgoing Rotation Group for the years 1979 to 1999. Dependent variable unless otherwise specified is log weekly earnings. Data are aggregated to state-year level cells. Manufactured data are data generated so that the variances match the CPS variances.

^{3.} All CPS regressions also include, in addition to the intervention variable, state fixed effects, year fixed effects and demographic controls for education and age.

^{4.} Standard errors are in parenthesis and computed using the number of simulations.