

# A Tug of War: Overnight Versus Intraday Expected Returns

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# A Tug of War: Overnight Versus Intraday Expected Returns

## Abstract

We show that momentum profits accrue entirely overnight while profits on all other trading strategies studied occur entirely intraday. Indeed, for four-factor anomalies, intraday returns are particularly large as there is a partially-offsetting overnight premium of the opposite sign. We link cross-sectional and time-series variation in our decomposition of momentum expected returns to variation in institutional momentum trading, generating variation in overnight-minus-intraday momentum returns of approximately 2 percent per month. An overnight/intraday decomposition of momentum returns in nine non-US markets is consistent with our US findings. Finally, we document strong and persistent overnight momentum, intraday momentum, and cross-period reversal effects.

*JEL classification:* G12, N22

# 1 Introduction

Understanding cross-sectional variation in average returns is crucial for testing models of market equilibrium. Indeed, over the last two decades, researchers have documented a rich set of characteristics that describe cross-sectional variation in average returns, thus providing a tough test to our standard models of risk and expected return.<sup>2</sup>

We deliver remarkable new evidence about the cross-section of expected returns through a careful examination of exactly when expected returns accrue. In particular, we decompose the abnormal profits associated with these characteristics into their overnight and intraday components.<sup>3</sup> We find that 100% of the abnormal returns on momentum strategies occur overnight; in stark contrast, the average intraday component of momentum profits is economically and statistically insignificant. This finding is robust to a variety of controls and risk-adjustments, is stronger among large-cap stocks and stocks with relatively high prices, and is true not only for a standard price momentum strategy but also for earnings and industry momentum strategies. In stark contrast, the profits on size and value (and many other strategies, as discussed below) occur entirely intraday; on average, the overnight components of the profits on these two strategies are economically and statistically insignificant.

It is possible that variation in risk drives why momentum profits accrue overnight while size and value premiums instead accrue intraday. However, we find no evidence that this is the case in terms of changing three-factor risks. Recent work has also highlighted the importance of FOMC announcements.<sup>4</sup> However, we find that momentum strategies are not profitable around FOMC announcements, with both overnight and intraday components close to zero.

Since the momentum phenomenon is often viewed as underreaction to news, and since a significant amount of firm-specific news is released after markets close, another possibility

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<sup>2</sup>Both risk-based, behavioral, and limits-to-arbitrage explanations of the value and/or momentum effects have been offered in the literature. A partial list includes Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishney (1998); Hong and Stein (1999); Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subramanyam (2001); Lettau and Wachter (2007); Vayanos and Woolley (2012); and Campbell, Giglio, Polk, and Turley (2014).

<sup>3</sup>A more precise explanation of our analysis is that we decompose returns into components based on exchange trading and non-trading periods. However, we refer to these two as intraday and overnight for simplicity's sake. Though the weekend non-trading period contains two intraday periods, we show in the paper that our results are not particularly different for this non-trading period. We thank Mike Hertzel for suggesting we confirm that the weekend is not special in this regard.

<sup>4</sup>See Savor and Wilson (2014), Lucca and Moench (2015), and Cieslak, Morse, and Vissing-Jorgenson (2015).

is that news drives the differences we find. However, we find no statistical difference in our decomposition across news and no-news months, defined as months with and without an earnings announcement or news coverage in Dow Jones Newswire, respectively.

As a consequence, we exploit a key difference between these two periods linked to investor heterogeneity, namely, the degree of institutional activity. Though there are certainly many types of investors, this heterogeneity is perhaps the most fundamental and relevant during our sample period. We link institutional activity to our effect in three steps.

We first examine when institutional investors likely trade (i.e., initiate trades). Specifically, we link changes in institutional ownership to the components of contemporaneous firm-level stock returns. We find that for all institutional ownership quintiles, institutional ownership increases more with intraday than with overnight returns. Indeed, in some of these quintiles, institutional ownership tends to decrease with overnight returns. To the extent that collective trading by institutions can move prices, this evidence is consistent with the notion that institutions tend to trade intraday while individuals are more likely to trade overnight. Such a result is also consistent with the usual understanding as to how these two classes of investors approach markets. Professional investors tend to trade during the day, and particularly near the close, taking advantage of the relatively high liquidity at that time. Conversely, individuals may be more likely to evaluate their portfolios in the evening after work and thus may tend to initiate trades that execute when markets open.

We then examine the extent to which institutions, relative to individuals, trade momentum stocks. We find that on average, for the value-weight portfolios we consider, institutions trade against the momentum characteristic. We build on this finding by refining our understanding of why this intraday/overnight tug of war occurs by conditioning our trading and decomposition results on two key variables. The first variable is a time series measure of the degree of investment activity in momentum strategies introduced by Lou and Polk (2014). The second variable is a cross-sectional measure of the aggregate active weight (in excess of the market weight) of all institutions invested in a stock, which is likely related to institutions' rebalancing motives.

Either in the time series, when the amount of momentum activity is particularly low, or in the cross-section, when the typical institution holding a stock has a particularly strong need to rebalance, we find that momentum returns are even larger overnight and more strongly reverse during the day. Both cases generate variation in the spread between overnight and intraday returns on the order of two percent per month.

We exploit two additional samples to confirm and extend our results. First, we decompose momentum profits in non-US markets. We find that for small stocks, momentum profits are primarily intraday. However, consistent with our US results, for large stocks, momentum profits are largely overnight. Second, we measure momentum profits in the pre-1963 period, a sample with much less institutional investment. In this sample, we find that momentum profits are primarily intraday. Consistent with our primary US results from the 1993-2013 period, overnight momentum profits in the pre-1963 period are larger and (marginally) statistically significant for large cap stocks.

Our analysis then studies patterns in the cross-section not captured by the four-factor Fama-French-Carhart model. We show that the premiums for profitability, investment, beta, idiosyncratic volatility, equity issuance, discretionary accruals, and turnover occur intraday. Indeed, by splitting abnormal returns into their intraday and overnight components, we find that the intraday premiums associated with these characteristics are significantly stronger than that from close to close. Thus, these results imply, which we then confirm, the striking finding that these characteristics have an economically and statistically significant overnight premium that is opposite in sign to their well-known and often-studied total effect.

A closer look reveals that in every case a positive risk premium is earned overnight for the side of the trade that might naturally be deemed as riskier. In particular, firms with low return-on-equity, or firms with high investment, market beta, idiosyncratic volatility, equity issuance, discretionary accruals, or share turnover all earn a positive premium overnight.<sup>5</sup>

We also include the one-month past return in our analysis. Interestingly, we find that the negative premium that previous research has documented from close to close turns out to be realized entirely overnight. Thus, momentum and short-term reversal are alike in this regard. We also find that the overnight premium for short-term reversal is more negative than the corresponding close-to-close estimate, and thus there is, on average, a partially offsetting positive premium intraday.

Motivated by these interesting links between intraday and overnight returns, our final analysis decomposes the standard one-month past return characteristic into overnight and intraday components. This analysis reveals striking results. We show that stocks with relatively-high lagged overnight returns have relatively-high average overnight returns the

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<sup>5</sup>Merton (1987) argues that both beta and idiosyncratic volatility can have positive premiums in a world where investors cannot fully diversify. Campbell, Polk, and Vuolteenaho (2010) link similar accounting risk measures to cash-flow beta.

next month; these stocks also have average intraday returns the next month that are relatively low. (These striking patterns persist even when we extend our holding period beyond one month.) More specifically, a portfolio that buys the value-weight overnight winner decile and sells the value-weight overnight loser decile has a three-factor overnight alpha of 3.47% per month with an associated  $t$ -statistic of 16.83 and a three-factor intraday alpha of -3.02% per month ( $t$ -statistic of -9.74). Similarly, stocks with relatively-high lagged intraday returns have relatively-high average intraday returns over the next month coupled with relatively-low average overnight returns. A portfolio that buys the value-weight intraday winner decile and sells the value-weight intraday loser decile has a three-factor intraday alpha of 2.41% per month ( $t$ -statistic of 7.70) and a three-factor intraday alpha of -1.77% per month ( $t$ -statistic of -7.89).

Of course, to be persuasive, our decomposition must be reliable and robust. We exclude microcaps (i.e., stock in the bottom size quintile of the NYSE sample) and low-price stocks. When sorting stocks into portfolios, we only examine value-weight strategies and generate breakpoints using only NYSE stocks. We confirm our results using four different measures of open price, including the volume-weighted average price during the first half-hour the market is open as well as the midpoint of the quoted bid-ask spread at the open. The former measure ensures that our open price is tradable while the latter ensures that bid-ask bounce is not responsible for any of our findings. We also show that our findings are robust to examining subsequent prices during the day. We further show that our finding continues to hold even in the most recent 10-year subperiod and, as mentioned above, is particularly strong in large-cap as well as high-price stocks.

Taken all together, our findings further challenge theories of the risk-return tradeoff by revealing striking temporal patterns as to when trading profits on well-known strategies occur. We argue that investor heterogeneity plays an important role in understanding these patterns, in particular why momentum profits accrue overnight, and especially so for stocks whose institutional owners have relatively strong preferences to trade against the momentum characteristic.

The organization of our paper is as follows. Section 2 motivates our work and briefly summarizes existing literature. Section 3 describes the data and empirical methodology. Section 4 presents our main results. Section 5 concludes.

## 2 Motivation and Previous Literature

Though we are the first to decompose the cross section of average returns in this way, we argue that such a decomposition is a natural one as these two periods are different along several key dimensions.

One key difference between these two periods is that much of the overnight return may reflect information surprises. The United States stock market is open from 9:30 am to 4:00 pm but the vast majority of earnings announcements occur outside of these times. Of these overnight announcements, roughly a quarter occur in the half hour after the market has closed with most of the remaining announcements taking place in the morning before the market opens. More generally, firms tend to submit important regulatory filings after the market has closed.

Second, it is reasonable to assume that the overnight return is predominantly driven by the trading of investors less concerned with liquidity and price impact, as the after-hours and opening markets are much thinner than when the exchanges are open. Though the pre-open auctions on the NYSE and Nasdaq may average anywhere from one to four percent of median daily volume, depending on the type of stock, this is significantly less than the volume one observes intraday, particularly near or at the close. Consistent with this idea, Barclay and Hendershott (2003) find that though prices are more efficient and more information is revealed during the day, individual after-hours trades contain more information than those made when markets are open.

Alternatively, trading at the open could reflect trades that are not purely information-based. Presumably, many of these trades are made to rebalance portfolios that were previously optimal but no longer are. Indeed, some of the trading overnight may be a result of institutional capital flows. Perhaps some institutional investors' mandates effectively require capital to be invested immediately in the strategies those investors pursue, once that capital arrives.

Researchers have shown since at least Fama (1965) that volatility is higher during trading hours than non-trading hours.<sup>6</sup> Recent work by Kelly and Clark (2011) suggests that stock returns on average are higher overnight than intraday.<sup>7</sup> To our knowledge, there is

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<sup>6</sup>See also French (1980) and French and Roll (1986).

<sup>7</sup>See related work by Branch and Ma (2008), Cliff, Cooper, and Gulen (2008), Tao and Qiu (2008), Berkman et al. (2009), and Branch and Ma (2012).

no paper decomposing the returns on popular trading strategies into their overnight and intraday components. By providing this evidence, our decomposition brings new and important constraints to risk-, intermediary-, or behavioral-based explanations of these empirical regularities.

Many papers have linked investor heterogeneity tied to institutions to patterns in the cross section of returns. A partial list includes Sias and Starks (1997); Sias and Nofsinger (1999); Cohen, Gompers, and Vuolteenaho (2002); Griffen, Harris, and Topaloglu (2003); Sias (2004); and Dasgupta, Prat, and Verardo (2011).

### 3 Data and Methodology

To decompose the close-to-close return into its overnight and intraday components, we use the open price from various sources: a) open prices as reported by the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), b) the first trade price from the Trade and Quote (TAQ) database, c) the volume-weighted average price (VWAP) in the first half hour of trading (9:30-10am) as reported in TAQ, and d) the midpoint of the quoted bid-ask spread at the open. In almost all of the results presented below, we use the VWAP price during this first half hour as the daily open price. Our findings are robust to using the other three proxies for the open price (results available upon request). To further ensure that our VWAP price is not driven by very small orders, we exclude observations where there are fewer than 100 shares traded in the first half an hour. (Our results are not sensitive to this restriction.)

For each firm  $i$ , we define the intraday return,  $r_{intraday,s}^i$ , as the price appreciation between market open and close of the same day  $s$ , and impute the overnight return,  $r_{overnight,s}^i$ , based on this intraday return and the standard daily close-to-close return,  $r_{close-to-close,s}^i$ , taken directly from CRSP,

$$r_{intraday,s}^i = \frac{P_{close,s}^i}{P_{open,s}^i} - 1$$

$$r_{overnight,s}^i = \frac{1 + r_{close-to-close,s}^i}{1 + r_{intraday,s}^i} - 1.$$

In other words, we assume that dividend adjustments, share splits, and other corporate

events that could mechanically move prices take place overnight.<sup>8</sup> Furthermore, to ensure that the returns are actually achievable, if the open price on day  $s$  for a particular stock is missing (which happens very rarely as we exclude small-cap stocks from our sample), we hold the overnight position from the closing of day  $s - 1$  to the next available open price. Put differently, we construct our return measures such that the overnight and intraday returns aggregate up to exactly the close-to-close return.

We then accumulate these overnight and intraday returns across the days in each month  $t$ .

$$\begin{aligned} r_{intraday,t}^i &= \prod_{s \in t} (1 + r_{intraday,s}^i) - 1 \\ r_{overnight,t}^i &= \prod_{s \in t} (1 + r_{overnight,s}^i) - 1 \\ (1 + r_{intraday,t}^i)(1 + r_{overnight,t}^i) &= (1 + r_t^i) \end{aligned}$$

Thus, all of our analysis examines the intraday and overnight components of the standard CRSP monthly return,  $r_t^i$ .

Most of our analysis examines portfolios, where we typically report the following three components:

$$\begin{aligned} r_t^p &= \sum_i w_{t-1}^i r_t^i \\ r_{intraday,t}^p &= \sum_i w_{t-1}^i r_{intraday,t}^i \\ r_{overnight,t}^p &= \sum_i w_{t-1}^i r_{overnight,t}^i \end{aligned}$$

Of course, due to the interaction term  $\sum_i w_{t-1}^i r_{intraday,t}^i r_{overnight,t}^i$ ,  $(1+r_t^p) \neq (1+r_{intraday,t}^p)(1+r_{overnight,t}^p)$ , though this interaction term can be simply backed out from our tables.

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<sup>8</sup>We know of no violation of this assumption in our sample. However, we have redone our analysis excluding months in which dividends are paid, and our results are nearly identical.

Our final sample is from 1993-2013, constrained by the availability of the TAQ data. We exclude microcap stocks—i.e., those with a price below \$5 a share and whose market capitalization is in the bottom NYSE size quintile—from the sample to mitigate microstructure issues. We augment these data with information on institutional ownership from Thompson Financial.

The main objective of this study is to examine the holding-period returns to a host of popular arbitrage strategies during the overnight vs. intraday periods. In particular, we focus on the following set of strategies/firm characteristics: price momentum, size, value, earnings momentum, industry momentum, profitability, investment, idiosyncratic volatility, beta, turnover, equity issuance, discretionary accruals, and short-term reversals.

## 4 Results

### 4.1 Setting the stage

We set the stage with two plots. We first show that there is significant volume at the open by reporting dollar trading volume over 30-minute intervals throughout the trading day. In particular, each month, we sum up the number of dollars traded in each of these half-hour windows. The first half-hour window that starts at 9:30am also includes the open auction. The last half-hour window that starts at 3:30pm also includes the last-minute (i.e., 4pm) trades and closing auction. We then compute the fraction of total daily volume (i.e., the sum over these 13 windows) that is accounted for by each 30-minute interval.

Figure 1 displays the time-series average of these fractions. The percent of dollar trading volume that takes place in the first 30-minute window is 14.25%. This is a non-trivial amount, though of course there is much more trading activity after the first half-hour. Consistent with previous research, trading activity dips during the day and then rises near the close. Nevertheless, we view Figure 1 as confirming that the open price is an important economic measure.

As a benchmark, we decompose the equity premium into its overnight and intraday components. Figure 2 reports this decomposition for two different market proxies, the value-weight CRSP universe and the value-weight portfolio of the top 1% of stocks by market capitalization. The red bars in Figure 2 correspond to the first market proxy, which is

typically used in performance attribution. This standard proxy for the market portfolio has an average annual return of 11.22%. Of this, 4.58% is earned intraday and 6.99% is earned overnight. This breakdown lines up pretty well with one simply based on the percentage of time corresponding to each of these two periods. Specifically, the US market is open for approximately 27% of the 24-hour day and the premium earned then is roughly 40% of the total. As we shall soon see, the decomposition results for the popular trading strategies we study are all very far from this natural benchmark.

Previous work has argued that the equity premium is primarily an overnight phenomenon. Much of that research bases their conclusions on narrow market proxies like an ETF tracking the Dow 30. Figure 2 sheds some light on these findings by confirming that our TAQ-based bottom-up decomposition is quite different for the very largest stocks. This result foreshadows our finding in section 4.3 that the well-known small-stock effect is completely an intraday phenomenon. As a consequence, one has to be careful using narrow-based market proxies in such a context.

## 4.2 Momentum

We first decompose the returns on a standard implementation of the classic momentum strategy, *MOM*, of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). In particular, we measure momentum over a twelve-month ranking period and then skip a month before forming portfolios. Table I Panel A reports *MOM*'s total (close-to-close) return for our sample from 1993-2013. Despite the fact that our sample period is relatively short and includes a significant momentum crash, the abnormal returns to the strategy are economically large and statistically significant. The three-factor alpha is 1.05% per month with an associated  $t$ -statistic of 2.22. A similar, though slightly weaker finding holds for CAPM-adjusted returns (0.93% per month with a  $t$ -statistic of 1.98).

Panel B of Table I presents the first major result of the paper. Essentially all of this abnormal three-factor alpha is generated overnight. Specifically, the overnight three-factor alpha is 0.95% ( $t$ -statistic of 3.65) while the intraday three-factor alpha is only 0.11% ( $t$ -statistic of 0.27).

We summarize these results in Table I Panel C. Though all of momentum profits occur from the closing price to the opening price, the overnight return on *MOM* is much less volatile (4.02% standard deviation) than the close-to-close return (7.85% standard deviation).

Thus, the Sharpe Ratio of the overnight return on *MOM* is more than twice as high as the Sharpe Ratio on the close-to-close return. Interestingly, on average, more of the negative skewness observed in momentum strategies (Daniel and Moskowitz 2013) and present in *MOM* arrives intraday rather than overnight.

In results not shown, we measure the extent to which these overnight returns are spread evenly throughout weeknights and the weekend. Of the 89 basis points of excess return, 72 basis points accrue Monday through Thursday while 18 basis points accrues over the weekend. Thus, in this regard, the weekend is roughly similarly to one overnight period.

Note that Table I controls for CAPM and three-factor risk by regressing monthly overnight or intraday *MOM* returns on the close-to-close monthly return of the factor(s) in question. Of course, since we are documenting that momentum returns occur disproportionately overnight, we must be careful to show that the risk premium implied by the CAPM or the three-factor model does not disproportionately occur overnight as well. Indeed, as mentioned above, for our sample, roughly 60% of the equity premium is earned overnight. In Table II, we similarly decompose the market and three-factor model into overnight and intraday components and re-estimate the three-factor regression using these components. For now, we do not describe how the properties of these factors vary from overnight to intraday; Section 4.3 will carefully decompose the size and value premiums into overnight and intraday components.

The top third of Table II examines how the three-factor loadings of *MOM*'s close-to-close return change as we split the Fama and French factors into their overnight and intraday components. We find that *MOM*'s market loading is higher overnight than intraday, but is still negative. Moreover, *MOM*'s *SMB* and *HML* loadings decrease and in both cases are negative. Thus, it seems unlikely that changing three-factor risks can account for the fact that momentum returns are primarily overnight.

We confirm that this is the case in the middle third of Table II where we explicitly regress the overnight *MOM* returns on the overnight Fama-French three-factor model. The three-factor loadings are negative, and the alpha remains an economically large 0.86% ( $t$ -statistic of 3.07). The lower third of Table II confirms that the intraday *MOM* three-factor alpha remains economically and statistically insignificant when the strategy and factor returns are both computed on an intraday basis.

A naturally interesting aspect of momentum returns is the extent to which they revert

(Jegadeesh and Titman 2001). Figures 3 and 4 examine this question by plotting the cumulative excess returns (Figure 3) and abnormal three-factor returns (Figure 4) on *MOM* for up to two years after portfolio formation. These figures plot not only the close-to-close return but also the overnight and intraday components. Figure 3 shows that overnight returns are strongly positive for up to 12 months. Then, starting around month 18, these returns begin to revert and, after two years, have reverted by roughly 30%. In stark contrast, intraday returns are strongly negative for the first two years.

Of course, an aspect of momentum strategies that complicates this analysis is that winner (loser) stocks are typically growth (value) stocks; this fact is true for *MOM* over our sample. Thus, one must be careful when examining the long-horizon performance of a momentum strategy as growth-minus-value bets are known to strongly underperform for several years in event time. By reporting cumulative three-factor residuals, Figure 4 removes this complicating aspect and reveals that the intraday profits are essentially zero for the first seven months. Indeed the curves representing the cumulative abnormal returns overnight and close-to-close are extremely close to each other all the way to month 12. After adjusting for three-factor exposure, we still find some evidence of long-run reversal as overnight profits revert partially (about 30%) during the second year.

The fact that the negative skewness present in momentum returns tends to occur intraday raises the question of how momentum strategies perform overnight versus intraday during momentum crashes. Figure 5 plots the components of momentum returns during 2009. In the first two months of 2009, overall momentum returns are positive. Beginning in March 2009, returns to the momentum strategy are negative for the next six months. Interestingly, March's negative return of -9.4% occurs entirely overnight (-12%) as the intraday return is positive (2.4%). The overnight crash in March is then followed by a dramatic -41% return in April, which almost entirely occurs intraday (-39%) rather than overnight (-2%). The momentum crash continues in May as returns to the momentum strategy are -18%, driven by an overnight drop that month of -26%. Though of course the March-May momentum crash coincides with many other market phenomena, it is interesting to see that the largest decline occurred intraday, but was precipitated by a smaller, but still quite large, overnight drop the month before.

### 4.3 Robustness Tests

To ensure the reliability of our results, we have excluded microcaps and low-price stocks from the sample and sorted stocks into value-weight portfolios based on NYSE breakpoints. Furthermore, we have made sure that overnight returns are only based on traded prices. However, to confirm those conclusions, Table III documents that our findings are robust to subsample analysis.

One possibility is that our finding is driven by extremes that occur in particular subperiods. Table III Panels A and B report the decomposition for the first and second halves of the sample. Of course, the 2009 crash results in very negative realized values for the momentum portfolios. As a consequence, we exclude that year from our analysis, and simply decompose momentum profits during normal markets. We find that momentum profits are entirely an overnight phenomenon in both the early subsample (1993-2002) and the late subsample (2003-2013). Specifically, we find that the three-factor alpha during the early period is 1.26% per month with a  $t$ -statistic of 3.99. The late period's three-factor alpha is 1.19 percent per month with a  $t$ -statistic of 4.26. Thus, our surprising finding is not just a historical quirk. Instead, these patterns are very much present in the recent data.

Despite our care in using only volume-weighted traded prices, a concern might be that our findings are driven by some microstructure artifact. Table III Panels C and D report our decomposition for small- and large-cap stocks separately. Presumably, by focusing on large-cap stocks, we can eliminate concerns that any such artifact drives our results. We sort stocks each month based on median NYSE market capitalization. We find that overnight returns to the momentum strategy are actually stronger for large-cap stocks. For small-cap stocks, the overnight three-factor alpha is 0.54% ( $t$ -statistic of 4.49) while the intraday three-factor alpha is 0.39% ( $t$ -statistic of 1.59). For large-cap stocks, the overnight three-factor alpha is 1.04% ( $t$ -statistic of 5.90) while the intraday three-factor alpha is actually negative, -0.24% ( $t$ -statistic of -0.79).

A related concern is that even though we are using traded prices, perhaps these prices disproportionately reflect the ask for the winner stocks and the bid for loser stocks. Table III Panels E and F split the sample based on price as high-priced stocks presumably have much lower bid-ask spreads on a percentage basis. We again split the sample based on monthly median NYSE values and find that overnight returns to the momentum strategy are actually stronger for high-price stocks. For low-price stocks, the overnight three-factor alpha is 0.66%

( $t$ -statistic of 3.59) while the intraday three-factor alpha is 0.33% ( $t$ -statistic of 1.17). For high-price stocks, the overnight three-factor alpha is 1.14% ( $t$ -statistic of 6.63) while the intraday three-factor alpha is again negative, -0.41% ( $t$ -statistic of -1.33).

We further test this concern by replacing our VWAP open price with the midpoint of the bid-ask spread. We limit the data to NYSE stocks that have quote data updated regularly throughout the day. Table I Panel B reports that the average excess overnight return is 0.89% per month with an associated  $t$ -statistic of 3.44 and the average excess intraday return is -0.18% per month ( $t$ -statistic of -0.43) when using the VWAP price. In results not reported, we find that these results are very similar if we instead use the midpoint of the bid-ask spread. In particular, the average excess overnight return is 0.95% per month with an associated  $t$ -statistic of 2.95, and the average excess intraday return is only 0.04% per month ( $t$ -statistic of 0.17).

Finally, to ensure that we are not picking up an unusual spike in the prices of momentum stocks when the market opens, Figure 6 decomposes the intraday momentum return into its hourly components. There is no evidence of anything unusual throughout the day, confirming our paper’s surprising result that the vast majority of momentum profits occur overnight. Figure 6 plots both excess and three-factor adjusted returns; our conclusions are robust to using either.

In summary, our finding that momentum is an overnight phenomenon continues to hold even when we carefully examine traded prices throughout the day, study only the largest or highest-priced stocks, or focus only on the last ten years of data.

## 4.4 Comparison with Size and Value

A possible economic explanation for our finding might be that the overnight premium for momentum represents compensation for when intermediary capital and/or collateral is most expensive. We examine two other well-known strategies that should be similar to momentum in this regard, namely strategies that capture the average returns associated with size and value (Fama and French 1992).<sup>9</sup> We first examine a strategy ( $ME$ ) that goes long the small-

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<sup>9</sup>Fama and French (1992) argue that size and the book-to-market-equity ratio describe the cross section of average returns, subsuming many other related characteristics. Fama and French (1993) propose a three-factor model that includes not only a market factor but also a size and value factor. Fama and French (1996) argue that these factors price a variety of trading strategies except for the momentum effect of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993).

stock decile and short the large-stock decile. Table IV Panel A reports the overnight and intraday components of  $ME$ 's excess and CAPM-adjusted returns. Essentially all of the size premium occurs intraday. Specifically, the intraday CAPM alpha is  $-0.43\%$  ( $t$ -statistic of  $-1.85$ ) while the overnight CAPM alpha is only  $-0.11\%$  ( $t$ -statistic of  $-0.75$ ).

We then decompose the returns on a strategy ( $BM$ ) that goes long the high book-to-market decile and short the low book-to-market decile. We measure book-to-market-equity ratios following Fama and French (1992). Table IV Panel B reports the overnight and intraday components of  $BM$ 's excess and CAPM-adjusted returns. Again, we find that essentially all of the value premium occurs intraday. Specifically, the intraday CAPM alpha is  $0.48\%$  ( $t$ -statistic of  $2.21$ ) while the overnight CAPM alpha is actually slightly negative, though not statistically significant ( $-0.10\%$  per month,  $t$ -statistic of  $-0.67$ ).

As a consequence, simple stories that rely on the fact that capital and/or collateral is more expensive overnight cannot explain why momentum profits only accrue overnight but size and value premiums do not.

## 4.5 The Role of News Announcements

### *Macroeconomic news*

Scheduled macroeconomic announcements are made both when markets are open and when they are closed, with roughly equal proportions. Of course, particular announcements may be particularly relevant in terms of cross-sectional differences in risk. We take a first step in analyzing whether exposure to macroeconomic news can explain the cross-section of overnight versus intraday returns by examining the cross-sectional response to a macroeconomic announcement that has been shown to be relevant for the market as a whole, namely the announcement from the meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). Lucca and Moench (2015) show the market response to macro announcements documented in Savor and Wilson (2014) exclusively comes from the FOMC announcement and occurs during the 2pm-to-2pm period prior to the scheduled FOMC announcements. Since the market response is quite strong and covers both an intraday and overnight period, this announcement has the potential to uncover differences in risk across these periods for momentum, size, and value strategies.

Table IV Panel C reports the overnight and intraday components for the day of the

announcement as well as the days before and after the announcement for momentum, size, and value long-short portfolios. We find no statistically significant average returns over these days for any of the three strategies.

#### *Firm-specific news*

One clear difference between the intraday and overnight periods is that firm-specific news tends to be released after markets close. Table IV Panels D and E examine the role of news announcements. In particular, we classify months as containing news if there is either an earnings announcement or news coverage in the Dow Jones Newswire. Months without either an earnings announcement or news coverage are classified as months without news. Note that this classification is done ex post so our results should be interpreted as simply attributing whether realized overnight momentum returns are particularly large when news occurs.

Table IV Panel D reports that momentum earns an overnight premium in both news months (1.02% three-factor alpha with a  $t$ -statistic of 4.30) and in no-news months (1.35% three-factor alpha with a  $t$ -statistic of 5.15). The difference in the overnight returns to momentum between months in which there is news and months without news is not statistically significant. Table IV Panel E examines whether the realized intraday returns on ME and BM are particularly large during news months. We find no statistical difference across the two categories here as well.

## **4.6 The Role of Institutional Investors**

Though it is possible that variation in risk from overnight to intraday explains these striking patterns in expected returns, we are unable to find such variation, at least in terms of standard measures such as CAPM, three-factor, and macroeconomic risks. Though risks may be different from intraday to overnight, other aspects of the market are clearly different, including, but not limited to, the types of investors that tend to trade intraday versus overnight. We pursue this avenue to understand our findings.

#### *When do institutions trade?*

We first study when institutional investors tend to trade. Specifically, we link changes in institutional ownership to the components of *contemporaneous* firm-level stock returns. In

Table V Panel A, we regress quarterly changes in institutional ownership on the overnight and intraday components of contemporaneous returns. We examine this relation across institutional ownership quintiles. We find that for all but the lowest institutional ownership quintile, institutional ownership increases more with intraday rather than overnight returns.

To the extent that investors' collective trading can move prices, this evidence suggests that institutions are more likely to trade intraday while individuals are more likely to trade overnight. Of course one could argue it is hard to know how to interpret these correlations because institutional trading can both drive stock returns and react to stock returns within the quarter. Three reasons suggest that interpretation of our results is unlikely. For one thing, such a result is consistent with the usual understanding as to how these two classes of investors approach markets. Professional investors tend to trade during the day, and particularly near the close, taking advantage of the relatively higher liquidity at that time. Conversely, individuals may be more likely to evaluate their portfolios in the evening after work and thus may tend to make trades that execute when markets open. Our discussions with asset managers indicates that the typical manager does not trade at the open.

Two, it would be a bit odd that institutions chase only intraday returns. Finally, we replicate the analysis using high-frequency daily institutional flows from Campbell, Ramadorai, and Schwartz (2009). We find that our results continue to hold and, in fact, are statistically speaking, much stronger. Table V Panel B shows that for all but the lowest institutional ownership quintile, daily institutional ownership increases much more with intraday rather than overnight returns.

*What types of stocks do institutions trade?*

We then examine whether institutions trade with or against the momentum characteristic, both on average and conditional on key indicators. In particular, we *forecast* quarterly changes in institutional ownership using a firm's momentum characteristic.

In Table VI Panel A, we estimate both OLS and WLS (with weights tied to a firm's lagged market capitalization) cross-sectional regressions and report the resulting Fama-MacBeth estimates. We first focus on the unconditional results, reported in columns (1) and (3). When we weight firms equally, we find no relation between a stock's momentum characteristic and its subsequent change in institutional ownership. Since our analysis of returns mainly relies on value-weight portfolios, we also examine the results when we weight observations by market capitalization. In this case, we find that institutions collectively trade against the

momentum characteristic. The estimate is -0.260 with an associated standard error of 0.119. Of course, since a decrease in institutional ownership is an increase in individual ownership, these findings suggest that, if anything, on average, individuals, relative to institutions, are the ones trading momentum.

To better understand these patterns, we exploit two variables that arguably generate variation in momentum trading by institutions. The first variable we use is *comomentum*. Lou and Polk (2014) propose a novel approach to measuring the amount of momentum trading based on time-variation in the degree of high-frequency abnormal return comovement among momentum stocks. This idea builds on Barberis and Shleifer (2003), who argue that institutional ownership can cause returns to comove above and beyond that implied by their fundamentals.<sup>10</sup> Lou and Polk confirm that their measure of the momentum crowd is a success based on three empirical findings. First, *comomentum* is significantly correlated with existing variables plausibly linked to the size of momentum trading. Second, *comomentum* forecasts relatively low holding-period returns, relatively high holding-period return volatility, and relatively more negative holding-period return skewness for the momentum strategy. Finally, when *comomentum* is relatively high, the long-run buy-and-hold returns to a momentum strategy are negative, consistent with times of relatively high amounts of momentum investing pushing prices further away from fundamentals.

Columns (2) and (4) in Table VI Panel A report the results from forecasting the time-series of cross-sectional regression coefficients using *comomentum*. For robustness, we simply measure *comomentum* using tritile dummies. Consistent with the interpretation that *comomentum* measures time-variation in the size of the momentum crowd, we find that institutions' tendency to trade against the momentum characteristic is decreasing in *comomentum*. The effect is statistically significant for both the OLS and WLS estimates.

Table VI Panels B and C explore the implications of this result for our decomposition of momentum profits. In particular, we partition the data into three subsamples based on the relative value of *comomentum*. Following Lou and Polk (2014), we track the buy-and-hold performance of *MOM* for two years following portfolio formation. When *comomentum* is low, we find that the overnight excess returns to momentum strategies are particularly strong in both Year 1 and Year 2 after classification. However, when *comomentum* is high, the excess returns turn negative. The difference in the average overnight return to momentum

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<sup>10</sup>Recent work by Anton and Polk (2014) uses a natural experiment to confirm that institutional ownership can cause this sort of comovement. Lou (2012) shows that mutual fund flow-induced trading could also lead to excess stock return comovement.

across high and low *comomentum* states of the world is -1.56% in Year 1 and -2.26% in Year 2. Both estimates are jointly statistically significant ( $t$ -statistics of -2.22 and -4.05 respectively).

A corresponding *comomentum* effect can be seen in the average intraday returns to momentum. When *comomentum* is low, we find that the intraday excess returns to momentum strategies are particularly negative in both Year 1 and Year 2. However, when *comomentum* is high, these excess returns turn positive. The difference in the average intraday return to momentum across high and low *comomentum* states of the world is 1.11% in Year 1 and 0.86% in Year 2. Both estimates are jointly statistically significant ( $t$ -statistics of 1.79 and 2.04 respectively).

The second key indicator we use is the aggregate *active weight* in a stock. We measure *active weight* as the difference between the aggregate weight of all institutions in a stock and the weight of the stock in the value-weight market portfolio. We conjecture that a relatively large *active weight* will indicate a preference by those institutional investors to rebalance towards market weights, due to risk management concerns such as tracking error.

Columns (2) and (4) in Table VII Panel A report the results from cross-sectional regressions forecasting quarterly changes in institutional ownership using a firm's momentum characteristic, *active weight*, and the interaction between these two variables. For robustness, we simply measure *active weight* using quintile dummies.

Consistent with our conjecture that institutions with high *active weight* in a stock are reluctant to let their positions ride, we find that institutions' tendency to trade against the momentum characteristic is increasing in *active weight*. The effect is statistically significant for both the OLS and WLS estimates.

Table VII Panels B and C explore the implications of this result for our decomposition of momentum profits. In particular, we independently sort stocks on momentum and *active weight* into quintiles and form 25 value-weight portfolios.<sup>11</sup> When *active weight* is low, we find that the overnight excess returns to momentum strategies are relatively weak the next month. However, when *active weight* is high, overnight returns become strongly positive. The difference in the average overnight return to momentum across high and low *active weight* stocks is 1.15% with an associated  $t$ -statistic of 5.39.

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<sup>11</sup>As throughout the paper, these sorts are based on NYSE breakpoints.

A corresponding effect can, again, be seen in the average intraday returns to momentum. When *active weight* is low, the average intraday excess returns to momentum strategies are close to zero. However, when *active weight* is high, these average excess returns become quite negative. The difference in the average intraday return to momentum across high and low *active weight* stocks is -0.76% with an associated *t*-statistic of -2.70.

Whether or not institutions are momentum traders is an important research question in finance. Despite the importance of this question, there is no clear consensus; the answer appears to depend on both the type of institution being studied and the sample in question. For our data, we find that on average, institutions tend to trade against momentum.<sup>12</sup> Moreover, there is interesting time-series and cross-sectional variation in institutional momentum trading that goes hand-in-hand with variation in the decomposition of momentum profits into overnight and intraday components.

Namely, in the time series, when the amount of momentum trading activity is particularly low, or in the cross-section, when the typical institution holding a stock has a particularly strong need to rebalance, we find that institutions trade more strongly against momentum and that momentum returns are even larger overnight and more strongly reverse during the day. Both cases generate variation in the spread between overnight and intraday returns on the order of two percent per month.

## 4.7 Non-US markets

To provide further evidence of our finding that momentum profits, particularly for stocks held by institutional owners, accrue primarily overnight, we decompose profits to momentum strategies in the nine of the largest non-US equity markets. Those markets are Canada, France, Germany, Italy, United Kingdom, Australia, Hong Kong, Japan, and South Africa.

A significant challenge in decomposing momentum profits in non-US markets is finding reliable data for open prices. We obtained that data from Thomson Reuters Tick History database, which provides complete microsecond tick data for markets around the world since 1996.<sup>13</sup> To construct an open price, we followed our US method and computed a VWAP

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<sup>12</sup>Our results are consistent with the findings of Badrinath and Wahal (2002), who show that institutions tend to be momentum traders when they open new positions but are contrarian when they adjust existing ones.

<sup>13</sup>When processing the data, we also compared our accurate measures of open prices to those found on Datastream. Our analysis indicated that Datastream open prices can be quite misleading.

price for each stock.

Table VIII reports our findings. The left-side of the Table reports results for the full sample of stocks, while the right side of the Table reports results for large-cap stocks. Of course, large-cap stocks are much more likely to be held by institutions.

For the full sample, we find that momentum is primarily an intraday phenomenon. For eight of the nine countries in our sample, intraday momentum profits are larger than overnight momentum profits. Indeed, only two countries, Australia and South Africa, have positive overnight momentum profits that are statistically significant. An value-weight average of the close-to-close momentum profits is 1.28% per month ( $t$ -statistic of 2.55) with 0.96% ( $t$ -statistic of 3.62) accruing intraday and only 0.23% ( $t$ -statistic of 0.58) accruing overnight.

The results change dramatically for the large-cap sample. Now, six countries have overnight momentum profits that are larger than the corresponding intraday profits. For all six of these countries, the overnight component of momentum profits is economically and statistically significant. Only one country, Germany, has momentum returns that are statistically significant. An value-weight average of the close-to-close momentum profits for the large-cap sample is 1.24% per month ( $t$ -statistic of 2.17) with a statistically-insignificant 0.44% ( $t$ -statistic of 1.24) accruing intraday and a statistically-significant 0.80% ( $t$ -statistic of 2.50) accruing overnight.

As a consequence, the change in the overnight and intraday components as one moves from the full sample to the large-cap sample goes the right way and is quite statistically significant. Specifically, the overnight component increases by 0.57% ( $t$ -statistic of 3.13) and the intraday component decreases by 0.52% ( $t$ -statistic of -2.78). This difference-in-difference test is consistent with our conjecture that we should expect momentum to be more of an overnight phenomenon among stocks with a larger institutional presence.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>14</sup>Though the equal-weight average intraday component is statistically significant, this is driven entirely by one country, Germany, which is known to be more of a banking-based than market-based economy. Presumably, weighting countries by the relative presence of institutional investors would downweight Germany in our analysis.

## 4.8 The Pre-1962 evidence

Open prices are also available for a thirty-year period from 1927-1962. Of course, these prices do not have the nice feature of the VWAP approach used in the rest of our analysis in that they do not necessarily represent traded prices. Nevertheless, this sample provides a potentially useful placebo test of our hypothesis that institutional ownership is responsible for the overnight momentum pattern, as institutional ownership was very low for all but the largest stocks. Consistent with that idea, Panel A of Table A1 in the Internet Appendix shows that for this sample, momentum is primarily an intraday phenomenon. Momentum has a monthly three-factor alpha of 1.45% ( $t$ -statistic of 4.43). The intraday component is 1.03% ( $t$ -statistic of 3.43), while the overnight component is insignificant from zero (point estimate of 0.21% with a  $t$ -statistic of 0.97).

We also examine whether the overnight component becomes more important for large-cap stocks. Table A1 Panel B shows that this is the case. Specifically, we find that large-cap momentum has a monthly three-factor alpha of 1.39% ( $t$ -statistic of 4.74). The intraday component is still large at 0.95% ( $t$ -statistic of 3.51). However, now the overnight component is statistically significant from zero (point estimate of 0.34% with a  $t$ -statistic of 2.05). In summary, though we have less faith in the pre-1963 open price data, we do find that the results using that data are broadly consistent with the view that institutional investors play an important role in understanding why momentum is an overnight phenomenon in the 1993-2013 sample.

## 4.9 Other Patterns in the Cross-Section of Expected Returns

We now decompose the returns on a variety of popular trading strategies to confirm and extend our results.

### *Earning Momentum and Industry Momentum*

To show that our conclusion that momentum profits occur overnight is robust, we next examine two other momentum strategies. Table IX Panel A decomposes the abnormal returns on an earnings momentum strategy ( $SUE$ ). Our earnings momentum characteristic is simply the difference between reported earnings and the consensus forecast; this difference is scaled by the firm's stock price. As with price momentum, we find that 100% of the returns to  $SUE$  occur overnight. In particular, the three-factor alpha of a long-short earnings

momentum portfolio is 0.58% with a  $t$ -statistic of 3.23. The corresponding intraday three-factor alpha is indistinguishable from zero.

Table IX Panel B decomposes the abnormal returns on an industry momentum strategy (*INDMOM*). We follow Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) and measure industry momentum over a twelve-month ranking period for 20 industries based on SIC codes. Again, we find that 100% of the *INDMOM* effect occurs overnight. In particular, the three-factor alpha of a long-short industry momentum portfolio is 1.09% with a  $t$ -statistic of 6.65. The corresponding intraday three-factor alpha is an economically large -0.56%, though (just barely) statistically indistinguishable from zero. In summary, for the three different momentum strategies studied in this paper, all of the abnormal profits occur overnight.

#### *Profitability and Investment*

Despite the success of the three-factor model, researchers have documented that several other characteristics generate cross-sectional variation in average returns. Chief among these characteristics are profitability – introduced by Haugen and Baker (1996) and confirmed in Vuolteenaho (2002) – and investment – introduced by Fairfield, Whisenant, and Yohn (2003) and carefully analyzed in Titman, Wei, and Xie (2004) and Polk and Sapienza (2009). Indeed, Fama and French (2014) grants that two factors based on profitability and investment help describe the cross section of average returns, even in the presence of their value factor, *HML*.

We examine a strategy (*ROE*) that goes long the high profitability decile and short the low profitability decile. Table IX Panel C reports the overnight and intraday components of *ROE*'s excess, CAPM-adjusted, and three-factor-adjusted returns. More than 100% of the profitability premium occurs intraday as there is a very strong *negative* expected return associated with *ROE* overnight. Specifically, the intraday three-factor alpha is 1.43% ( $t$ -statistic of 6.44) while the overnight three-factor alpha is -0.95% ( $t$ -statistic of -6.22).

We then examine a strategy (*INV*) that goes long the high investment decile and short the low investment decile. Table IX Panel D reports the overnight and intraday components of *INV*'s average excess, CAPM-adjusted, and three-factor-adjusted returns. Again, more than 100% of the negative investment premium occurs intraday as there is a statistically significant *positive* expected return associated with *INV* overnight. Specifically, the intraday three-factor alpha is -0.78% ( $t$ -statistic of -4.09) while the overnight three-factor alpha is 0.36% ( $t$ -statistic of 2.85).

#### *Beta and Idiosyncratic Volatility*

The next two strategies we study relate to traditional measures of risk. The fundamental measure of risk in the asset-pricing model of Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965), and Black (1972) is market beta. However, empirical evidence indicates that the security market line is too flat on average (Black 1972 and Frazzini and Pedersen 2014).

We examine a strategy (*BETA*) that goes long the high-beta decile and short the low-beta decile. We measure beta using daily returns over the last year in a market model regression. We include one lead and one lag of the market in the regression to take nonsynchronous trading issues into account. Table IX Panel E reports the overnight and intraday components of *BETA*'s excess, CAPM-adjusted, and three-factor-adjusted returns. More than 100% of the negative beta premium occurs intraday as there is a *positive* premium associated with *BETA* overnight. Specifically, the intraday three-factor alpha is -0.80% (*t*-statistic of -2.60) while the overnight three-factor alpha is 0.49% (*t*-statistic of 2.10).

We then analyze a strategy (*IVOL*) that goes long the high idiosyncratic volatility decile and short the low idiosyncratic volatility decile. Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2006) argue that high idiosyncratic stocks have abnormally low returns. We measure idiosyncratic volatility as the volatility of the residual from a daily Fama-French-Carhart four-factor regression estimated over the prior year. We include a lead and lag of each factor in the regression so that nonsynchronous trading issues are taken into account. Table IX Panel F documents that more than 100% of *IVOL* occurs intraday. As a consequence, *IVOL* is associated with a *positive* risk premium overnight. Specifically, the intraday three-factor alpha for *IVOL* is -2.34% per month with an associated *t*-statistic of -7.82. The corresponding overnight three-factor alpha is 1.61% per month with a *t*-statistic of 5.81.

#### *Equity Issuance and Discretionary Accruals*

Our next group of strategies are related to firm financing and accounting decisions. Daniel and Titman (2006) show that issuance activity negatively predicts cross-sectional variation in average returns. Sloan (1996) documents a strong negative correlation between discretionary accruals and subsequent stock returns. We first examine a strategy (*ISSUE*) that goes long the high-equity-issuance decile and short the high-equity-issuance decile. Table IX Panel G reports the overnight and intraday components of *ISSUE*'s excess, CAPM-adjusted, and three-factor-adjusted returns. More than 100% of the issuance premium occurs intraday as there is a very strong *positive* expected return associated with *ISSUE* overnight. Specifically, the intraday three-factor alpha is -1.05% (*t*-statistic of -6.05) while the overnight three-factor alpha is 0.52% (*t*-statistic of 3.35).

We then examine a strategy (*ACCRUALS*) that goes long the high discretionary accruals decile and short the low discretionary accruals decile. Table IX Panel H reports the overnight and intraday components of *ACCRUALS*'s average excess, CAPM-adjusted, and three-factor-adjusted returns. Again, more than 100% of the accruals premium occurs intraday as there is a statistically significant *positive* expected return associated with *ACCRUALS* overnight. Specifically, the intraday three-factor alpha is -0.94% (*t*-statistic of -4.95) while the overnight three-factor alpha is 0.56% (*t*-statistic of 4.00).

#### *Turnover and One-month Return*

The final two strategies we study relate to liquidity and price impact. Datar, Naik and Radcliffe (1998) show that turnover (*TURNOVER*) is negatively related to the cross-section of average returns, and this finding is confirmed in Lee and Swaminathan (2000). Jegadeesh (1990) shows that buying (selling) short-term losers (winners) is profitable.

We first examine a strategy (*TURNOVER*) that goes long the high turnover decile and short the low turnover decile. We measure turnover following Lee and Swaminathan (2000) as the average daily volume over the last year. Table IX Panel I reports the overnight and intraday components of *TURNOVER*'s average excess, CAPM-adjusted, and three-factor-adjusted returns. Again, more than 100% of the negative turnover premium occurs intraday as there is a statistically significant *positive* expected return associated with *TURNOVER* overnight. Specifically, the intraday three-factor alpha is -0.52% (*t*-statistic of -3.22) while the overnight three-factor alpha is 0.35% (*t*-statistic of 2.54).

We then analyze a strategy (*RET1*) that goes long the high past one-month return decile and short the low past one-month return turnover decile. Table IX Panel J reports the overnight and intraday components of *RET1*'s average excess, CAPM-adjusted, and three-factor-adjusted returns. Note that we find no short-term reversal close-to-close effect, which is perhaps not surprising given that we exclude microcaps from our sample, form value-weight portfolios, and study a relatively recent time period. However, what is surprising is that our decomposition reveals a strong overnight reversal and a slightly stronger *positive* expected return associated with *RET1* intraday. Specifically, the intraday three-factor alpha is 1.05% (*t*-statistic of -3.26) while the overnight three-factor alpha is -0.88% (*t*-statistic of 4.01).

#### *The interaction between momentum and idiosyncratic volatility*

So far our momentum analysis has focused on the winner and loser decile portfolios.

We now look more closely at how our decomposition varies across the momentum decile portfolios. This closer look in turn leads us to show that the interaction between idiosyncratic volatility and momentum plays an important role in our decomposition.

Figure 7 plots the value-weight excess returns from close-to-close, overnight, and intraday for ten value-weight momentum decile portfolios. Though the average close-to-close returns are roughly increasing as one moves from the loser decile to the winner decile, the overnight and intraday components are surprisingly U- and hump-shaped respectively.

To explain these patterns, we exploit two facts. The first fact is that extreme momentum stocks tend to be stocks with high idiosyncratic volatility. The second fact is that *IVOL* is associated with a *positive* risk premium overnight, as our decomposition of *IVOL* above shows. These two facts suggest an explanation for the U- and hump-shaped patterns of Figure 7; namely, extreme winner or loser stocks generally outperform overnight and underperform intraday because they tend to be high idiosyncratic volatility stocks.

As a consequence, Table X Panels A and B decompose the excess returns on 25 momentum- and idiosyncratic-volatility-sorted portfolios into their overnight and intraday components respectively. There are several findings worth noting. First, within all but the highest idiosyncratic volatility quintile, average excess returns are increasing with momentum. And even within the highest idiosyncratic volatility quintile, the momentum effect is much more monotonic. Second, the *t*-statistics on the 5-1 long-short momentum portfolios within each idiosyncratic volatility quintile are now much more statistically significant. Third, the idiosyncratic-volatility-stratified intraday return on a momentum bet is statistically insignificant from zero. Finally, both the positive overnight and the negative intraday premia associated with idiosyncratic volatility remain robust when controlling for momentum.

Table X Panel C presents another way to control for this interesting interaction between momentum and idiosyncratic volatility, simply excluding high idiosyncratic stocks (stocks with idiosyncratic volatility above the NYSE 80th percentile) from the sample each month. As one might expect from findings of the previous table, we find the overnight three-factor alphas on value-weight momentum deciles using this sample are now much more monotonic. The overnight return on a portfolio that is long the winner decile and short the loser decile has a three-factor alpha of 1.25% per month with a *t*-statistic of 4.28.

#### *Fama-MacBeth Regressions*

Though portfolio sorts are useful as a robust, non-parametric approach to document

the link between a characteristic and the cross-section of average returns, it is difficult to control for other characteristics to measure carefully the partial effect with this method. As a consequence, we turn to Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions to describe the cross-section of overnight versus intraday expected returns. Observations are weighted by lagged market capitalization in each cross sectional regression to be consistent with our portfolio analysis. Columns (1) through (3) of Table XI report the following three regressions: a standard regression forecasting the cross-section of  $r_{close-to-close}$ , a regression forecasting the cross-section of  $r_{overnight}$ , and a regression forecasting the cross-section of  $r_{intraday}$ . In each regression, we include all of the characteristics studied above except for  $SUE$ , as it reduces the number of observations in each cross-section considerably.

Regression (1) shows that, for our sample, only  $RET1$ ,  $INV$ , and  $ISSUE$  are statistically significant (on a value-weighted basis). Regression (3) reveals that many of these characteristics are much stronger predictors of the cross-section of intraday returns. In fact,  $SIZE$ ,  $IVOL$ ,  $BETA$ ,  $TURNOVER$ ,  $ROE$ ,  $INV$ ,  $ISSUE$ , and  $ACCRUALS$  are all statistically significant. Interestingly, the sign on  $RET1$  flips to be positive and statistically significant. There are negative intraday  $MOM$  and  $BM$  effects, though the estimates are not significant at the five percent level of significance.<sup>15</sup>

In the cross-section of overnight returns described by regression (2),  $MOM$  is very strong. Consistent with the results in previous tables, there is a strong positive premium associated with  $IVOL$  and  $TURNOVER$  and a strong negative premium associated with  $ROE$  and  $RET1$ . The positive premium for  $BETA$  is large but only marginally statistically significant. Interestingly, there is a positive premium for  $SIZE$ . Overall, these regressions are consistent with our main findings.

#### *Overnight premiums for Fama-French-Carhart anomalies*

Table IX has the interesting result that all of the variables that are anomalous with respect to the Fama-French-Carhart model have risk premiums overnight that are opposite in sign to their intraday average returns. A closer look reveals that in every case a positive risk premium is earned overnight for the side of the trade that might naturally be deemed as riskier. In particular, firms with low return-on-equity, or firms with high investment, market beta, idiosyncratic volatility, equity issuance, discretionary accruals, or share turnover all earn a positive premium overnight. In addition to market beta, Merton (1987) argues that

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<sup>15</sup>The fact that  $BM$  does not describe cross-sectional variation in average returns after controlling for  $INV$  and  $ROE$  is consistent with Fama and French (2014b).

idiosyncratic volatility can have positive premiums in a world where investors cannot fully diversify. Relatively low profits or (excessive) investment/issuance/accruals are intuitive accounting risk factors. For example, Campbell, Polk, and Vuolteenaho (2010) link cross-sectional variation in similar accounting characteristics to cross-sectional variation in cash-flow beta.

At first glance, the fact that low size and high book-to-market firms do not earn positive premiums overnight as well seems inconsistent with this interpretation. However, since both size and book-to-market ratio are well-known styles that many investors follow, one could argue that there is safety in numbers for investors who invest within these styles and are evaluated relative to how the style performs. In contrast, the strategies above (*ROE*, *INV*, *BETA*, *IVOL*, *ISSUE*, *ACCRUALS*, or *TURNOVER*) are not common styles in equity markets.

We explore this possibility in the setting of Fama-MacBeth regressions, which help us isolate partial effects. Column (4) in Table XI takes a first step in explaining these overnight premiums. We regress each of the time series of cross-sectional regression coefficients behind the estimates in regression (2) of the table on the contemporaneous overnight market return and report the resulting intercept. Doing so, we are able to control directly for a strategy's overnight market exposures. An obvious future step is to control for other overnight measures of risk. We find that the positive overnight risk premium associated with market beta is dramatically lower and no longer statistically significant. Our work-in-progress hopes to continue to link the positive overnight premiums on other stocks to more general measures of overnight risk.

#### *Overnight/Intraday Short-term Momentum and Reversal*

Since we have documented a striking tug of war tied to momentum linking cross-sectional variation in intraday and overnight returns over the next month, our final analysis examines the relation between intraday and overnight short-run returns more generally by decomposing the short-term reversal signal into overnight and intraday components. Specifically, in Table XII, at the end of each month, all stocks are sorted into deciles based on their lagged one-month overnight returns (Panel A) or lagged one-month intraday returns (Panel B). In each sort, we then go long the value-weight winner decile and short the value-weight loser decile. We report monthly portfolio returns in excess of the risk-free rate, adjusted by the CAPM, and by the three-factor model.

We find striking results. A hedge portfolio based on past one-month overnight returns earns on average an overnight excess return of 3.47% per month with an associated  $t$ -statistic of 16.57. This finding continues to hold regardless of the risk adjustment as the three-factor alpha is also 3.47% per month ( $t$ -statistic of 16.83). This one-month overnight return hedge portfolio earns on average an intraday excess return of -3.24% per month with an associated  $t$ -statistic of -9.34 (three-factor alpha of -3.02% per month with a  $t$ -statistic of -9.74).

Similarly, a hedge portfolio based on past one-month intraday returns earns on average an intraday excess return of 2.19% per month with an associated  $t$ -statistic of 6.72. This finding continues to hold regardless of the risk adjustment as the three-factor alpha is also 2.41% per month ( $t$ -statistic of 7.70). This one-month intraday return hedge portfolio earns on average an overnight excess return of -1.81% per month with an associated  $t$ -statistic of -8.44 (three-factor alpha of -1.77% per month with a  $t$ -statistic of -7.89).<sup>16</sup>

As with our momentum decomposition, these results are robust to replacing the VWAP open price with the midpoint of the quoted bid-ask spread at the open. In particular, the portfolio based on past one-month overnight returns has an overnight three-factor alpha of 1.88% ( $t$ -statistic of 8.75) and an intraday three-factor alpha of -1.43% ( $t$ -statistic of -7.05). Similarly, the portfolio based on past one-month intraday returns has an intraday three-factor alpha of 1.35% ( $t$ -statistic of 4.86) and an overnight three-factor alpha of -0.85% ( $t$ -statistic of -3.31).

One interpretation is that investors persistently trade certain stocks in the same direction at market open or market close, which is why we see this strong persistence in overnight and intraday returns. Figure 8 reports how the  $t$ -statistics associated with the four strategies analyzed in Table XI evolve in event time. Consistent with this interpretation, for each of the four strategies,  $t$ -statistics indicate statistical significance up to five years later.

## 5 Conclusions

We provide a novel decomposition of the cross section of expected returns into overnight and intraday components. We show that essentially all of the abnormal return on momentum strategies occurs overnight while the abnormal returns on other strategies primarily

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<sup>16</sup>Table A2 shows that the result in Table XI that momentum is an overnight phenomenon continues to hold if we break the one-month return into its intraday and overnight components.

occur intraday. Taken all together, our findings represent a challenge not only to traditional neoclassical models of risk and return but also to intermediary- and behavioral-based explanations of the cross section of average returns.

We argue that investor heterogeneity may help explain why momentum profits accrue overnight. Relative to individuals, we show that institutions as a class (on a value-weight basis) tend to trade against momentum during the day. However, the degree to which this is the case varies through time and across stocks, generating an interesting tug of war from intraday to overnight. Specifically, for those times or those stocks where the institutional holders have a relatively strong preference to trade against momentum, we find that momentum profits are not only higher overnight, but also partially revert intraday.

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Table I: Overnight/Intraday Momentum Returns

This table reports returns to the momentum strategy during the day vs. at night for the period 1993-2013. At the end of each month, all stocks are sorted into deciles based on their lagged 12-month cumulative returns (skipping the most recent month). We then go long the value-weight winner decile and short the value-weight loser decile. Stocks with prices below \$5 a share and/or that are in the bottom NYSE size quintile are excluded from the sample. Panel A reports the close-to-close momentum returns in the following month. Panel B reports the overnight and intraday momentum returns in the following month. Panel C reports some basic statistics of momentum returns during these different periods. We report monthly portfolio returns in excess of the risk-free rate, adjusted by the CAPM, and by the three-factor model. T-statistics, shown in parentheses, are computed based on standard errors corrected for serial-dependence with 12 lags. 5% statistical significance is indicated in bold.

Panel A: Close-to-Close MOM Returns			
Decile	Excess	CAPM	3-Factor
1	0.01%	-0.80%	-0.86%
	(0.02)	(-2.44)	(-2.55)
10	0.71%	0.13%	0.20%
	(1.82)	(0.58)	(0.99)
10 - 1	0.70%	<b>0.93%</b>	<b>1.05%</b>
	(1.38)	(1.98)	(2.22)

Panel B: Overnight vs. Intraday MOM Returns						
Decile	Overnight			Intraday		
	Excess	CAPM	3-Factor	Excess	CAPM	3-Factor
1	0.39%	0.10%	0.15%	-0.51%	-1.05%	-1.13%
	(1.33)	(0.40)	(0.55)	(-1.09)	(-2.92)	(-3.07)
10	1.28%	1.09%	1.09%	-0.69%	-1.07%	-1.02%
	(6.35)	(6.37)	(6.33)	(-2.29)	(-4.82)	(-4.96)
10 - 1	<b>0.89%</b>	<b>0.98%</b>	<b>0.95%</b>	-0.18%	-0.02%	0.11%
	(3.44)	(3.84)	(3.65)	(-0.43)	(-0.06)	(0.27)

Panel C: Summary Statistics			
Mean	Stdev	Skew	Sharpe
Close-to-Close MOM Returns			
0.70%	7.85%	-1.16	0.31
Overnight MOM Returns			
0.89%	4.02%	-1.08	0.77
Intraday MOM Returns			
-0.18%	6.50%	-1.53	-0.10

Table II: Factor Betas

This table reports factor betas of momentum returns. At the end of each month, all stocks are sorted into deciles based on their lagged 12-month cumulative returns (skipping the most recent month). We then go long the value-weight winner decile and short the value-weight loser decile. Stocks with prices below \$5 a share and/or that are in the bottom NYSE size quintile are excluded from the sample. The first two rows report factor exposures of close-to-close momentum returns, the middle two rows report the exposures of overnight momentum returns, and the last two rows report the exposures of intraday momentum returns. In the first two columns, we include in the time-series regression monthly Fama-French factors; in the next four columns, we include in the regression the overnight and intraday versions of the Fama-French factors. T-statistics, shown in parentheses, are computed based on standard errors corrected for serial-dependence with 12 lags. 5% statistical significance is indicated in bold.

	FF Factors	Overnight Factors	Intraday Factors			
Close-to-Close MOM Returns						
Alpha	<b>1.05%</b>	(2.22)	0.56%	(1.17)	<b>1.04%</b>	(2.01)
Mktrf	<b>-0.55</b>	(-3.22)	-0.20	(-0.78)	<b>-0.87</b>	(-3.36)
SMB	0.19	(0.72)	-0.31	(-0.61)	0.17	(0.64)
HML	-0.36	(-1.06)	-1.02	(-1.25)	-0.68	(-1.23)
Overnight MOM Returns						
Alpha	<b>0.95%</b>	(3.65)	<b>0.86%</b>	(3.07)	<b>0.74%</b>	(2.36)
Mktrf	<b>-0.20</b>	(-2.38)	<b>-0.35</b>	(-2.34)	-0.13	(-1.73)
SMB	0.18	(2.28)	-0.04	(-0.18)	0.13	(1.67)
HML	0.03	(0.29)	-0.84	(-1.51)	0.30	(1.48)
Intraday MOM Returns						
Alpha	0.11%	(0.27)	-0.26%	(-0.69)	0.30%	(0.68)
Mktrf	<b>-0.36</b>	(-2.86)	0.15	(0.74)	<b>-0.74</b>	(-3.21)
SMB	0.00	(0.01)	-0.27	(-0.65)	0.03	(0.10)
HML	-0.35	(-1.32)	-0.07	(-0.09)	-0.90	(-1.80)

Table III: Robustness Checks

This table reports returns to the momentum strategy during the day vs. at night for the period 1993-2013. At the end of each month, all stocks are sorted into deciles based on their lagged 12-month cumulative returns (skipping the most recent month). We then go long the value-weight winner decile and short the value-weight loser decile. Stocks with prices below \$5 a share and/or that are in the bottom NYSE size quintile are excluded from the sample. Panels A and B report overnight and intraday momentum returns in the following month in the first and second half of the sample period, respectively. Panels C and D report overnight and intraday momentum returns among small-cap and large-cap stocks, respectively. Panels E and F report overnight and intraday momentum returns among low-price and high-price stocks, respectively. We report monthly portfolio returns in excess of the risk-free rate, adjusted by the CAPM, and by the three-factor model. T-statistics, shown in parentheses, are computed based on standard errors corrected for serial-dependence with 12 lags. 5% statistical significance is indicated in bold.

Panel A: 1993-2002						
Decile	Overnight			Intraday		
	Excess	CAPM	3-Factor	Excess	CAPM	3-Factor
1	0.20%	-0.05%	0.01%	-0.79%	-1.19%	-1.17%
	(0.50)	(-0.16)	(0.04)	(-1.22)	(-2.29)	(-1.95)
10	1.48%	1.29%	1.27%	-0.82%	-1.15%	-0.98%
	(4.95)	(5.35)	(4.92)	(-1.84)	(-3.40)	(-3.04)
10 - 1	<b>1.28%</b>	<b>1.34%</b>	<b>1.26%</b>	-0.03%	0.04%	0.20%
	(3.90)	(4.16)	(3.99)	(-0.06)	(0.07)	(0.29)

Panel B: 2003-2013 (excluding 2009)						
Decile	Overnight			Intraday		
	Excess	CAPM	3-Factor	Excess	CAPM	3-Factor
1	0.15%	-0.21%	-0.14%	-0.26%	-0.89%	-0.95%
	(0.43)	(-0.73)	(-0.52)	(-0.51)	(-2.25)	(-2.56)
10	1.30%	1.06%	1.05%	-0.49%	-1.17%	-1.20%
	(5.01)	(4.58)	(4.56)	(-1.79)	(-4.21)	(-4.56)
10 - 1	<b>1.16%</b>	<b>1.27%</b>	<b>1.19%</b>	-0.23%	-0.28%	-0.25%
	(4.06)	(4.30)	(4.26)	(-0.99)	(-0.60)	(-0.55)

Panel C: Small-Cap Stocks (< NYSE Median)						
Decile	Overnight			Intraday		
	Excess	CAPM	3-Factor	Excess	CAPM	3-Factor
1	-0.17%	-0.45%	-0.47%	0.66%	0.02%	-0.21%
	(-0.84)	(-2.86)	(-2.94)	(1.55)	(0.05)	(-0.86)
5	0.35%	0.08%	0.07%	0.78%	0.30%	0.18%
	(1.76)	(0.53)	(0.49)	(2.59)	(1.38)	(1.12)
5 - 1	<b>0.52%</b>	<b>0.54%</b>	<b>0.54%</b>	0.13%	0.29%	0.39%
	(4.09)	(4.31)	(4.49)	(0.46)	(1.14)	(1.59)

Panel D: Large-Cap Stocks (>= NYSE Median)						
Decile	Overnight			Intraday		
	Excess	CAPM	3-Factor	Excess	CAPM	3-Factor
1	0.08%	-0.24%	-0.25%	0.07%	-0.47%	-0.53%
	(0.34)	(-1.28)	(-1.29)	(0.20)	(-1.82)	(-2.01)
5	1.00%	0.79%	0.79%	-0.39%	-0.79%	-0.77%
	(6.01)	(5.72)	(5.57)	(-1.60)	(-4.69)	(-4.60)
5 - 1	<b>0.93%</b>	<b>1.03%</b>	<b>1.04%</b>	-0.46%	-0.32%	-0.24%
	(5.13)	(5.92)	(5.90)	(-1.49)	(-1.06)	(-0.79)

Panel E: Low-Price Stocks (< NYSE Median)						
Decile	Overnight			Intraday		
	Excess	CAPM	3-Factor	Excess	CAPM	3-Factor
1	0.33%	-0.03%	-0.09%	-0.12%	-0.75%	-0.86%
	(1.31)	(-0.14)	(-0.40)	(-0.30)	(-2.63)	(-3.02)
5	0.89%	0.60%	0.57%	0.07%	-0.43%	-0.53%
	(4.03)	(3.30)	(3.20)	(0.22)	(-1.82)	(-2.65)
5 - 1	<b>0.56%</b>	<b>0.63%</b>	<b>0.66%</b>	0.19%	0.33%	0.33%
	(2.89)	(3.35)	(3.59)	(0.66)	(1.13)	(1.17)

Panel F: High-Price Stocks (>= NYSE Median)						
Decile	Overnight			Intraday		
	Excess	CAPM	3-Factor	Excess	CAPM	3-Factor
1	-0.14%	-0.42%	-0.40%	0.20%	-0.13%	-0.29%
	(-0.63)	(-2.30)	(-2.15)	(0.80)	(-0.85)	(-1.07)
5	0.95%	0.74%	0.74%	-0.22%	-0.42%	-0.70%
	(5.78)	(5.43)	(5.30)	(-1.36)	(-2.36)	(-4.28)
5 - 1	<b>1.08%</b>	<b>1.16%</b>	<b>1.14%</b>	-0.42%	-0.29%	-0.41%
	(6.31)	(6.77)	(6.63)	(-1.90)	(-1.56)	(-1.33)

Table IV: Size and Value, and the Role of News Announcements

This table reports returns to the size and value strategies during the day vs. at night and the role of news announcements. In Panel A, at the end of each month, all stocks are sorted into deciles based on the prior month market capitalization; in Panel B, stocks are sorted based on lagged book-to-market ratio. We then go long the value-weight highest market-cap/book-to-market ratio decile and short the value-weight lowest market-cap/book-to-market ratio decile. In Panels C, D and E, we examine various strategy returns in news vs. non-news months. In Panel C, we examine overnight and intraday returns to the momentum, size and value strategies in the three days (t-1 to t+1) around FOMC announcements. Panels D and E then examine overnight momentum returns and intraday size and value returns in months with and without firm-specific news announcements, respectively. The first row in either panel corresponds to holding months without earnings announcements or news coverage in Dow Jones Newswire, the second row corresponds to holding months with earnings announcements or news coverage, and the third row reports the difference between “news” and “no-news” months. Stocks with prices below \$5 a share and/or that are in the bottom NYSE size quintile are excluded from the sample. We report monthly portfolio returns in excess of the risk-free rate, adjusted by the CAPM, and by the three-factor model. T-statistics, shown in parentheses, are computed based on standard errors corrected for serial-dependence with 12 lags. 5% statistical significance is indicated in bold.

Panel A: Overnight vs. Intraday ME Returns				
Decile	Overnight		Intraday	
	Excess	CAPM	Excess	CAPM
1	0.45%	0.25%	0.55%	0.11%
	(2.27)	(1.53)	(1.61)	(0.47)
10	0.32%	0.14%	-0.01%	-0.32%
	(2.04)	(1.12)	(-0.03)	(-2.49)
10 - 1	-0.13%	-0.11%	<b>-0.56%</b>	-0.43%
	(-0.91)	(-0.75)	(-2.28)	(-1.85)

Panel B: Overnight vs. Intraday BM Returns				
Decile	Overnight		Intraday	
	Excess	CAPM	Excess	CAPM
1	0.29%	0.10%	0.00%	-0.34%
	(1.77)	(0.77)	(0.01)	(-2.16)
10	0.18%	0.00%	0.41%	0.14%
	(0.99)	(0.00)	(1.71)	(0.75)
10 - 1	-0.11%	-0.10%	0.41%	<b>0.48%</b>
	(-0.77)	(-0.67)	(1.85)	(2.21)

Panel C: Returns around FOMC Announcements					
	Close-to-Close <sub>t</sub>	Intraday <sub>t</sub>	Overnight <sub>t</sub>	Intraday <sub>t-1</sub>	Overnight <sub>t+1</sub>
MOM	0.01% (0.05)	0.03% (0.48)	-0.05% (-0.37)	0.09% (0.90)	0.03% (0.42)
ME	0.02% (0.30)	0.00% (-0.05)	0.00% (0.02)	0.10% (1.05)	0.01% (0.42)
BM	0.05% (0.66)	0.00% (0.03)	0.05% (0.88)	-0.02% (-0.31)	0.01% (0.23)

Panel D: Overnight Returns in News Months			
	MOM		
	Excess	CAPM	3-Factor
NoNews	<b>0.98%</b> (4.18)	<b>1.04%</b> (4.25)	<b>1.02%</b> (4.30)
News	<b>1.27%</b> (4.61)	<b>1.37%</b> (5.17)	<b>1.35%</b> (5.15)
News-NoNews	0.29% (1.07)	0.33% (1.17)	0.33% (1.17)

Panel E: Intraday Returns in News Months				
	ME		BM	
	Excess	CAPM	Excess	CAPM
NoNews	<b>-0.44%</b> (-1.96)	-0.41% (-1.79)	<b>0.63%</b> (2.07)	<b>0.70%</b> (2.26)
News	<b>-0.79%</b> (-2.97)	<b>-0.65%</b> (-2.50)	0.53% (1.48)	0.50% (1.40)
News-NoNews	-0.36% (-1.35)	-0.25% (-0.98)	-0.09% (-0.24)	-0.19% (-0.45)

Table V: Institutional Trading and Contemporaneous Returns

This table reports Fama-MacBeth regressions of changes in institutional ownership on contemporaneous stock returns. The dependent variable is the change in the fraction of shares outstanding held by all institutional investors. The independent variable in column 1 is the cumulative overnight return measured in the contemporaneous period, and that in column 2 is the cumulative intraday return in the same period. Column 3 reports the difference between the coefficients on overnight vs. intraday cumulative returns. Panel A uses quarterly changes in institutional ownership as reported in 13-F filings. Panel B uses daily changes in institutional ownership as inferred from large trades in the TAQ database (following Campbell, Ramadorai and Schwartz, 2008). Stocks with prices below \$5 a share and/or that are in the bottom NYSE size quintile are excluded from the sample. We further sort stocks into five quintiles based on institutional ownership at the beginning of the quarter and conduct the same regression for each IO quintile. Standard errors, shown in brackets, are adjusted for serial-dependence with 12 lags. \*, \*\*, \*\*\* denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.

Panel A: Quarterly Change in IO			
DepVar = Contemporaneous Qtrly Change in Institutional Ownership			
IO	Overnight Return	Intraday Return	Overnight - Intraday
1	-0.003 [0.007]	0.030* [0.017]	-0.033 [0.022]
2	-0.001 [0.005]	0.055*** [0.003]	-0.056*** [0.005]
3	0.000 [0.003]	0.073*** [0.004]	-0.073*** [0.005]
4	-0.005 [0.003]	0.071*** [0.009]	-0.077*** [0.007]
5	-0.008 [0.006]	0.070*** [0.010]	-0.077*** [0.006]
5-1	-0.005 [0.008]	0.039* [0.023]	-0.044* [0.027]

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Panel B: Daily Change in IO

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DepVar = Contemporaneous Daily Change in Institutional Ownership

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IO	Overnight Return	Intraday Return	Overnight - Intraday
1	0.177*** [0.041]	0.159*** [0.019]	0.018 [0.040]
2	0.119*** [0.024]	0.395*** [0.053]	-0.276*** [0.038]
3	0.142*** [0.024]	0.705*** [0.062]	-0.563*** [0.067]
4	0.166*** [0.031]	0.997*** [0.086]	-0.830*** [0.082]
5	0.130*** [0.039]	1.254*** [0.116]	-1.123*** [0.104]
5-1	-0.047 [0.051]	1.095*** [0.078]	-1.141*** [0.062]

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Table VI: Momentum Trading

This table examines the potential role of momentum trading. Panel A reports Fama-MacBeth forecasting regressions of changes in institutional ownership on the momentum characteristic. The dependent variable is the change in the fraction of shares outstanding held by all institutional investors (as reported in 13F filings) in the subsequent quarter. The main independent variable is the lagged 12-month cumulative stock return. We estimate OLS in the first two columns and WLS (with weights proportional to lagged market capitalization) in the next two columns. We then regress the time-series coefficients on our measure of arbitrage trading in the momentum strategy, a tercile dummy constructed from comomentum, defined as the average pairwise partial return correlation in the loser decile ranked in the previous 12 months. Changes in institutional ownership are expressed in percentage terms. Panels B and C report, respectively, the overnight and intraday returns to the momentum strategy as a function of lagged comomentum. All months in our sample are classified into three groups based on comomentum. Reported in these two panels are the overnight/intraday returns to the momentum strategy (i.e., long the value-weight winner decile and short the value-weight loser decile) in the two years after portfolio formation, following low to high comomentum. Stocks with prices below \$5 a share and/or that are in the bottom NYSE size quintile are excluded from the sample. Standard errors are adjusted for serial-dependence with 12 lags. \*, \*\*, \*\*\* denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.

Panel A: DepVar = Subsequent Change in Institutional Ownership				
X 100	Second stage of the Fama-MacBeth regression			
	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]
	OLS		WLS	
MOM	0.189	-0.240	-0.260**	-0.737**
	[0.117]	[0.215]	[0.119]	[0.317]
MOM X COMOM		0.199**		0.233*
		[0.088]		[0.125]
Adj-R <sup>2</sup>	0.003	0.003	0.004	0.004
No. Obs.	181,891	181,891	181,891	181,891

Panel B: Overnight Momentum Returns					
COMOM		Year 1		Year 2	
Rank	No Obs.	Estimate	t-stat	Estimate	t-stat
1	72	1.14%	(4.76)	0.95%	(3.80)
2	72	1.04%	(4.41)	-0.03%	(-0.10)
3	72	-0.41%	(-0.61)	-1.30%	(-3.02)
3-1		<b>-1.56%</b>	(-2.22)	<b>-2.26%</b>	(-4.05)

Panel C: Intraday Momentum Returns					
COMOM		Year 1		Year 2	
Rank	No Obs.	Estimate	t-stat	Estimate	t-stat
1	72	-0.92%	(-2.95)	-0.62%	(-3.12)
2	72	-0.84%	(-2.09)	-0.70%	(-1.40)
3	72	0.19%	(0.36)	0.24%	(0.42)
3-1		1.11%	(1.79)	<b>0.86%</b>	(2.04)

Table VII: Rebalancing Trades

This table examines the potential role of rebalancing trades. Panel A reports Fama-MacBeth forecasting regressions of changes in institutional ownership on the momentum characteristic. The dependent variable is the change in the fraction of shares outstanding held by all institutional investors (as reported in 13F filings) in the subsequent quarter. The main independent variable is the lagged 12-month cumulative stock return. We also include in the regression a quintile dummy constructed each quarter based on the active weight of the aggregate institutional portfolio (i.e., the aggregate weight of all institutions in a stock minus that in the market portfolio), as well as the interaction term between the quintile dummy and the lagged 12-month return. We estimate OLS in the first two columns and WLS (with weights proportional to lagged market capitalization) in the next two columns. Panels B and C report, respectively, the overnight and intraday returns to the momentum strategy as a function of institutional active weight. In particular, in each month, stocks are sorted independently into a 5X5 matrix by both institutional active weight from the most recent quarter and lagged 12-month stock returns. Reported in these two panels are the overnight/intraday returns to the momentum strategy (i.e., long the value-weight winner decile and short the value-weight loser decile) in the following month. Stocks with prices below \$5 a share and/or that are in the bottom NYSE size quintile are excluded from the sample. Standard errors are adjusted for serial-dependence with 12 lags. \*, \*\*, \*\*\* denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.

Panel A: DepVar = Subsequent Change in Institutional Ownership				
X 100	Fama-MacBeth Regressions			
	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]
	OLS		WLS	
MOM	0.189 [0.117]	0.620*** [0.128]	-0.260** [0.119]	0.210* [0.114]
MOM X AWGHT		-0.182*** [0.043]		-0.143*** [0.046]
AWGHT		-0.292*** [0.022]		-0.178*** [0.015]
Adj-R <sup>2</sup>	0.003	0.015	0.004	0.017
No. Obs.	181,891	181,891	181,891	181,891

Panel B: Overnight MOM Returns						
Institutional Active Weight						
MOM	1	2	3	4	5	5-1
1	0.52%	0.00%	-0.07%	-0.08%	-0.27%	-0.79%
	(1.91)	(0.01)	(-0.33)	(-0.39)	(-1.21)	(-4.32)
5	0.79%	0.53%	0.44%	0.67%	1.15%	0.36%
	(4.31)	(2.60)	(2.22)	(3.64)	(6.66)	(3.37)
5 - 1	0.27%	<b>0.53%</b>	<b>0.51%</b>	<b>0.75%</b>	<b>1.42%</b>	<b>1.15%</b>
	(1.10)	(2.68)	(2.72)	(4.54)	(7.92)	(5.39)

Panel C: Intraday MOM Returns						
Institutional Active Weight						
MOM	1	2	3	4	5	5-1
1	-0.36%	0.18%	0.71%	0.51%	0.38%	0.74%
	(-0.92)	(0.43)	(1.63)	(1.23)	(1.03)	(3.03)
5	-0.44%	0.44%	0.55%	0.24%	-0.46%	-0.02%
	(-1.71)	(1.45)	(1.81)	(0.87)	(-1.89)	(-0.14)
5 - 1	-0.09%	0.26%	-0.16%	-0.27%	<b>-0.84%</b>	<b>-0.76%</b>
	(-0.24)	(0.75)	(-0.48)	(-0.84)	(-2.62)	(-2.70)

Table VIII: Overnight/Intraday Momentum Returns: International Evidence

This table reports returns to the momentum strategy during the day vs. at night for the period 1996-2013 in nine foreign markets: Canada (North America), France, Germany, Italy, United Kingdom (Europe), Australia, Hong Kong, Japan (Asia-Pacific), and South Africa (Africa). At the end of each month, all stocks are sorted into deciles based on their lagged 12-month cumulative returns (skipping the most recent month). We then go long the value-weight winner decile and short the value-weight loser decile. Columns 1 and 4 report the close-to-close long-short momentum returns in the following month. Columns 2 and 5 report the overnight, while Columns 3 and 6 the intraday momentum returns in the following month. In the first three columns, we exclude stocks whose market capitalization is below the 10<sup>th</sup> percentile of the sample. In the next three columns, we exclude stocks whose market capitalization is below the 50<sup>th</sup> percentile of the sample (i.e., large-cap stocks). In the last two rows, we average the momentum strategy returns across all countries, based on either equal weights or weights that are proportional to the total market value. T-statistics, shown in parentheses, are computed based on standard errors corrected for serial-dependence with 12 lags. 10% statistical significance is indicated in bold.

Momentum Returns in Other Markets						
	Full Sample			Large-Cap Stocks		
	Close-to-Close	Overnight	Intraday	Close-to-Close	Overnight	Intraday
Canada	<b>1.45%</b> (2.23)	-0.10% (-0.19)	<b>1.34%</b> (2.39)	<b>1.14%</b> (2.19)	<b>1.00%</b> (2.41)	0.14% (0.29)
France	1.13% (1.42)	<b>-0.78%</b> (-1.31)	1.84% (4.15)	<b>1.01%</b> (1.75)	0.37% (0.87)	0.73% (1.38)
Germany	<b>1.83%</b> (2.19)	-0.59% (-1.08)	<b>2.49%</b> (4.55)	<b>1.43%</b> (1.73)	-0.09% (-0.16)	<b>1.60%</b> (2.55)
Italy	<b>1.86%</b> (2.62)	0.30% (0.51)	<b>1.37%</b> (3.72)	<b>1.55%</b> (2.11)	<b>1.17%</b> (2.23)	0.38% (0.77)
UK	<b>1.18%</b> (1.93)	0.32% (0.98)	0.71% (1.71)	1.10% (1.46)	<b>0.86%</b> (2.16)	0.28% (0.44)
Australia	<b>1.93%</b> (3.17)	<b>0.75%</b> (1.76)	<b>1.15%</b> (3.08)	<b>1.68%</b> (2.50)	<b>1.37%</b> (2.89)	0.30% (0.76)
Hong Kong	0.07% (0.11)	0.01% (0.03)	0.10% (0.18)	0.57% (0.86)	0.04% (0.07)	0.54% (1.02)
Japan	0.43% (0.76)	-0.02% (-0.04)	0.45% (1.65)	0.76% (1.34)	<b>0.62%</b> (1.69)	0.15% (0.47)
South Africa	<b>2.29%</b> (2.91)	<b>1.61%</b> (2.94)	0.75% (1.17)	<b>2.25%</b> (2.65)	<b>1.76%</b> (3.00)	0.53% (0.77)
All Countries	<b>1.42%</b> (3.22)	0.23% (0.84)	<b>1.12%</b> (4.73)	<b>1.37%</b> (3.07)	<b>0.81%</b> (3.20)	<b>0.59%</b> (2.16)
All Countries (Weighted)	<b>1.28%</b> (2.55)	0.23% (0.58)	<b>0.96%</b> (3.62)	<b>1.24%</b> (2.17)	<b>0.80%</b> (2.50)	0.44% (1.24)

Table IX: Other Firm Characteristics

This table reports returns to various strategies during the day vs. at night. In Panel A, at the end of each month, all stocks are sorted into deciles based on prior quarter earnings surprises (= actual earnings – consensus forecast); in Panel B, all industries are sorted into quintiles based on lagged 12-month cumulative industry returns. In Panel C, stocks are sorted into deciles based on lagged return-to-equity; in Panel D, stocks are sorted into deciles based on lagged asset growth; in Panel E, stocks are sorted into deciles based on lagged 12-month market betas (using daily returns with one lead and one lag); in Panel F, stocks are sorted into deciles based on their lagged 12-month daily idiosyncratic volatilities (with regard to the Carhart four factor model, with one lead and one lag); in Panel G, stocks are sorted into deciles based on equity issuance in the prior year; in Panel H, stocks are sorted into deciles based on lagged discretionary accruals; in Panel I, stocks are sorted into deciles based on lagged 12-month share turnover; in Panel J, stocks are sorted into deciles based on lagged one month returns. We then go long the value-weight top decile (quintile) and short the value-weight bottom decile (quintile). Stocks with prices below \$5 a share and/or that are in the bottom NYSE size quintile are excluded from the sample. We report monthly portfolio returns in excess of the risk-free rate, adjusted by the CAPM, and by the three-factor model. T-statistics, shown in parentheses, are computed based on standard errors corrected for serial-dependence with 12 lags. 5% statistical significance is indicated in bold.

Panel A: Overnight vs. Intraday SUE Returns						
Decile	Overnight			Intraday		
	Excess	CAPM	3-Factor	Excess	CAPM	3-Factor
1	0.30%	0.04%	0.02%	-0.20%	-0.70%	-0.93%
	(1.16)	(0.17)	(0.10)	(-0.47)	(-2.10)	(-3.22)
10	0.80%	0.60%	0.60%	-0.04%	-0.49%	-0.58%
	(4.08)	(3.72)	(3.74)	(-0.12)	(-2.26)	(-2.69)
10 - 1	<b>0.49%</b>	<b>0.56%</b>	<b>0.58%</b>	0.16%	0.21%	0.34%
	(2.98)	(3.20)	(3.23)	(0.56)	(0.70)	(1.20)

Panel B: Overnight vs. Intraday INDMOM Returns						
Decile	Overnight			Intraday		
	Excess	CAPM	3-Factor	Excess	CAPM	3-Factor
1	-0.12%	-0.31%	-0.34%	0.52%	0.16%	0.05%
	(-0.62)	(-1.86)	(-2.05)	(1.62)	(0.66)	(0.22)
5	0.93%	0.77%	0.75%	-0.14%	-0.47%	-0.51%
	(5.08)	(4.79)	(4.73)	(-0.51)	(-2.41)	(-2.68)
5 - 1	<b>1.05%</b>	<b>1.07%</b>	<b>1.09%</b>	<b>-0.66%</b>	<b>-0.63%</b>	-0.56%
	(6.34)	(6.47)	(6.65)	(-2.16)	(-2.03)	(-1.92)

Panel C: Portfolios Sorted by ROE						
Decile	Overnight			Intraday		
	Excess	CAPM	3-Factor	Excess	CAPM	3-Factor
1	1.09%	0.86%	0.88%	-0.84%	-1.36%	-1.30%
	(4.67)	(4.42)	(4.52)	(-2.24)	(-5.39)	(-5.44)
10	0.09%	-0.10%	-0.07%	0.35%	0.06%	0.13%
	(0.55)	(-0.78)	(-0.53)	(1.63)	(0.43)	(0.93)
10 - 1	<b>-1.00%</b>	<b>-0.95%</b>	<b>-0.95%</b>	<b>1.19%</b>	<b>1.42%</b>	<b>1.43%</b>
	(-6.46)	(-6.25)	(-6.22)	(4.33)	(5.58)	(6.44)

Panel D: Portfolios Sorted by INV						
Decile	Overnight			Intraday		
	Excess	CAPM	3-Factor	Excess	CAPM	3-Factor
1	0.36%	0.19%	0.16%	0.25%	-0.09%	-0.19%
	(2.09)	(1.26)	(1.06)	(0.98)	(-0.53)	(-1.05)
10	0.69%	0.47%	0.52%	-0.64%	-1.06%	-0.97%
	(3.33)	(2.78)	(3.01)	(-2.04)	(-5.07)	(-4.71)
10 - 1	<b>0.33%</b>	<b>0.28%</b>	<b>0.36%</b>	<b>-0.88%</b>	<b>-0.97%</b>	<b>-0.78%</b>
	(2.49)	(2.10)	(2.85)	(-4.00)	(-4.39)	(-4.09)

Panel E: Portfolios Sorted by Market BETA						
Decile	Overnight			Intraday		
	Excess	CAPM	3-Factor	Excess	CAPM	3-Factor
1	0.38%	0.17%	0.19%	-0.08%	-0.41%	-0.36%
	(1.60)	(0.80)	(0.87)	(-0.27)	(-1.74)	(-1.54)
10	0.92%	0.66%	0.68%	-0.58%	-1.11%	-1.16%
	(3.66)	(3.17)	(3.18)	(-1.53)	(-4.68)	(-4.87)
10 - 1	<b>0.54%</b>	<b>0.49%</b>	<b>0.49%</b>	<b>-0.50%</b>	<b>-0.70%</b>	<b>-0.80%</b>
	(2.43)	(2.17)	(2.10)	(-1.63)	(-2.40)	(-2.60)

Panel F: Portfolios Sorted by IVOL						
Decile	Overnight			Intraday		
	Excess	CAPM	3-Factor	Excess	CAPM	3-Factor
1	-0.23%	-0.32%	-0.38%	0.72%	0.62%	0.53%
	(-1.75)	(-2.48)	(-3.16)	(3.67)	(3.10)	(2.83)
10	1.49%	1.15%	1.22%	-1.21%	-1.86%	-1.81%
	(4.67)	(4.48)	(4.65)	(-2.49)	(-5.79)	(-6.95)
10 - 1	<b>1.71%</b>	<b>1.46%</b>	<b>1.61%</b>	<b>-1.93%</b>	<b>-2.48%</b>	<b>-2.34%</b>
	(5.57)	(5.23)	(5.81)	(-3.86)	(-6.21)	(-7.82)

Panel G: Portfolios Sorted by Equity ISSUE						
Decile	Overnight			Intraday		
	Excess	CAPM	3-Factor	Excess	CAPM	3-Factor
1	0.08%	-0.11%	-0.12%	0.56%	0.15%	0.07%
	(0.43)	(-0.72)	(-0.75)	(2.08)	(0.75)	(0.35)
10	0.67%	0.40%	0.40%	-0.48%	-0.98%	-0.98%
	(3.41)	(2.49)	(2.34)	(-1.63)	(-5.23)	(-5.13)
10 - 1	<b>0.60%</b>	<b>0.52%</b>	<b>0.52%</b>	<b>-1.03%</b>	<b>-1.13%</b>	<b>-1.05%</b>
	(3.94)	(3.27)	(3.35)	(-5.41)	(-6.13)	(-6.05)

Panel H: Portfolios Sorted by Discretionary ACCRUALS						
Decile	Overnight			Intraday		
	Excess	CAPM	3-Factor	Excess	CAPM	3-Factor
1	0.11%	-0.05%	-0.10%	0.35%	-0.03%	-0.03%
	(0.78)	(-0.40)	(-0.71)	(1.55)	(-0.17)	(-0.18)
10	0.73%	0.41%	0.47%	-0.56%	-1.12%	-0.96%
	(3.19)	(2.30)	(2.52)	(-1.59)	(-4.50)	(-4.32)
10 - 1	<b>0.62%</b>	<b>0.47%</b>	<b>0.56%</b>	<b>-0.90%</b>	<b>-1.10%</b>	<b>-0.94%</b>
	(3.82)	(3.25)	(4.00)	(-3.75)	(-4.73)	(-4.95)

Panel I: Portfolios Sorted by TURNOVER						
Decile	Overnight			Intraday		
	Excess	CAPM	3-Factor	Excess	CAPM	3-Factor
1	0.24%	0.08%	0.07%	0.16%	-0.11%	-0.07%
	(1.68)	(0.69)	(0.61)	(0.84)	(-0.88)	(-0.56)
10	0.61%	0.37%	0.42%	-0.23%	-0.68%	-0.59%
	(2.65)	(1.97)	(2.21)	(-0.72)	(-3.00)	(-3.19)
10 - 1	<b>0.37%</b>	0.29%	<b>0.35%</b>	-0.40%	<b>-0.57%</b>	<b>-0.52%</b>
	(2.39)	(1.98)	(2.54)	(-1.74)	(-2.58)	(-3.22)

Panel J: Portfolios Sorted by One-Month Returns						
Decile	Overnight			Intraday		
	Excess	CAPM	3-Factor	Excess	CAPM	3-Factor
1	1.39%	1.06%	1.04%	-1.03%	-1.65%	-1.67%
	(5.54)	(4.95)	(4.76)	(-2.73)	(-6.15)	(-6.18)
10	0.38%	0.14%	0.16%	-0.17%	-0.60%	-0.63%
	(1.83)	(0.78)	(0.86)	(-0.60)	(-2.75)	(-2.97)
10 - 1	<b>-1.01%</b>	<b>-0.93%</b>	<b>-0.88%</b>	<b>0.86%</b>	<b>1.05%</b>	<b>1.05%</b>
	(-4.74)	(-4.28)	(-4.01)	(2.67)	(3.25)	(3.26)

Table X: Controlling for IVOL

This table reports returns to the momentum strategy during the day vs. at night after controlling for idiosyncratic volatility. In Panels A and B, at the end of each month, all stocks are independently sorted into a 5 by 5 matrix based on lagged 12-month daily idiosyncratic volatilities (with regard to the Carhart four factor model, with one lead and one lag to incorporate non-synchronous trading) and lagged 12-month cumulative returns (skipping the most recent month). Panel A reports the value-weight overnight returns to these 25 portfolios in the following month. Panel B reports the value-weight intraday returns to these portfolios in the following month. Stocks with prices below \$5 a share and/or that are in the bottom NYSE size quintile are excluded from the sample. In Panel C, we further exclude stocks whose lagged 12-month idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL) is in the top NYSE IVOL quintile; the remaining stocks are then sorted into deciles based on their lagged 12-month cumulative returns. Reported below are the monthly portfolio returns in excess of the risk-free rate. T-statistics, shown in parentheses, are computed based on standard errors corrected for serial-dependence with 12 lags. 5% statistical significance is indicated in bold.

Panel A: Overnight Returns					
IVOL					
MOM	1	2	3	4	5
1	-0.65%	-0.33%	-0.11%	-0.08%	0.63%
	(-2.19)	(-1.29)	(-0.42)	(-0.29)	(2.29)
5	-0.03%	0.58%	0.74%	1.19%	1.52%
	(-0.13)	(3.66)	(3.95)	(5.80)	(5.12)
5 - 1	<b>0.78%</b>	<b>0.92%</b>	<b>0.85%</b>	<b>1.27%</b>	<b>0.89%</b>
	(2.16)	(3.84)	(3.37)	(5.52)	(4.09)

Panel B: Intraday Returns					
IVOL					
MOM	1	2	3	4	5
1	0.63%	1.11%	0.38%	0.14%	-0.87%
	(1.89)	(2.42)	(0.94)	(0.36)	(-1.73)
5	0.84%	0.09%	-0.22%	-0.50%	-0.67%
	(2.59)	(0.38)	(-0.82)	(-1.62)	(-1.65)
5 - 1	0.19%	<b>-1.02%</b>	-0.60%	-0.64%	0.19%
	(0.43)	(-2.38)	(-1.68)	(-1.84)	(0.56)

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Panel C: Excluding stocks with high IVOL

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Overnight MOM Returns

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Decile	Excess	CAPM	3-Factor
1	-0.05% (-0.15)	-0.30% (-1.05)	-0.29% (-0.99)
2	-0.16% (-0.74)	-0.36% (-1.89)	-0.40% (-1.91)
3	-0.23% (-1.23)	-0.41% (-2.51)	-0.47% (-2.99)
4	-0.13% (-0.79)	-0.29% (-2.10)	-0.32% (-2.38)
5	-0.25% (-1.60)	-0.39% (-2.85)	-0.41% (-3.11)
6	-0.07% (-0.44)	-0.20% (-1.43)	-0.27% (-1.98)
7	0.00% (0.02)	-0.14% (-1.11)	-0.18% (-1.42)
8	0.12% (0.80)	-0.04% (-0.30)	-0.08% (-0.58)
9	0.37% (2.43)	0.23% (1.74)	0.19% (1.47)
10	1.14% (6.38)	0.97% (6.28)	0.96% (6.18)
10 - 1	<b>1.19%</b> (4.04)	<b>1.26%</b> (4.37)	<b>1.25%</b> (4.28)

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Table XI: Fama-MacBeth Return Regressions

This table reports Fama-MacBeth regressions of monthly stocks returns on lagged firm characteristics. The dependent variable in the first column is the close-to-close return in the following month; the dependent variable in the second column is the overnight return in the following month, and that in the last column is the intraday return in the following month. The main independent variables include the lagged 12-month cumulative stock return (skipping the most recent month), market capitalization, book-to-market ratio, one-month stock return, 12-month daily idiosyncratic volatility (with regard to the Carhart four factor model, with one lead and one lag), 12-month market beta (using daily returns with one lead and one lag), 12-month share turnover, return-on-equity, asset growth, equity issuance, and discretionary accruals. For the fourth column, we regress the time series of coefficients from the analysis in the second column on the contemporaneous overnight market return and report the intercept from that regression. Stocks with prices below \$5 a share and/or that are in the bottom NYSE size quintile are excluded from the sample. Stock returns are expressed in percentage terms. Observations are weighted by lagged market capitalization in each cross sectional regression. Standard errors, shown in brackets, are adjusted for serial-dependence with 12 lags. \*, \*\*, \*\*\* denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.

X 100	Close-to-Close	Overnight	Intraday	Overnight Adjusted
	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]
<i>MOM</i>	0.159 [0.327]	0.578*** [0.134]	-0.417* [0.230]	0.621*** [0.127]
<i>SIZE</i>	-0.079 [0.062]	0.157*** [0.034]	-0.246*** [0.051]	0.132*** [0.032]
<i>BM</i>	0.037 [0.074]	-0.149 [0.092]	0.157* [0.081]	-0.127** [0.065]
<i>RET1</i>	-1.743*** [0.609]	-2.939*** [0.728]	1.169** [0.595]	-2.821*** [0.727]
<i>IVOL</i>	-0.052 [0.101]	0.295*** [0.084]	-0.285*** [0.064]	0.220*** [0.077]
<i>BETA</i>	-0.101 [0.172]	0.208* [0.110]	-0.310*** [0.119]	0.090 [0.111]
<i>TURNOVER</i>	0.092 [0.066]	0.223*** [0.054]	-0.161*** [0.043]	0.195*** [0.048]
<i>ROE</i>	0.230 [0.250]	-0.399*** [0.109]	0.631*** [0.267]	-0.384*** [0.108]
<i>INV</i>	-0.594** [0.239]	0.077 [0.111]	-0.685*** [0.235]	0.111 [0.112]
<i>ISSUE</i>	-0.780*** [0.276]	-0.190 [0.241]	-0.583** [0.229]	-0.113 [0.244]
<i>ACCRUALS</i>	-0.462 [0.471]	0.224 [0.344]	-0.715* [0.398]	-0.011 [0.320]
Adj-R <sup>2</sup>	0.118	0.083	0.119	
No. Obs.	462,070	462,070	462,070	

Table XII: Overnight/Intraday Short Term Reversal

This table reports returns to the short-term reversal strategy during the day vs. at night. In Panel A, at the end of each month, all stocks are sorted into deciles based on their lagged one-month overnight returns. In Panel B, stocks are sorted based on their lagged one-month intraday returns. We then go long the value-weight winner decile and short the value-weight loser decile. The first three columns show the overnight return in the subsequent month of the two short-term reversal strategies, and the next three columns show the intraday returns in the subsequent month. Stocks with prices below \$5 a share and/or that are in the bottom NYSE size quintile are excluded from the sample. We report monthly portfolio returns in excess of the risk-free rate, adjusted by the CAPM, and by the three-factor model. T-statistics, shown in parentheses, are computed based on standard errors corrected for serial-dependence with 12 lags. 5% statistical significance is indicated in bold.

Panel A: One-Month Overnight Returns						
Decile	Overnight			Intraday		
	Excess	CAPM	3-Factor	Excess	CAPM	3-Factor
1	-1.51%	-1.70%	-1.73%	1.62%	1.23%	1.06%
	(-7.76)	(-9.88)	(-9.77)	(4.76)	(4.55)	(4.15)
10	1.96%	1.73%	1.74%	-1.63%	-2.07%	-1.96%
	(8.17)	(8.60)	(8.69)	(-4.74)	(-8.58)	(-9.03)
10 - 1	<b>3.47%</b>	<b>3.42%</b>	<b>3.47%</b>	<b>-3.24%</b>	<b>-3.30%</b>	<b>-3.02%</b>
	(16.57)	(16.57)	(16.83)	(-9.34)	(-9.00)	(-9.74)

Panel B: One-Month Intraday Returns						
Decile	Overnight			Intraday		
	Excess	CAPM	3-Factor	Excess	CAPM	3-Factor
1	1.59%	1.32%	1.35%	-1.51%	-2.04%	-2.14%
	(5.51)	(5.28)	(5.04)	(-3.45)	(-6.58)	(-6.95)
10	-0.22%	-0.41%	-0.42%	0.69%	0.32%	0.27%
	(-1.20)	(-2.68)	(-2.64)	(2.51)	(1.76)	(1.57)
10 - 1	<b>-1.81%</b>	<b>-1.73%</b>	<b>-1.77%</b>	<b>2.19%</b>	<b>2.36%</b>	<b>2.41%</b>
	(-8.44)	(-8.16)	(-7.89)	(6.72)	(7.56)	(7.70)




Figure 1: This figure shows dollar trading volume over 30-minute intervals throughout the trading day. In particular, we first sum up the number of dollars traded in each of these half-hour windows. We then compute the fraction of total daily volume (i.e., the sum over these 13 windows) that is accounted for by each 30-minute interval. In other words, these red bars sum up to 1. The first half-hour window that starts at 9:30am also includes the open auction. The last half-hour window that starts at 3:30pm also includes the last-minute (i.e., 4pm) trades and closing auction.




Figure 2: This figure shows the average monthly returns of the value-weight market portfolio for the period 1993-2013. The first two bars show the average close-to-close market return. The next two bars show the average intraday market return, and the last two bars show the average overnight market return. The red solid bars correspond to the value-weight CRSP index and the blue wide-upward-diagonal bars correspond to the value-weight portfolio that only includes stocks whose market capitalization is above the 99<sup>th</sup> percentile of the NYSE sample (as a proxy for the Dow-Jones Industrial Average).




Figure 3: This figure plots cumulative returns to the momentum strategy during the day vs. at night in the 24 months following portfolio formation. At the end of each month, all stocks are sorted into deciles based on their lagged 12-month cumulative returns (skipping the most recent month). We then go long the value-weight winner decile and short the value-weight loser decile. Stocks with prices below \$5 a share and/or that are in the bottom NYSE size quintile are excluded from the sample. The red solid curve shows the cumulative close-to-close momentum returns in the 24 months following portfolio formation. The blue dashed curve shows the cumulative overnight momentum returns in the 24 months following portfolio formation. The green dotted curve shows the cumulative intraday momentum returns in the 24 months following portfolio formation.




Figure 4: This figure shows cumulative three-factor alpha to the momentum strategy during the day vs. at night in the 24 months following portfolio formation. At the end of each month, all stocks are sorted into deciles based on their lagged 12-month cumulative returns (skipping the most recent month). We then go long the value-weight winner decile and short the value-weight loser decile. Stocks with prices below \$5 a share and/or that are in the bottom NYSE size quintile are excluded from the sample. The red solid curve shows the cumulative close-to-close momentum returns in the 24 months following portfolio formation. The blue dashed curve shows the buy-and-hold overnight momentum returns in the 24 months following portfolio formation. The green dotted curve shows the buy-and-hold intraday momentum returns in the 24 months following portfolio formation.




Figure 5: This figure shows monthly returns to the momentum strategy during the day vs. at night in the year 2009. At the end of each month, all stocks are sorted into deciles based on their lagged 12-month cumulative returns (skipping the most recent month). We then go long the value-weight winner decile and short the value-weight loser decile. Stocks with prices below \$5 a share and/or that are in the bottom NYSE size quintile are excluded from the sample. The red solid bars show the value-weight close-to-close momentum return in each month of 2009. The blue shaded bars show the value-weight overnight momentum return in each month, and the green shaded bars show the value-weight intraday momentum return in each month.




Figure 6: This figure shows the cumulative hourly (abnormal) returns to the momentum strategy from the previous close to the next close, aggregated to the monthly level. At the end of each month, all stocks are sorted into deciles based on their lagged 12-month cumulative returns (skipping the most recent month). We then go long the value-weight winner decile and short the value-weight loser decile. Stocks with prices below \$5 a share and/or that are in the bottom NYSE size quintile are excluded from the sample. The red solid curve shows the cumulative hourly returns to the momentum strategy. The blue dashed curve shows the cumulative three-factor alpha to the momentum strategy.




Figure 7: This figure shows value-weight portfolio returns of the ten momentum deciles during the day vs. at night. At the end of each month, all stocks are sorted into deciles based on their lagged 12-month cumulative returns (skipping the most recent month). Stocks with prices below \$5 a share and/or that are in the bottom NYSE size quintile are excluded from the sample. The red solid curve shows the value-weight close-to-close returns of the ten momentum deciles in the following month. The blue dashed curve shows the value-weight overnight returns of the ten momentum deciles in the following month. The green dotted curve shows the value-weight intraday returns of the ten momentum deciles in the following month. Table X Panel C documents that the U-shaped overnight momentum pattern of this graph becomes much more monotonic once we exclude the 20% of stocks with high idiosyncratic volatility.




Figure 8: This figure shows the  $t$ -statistics of the overnight/intraday return persistence test, as reported in Table XII. We extend our analysis in Table XII by varying the lag between the ranking period and holding period from one month all the way to sixty months (i.e., shown by the X-axis). Stocks with prices below \$5 a share and/or that are in the bottom NYSE size quintile are excluded from the sample. The dotted green curve corresponds to using lagged overnight returns to forecast future overnight returns. The dashed dark red curve corresponds to using lagged intraday returns to forecast future intraday returns. The dashed blue curve corresponds to using lagged overnight returns to forecast future intraday returns. Finally, the dashed red curve corresponds to using lagged intraday returns to forecast future overnight returns.

Table A1: Overnight/Intraday Momentum Returns: 1927-1962

This table reports returns to the momentum strategy during the day vs. at night for the period 1927-1962. At the end of each month, all stocks are sorted into deciles based on their lagged 12-month cumulative returns (skipping the most recent month). We then go long the value-weight winner decile and short the value-weight loser decile. Stocks with prices below \$5 a share and/or that are in the bottom NYSE size quintile are excluded from the sample. We report the close-to-close, overnight and intraday momentum returns in the following month. Panel A reports momentum returns for the full sample. Panel B reports momentum returns for large cap stocks (i.e., whose market capitalization is above the NYSE median cut-off). We report monthly portfolio returns in excess of the risk-free rate, adjusted by the CAPM, and by the three-factor model. T-statistics, shown in parentheses, are computed based on standard errors corrected for serial-dependence with 12 lags. 5% statistical significance is indicated in bold.

Panel A: Full Sample									
Decile	Close-to-Close			Overnight			Intraday		
	Excess	CAPM	3-Factor	Excess	CAPM	3-Factor	Excess	CAPM	3-Factor
1	0.48%	-0.86%	-0.94%	1.55%	1.18%	1.14%	-0.84%	-1.74%	-1.79%
	(0.82)	(-3.67)	(-4.36)	(6.09)	(5.70)	(5.77)	(-1.94)	(-7.44)	(-7.98)
10	1.23%	0.48%	0.50%	1.56%	1.35%	1.36%	-0.25%	-0.78%	-0.77%
	(3.63)	(2.89)	(3.02)	(9.45)	(9.08)	(9.07)	(-0.92)	(-4.19)	(-4.19)
10 - 1	0.75%	<b>1.34%</b>	<b>1.45%</b>	0.01%	0.18%	0.21%	0.59%	<b>0.96%</b>	<b>1.03%</b>
	(1.70)	(3.97)	(4.43)	(0.06)	(0.78)	(0.97)	(1.64)	(3.07)	(3.43)

Panel B: Large-Cap Stocks									
Decile	Close-to-Close			Overnight			Intraday		
	Excess	CAPM	3-Factor	Excess	CAPM	3-Factor	Excess	CAPM	3-Factor
1	0.35%	-0.80%	-0.86%	1.38%	1.06%	1.03%	-0.91%	-1.71%	-1.74%
	(0.72)	(-4.77)	(-5.41)	(6.76)	(6.46)	(6.35)	(-2.40)	(-8.71)	(-8.97)
10	1.22%	0.50%	0.53%	1.57%	1.37%	1.38%	-0.31%	-0.82%	-0.79%
	(3.61)	(2.87)	(3.07)	(9.59)	(9.31)	(9.31)	(-1.14)	(-4.40)	(-4.37)
10 - 1	<b>0.86%</b>	<b>1.30%</b>	<b>1.39%</b>	0.20%	0.31%	<b>0.34%</b>	0.60%	<b>0.90%</b>	<b>0.95%</b>
	(2.27)	(4.31)	(4.74)	(1.10)	(1.83)	(2.05)	(1.88)	(3.23)	(3.51)

Table A2: Fama-MacBeth Return Regressions

This table reports Fama-MacBeth regressions of monthly stocks returns on lagged firm characteristics. The dependent variable in the first column is the close-to-close return in the following month; the dependent variable in the second column is the overnight return in the following month, and that in the last column is the intraday return in the following month. The main independent variables include the lagged 12-month cumulative stock return (skipping the most recent month), market capitalization, book-to-market ratio, one-month overnight return, one-month intraday return, 12-month daily idiosyncratic volatility (with regard to the Carhart four factor model, with one lead and one lag), 12-month market beta (using daily returns with one lead and one lag), 12-month share turnover, return-on-equity, asset growth, equity issuance, and discretionary accruals. Stocks with prices below \$5 a share and/or that are in the bottom NYSE size quintile are excluded from the sample. Stock returns are expressed in percentage terms. Observations are weighted by lagged market capitalization in each cross sectional regression. Standard errors, shown in brackets, are adjusted for serial-dependence with 12 lags. \*, \*\*, \*\*\* denote statistical significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% level, respectively.

X 100	Close-to-Close	Overnight	Intraday
	[1]	[2]	[3]
<i>MOM</i>	0.126 [0.337]	0.529*** [0.137]	-0.402* [0.228]
<i>SIZE</i>	-0.085 [0.061]	0.114*** [0.030]	-0.210*** [0.048]
<i>BM</i>	0.037 [0.072]	-0.123** [0.053]	0.137* [0.075]
<i>STR_NIGHT</i>	-0.073 [0.715]	5.092*** [0.506]	-5.213*** [0.589]
<i>STR_DAY</i>	-2.799 [0.657]	-7.776*** [0.861]	4.987*** [0.737]
<i>IVOL</i>	-0.058 [0.099]	0.249*** [0.076]	-0.246*** [0.061]
<i>BETA</i>	-0.098 [0.170]	0.171 [0.118]	-0.270*** [0.111]
<i>TURNOVER</i>	0.086 [0.063]	0.175*** [0.047]	-0.119*** [0.039]
<i>ROE</i>	0.251 [0.254]	-0.326*** [0.098]	0.578*** [0.252]
<i>INVSTMNT</i>	-0.582 [0.238]	0.045 [0.107]	-0.639*** [0.218]
<i>ISSUE</i>	-0.800 [0.279]	-0.197 [0.222]	-0.596*** [0.217]
<i>DISCACC</i>	-0.509 [0.478]	0.124 [0.302]	-0.669 [0.466]
Adj-R <sup>2</sup>	0.121	0.097	0.126
No. Obs.	462,070	462,070	462,070