

Can Gambling Increase Savings? Empirical Evidence on Prize-linked Savings Accounts

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Abstract

This paper studies the adoption and impact of prize-linked savings (PLS) accounts, which offer random, lottery-like payouts to individual account holders in lieu of interest. Using micro-level data from a bank offering these products in South Africa, we show that a PLS product was attractive to a broad group of individuals, across all age, race, and income levels. Financially-constrained individuals and those with no other deposit accounts were particularly likely to open a PLS account. Participants in the PLS program increased their total savings on average by 1% of annual income, a 38% increase from the mean level of savings. Deposits in PLS did not appear to cannibalize same-bank savings in standard savings products. Instead, PLS appears to serve as a substitute for lottery gambling. Exploiting the random assignment of prizes, we also present evidence that prize winners increase their investment in PLS, sometimes by more than the amount of the prize won, and that large prizes generate a local “buzz” which lead to an 11.6% increase in demand for PLS at a winning branch.

I. Introduction

Personal savings serve as the first available buffer for households when faced with job loss, healthcare costs, or other financial shocks. However, recent evidence suggests that a large percentage of households maintain little to no savings, despite potentially high returns to saving (Dupas and Robinson 2013) and significant costs of financial fragility (Lusardi, Schneider, and Tufano 2011; FDIC 2012). In light of this, economists and policymakers have investigated many proposals and products aimed at encouraging higher savings rates (see Tufano & Schneider 2008, for an overview of policy proposals). One such proposal is the usage of prize-linked savings (PLS) products, which provide participants the chance to win prizes by saving money, typically in a lottery-like setting. While PLS programs have existed for hundreds of years and are prevalent around the world, they have only recently begun to receive academic attention.¹ Using micro-level data from a PLS program run by one of the largest banks in South Africa, this paper demonstrates that PLS accounts can attract new individuals into the banking system and significantly increase overall savings rates, particularly for individuals with low initial savings.

PLS accounts differ from standard savings accounts in that they offer individual savers a stochastic, heavily-skewed return as opposed to a predetermined interest rate. Depositors in a PLS account are entered periodically into a drawing in which their chance at winning a potentially large prize (or smaller prizes) is a function of the amount they have deposited. In aggregate, all savers receive a total amount of prizes (interest payments) that may approximate market rates, but this lottery-like system changes the payoff structure for saving, adding an element of risk and, possibly, excitement to holding money in the account.

While the payment of prizes is random, PLS differs from regular lottery gambling by protecting all principal invested. When a consumer places funds in a PLS account, she has access to those funds either on demand or at a future date, and so in this sense she is gambling only with the potential interest payments. In contrast, the principal “invested” in a lottery ticket is only preserved if the buyer happens to

¹ Recent papers on PLS include Guillén and Tschoegl (2002), Tufano (2008), Kearney et al. (2010), Atalay et al. (2012), and Filiz-ozbay et al. (2013).

win. In practice, nearly all lotteries have a negative expected return, while PLS offers a positive nominal expected return.

Given the widespread demand for lottery gambling, it has been hypothesized that the lottery-like incentive structure of PLS could be attractive to large numbers of participants (Kearney et al. 2010). Indeed, participation rates in the UK's Premium Bond program, a PLS product, are estimated to be between 22 and 40 percent of UK citizens (Tufano 2008). The PLS account examined in this paper—the “Million-a-Month Account,” or MaMa, offered by First National Bank (FNB), a large South African retail bank—saw similarly robust demand: within 18 months of the start date of the program there were more PLS accounts than regular savings accounts at the bank, and within 3 years PLS deposits amounted to R1.4 billion at the bank, as compared to total savings of R4.5 billion in the comparable standard savings account (Figure 1).

[FIGURE 1]

In addition to attracting deposits, the lottery-like structure of PLS may also appeal to a different type of saver. For example, individuals who feel they have little hope of escaping poverty in the future have little incentive to save today (Banerjee and Mullainathan 2010a; Banerjee and Duflo 2011a). Because of this, even if standard savings products are readily available, the poor may be unwilling to use them. The large prizes offered by PLS products present the possibility of escaping this “poverty trap” and thus may attract individuals who eschew traditional savings products, even if the probability of winning those prizes is quite low. Using survey data from individuals that live near First National Bank branches, we find that usage of PLS was especially strong in low- and medium-income areas, and in areas where a high percentage of individuals felt unable to repay their debts. Corroborating this, we also use account-level data on employees of FNB and find that individuals who were the largest net borrowers from the bank were most likely to open a PLS account, while those with moderate savings amounts were least likely. This is in line with recent experimental evidence that shows individuals with low initial savings are especially attracted to PLS products (Atalay et al. 2012; Filiz-Ozbay et al. 2013; Tufano, Maynard, and De Neve 2008). Further, we also find that employees who had no standard deposit accounts

previously were 4.9% more likely to open a PLS account than those with accounts. This suggests that PLS may be uniquely positioned to attract savings from individuals who are less likely to maintain emergency savings.

An important issue in evaluating PLS is whether these types of accounts attract new savings or merely cannibalize regular savings. Both Atalay et al. (2012) and Filiz-ozbay et al. (2013) show that the introduction of a PLS-like option increases savings rates in experimental settings. Using account-level data, we show that bank employees who open a PLS account tend to increase their net savings at First National Bank by about 1% of their income, a 38% increase from the mean level of savings. We do not find any evidence that employees who open PLS accounts decrease their savings in standard FNB savings products. Rather, we show that they tend to increase deposits in regular savings accounts as well. Further, we show that demand for the PLS program nationwide was especially strong in periods when the jackpot of the South Africa National Lottery was small, suggesting that PLS and lottery gambling may act as substitutes.² Taken together, these findings show no evidence that PLS cannibalizes regular savings.

A unique feature of PLS is the fact that “lucky” account holders win prizes. In the PLS program run by First National Bank, each month a total of 113 prizes were awarded, including a grand prize of R1,000,000 (approximately \$150,000) and R500,000 in smaller prizes. We track the accounts of these randomly selected prize-winners and test whether they are more likely to close their accounts after winning, or whether winning a prize induces them to invest more in PLS. Relative to non-winners, winners of small R1,000 prizes are 4.2% more likely to close their accounts within one year of winning their prize, while winners of larger prizes are no more likely to close their accounts. Despite being more likely to close their accounts, however, prize winners on average keep substantially more in their accounts than those who did not win prizes. In some cases, prize winners increase their account balances in PLS

² This is also consistent with evidence in Atalay et al. (2012) and Filiz-ozbay et al. (2013), which both show that PLS demand is especially strong among lottery players.

by more than the amount won, indicating that this increased investment in PLS is more than just a wealth effect.³ This increased savings is persistent for at least one year after winning.

We also find that large prize winners create a “buzz” that generates more demand for PLS in the local area. In particular, bank branches which had a R1,000,000 prize winner experienced 11.6% excess growth in PLS deposits (over and above the amount awarded as a prize) in the month after the win, relative to all other bank branches. Thus, the excitement of winning a prize has spillover effects that also serve to increase savings by other individuals.

This paper connects to a broad literature that investigates why many individuals fail to save and what financial innovations might help them save more, such as default options (Carroll et al. 2009), commitment devices (Thaler and Benartzi 2004; Ashraf, Karlan, and Yin 2006), or simply reminding individuals to save (Karlan et al. 2012). Our paper adds to this research by providing a first micro-level look at the usage and consequences of prize-linked savings. In particular, our findings provide insight into a number of questions raised by previous research on PLS. In their overview of PLS, Kearney et al. (2010) state that “the key question yet to be answered is whether the availability of prize-linked savings would generate new savers and new saving, and if so by whom.” Our evidence suggests that PLS can indeed attract new savers and new saving, and that, relative to typical savings accounts, PLS is particularly attractive to cash constrained and poorer individuals. While other papers show that supply-side factors make it difficult for poor households to access banking services (Celerier and Matray 2014), our evidence shows that standard savings products are under-used by poor individuals due to demand-side factors as well. In particular, our results are consistent with the theory that poor individuals do not use standard savings products because feel they have no hope of accumulating significant savings in these products (Banerjee and Mullainathan 2010b; Banerjee and Duflo 2011b), and instead might turn to lottery play (Herring & Bledsoe 1994). Our findings also build on Atalay et al. (2012) and Filiz-ozbay et al. (2013) who use experiments to show that PLS tends to increase total savings, particularly among

³ For example, increased investment after winning a prize could be due to a “house money” effect, in which gamblers are more willing to accept risks after a prior gain (Thaler and Johnson 1990).

individuals with low savings or who are lottery players. Our findings are directly in line with this evidence. Finally, our results are relevant to Lusardi et al. (2011), who find that gamblers are particularly prone to lack precautionary savings. By combining a gambling element with savings, PLS provides a natural way for these individuals become less financially fragile.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II gives background information on First National Bank's PLS product and the data used in our analysis. Section III provides results on the characteristics of PLS participants, while Section IV presents evidence on whether PLS reduces deposits in regular savings products or in the amount of lottery gambling. Section V then discusses how winning a prize affects both the prize winner and others nearby. Section VI concludes.

II. Background and Data

A. First National Bank's Prize-Linked Savings Product

The data for this paper come from First National Bank, the retail and commercial bank subsidiary of FirstRand Bank Limited, the third largest bank in South Africa.⁴ First National Bank introduced a PLS account in January, 2005 in an effort to expand its deposit base among low-income and unbanked individuals (see Cole et al. 2008, who also discuss the informal savings programs that exist in South Africa).

First National called its PLS account the "Million-a-Month Account," or MaMa, and awarded a grand prize of R1,000,000 to one random account-holder each month, with the winning account number announced on national television. In addition to the grand prize, the bank initially also awarded two prizes of R100,000, 10 prizes of R20,000, and 100 prizes of R1,000 each month. In September, 2007, the bank doubled the number of smaller prizes given each month, awarding four R100,000 prizes, 20 R20,000 prizes, and 200 R1,000 prizes.⁵ Throughout the program, each account-holder received one

⁴ There were a total of 17 banks functioning in South Africa in 2008, of which the four largest account for 91% of total assets (South African Reserve Bank 2008).

⁵ Pfiffelmann (2013) shows that a highly-skewed prize structure is the optimal design for PLS when investors overweight rare events.

entry into the lottery for each R100 held in her account.⁶ MaMa accounts were 32-day notice accounts, meaning that if a customer wished to withdraw some of her funds she must notify the bank 32 days in advance of the withdrawal.⁷ The most comparable account at First National to MaMa was a standard 32-day notice account, which paid interest on a variable scale depending on the customer's balance in the account. As of November, 2004, for balances below R10,000 the 32-day account paid 4% annual interest, for balances between R10,000 and R25,000 it paid 4.25% APR, and for balances from R25,000 to R250,000 the APR ranged from 4.5% to 4.75% (Cole et al. 2008).

In contrast to the regular 32-day account, the expected return to holding MaMa balances depended on the amount of deposits held in the accounts. As the total amount of deposits increased, the expected return on a 100 Rand deposit decreased, because the chance of winning a prize declined. The new MaMa accounts proved to be quite popular, and deposits increased dramatically in the first months (Figure 1). Although the total amount held in MaMa accounts never approached the aggregate balance of the regular 32-day accounts, the number of MaMa accounts exceeded that of regular 32-day accounts by June 2006, a mere 18 months after the product was launched. Because of this growth, the expected interest rate on MaMa accounts declined rapidly. When the first drawing was held in March 2005 (three months after the start date of the program), the expected annualized interest rate for holding R100 in a MaMa account was about 12.2%, due to the relatively small amount of total deposits. However, as the popularity of the program grew, the expected return quickly dropped, and by December 2005 the rate was 3.64%, slightly lower than that offered by the regular 32-day account.⁸ At its lowest, the expected interest rate on MaMa accounts was 1.59% in August 2007, just before the number of prizes was doubled.

An individual with a preference for lottery-like returns could duplicate the PLS structure by depositing funds in a regular 32-day account and then using the interest earned from this account to

⁶ Initially, the accounts paid no interest at all, but the bank began paying a 0.25% interest rate on deposits in addition to the random prizes in September 2005.

⁷ 32-day notice accounts are common in South Africa and are offered by all of the major banks there.

⁸ Barberis and Huang (2008) show that an asset with lottery-like payoffs can earn negative excess returns when investors overweight small probabilities, as in cumulative prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman 1992).

purchase lottery tickets. This strategy duplicates the MaMa account by combining two other readily available alternatives, and is thus a useful comparison to the MaMa expected return. From 2005-2008, the expected return on the South African National Lottery was about 46 cents per Rand invested.⁹ An individual seeking a skewed return could have deposited, say, R100 (the amount needed for one entry in the MaMa program) in a regular 32-day account and earned R4 of interest in a given year. If he then used the R4 to purchase lottery tickets, his expected winnings would amount to about R1.86, giving a net return of 1.86% on his investment of R100. As noted above, expected returns in the MaMa program were significantly higher than this amount early on, but dropped to an amount quite close to this as the popularity of the program grew. In MaMa's final year, expected returns averaged 1.81% and were quite stable, suggesting that equilibrium PLS returns settled near what could have been earned via this synthetic PLS-like investment.

The MaMa program only lasted until March 2008, when it was deemed a violation of the Lottery Act of 1997 by the Supreme Court of Appeals (*FirstRand Bank v. National Lotteries Board* 2008). In South Africa, as in the U.S., the government holds a monopoly on lotteries. Although First National argued that its program wasn't technically a lottery, since all principal was preserved, it failed to convince the courts and was forced to end the program. At the end of March, all MaMa accounts were converted to regular 32-day accounts, and account holders were allowed to withdraw their deposits if they chose to do so. The data provided by First National ends in July 2008, four months after the program ended. During that time period, aggregate MaMa balances fell 16.2% in April 2008, and an additional 11.8% in May. However, balances held steady in June and July, at which point our data end. Thus, while some participants in the program did withdraw their funds, over 77% of all PLS deposits remained in the bank for at least four months after the accounts converted to standard savings products.

B. Data

⁹ This negative 54% return is similar to that found for other lotteries (e.g. Thaler and Ziemba, 1988).

Most of the data for this paper come directly from First National Bank, which provided three main datasets: branch-level data for all bank branches, anonymized account-level data for all bank employees, and anonymized account-level data for all prize winners. The bank also provided us with bank-wide data on total accounts and total deposits held in MaMa accounts at a daily frequency. We augment the data from First National Bank with the 2005 FinScope financial survey of South Africa, provided by FinMark Trust. Details of each dataset are described below.

B.1. First National Bank Data

First National provided both branch-level and account-level data for this paper. At the branch level, we have monthly observations for each of 604 bank branches from January 2003 through July 2008. For each month, we observe the total number of accounts and total Rand balance held at the branch in both standard 32-day accounts and MaMa accounts. Table I provides summary statistics of the total number of accounts and total deposits at each branch as of March 2008, when the MaMa program ended.

[TABLE I]

In addition to branch-level time series data, we also observe branch-level demographic characteristics of depositors in both 32-day and MaMa products for one snapshot taken in June 2008, 3 months after the MaMa program ended. This allows us to compare the characteristics of MaMa participants to those of typical savers, which we do in Table I. With respect to race, MaMa depositors are less likely to be white, and more likely to be Asian or of mixed race.¹⁰ Men account for a total of 52% of MaMa deposits, as compared to only 46% of regular 32-day deposits, suggesting that the lottery payoff structure might be more attractive to men than women, perhaps due to lower risk aversion (Eckel and Grossman 2008) or overconfidence (Barber and Odean 2001). MaMa participants also tended to be younger than standard 32-day account holders (Figure 2, Panel A). This is important, as younger

¹⁰ Black persons are those of native African descent. Asian persons include those of Indian descent.

individuals also tend to be those who maintain less precautionary savings (Lusardi, Schneider, and Tufano 2011).¹¹

[FIGURE 2]

The income profile of MaMa savers appears to be similar to that of regular savers (Figure 2, Panel B). In fact, those in the lowest income bracket account for a slightly larger share of total 32-day balances (45%) than of MaMa balances (42%). While some of the evidence in Section III suggests that the MaMa product had more demand in lower-income areas, it should be kept in mind that overall it does not appear that MaMa savings came disproportionately from low-income households.

In addition to the relatively coarse branch-level data, we also analyze account-level data for employees of First National Bank. This dataset contains month-by-month information on account balances of 38,256 employees of First National Bank for the time period from January 2005 - March 2008. For each employee, we observe the month-end balance of their 32-day savings, checking, money market¹², and MaMa accounts. In addition, we also have a snapshot of the employee's race, gender, age, income estimate¹³, and the region of South Africa in which they work. Summary statistics of employee account balances are provided in Table I, Panel C.

Of the 38,256 employees, 12,237 had their employment terminated at some point during the sample period. In all regressions, we include an *ex-staff* dummy to control for these individuals, but our results are unchanged if these individuals are removed completely.

There are both advantages and disadvantages to working with staff data. Using account-level data we get much finer estimates of the effects of PLS. However, as the staff of the bank is not a representative sample of the South African population, this subsample may limit external validity. For example, only 41% of bank employees are black as compared to 73% in the population at large. Of more

¹¹ In addition, if PLS products can be used to develop a habit of saving earlier in life, the long-term benefits could be multiplied through compound interest.

¹² The money market account was a special account available only to staff of the bank that was launched in July 2007, towards the end of the sample period.

¹³ Income data was not directly available from First National and was instead estimated by the bank according to an internal model.

particular concern is the fact that bank employees are likely better educated and earn more than the population in general. The average First National employee earns R175,963 per year, while in 2006 average household income in South Africa was estimated to be R74,589 (Statistics South Africa 2008). Finally, just over 22% of the staff in our sample have no checking, money market, 32-day, or PLS account at FNB. Nationwide, about 47% of individuals were completely unbanked in South Africa in 2005. To the extent possible, we control for staff characteristics in our analysis, but we do note that there are large differences between the staff sample and the general population.

Another potential limitation of the staff dataset is that we can only observe deposit accounts held at FNB, and thus we do not observe their total portfolio if they hold savings elsewhere. However, based on FinScope Survey data (described below), we estimate that only 3.3% of South Africans have accounts at multiple banks, conditional on having at least one account. Meanwhile, of survey respondents that reported having no bank accounts, only 6.3% maintain any savings at home. In addition, one would expect that the majority of First National employees would do most or all of their banking at First National due to familiarity with the products, the ease of banking where you work, extra benefits of banking at work (in particular the ability to utilize overdraft facilities, as discussed below), and likely encouragement to use the products. Thus, although we cannot observe the entire portfolio of all employees, we likely have a relatively comprehensive view of staff banking behavior.

An important aspect of the staff data is that it contains information on checking account balances, which are often negative. Bank staff can easily obtain an overdraft facility on their checking accounts; this facility offers flexible repayment possibilities. These negative balances can be interpreted as unsecured consumer credit obtained from the bank. Table I shows that a significant number of bank staff have negative balances in their checking accounts. Net of these negative balances, the average employee had about R4,930 in savings across all accounts at the bank in March 2008, or about 3.5% of their annual income. A total of 29% of employees are net borrowers from the bank, while just over 22% have no active accounts at the bank at all. To prevent undue influence of a few outlier employees with either large

savings or large borrowings, in all of our analysis using the staff dataset we winsorize account balances at the 1% and 99%.

Finally, we also have account-level information on prize winners. In the winners dataset we have month-by-month information on MaMa account balances and demographic information only; account balances in other products were not provided. In total there were 4,965 prizes given out to 4,341 account holders (some account holders won more than once) between March 2005, when the first drawing was held, and March 2008, when the program closed.

B.2. FinScope Data

We augment the data obtained from First National Bank with geographic, demographic, and socioeconomic data collected in the 2005 FinScope Survey. FinScope surveys are nationally representative surveys carried out annually by FinMark Trust, and are designed to measure the use of financial products by consumers in South Africa. The 2005 survey contains responses from 3,885 individuals, and has in-depth information on each respondent's financial sophistication, use of financial products, attitudes towards financial service providers, income and employment status, demographic information, and indicators of their general well-being.

We relate these characteristics to MaMa demand at individual First National Bank branches by calculating the average response of individuals who live near each branch. Specifically, we use the latitude and longitude of each bank branch and the latitude and longitude of the center of the city or town of each FinScope respondent to measure the distance between the two locations using the Haversine formula. For each branch, we average the values for all respondents within a 50km (31.1 miles) radius of the branch, thereby giving the general characteristics of individuals who are likely to use that particular bank branch.

Table II provides summary statistics of the collapsed survey data at the branch level. For 62 of the bank branches there were no survey responses with 50 km, dropping the number of observations to a

total of 542 branches.¹⁴ In addition, there are 11 private branches which we remove from the sample, leaving a total of 531 observations. Of particular note is the high share of individuals with no bank accounts at all (49%) as well as very elevated unemployment rates (25%).

In the analysis in Section III, we correlate FinScope's Financial Segmentation Model (FSM) with demand for MaMa. The FSM places individuals in one of eight tiers based on answers to a set of questions in the survey. The model is made up of five components, each of which is meant to capture a specific aspect of each individual's access and use of financial services, along with how people manage their money and what drives their financial behavior:

- Financial penetration: take-up of available financial products
- Financial access: physical access to financial services
- Financial discipline
- Financial knowledge
- Connectedness and optimism: individual's overall feeling of fulfillment, of being connected to their community, and of having hope of achieving their lifetime goals¹⁵

The respondent's combined score across these five categories is used to segment the population into eight tiers, with higher tiers signifying individuals who have more access to take-up of and access to financial products, have more financial discipline and knowledge, and feel more connected and optimistic.

[TABLE II]

III. MaMa Product Adoption

The widespread growth of MaMa was remarkable. By June 2008, the number of MaMa accounts at First National Bank exceeded the number of 32-day savings accounts at First National for every age, gender, income, and race subgroup.¹⁶ Among employees of the bank, just 27% used a regular 32-day savings account (we define this as having had a positive balance for at least one month) during January 2005 - March 2008, while 63% opened a MaMa account during the sample period. Why was MaMa so

¹⁴ Results are similar if we use a radius of 30km (18.6 miles) or if we limit to branches that had at least 15 respondents within a 50km radius. Sample size is reduced to 492 branches in the first case and 463 branches in the second, so statistical significance is reduced somewhat for some estimates in these robustness checks, but estimated signs and magnitudes are similar.

¹⁵ For more information on the FSM and how it is calculated, see the FinScope 2005 brochure at http://www.finscope.co.za/documents/2005/SA05_brochure.pdf.

¹⁶ However, average account balances were much lower in MaMa accounts than regular 32-day savings.

popular? In this section we analyze the characteristics that are associated with opening a PLS account using both FinScope survey data as well as account-level data of First National employees. Knowledge of what drives demand for PLS can help academics and policymakers alike understand how consumers think about savings and gambling, as well as assess the potential for PLS to encourage precautionary savings.

A. Geographic characteristics and MaMa demand

Because of its lottery-like payoff, it has been hypothesized that PLS might be attractive to low-wealth individuals, those with less education, or perhaps to particular racial groups, as these groups have been shown to a larger percentage of their income on lottery gambling in other settings (Kearney et al. 2010). We test these intuitions by correlating take-up of the MaMa product at each bank branch to demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of individuals who live within 50 km of the branch, using responses to the 2005 FinScope survey. Panel A of Table III presents OLS regressions which relate overall MaMa usage at a particular branch with demographic characteristics of individuals who live near the branch. In these regressions, the dependent variable is either the log of the total balances held in MaMa accounts at the branch or the log of the total number of MaMa accounts as of March 2008. To determine whether demand for MaMa products differs from the demand for regular 32-day savings, we control for the log of the total balance held in 32-day savings accounts in the first column or the log of the total number of accounts in the second column.¹⁷ We also control for whether the branch is located in a rural area to account for branch size differences.

[TABLE III]

Confirming the intuition that the possibility of winning large prizes is attractive for low-income households, we find a negative relationship between median income and MaMa demand. We estimate that a one standard deviation decrease in median income (a reduction of R 18,462 per year) would increase total balances held in MaMa accounts by 15.25 percentage points at a given branch. While this

¹⁷ Similar results are found if the dependent variable is defined as the ratio of MaMa balances to savings balances instead of including the total savings balance as a right-hand side variable.

finding is in line with intuition of demand for lottery products by low-wealth individuals, it is not entirely consistent with the results presented in Panel B of Figure 2, which shows that MaMa balances did not come disproportionately from lower-income households. We return to this issue with more evidence below in Section III.B.

Other demographic controls do not have a strong relationship with MaMa demand. Of particular note, we do not find that branches in more educated areas experienced lower PLS demand. If anything, these branches had slightly higher MaMa usage, although this result is only significant at the 10% level. Based on this, it does not appear to PLS demand is coming predominantly from less-educated individuals who perhaps do not understand standard interest-bearing accounts. Panel B of Table III tests whether additional financial characteristics are associated with MaMa demand. To be concise, we only report results for total amount of MaMa deposits as the dependent variable, but results are similar if we instead use the number of MaMa accounts. We fail to find evidence that take-up of MaMa was higher in areas with more unbanked individuals. In the next two columns, we use FinScope's Financial Segmentation Model as an independent variable and test its association with PLS demand. The FSM categorizes individuals according to their financial access, knowledge, discipline, and usage of financial products, as well as their overall optimism and connectedness. When we include the average overall FSM tier for the area we again fail to find a strong relationship between FSM and MaMa demand. However, when we split the FSM by its components, we find that the only strong correlate of MaMa usage is low levels of optimism and connectedness.

The optimism and connectedness FSM score is derived from a set of survey questions that are designed to measure an individual's satisfaction with their life, how hopeful they are of reaching their life dreams, and how connected they feel to others around them.¹⁸ In some ways, it is unsurprising that this is the only FSM component that shows a significant relationship to MaMa usage, as all of the other components are likely highly correlated with the demographic controls already included in the

¹⁸ For example, respondents are asked whether they agree with statements such as, "I have many dreams in life but will never achieve them," "My life has meaning and purpose," "I feel lonely," and "In many ways, my life is ideal."

regressions. However, it is striking that it is in areas in which individuals feel *least* hopeful that we see the highest usage of the MaMa product. As mentioned above, optimism—in particular, over-weighting of small probabilities—has been found to be a significant driver of demand for lotteries and PLS; it is, however, not necessarily the case that individuals who are attracted to lotteries are overly optimistic in all areas of their lives. Rather, depressed or pessimistic individuals are likely to value the “dream” of winning the jackpot the most (Thaler and Ziemba 1988; Brunnermeier and Parker 2005), and these results suggest that this desire is perhaps a significant driver of PLS demand (Tufano 2008). This finding is also related to evidence from the Consumer Federation of America and The Financial Planning Association (2006), which found that 21% of Americans, and 38% of those with incomes below \$25,000, thought that winning the lottery represents the most practical way for them to accumulate several hundred thousand dollars. Individuals who feel that their dreams are extremely difficult to reach may very well feel as if the only way possible for them even to have a chance at reaching those goals is by winning a large prize. PLS differs from standard savings accounts by offering highly skewed payouts, making large wealth accumulation possible.

In the final two columns of Panel B, we more directly test whether individuals who are struggling financially are more likely to use PLS. The key independent variable in these regressions is the percentage of individuals living near a bank branch who agreed with the statement, “You never seem to be able to pay off your debt, your debt just keeps getting worse.” Individuals who feel this way may be more likely to use PLS because it represents a chance for them to pay off their debts and escape a “poverty trap,” while standard savings products do not accumulate enough interest to do so (Banerjee and Mullainathan 2010b). In addition, financial constraints themselves could lead individuals to play the lottery (Shah, Mullainathan, and Shafir 2012; Haisley, Mostafa, and Loewenstein 2008).

We find that branches in more indebted areas experienced higher MaMa demand, but the relationship is statistically insignificant (second to last column). However, there are a few outlier branches which had an extremely high percentage of respondents who were unable to repay their debts. In the final column of Panel B we remove branches above the 98th percentile, corresponding to areas

where greater than 40% of individuals are unable to pay off their debts.¹⁹ When these branches are removed, the relationship becomes much stronger and is significant at the 1% level. In terms of economic magnitude, a one standard deviation increase in the share of individuals who feel unable to pay their debts (increase of 8.7%) is associated with a 14.3 percentage point increase in MaMa demand. This is added evidence that PLS is particularly attractive to individuals who are looking for a way to significantly change their economic circumstances.

B. MaMa demand among bank employees

While the FinScope survey data provides a representative sample of households near bank branches, the resulting averages are necessarily coarse measures of general geographic characteristics. In this section we use account-level data on First National Bank employees to associate MaMa demand with individual characteristics. Table IV presents results from linear probability models in which we estimate the relationship between income, age, gender, race, and past saving behavior with the propensity to open a MaMa account for 38,262 employees of the bank.²⁰ In all models we include 34 regional fixed effects to account for geographic differences in MaMa take-up, where regions are as defined by First National Bank.

[TABLE IV]

Panel A of Table IV compares demand for standard savings products and demand for MaMa across different demographic characteristics. The dependent variable in the first column is a dummy variable equal to one if the employee had a positive balance in a standard 32-day savings account at FNB at any time between January 2005 and March 2008, when the MaMa product was available. The second column is similar except it equals one if there was a positive balance in either a standard 32-day savings account or a special employee-only money market account that the bank made available in July 2007. The estimates in these first two columns can then be directly compared to the coefficient reported in the

¹⁹ Many of these outlier branches had only a few survey participants within 50 km, resulting in noisy measures of indebtedness.

²⁰ Tables IV and VI present linear probability models estimated by OLS, but essentially identical results are found if the models are estimated using probit or logit models.

third column, in which the dependent variable equals one if the employee at any time had a positive balance in a MaMa account.

Given previous literature suggesting that PLS could be particularly attractive for low-income individuals, results on the relationship between income and the propensity to save in a MaMa account are of interest. In the regression results in Table IV, we estimate the relationship between income and MaMa usage non-parametrically using income deciles. By comparing coefficient estimates across deciles, it is apparent that demand for both regular savings and PLS is hump-shaped in income, such that the lowest and highest deciles are least likely to have an account.²¹ This pattern can be more easily seen in Figure 3, where we divide all employees of the bank by income decile, and plot the share of employees that had a standard savings product and the share that had a MaMa account at any point during the sample period for each decile. Although the results in Figure 3 are unconditional probabilities of having an account, they paint the same picture as the coefficient estimates in Table IV. While the propensity to have an account is hump-shaped in income for both regular savings and PLS account, MaMa usage appears to be somewhat less sensitive to income than regular savings. Further, while the lowest-income employees were the least likely to use MaMa, a substantially higher portion had MaMa accounts (46%) than had standard savings products (31%). The share with MaMa accounts exceeds the share with regular savings across all income deciles.

[FIGURE 3]

When evaluating the relationship between income and demand for MaMa, it is important to keep in mind that the majority of bank employees earn substantially more than the median income in South Africa. Because of this, the 1st income decile of our sample includes salaries up to R60,000 per year, while the average household income in South Africa in 2006 was about R74,600 per year. However, even limiting to employees with the lowest salaries, the same patterns persist: 33% of those who make less than R38,000 per year opened a MaMa account, while only 19% had a 32-day or money market account.

²¹ This pattern is likely due to the lowest income groups being less likely to save at all and the highest income groups being less likely to save in standard bank products because they have access to alternatives.

Taken together with the findings in Section III.A above, it does appear that low income individuals are more likely to use a PLS account than a standard savings account, but demand for PLS follows a similar pattern across income groups.

With regards to gender, we find that males are 8.8% less likely than women to have a standard savings account, but this gap narrows to only 4.2% for MaMa accounts. Thus, relative to standard savings, MaMa appears more attractive to men in particular, which is in line with Donkers, Melenberg, & Soest (2001), who find that men are more likely to play the lottery, and Filiz-ozbay et al. (2013), who find that men are more likely to save when a PLS option is available in a laboratory experiment. We also find substantial differences in MaMa demand across racial groups. While black employees are substantially more likely to have a savings account than other ethnicities, they are equally likely to have a MaMa account as whites and Asians. Meanwhile, individuals of mixed race are about 4.4% more likely to open a MaMa account than other racial groups.²²

Panel B of Table IV tests whether previous banking behavior is related to the propensity to open a MaMa account after controlling for demographic and geographic characteristics of employees. The regressions in this panel are identical to those in the final column of Panel A, except here we test whether the prior banking behavior of the employees is related to the propensity to open a PLS account. We find that employees who did not have any saving or checking accounts at FNB were 4.6% more likely to open a MaMa account than those who already had active bank accounts at FNB. It is important to note that we cannot observe whether these employees had active accounts at other banks, so these individuals were not necessarily unbanked. However, given that they worked at FNB it seems reasonable to assume that they would be likely to bank at FNB if they have bank accounts anywhere. If that is the case, this suggests that PLS-type products may attract new savers who were previously sitting outside the formal banking sector.

²² It is difficult to connect our results on race to previous literature due to cultural differences within race across countries. For example, Stinchfield & Winters (1998) find that Hispanic and African American youths have a higher propensity of gamble, but it is by no means clear that Africans would have a similar propensity to gamble.

The final two columns of Panel B delve further into this issue. In the middle column, we control separately for whether the employee actively used a savings or checking account prior to opening a MaMa account, finding that in particular the use of a standard savings account significantly decreases the probability of opening a MaMa account, while employees who only had checking accounts were equally likely as employees without any accounts at FNB to open a MaMa account. In the right-most column we separate employees by their net balances at the bank, defined as the sum of their checking, 32-day, and money market accounts at the bank. Because employees were allowed to maintain negative balances in their checking accounts, a significant portion (28%) are net borrowers from the bank, while 42% of employees have net positive balances, and the remaining 30% had no accounts at the bank. We split the group who are net savers into “high savers” and “low savers” depending on whether they had above- or below-median net savings at the bank as percentage of annual income. Similarly, we split the net borrowers into two groups, and thus end up with five groups of employees: above-median savers, below-median savers, those with no accounts, below-median borrowers, and above-median borrowers. Echoing our findings in Section III.A, of these five groups, employees who have borrowed the most from the bank are the most likely to open a MaMa account. Next most likely are those with no accounts and those with above-median savings. Staff with small amounts of borrowing or small amounts of saving are the least likely to use MaMa. The differences between the groups are substantial; those with high net borrowing are nearly 18% more likely to open a MaMa account than those with a small amount of savings. If this group is interpreted to be the most financially constrained, the result is consistent with PLS attracting non-traditional savers.

Taken together, our findings are indicative that demand for PLS comes from a broad range of consumers across all income levels, age brackets, and ethnicities, consistent with previous research showing broad-based preferences for skewness (Scott and Horvath 1980; Mitton and Vorkink 2007; Barberis and Huang 2008). In addition, the financial position and experience of an individual are important predictors of PLS demand. In particular, demand for the MaMa product was strongest among financially constrained individuals, as evidenced both by the FinScope survey results as well as high

demand by bank staff who had borrowed heavily from the bank. Finally, bank employees without any deposit accounts at First National exhibited strong demand for MaMa, suggesting that PLS can bring new savers into a bank.

IV. Banking behavior of PLS participants

A. Did MaMa attract new savings?

While the evidence in Section III shows that MaMa attracted new *savers* into the banking system, it is also important to test whether PLS can generate significant new net *savings*, rather than just cannibalizing existing savings. We note two important data limitations of this portion of our analysis. First, our individual-level data on FNB employees only contains information on their accounts held at FNB, and thus we cannot observe if these individuals have savings at home, in other banks, or in savings clubs or other informal institutions. Thus, we can test whether individuals who open MaMa accounts reduce savings held in other FNB accounts, but we cannot observe whether they are reducing savings held elsewhere. However, data from the FinScope survey shows that only 2.96% of South Africans had deposit accounts at multiple banks in 2005. In addition, only 1.73% of unbanked South Africans report that they regularly save any of their income either at home or in savings clubs. These figures suggest that it is unlikely that many of the individuals in our sample hold significant savings elsewhere.

A second important caveat is that the MaMa program was not a randomized experiment, and therefore we cannot draw unambiguous causal inference between usage of MaMa and increases in overall savings. However, we find no evidence that MaMa account holders reduced their savings in standard savings products at FNB.

Figure 4 provides a first look at the correlation between MaMa take-up and regular 32-day account balances. In this figure, we plot the average monthly growth rate of regular 32-day balances for two sets of bank branches: those that had above-median growth in MaMa account balances and those with below-median MaMa growth. Prior to the introduction of MaMa, average savings growth rates were very similar between the two sets of branches. After the MaMa program became active, those branches that had high average MaMa account growth also saw significantly higher growth in regular 32-day balances.

If significant cannibalization of standard savings were occurring, one would expect just the opposite pattern.

[FIGURE 4]

Account-level evidence from bank employees presents the same result. Figure 5 plots the change in net savings over time for employees that opened MaMa accounts relative to employees that did not open accounts. We define net savings as the sum of all deposit accounts, including 32-day, money market, checking, and MaMa, and then scale this amount by the annual income of the employee. We then estimate the following regression:

$$S_{i,t} = \beta X_i + \gamma_{r,t} + \sum_{k=-12}^{24} D_{i,t}^k \delta_k + \varepsilon_{i,t},$$

where i indicates employees and t indicates months. $S_{i,t}$ is the worker's level of total net savings at the bank as a percent of income at time t , X_i is a vector of worker characteristics including age, race, income, and gender, and $\gamma_{r,t}$ denotes region-by-time fixed effects. $D_{i,t}^k$ are dummy variables equal to one if month t is k months after (or before, if $k < 0$) the employee opened a MaMa account, and zero otherwise. The main coefficients of interest are δ_k , which show whether employees who opened MaMa accounts tended to have more or less savings k months after opening MaMa. Employees that never open an account will have $D_{i,t}^k = 0$ for all observations, and serve as the control group.

[FIGURE 5]

In Figure 5, Panel A we plot our estimates of δ_k as well as 95% confidence intervals based on the above regression.²³ As shown in Section III, prior to opening MaMa, these individuals tend to have lower than average savings levels relative to employees that never opened a MaMa account. About 2 months prior to opening a PLS account, total net savings begins to increase, with a large jump in savings occurring on the month that the MaMa account is opened. From this point onwards, MaMa participants

²³ Confidence intervals are calculated using standard errors that are clustered at the individual level. The regressions have a total of 1.56 million observations.

maintain roughly 1% of annual income more in total net savings at the bank, relative to non-participants. This represents a 38% increase from the average savings level of 2.9% of annual income.

Panel B of Figure 5 shows the trend in regular 32-day balances around the opening of a MaMa account. This chart is created in exactly the same way as Panel A, except that here the dependent variable in the regression is deposits in regular 32-day accounts as a percentage of annual income, rather than total net savings at the bank. If PLS is cannibalizing regular savings, one would expect to see regular savings balances decreasing when PLS accounts are opened. Instead, we find that employees who opened MaMa accounts tended also to increase their balances in regular 32-day accounts by about 0.3% of income. Put differently, about 30% of the increase in total savings held by MaMa participants was in standard 32-day accounts, not the PLS product.²⁴

It is important to note that the choice to open a MaMa account is endogenous, and so we cannot ascribe a causal relationship between opening a MaMa account and higher overall savings or higher 32-day balances. Indeed, the fact that savings balances tend to increase in the two months *prior* to opening a MaMa account suggests that some of those who chose to open a MaMa account likely did so because of a desire to save more (e.g., a positive wealth or income shock) and thus increased their balances in standard savings accounts as well. Because of this, we cannot rule out the possibility that MaMa participants would have had even higher 32-day savings balances than those who did not open MaMa accounts had MaMa not been available. However, both Atalay et al. (2012) and Filiz-ozbay et al. (2013) use lab experiments to show that PLS accounts tend to increase overall savings rates, and our results are in line with this evidence.

In Panels C and D of Figure 5 we explore further the trends in net savings prior to opening a MaMa account by focusing on two subsamples of FNB employees: those who are on average net savers prior to opening a MaMa account and those who are net borrowers. Employees who on average are net

²⁴ Importantly, we find similar results if we limit the sample to employees who had regular 32-day savings accounts prior to opening a MaMa account. Thus, the effect is driven partly by new account openings but also by individuals increasing deposits in pre-existing standard accounts.

savers or borrowers across the full time period but never open a MaMa account serve as the comparison group in each panel. We find starkly different trends in net savings prior to opening MaMa accounts for these two groups. In Panel C, we see that savers who open MaMa accounts are typically accumulating savings well before obtaining a MaMa account relative to other savers. Meanwhile, net borrowers who choose to use MaMa typically have deteriorating financing positions (relative to other borrowers) prior to opening the PLS account. These results highlight the idea that an individual's wealth can affect her demand for PLS. For example, our findings are consistent with poverty trap theories in which a financially fragile household – e.g. the net borrowers in Panel D – that experiences a negative wealth shock will seek for a highly skewed payoff (such as a lottery ticket or PLS) in order to escape the poverty trap. Importantly, Panel D also shows that on average those borrowers who choose to open PLS are able to accumulate savings (or decrease net borrowing) by about 1% of annual income over a 2-year period. Meanwhile, Panel C shows that savers experience a large increase in net savings *prior* to using PLS, but on average their net savings slowly decrease after opening a MaMa account relative to non-MaMa users such that they also hold about 1% more in net savings after 2 years.

B. MaMa demand and lottery gambling

Kearney et al. (2010) hypothesize that “the introduction of prize-linked savings products could provide an alternative to lottery tickets that offers a higher (and certainly less negative) return on one's ‘investment.’” Given the similar payoff structure, and previously documented substitutions between gambling and saving (Consumer Federation of America and The Financial Planning Association 2006; Lusardi, Schneider, and Tufano 2011), PLS could act as a natural substitute for lottery gambling. Further, experimental evidence in Atalay et al. (2012) shows that the introduction of a PLS program can reduce lottery expenditure.

We use random variation in the size of the jackpot of the National Lottery to test whether PLS demand and lottery demand are linked. Lottery prize winners in South Africa are drawn each Wednesday and Saturday, and the size of the jackpot is a function of the number of lottery tickets sold in each period. However, when a grand prize winner is not drawn, the jackpot rolls over to the next period, creating

random periods in which jackpots are substantially larger than others. If MaMa is a substitute for lottery gambling, one would expect that MaMa demand should be lower in periods when the lottery jackpot is particularly high. We use daily data on both the amount of new deposits placed in MaMa accounts and the number of new MaMa accounts created to calculate the total amount of new balances and number of new accounts at the bank during each draw period. We then use a time series regression to test whether MaMa demand (i.e., the number of new accounts created or amount of new funds deposited) was lower during draw periods with larger lottery jackpots.

Table V presents results from this estimation. The main independent variables in these regressions are dummies for the estimated size of the jackpot for each particular draw. These estimates were published by the National Lottery at the beginning of each draw period to generate demand for the lottery, and were hence readily available for potential consumers.²⁵ We include both the contemporaneous jackpot as well as the jackpot from the previous draw to account for possible lags in the relationship between lottery jackpots and MaMa demand.²⁶ We include a number of controls to account for other factors that may affect MaMa demand, including an indicator of whether the draw took place on a Saturday or a Wednesday and also an indicator of draw periods which offered less opportunity for customers to open MaMa accounts, because of bank holidays. Between March and October 2007 the National Lottery was shut down due to disputes over the ownership of the license to run the lottery, and so there are no jackpot draws for this time period (and these months are not included in the regressions). We include broad time dummies which split the sample into four time periods of roughly 9 months in length each: January – September 2005, October 2005 – June 2006, July 2006 – March 2007, and October 2007- March 2008. Including these time dummies controls for changes in the MaMa program—specifically, the introduction of a 0.25% interest rate in September 2005 and the doubling of prizes in

²⁵ Actual jackpots are very close to estimates. Estimated jackpots are derived from estimates of lottery ticket sales, combined with any jackpot which was rolled over from previous periods, or any special promotions (such as a guaranteed jackpot).

²⁶ For example, it possible that excitement from a large jackpot in the previous draw could continue to diminish demand for PLS. Excluding lagged jackpots does not alter the coefficients on contemporaneous jackpots significantly.

September 2007—and helps take account of long-run trends in the growth of MaMa accounts. We also control for the growth in regular 32-day savings balances and accounts at the bank, to account for factors that might be driving savings in general at the bank. Lastly, we include a lag of the dependent variable to help remove serial correlation. Newey-West standard errors which account for up to 2 weeks of serial correlation are reported.

[TABLE V]

In support of the hypothesis that PLS can act as a substitute for lottery gambling, we show that MaMa demand was lower in draw periods with larger jackpots. When the anticipated jackpot was between R4 million and R7 million (the third quartile) or over R7 million (fourth quartile), there was a reduction in total new deposits in MaMa accounts of 12.4% and 15.1%, respectively. Similarly, when jackpots are in the third (fourth) quartile total new MaMa accounts created decreased by about 341 (269), a decrease of 9.8% (7.7%) from the mean of 3,483 new accounts created per draw period.²⁷ Further, we also find evidence that one-period (3 days) lagged large jackpots also have a negative impact on MaMa demand relative to small jackpots, suggesting that even the recent memory of a large prize may entice some would-be PLS savers to purchase lottery tickets.²⁸

These results strongly suggest that MaMa was indeed acting as a substitute for lottery gambling, meaning that reduced lottery expenditure is likely one of the main sources for additional savings deposited in PLS accounts. Paradoxically, however, we find no discontinuous increase in MaMa demand when the National Lottery was shut down in March 2007, nor do we find a decrease in demand when it re-opened in October of 2007. While these are only two data points and there are other possible factors that could be affecting MaMa demand during this period²⁹, it is surprising that there was not a

²⁷ It is somewhat odd that the relationship between new MaMa accounts created and jackpot size is non-monotonic, as the estimated impact of jackpots in the 3rd quartile is larger than that of the 4th quartile. However, standard errors are large enough that we cannot statistically rule out that the true coefficient for the 4th quartile is indeed larger than that of the 3rd quartile, leaving open the possibility that this anomaly is simply due to statistical noise.

²⁸ We find no evidence of a relationship for lags longer than 1 draw period (3 days).

²⁹ Several concurrent events could also have affected MaMa demand around the lottery shutdown, including a series of appeals in the ongoing lawsuit between FNB and the National Lottery Board regarding the legality of the MaMa program in April and June 2007, as well as the doubling of MaMa prizes in September 2007.

discontinuous or even noticeable increase in MaMa usage during this period. Further work, with individual-level data on PLS usage and lottery expenditure may help fully resolve this question.

V. Prize winning and saving

A. Prize winner's own behavior

The very aspect that makes prize-linked savings unique—randomly assigned prizes—also makes it an interesting environment to study what individuals do with a cash windfall. In this section, we use account-level data for the 4,965 prize winners to test whether winning a prize increases or decreases demand for PLS.

Because prizes were awarded randomly, conditional on the MaMa account balance prior to the win, a prize is an exogenous shock to the financial situation of an account holder. We can examine whether that individual continues to invest in PLS and, if so, how much she holds in her account. Ex ante, it is unclear whether winning a prize will increase or decrease an individual's demand for PLS. On one hand, if an individual has invested in PLS with the hopes of dramatically improving his socioeconomic status, once a large prize has been won he might be expected to close his account and invest in more standard investment products, since his goal has been achieved. This effect should be especially prevalent for larger prizes. On the other hand, it is also possible that lottery play has an addictive aspect to it (Guryan and Kearney 2010), and that winning a prize serves to strengthen this tie.

In Table VI we estimate the probability that a prize-winner still has a MaMa account open six months or one year after winning, relative to employees of the bank who did not win prizes. Using bank employees as a control group is not ideal, as they are not necessarily directly comparable to prize winners who were not employees³⁰, but these are the only account-level data available to us which contain individuals that did not win prizes. To estimate these regressions, for each month we include all bank employees who had an open account in a given month as well as all prize winners in that month, and then

³⁰ There were only 59 employees who also won prizes, out of a total of 4,965 total prizes awarded, so we lack sufficient sample size to limit to only employee winners.

test whether prize winners had a higher propensity to have an open account six months or one year after that point in time. In the regressions we include demographic controls as well as year-month fixed effects so that we are comparing employees and prize winners in the same months to each other. In addition, it is critical to control for the MaMa balance prior to winning, since winning a prize is only random conditional on the amount held in the account. We control for the MaMa balance prior to winning non-parametrically by including dummies for each decile of the distribution.

[TABLE VI]

The main variables of interest in these regressions are dummies indicating the prize won by an account holder. We split prize amounts into four categories: R1,000 to R19,999, R20,000 to R99,999, R100,000 to R 999,999, and R1,000,000. We use these ranges because a few prize winners won multiple prizes in a given month, and hence there are a few cases in which the prize amount is not exactly R1,000, R20,000, R100,000, or R1 million. However, the vast majority of winners in each category won only a single prize, and hence are exactly at the lower bound of that category.

We find that R1,000 prize winners are less likely than bank employees to keep their MaMa accounts open both six months and one year after winning. Coefficients for R20,000 and R100,000 prize winners are also negative at both horizons, although statistical significance for these groups is only found for R100,000 prize winners at the 12-month horizon.³¹ However, the economic magnitudes of these estimates are not overly large. We estimate that winners of the R1,000 prize are 4.2% less likely keep their account open one year after winning, a small reduction from the mean of 79.7%. Even for R100,000 prize winners, which are 13.7% less likely than non-winners to keep their account open for a year, the likelihood of keeping their account open remains well above 60%. Meanwhile, we also find that winners of the grand prize are somewhat more likely to keep their account open six months after winning, but the effect is no longer statistically significant at the one-year horizon. The fact that the finding reverses for the largest prize winners suggests that winning the jackpot could have some addictive aspect, or perhaps

³¹ Because there are substantially more R1,000 prize winners, estimates of these coefficients tend to be much more precise than estimates for other prize categories.

individuals feel that they have enough money that they can afford to gamble a bit. Regardless, the estimated coefficients are again not large: R1 million prize winners are only 5.4% more likely to keep their account open for six months, and 4.1% more likely for a full year.

In the last two columns of Table VI, we test whether prize winners keep more funds in their MaMa accounts after winning. The dependent variable in these regressions is the MaMa account balance at the 6- or 12-month horizon, a figure which we winsorize at the 95th percentile to avoid undue influence of outliers.³² It should be noted that when prizes were awarded the amounts were automatically deposited into the winner's MaMa account, so there is an immediate increase in a winner's MaMa balance in the month following the win. Thus, we are testing whether prize winners leave these amounts in their accounts or even increase their investment, or whether they take their winnings out of the accounts for other uses.

Across all levels of winnings, prize winners keep substantially more in their accounts than non-winners, even a full year after the prize was awarded. The magnitude of these effects is quite large: even winners of R1,000 held on average R5,842 more in their accounts six months after winning a prize. It is notable that winners of R1,000 or R20,000 increase their PLS holdings by amounts *larger* than the prize awarded. This suggests that the increased holdings reflect more than a pure wealth effect, at least for smaller prize winners. Instead, this evidence is consistent with the idea that prize winning may add to the excitement of PLS and hence lead to increased demand.

A year after winning, R100,000 and R1 million prize winners held on average about R20,000 more in their accounts than non-winners, and amount roughly equivalent to increased holdings by winners of R20,000 prizes. Thus, larger prizes did not lead to correspondingly larger demand for PLS, although an increase of R20,000 is still a large amount, relative to average (median) account balances of R17,800 (R400).

³² We also obtain similar results if we use $\ln(\text{MaMa Balance})$ as the dependent variable.

Finally, we check to see whether MaMa winners add "new" money into their account in the period after their prizes are awarded. Specifically, we determine the minimum balance in the six month period following the date on which they win a prize. We then compare the balance one year after the prize award date, relative to this minimum. One year after the prize is awarded, 68% of winners (1,670 out of 2,439) have added net deposits to the account; 7% (170) have maintained the balance; and 24% (599) have made further net withdrawals.

Taken together, these results show that, while prize winners were somewhat more likely to close their accounts after winning, overall prize-winning leads to significantly higher PLS demand.

B. Effect of prize on other's behavior

Large prizes can also have an impact on the behavior of others. In this section we test whether prize winners create a "buzz" at a particular bank branch, leading to increased demand for PLS at that branch relative to other bank branches. To do this, we follow the methodology of Guryan & Kearney (2008), who find that in the week following the sale of a winning lottery ticket, lottery ticket sales at the winning store increase substantially relative to other sales locations. Similarly, we look for a "lucky stores" effect by testing whether bank branches where the jackpot winner holds an account experience excess demand for MaMa in the month following the win. To do so, we estimate the following specification:

$$MaMaGrowth_{bt} = \alpha_k + \gamma_k w_{b(t-k)} + \delta_k \ln(MaMaBal_{b(t-k)}) + \mu_{k,t} + \varepsilon_{k,bt}$$

where b indexes bank branches, t indexes months, k indexes months since the drawing, $MaMaGrowth$ is the monthly log growth rate of MaMa balances at the branch, w is a dummy variable equal to one if the jackpot winner's account was at branch b , $\ln(MaMaBal)$ is the natural log of total MaMa deposits held at the branch, and μ is a fixed month effect. With this setup, γ_k is the estimated effect of having a R1 million winner at the branch k months after the drawing relative to all other branches. This specification is estimated once for each value of k . It is crucial in these specifications to condition on the amount of MaMa deposits held at the branch, as each branch only has the same chance of having a jackpot winner

conditional on the amount of MaMa deposits held at the branch that month. In addition, when calculating the growth rate of MaMa balances we remove the jackpot winner's account from the total balance since the winner receives R1 million in her account in the month following the win, which has a drastic impact on growth rates.

Panel A of Figure 6 plots estimates of γ_k for values of k ranging from 3 months prior to the drawing to 3 months after, as well as 95% confidence intervals for the estimate. As expected, coefficient estimates are statistically indistinguishable from zero for all months prior to the drawing, which verifies the identifying assumption that the assignment of the prize was truly random conditional on MaMa deposits held at the branch. In the month following the drawing we find that MaMa deposits grow by an excess of 11.6% at the branch which had the winning MaMa account. Note that this is a monthly growth rate. Across the whole sample, the average monthly growth rate of MaMa balances was 13.3%, and so having a jackpot-winning account holder increases the growth rate of deposits by 87%. However, the effect does not persist past one month. In the following month, growth at the winning branch is again indistinguishable from that of other branches. At the same time, the growth rate does not shrink below that of non-winning branches, such that this one-time shock results in a permanent *level* change in the amount of MaMa deposits at the branch.³³

[FIGURE 6]

In Panel B of Figure 6 we plot a similar picture except in this case the dependent variable in the regression is the change in the number of MaMa accounts in month t . In this case, the estimated effect one month after the prize is not quite statistically significant (p-value=0.07), but the point estimate is similarly large. Specifically, having a jackpot winner increases the number of new MaMa accounts at the winning branch by about 36 accounts, a 70.5% increase from the mean increase of 51 new accounts.

³³ In unreported results, we also find that branches with a higher than expected number of prizes experience abnormally high growth in MaMa balances in the following month. In addition, our results also hold if we change w to be a dummy equal to 1 if any large prize (i.e., greater than R1,000) was won by an account holder at a particular branch, although the estimated impact is smaller at 2.9% excess growth in MaMa balances.

We also find evidence that a jackpot winner generates excess demand in non-MaMa savings deposits. Panel C of Figure 6 shows that bank branches with jackpot winners have 4.2% higher growth in standard 32-day balances in the month following the win. This suggests that the shock to demand in PLS can generate spillovers into standard savings products as well.³⁴

Finally, we test whether there is a spillover effect to other nearby First National branches. Here, we alter the definition of w such that it is a dummy equal to 1 if a branch within 10km (6.2 miles) has an account holder that wins the jackpot. In these regressions we drop the winning branches from the sample, so as to focus entirely on estimating the spillover effect by itself. Results are presented in Figure 6, Panel D. We find weak evidence that branches experience excess MaMa deposit growth of about 1.7% in the month after a nearby branch has a jackpot-winning account. This result is just outside of the range of statistical significance (p-value=0.056), which is perhaps unsurprising given that effect is an order of magnitude smaller.

Our results are consistent with the findings in Guryan & Kearney (2008), who also find strong same-store effects for selling a winning lottery ticket and much smaller spillover effects to other nearby stores. In the context of prize-linked savings, our results show that prize-winning can indeed create a “buzz” that results in significant and permanent increases to savings held in the PLS product even by those who did not win a prize. We also find increases in non-PLS savings at the winning branch. In this way, the prizes themselves can act as a self-contained mechanism to generate savings, similar to the process modeled by Han and Hirshleifer (2013).

VI. Conclusions

The raw growth of the MaMa program confirms that, in South Africa at least, there was strong “unmet consumer demand...for saving products that offer the (remote) prospect of changing current wealth status, rather than incrementally building wealth with certainty” (Kearney et al. 2010). By relating

³⁴ While our data allow us to remove the MaMa balances of the jackpot winner in order to focus only on the non-winners, we do not observe the standard 32-day savings balances of the winner. Because of this, it is possible that some of the spillover effect to regular 32-day accounts is driven by winners transferring some of their winnings into regular savings accounts.

personal characteristics to PLS usage, we find that demand for MaMa came in particular from financially constrained individuals – consumers who reported feeling unable to repay their debt. Relatedly, we find evidence that lower levels of optimism are also positively related to PLS demand. These results are in line with the idea that the attraction of “winning big” is strongest for individuals who have the greatest desire to obtain a life-changing amount of money, such as low-wealth or depressed individuals. Further, we did not find a relationship between financial knowledge and PLS take-up, suggesting that the relatively low observed levels of precautionary savings and high amounts spent on lottery gambling are not due to a lack of financial sophistication such as misunderstanding compound interest.

Building on this, our evidence suggests that prize-linked savings increase net savings. We do not see any evidence that the MaMa program cannibalized savings, and instead find the reverse: branches with higher MaMa usage also saw expansion of regular savings, and individuals who opened MaMa accounts typically increased their balances in standard savings accounts (although these relationships are not necessarily causal). Meanwhile, demand for MaMa was highest when the jackpot of the National Lottery was lowest, suggesting that the two may be substitutes.

The welfare impact of PLS depends crucially on the relative benefits of consumption today versus savings for tomorrow. By ruling out cannibalization of savings, our evidence shows that increased savings in PLS is likely to come at the expense of reduced consumption. Some of that reduction comes from a decline in lottery expenditure (and in that sense can be seen as a shift in investment from the lottery to PLS), but our data do not allow us to pin down exactly how individuals adjust consumption in order to invest in PLS. While other evidence suggests that there are potentially large benefits to increasing savings and that many individuals express a desire to save more (Lusardi, Schneider, and Tufano 2011; Dupas and Robinson 2013), the exact benefits of PLS must be weighed against a decrease in current consumption.

We also show that prize-winning has a material effect on the saving behavior of both the winner as well as those nearby. Prize winners tend to increase balances held in PLS by substantial amounts, in

some cases by even more than the amount of the prize won. Further, large prizes create a local “buzz,” leading to dramatically increased demand for PLS at the winning branch in the month following the win.

These findings are important for academic researchers seeking to understand saving and gambling behavior, as well as policy makers who are considering alternative policies geared toward increasing savings. Prize-based incentives such as those offered in PLS products can successfully attract new savers and new savings, and would also likely decrease the amount of lottery gambling. Our evidence shows that there is a potentially large group of consumers whose savings patterns might be enhanced if given a chance, however remote, of winning a life-altering prize.

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
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FIGURE 1 GROWTH OF THE MAMA PROGRAM

Panel A shows the total number of standard 32-day notice accounts and MaMa prize-linked accounts at First National Bank from January 2003 – July 2008, while Panel B shows the total balances held in these accounts (in Rand billions). In both charts, the vertical lines identify the beginning and end of the MaMa program, in January 2005 and March 2008, respectively.

Panel A: Total number of 32-day and MaMa accounts, bank-wide (thousands of accounts)



Panel B: Total deposits in 32-day and MaMa accounts, bank-wide (Rand billions)





FIGURE 2

SHARE OF DEPOSITS HELD IN STANDARD SAVINGS AND PLS, BY AGE AND INCOME

Panel A of this figure displays share of total deposits held by individuals in different age brackets for both standard 32-day and MaMa accounts. Panel B shows the share of total balances held by individuals across income brackets. For reference, the 25th, 50th, 75th, and 95th percentiles of income in South Africa in 2005 were R13,314, R26,559, R68,527, and R290,253, respectively. Data reflect account balances as of June 2008, 3 months after the MaMa program ended.

Panel A: Share of deposits held, by age bracket



Panel B: Share of deposits held, by income bracket




FIGURE 3

SHARE OF EMPLOYEES WITH STANDARD SAVINGS OR PLS ACCOUNTS, BY INCOME

This figure plots the share of bank employees that have a standard savings account or MaMa account across ten income deciles. Employees are classified as having a standard savings account if they have either a regular 32-day notice account or a money market account. Income deciles divide the 38,262 employees into ten groups of 3,826 employees each based on estimated income.




FIGURE 4
GROWTH RATES OF STANDARD 32-DAY SAVINGS BEFORE AND AFTER MAMA

This figure displays the average monthly growth rate of standard 32-day savings balances for two groups of First National’s branches. Branches are divided based on their average monthly MaMa balance growth rate from Jan. 2005 – Mar. 2008. Those branches that had below-median MaMa growth are in the *low MaMa growth* group, while the remaining branches are placed in the *high MaMa growth* group. The figure shows average growth rates of standard 32-day balances both before and after the MaMa program, with the vertical line denoting the start of the program. While *high MaMa growth* branches averaged 0.57% higher 32-day savings growth than *low MaMa growth* branches prior to the introduction of the MaMa account, after this date the difference grew to an average of 2.01%. A t-test that the difference-in-differences is different from zero is significant at the 1% level.





FIGURE 5


SAVINGS BALANCES OF BANK EMPLOYEES: MAMA USERS VS. NON-USERS

This figure shows the evolution of savings balances for bank employees who opened MaMa accounts, as compared to employees who never used MaMa. Each panel displays coefficient point estimates and 95% confidence bands for dummy variables in regressions that test whether MaMa users savings balances were significantly difference from those of non-users. In both panels, the x-axis measures the number of months since opening MaMa, ranging from 1 year prior to two years after opening the account, and the vertical line indicates the month in which a MaMa account was first opened. Panel A shows evolution of total net savings balances, defined as the sum of all deposit accounts held by the employee in a given month. Panel B examines balances of standard 32-day accounts by themselves, and checks whether employees decreased their regular savings balances when opening MaMa accounts. Panels C & D repeat the estimates from Panel A on the subsample of employees who, on average, were net savers or net borrowers from FNB, respectively. Regressions are estimated by OLS, and exact specifications are described in detail in the text. Confidence intervals are based on robust standard errors which are clustered at the individual employee level.


Panel A: Evolution of net savings of MaMa users relative to non-users



Panel B: Evolution of regular 32-day account balances of MaMa users relative to non-users



Panel C: Evolution of net savings of MaMa users relative to non-users, employees who are net savers only



Panel D: Evolution of net savings of MaMa users relative to non-users, employees who are net borrowers only




FIGURE 6

EFFECT OF JACKPOT PRIZE WINNER ON LOCAL MAMA DEMAND

This figure shows the impact of having a million-Rand prize winner on local MaMa demand. Each panel displays coefficient point estimates and 95% confidence bands from seven separate regressions which test the lead and lag effect of a jackpot win. Panel A shows the effect of having a million-Rand winner on the excess monthly growth rate of MaMa balances at the same branch, relative to all other bank branches. Panels B and C are similar, except they show the impact of a jackpot win on the change in the number of MaMa accounts and the total standard 32-day deposits at the branch, respectively. Panel D displays the spillover effect of a jackpot win on the growth rate of MaMa balances at branches that are within 10km of the winning branch. Regressions are estimated by OLS, and exact specifications are described in detail in the text. Confidence intervals are based on robust standard errors which are clustered at the branch level.






FIGURE 6 - continued

Panel C: Excess growth of total 32-day deposits at winning branch



Panel D: Excess growth of total MaMa deposits at nearby branches




TABLE I
SUMMARY STATISTICS OF FIRST NATIONAL BANK DATA

This table reports summary statistics for data obtained from First National Bank. Panel A presents summary statistics on the total number of accounts and total deposits in standard 32-day and MaMa accounts at 604 bank branches as of March 2008, when the MaMa program ended. Panel B compares the share of balances owned by race and gender for 32-day and MaMa accounts. Panel C contains account-level summary statistics for bank employees.

Panel A: Branch-level summary statistics as of March 2008

	<i>Product</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Std. Dev.</i>	<i>10th percentile</i>	<i>Median</i>	<i>90th percentile</i>
Total No. of Accounts	32-day	604	1,097	1,064	148	826	2,273
	MaMa	604	1,863	2,505	211	1,408	3,797
Total balance (Rand millions)	32-day	604	R 7.81	R 8.08	R 0.89	R 5.29	R 18.00
	MaMa	604	R 2.35	R 3.25	R 0.23	R 1.70	R 5.00

Panel B: Share of balances owned by race and gender

	<u>MaMa</u>	<u>32-day</u>
Race:		
Black	0.45	0.45
White	0.37	0.41
Asian	0.09	0.07
Mixed race	0.08	0.07
Males		
	0.52	0.46

Panel C: Account-level summary statistics of bank employees as of March 2008

	<i>N</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Std. Dev.</i>	<i>10th %tile</i>	<i>Median</i>	<i>90th %tile</i>	<i>% with non-zero balance</i>	
							<i>Jan. 2005</i>	<i>Mar. 2008</i>
Total balance:								
32-day saving	38,301	872	9,989	0	0	322	9.9%	15.4%
Money market	38,301	3,285	31,091	0	0	841	--	22.9%
Checking	38,301	206	17,507	-5,833	0	2,703	39.0%	62.6%
MaMa	38,301	567	5,510	0	0	723	5.5%	45.5%
Combined	38,301	4,930	39,921	-5,065	0	10,043	41.4%	77.9%
Income Estimate	38,301	175,920	203,408	60,000	112,297	360,000	--	--
<i>Combined bal. (% income)</i>	38,301	3.41	62.44	-4.4	0	6.9	--	--

TABLE II
FINSCOPE SUMMARY STATISTICS

This table reports summary statistics of demographic characteristics derived from the FinScope 2005 survey. Each item represents the mean or median of all survey respondents within 50km of each bank branch. This table reports summary statistics across the distribution of the 531 branches which had any respondents within the 50km radius. Financial segmentation model (FSM) tier and FSM components are calculated by FinScope based on responses to a battery of questions. Each respondent is segmented for each component separately on a scale from 1 to 8, and then the overall tier is a combination of those components (and also ranges from 1 to 8). For all components a higher tier signifies more, e.g., higher financial penetration score signifies that an individual has adopted more financial products. *% can't pay debt* is the percentage of respondents within 50km of the branch who agreed with the statement "you never seem to be able to pay off your debt; your debt just keeps getting worse." *% can't pay debt (outliers removed)* reports summary stats when branches above the 98th percentile have been removed.

	<i>N</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Std. Dev.</i>	<i>10th %tile</i>	<i>Median</i>	<i>90th %tile</i>
<i>Demographics</i>						
Race:						
Black	531	69.0%	26.3%	33.7%	72.3%	100.0%
White	531	15.2%	13.7%	0.0%	16.0%	25.6%
Asian	531	3.1%	7.2%	0.0%	1.0%	8.2%
Coloured	531	12.8%	22.4%	0.0%	4.1%	40.7%
% Male	531	48.7%	3.3%	47.1%	48.8%	50.5%
% Married	531	42.4%	12.7%	29.0%	45.3%	50.9%
Median Age	531	33.77	5.64	27	32	37
Median Household Income (000s)	531	29.9	18.5	15.0	27.0	42.0
% Rural	531	31.2%	33.9%	0.8%	14.7%	90.8%
% with at least High School Education	531	39.6%	15.9%	16.3%	39.9%	55.8%
% unemployed	531	25.3%	10.7%	16.3%	23.0%	39.0%
Homeownership rate	531	74.4%	15.0%	64.8%	73.3%	93.5%
<i>Financial Indicators</i>						
% Banked	531	50.7%	17.1%	27.7%	54.2%	67.6%
FSM Tier	531	3.45	0.77	2.40	3.52	4.15
FSM Components:						
Financial Penetration	531	2.28	0.56	1.61	2.32	2.95
Financial Access	531	3.84	1.00	2.51	3.96	4.73
Financial Discipline	531	4.94	0.43	4.43	4.99	5.27
Financial Knowledge	531	3.47	0.60	2.61	3.52	4.08
Connectedness and Optimism	531	6.67	0.32	6.29	6.75	6.98
% can't pay debt	531	14.9%	9.8%	0.0%	14.4%	23.9%
% can't pay debt (outliers dropped)	522	14.3%	8.7%	0.0%	14.4%	23.8%

TABLE III
BRANCH-LEVEL MAMA TAKE-UP AS A FUNCTION OF DEMOGRAPHIC AND FINANCIAL CHARACTERISTICS

This table presents results of OLS regressions where the dependent variable is the log total usage of MaMa in March 2008 (at the close of the program) for each bank branch. Panel A shows the relationship between demographic characteristics and MaMa usage, as measured both by log total MaMa deposits and by the log number of MaMa accounts. Panel B adds financial characteristics to these demographic controls to test whether banking attitudes have an additional impact on MaMa usage. To be concise, we present only results relating to log total MaMa deposits in Panel B, but similar results are found using log number of MaMa accounts. Independent variables come from the FinScope 2005 survey, and are averages (or medians, if specified) for all respondents within a 50km radius of the bank branch. *FSM Tier* is a classification created by FinScope which categorizes respondents by various financial segments, and is based on 5 separate components which are identified separately in Panel B. See text for a complete explanation of how the FSM tiers were created. The final column of Panel B removes branches above the 98th percentile of % *can't pay debt*. In all regressions we control for the size of the branch by including the log total amount of regular 32-day deposits as an independent variable. Standard errors are clustered by 54 district municipalities, and are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.

<i>Panel A: Demographic characteristics</i>		
<i>Dependent variable:</i>	<i>Ln(MaMa deposits)</i>	<i>Ln(No. of MaMa accts.)</i>
Race (% Coloured omitted):		
% Black	-0.386 (0.251)	-0.553** (0.217)
% White	0.011 (0.489)	-0.368 (0.495)
% Asian	0.849 (0.868)	1.337 (0.836)
% Male	0.112 (0.722)	-0.025 (0.691)
% Married	-0.526* (0.301)	-0.575* (0.319)
Median Age	-0.011* (0.006)	-0.007 (0.007)
Median Household Income	-0.008*** (0.002)	-0.006*** (0.002)
% with at least High School education	0.614* (0.347)	0.293 (0.361)
Unemployment rate	-0.552 (0.450)	-0.357 (0.428)
Homeownership rate	-0.564* (0.308)	-0.639** (0.263)
Rural Area	-0.518*** (0.179)	-0.408** (0.177)
Ln(Regular savings demand)	0.816*** (0.035)	0.891*** (0.038)
Observations	531	531
R-squared	0.754	0.737

TABLE III - continued

Panel B: Financial characteristics

<i>Dependent variable:</i>	Full Sample				Outliers removed
	<i>Ln(MaMa deposits)</i>				
% banked	-0.259 (0.348)				
FSM Tier	-0.102 (0.138)				
FSM Components:					
Financial Penetration	-0.255 (0.205)				
Financial Access	0.039 (0.082)				
Financial Discipline	-0.071 (0.105)				
Financial Knowledge	0.201 (0.132)				
Connectedness and Optimism	-0.281** (0.117)				
% can't pay off debt					0.708 (0.489) 1.634*** (0.466)
Demographic controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	531	531	531	531	522
<i>R</i> -squared	0.755	0.755	0.762	0.757	0.761

TABLE IV
INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL MAMA TAKE-UP AMONG BANK STAFF

This table presents estimates from OLS regressions run on the First National Bank staff dataset. In each regression, the dependent variable equals one if the employee has a positive balance in a particular saving product at any time during the sample period (Jan. 2005 - Mar. 2008). In Panel A we correlate demographic characteristics with the propensity to have either a standard 32-day savings account, a money market or standard 32-day account, or a MaMa account. *Ex-staff* indicate employees whose employment terminated at some point during the sample period. In Panel B we test whether previous banking behavior is correlated with the propensity to open a MaMa account, after controlling for all demographic characteristics contained in Panel A. *High* and *low savings before MaMa* are dummy variables indicating employees with above- and below-median savings, respectively, as a percent of income prior to opening a MaMa account. *High* and *low borrowing before MaMa* are defined similarly for net borrowers (and thus those with no accounts are the omitted group). All regressions contain 34 bank region fixed effects (regions are defined internally by First National Bank). Robust standard errors (reported in parentheses) are clustered at the region level. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.

<i>Panel A: Demographic characteristics</i>			
<i>Dependent Variable:</i>	<i>Has 32-day Savings Account</i>	<i>Has 32-day or MM account</i>	<i>Has MaMa Account</i>
<i>Age (<30 omitted):</i>			
30-39	-0.074*** (0.005)	-0.093*** (0.005)	0.056*** (0.011)
40+	-0.096*** (0.009)	-0.104*** (0.007)	0.146*** (0.017)
<i>Income decile (1st omitted):</i>			
2 nd	0.058*** (0.011)	0.095*** (0.010)	0.105*** (0.013)
3 rd	0.087*** (0.013)	0.141*** (0.013)	0.153*** (0.016)
4 th	0.106*** (0.015)	0.148*** (0.011)	0.190*** (0.010)
5 th	0.107*** (0.015)	0.143*** (0.014)	0.203*** (0.012)
6 th	0.082*** (0.009)	0.129*** (0.011)	0.182*** (0.013)
7 th	0.083*** (0.018)	0.141*** (0.015)	0.178*** (0.012)
8 th	0.058*** (0.010)	0.126*** (0.012)	0.174*** (0.012)
9 th	0.046*** (0.016)	0.099*** (0.017)	0.168*** (0.014)
10 th	0.018 (0.015)	0.064*** (0.017)	0.145*** (0.019)
Male	-0.061*** (0.004)	-0.088*** (0.005)	-0.042*** (0.005)

TABLE IV – continued

Race (mixed race omitted):			
Black	0.093*** (0.011)	0.074*** (0.014)	-0.044*** (0.011)
White	0.003 (0.007)	0.022** (0.009)	-0.042*** (0.009)
Asian	-0.012** (0.006)	-0.004 (0.009)	-0.044*** (0.006)
Ex-staff	-0.018** (0.007)	-0.145*** (0.019)	-0.104*** (0.009)
Region Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y
Observations	38,262	38,262	38,262
<i>R</i> -squared	0.036	0.055	0.046

Panel B: Previous banking behavior

<i>Dependent Variable:</i>	<i>Opened a MaMa Account</i>		
No saving or checking acct. before opening MaMa	0.046** (0.022)		
Had saving account before opening MaMa	-0.122*** (0.008)		
Had checking account before opening MaMa	-0.019 (0.021)		
High savings before MaMa	-0.012 (0.025)		
Low savings before MaMa	-0.124*** (0.026)		
Low borrowing before MaMa	-0.051*** (0.017)		
High borrowing before MaMa	0.054*** (0.019)		
Demographic controls	Y	Y	Y
Region Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y
Observations	38,262	38,262	38,262
<i>R</i> -squared	0.048	0.058	0.060

TABLE V
BANK-WIDE MAMA GROWTH AND THE NATIONAL LOTTERY

This table relates overall MaMa demand to the size of the jackpot available in the South Africa National Lottery. Each week, winning lotto numbers are drawn on Wednesday and Saturday. For each regression, the dependent variable is an indicator of growth in MaMa usage over the 3-day period (M-W or Th-S) preceding the draw. *ln(New funds deposited)* is the log of total Rand deposited in new accounts during the draw period, and *# of new accts. opened* is the total number of new MaMa accounts opened over the draw period. Jackpot sizes were estimated and published by the National Lottery prior to the draw. We non-parametrically divide jackpots into 4 quartiles, where the largest jackpots are typically due to rollovers or guaranteed prizes. Both the contemporaneous jackpot and the lagged jackpot are included in the model. *Saturday* indicates draws that were done on Saturday, and controls for time-of-week fixed effects. *Few business days* controls for draw periods that covered less than 3 business days due to holidays. *Savings growth* controls for the growth in regular 32-day deposit balances (1st column) and accounts (2nd column) at First National during the draw period. To remove serial correlation, we include lagged values of the dependent variable. In addition, 4 time fixed effects are included to control for different periods of the MaMa program: Jan-Sept. 2005, Oct. 2005-Jun. 2006, Jul. 2006-Mar. 2007, and the period after the lottery re-opened from Oct. 2007-Mar. 2008. Newey-West standard errors that account for up to 2 weeks of remaining serial correlation are reported. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.

<i>Dependent Variable:</i>	<i>ln(New funds deposited)</i>	<i># of new accts. opened</i>
Estimated Jackpot size (< R3 million omitted):		
R3 million - R4 million	-0.0118 (0.0674)	-89.98 (141.3)
R4 million - R7 million	-0.124*** (0.0456)	-341.4*** (113.6)
> R7 million	-0.151*** (0.0574)	-269.0* (143.0)
Last period jackpot:		
R3 million - R4 million	-0.147** (0.0606)	-246.5 (151.0)
R4 million - R7 million	-0.107** (0.0503)	-263.7* (134.4)
> R7 million	-0.0494 (0.0608)	-233.5* (139.4)
Saturday	-0.0429 (0.0494)	58.67 (94.52)
Few Business days	-0.394*** (0.0877)	-1,162*** (170.4)
Savings Growth (%)	2.563 (2.532)	13,824** (5,711)
Lagged dependent variable	0.668*** (0.0562)	0.686*** (0.0566)
Time period fixed effects	Y	Y
Observations	276	276

TABLE VI
INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL MaMa DEMAND AFTER WINNING A PRIZE

This table presents OLS regressions which test the effect of winning on MaMa account holders, as compared to bank staff. Data is at the individual-month level. In each regression, we control non-parametrically for the decile of MaMa balances 1 month prior to winning, as well as all demographic controls contained in Table IV, thus focusing only on the random event of winning a prize. Prize-winners are included in each regression once, while each month of observation for bank staff is included in the sample if that employee has a MaMa account 6 months or 12 months prior to that month, such that all bank employees who had active accounts in the month of the win act as the control group. The first two columns present results from linear probability models which test whether winning a prize affects one's propensity to continue to use a MaMa account 6 months or a year after winning. The second two columns test whether winners have higher or lower balances in those accounts than bank employees who did not win. All regressions include year-month fixed effects. MaMa account balances used as dependent variables in the last two columns are winsorized at the 95th percentile to avoid outlier bias. Robust standard errors are in parentheses, and are clustered at the individual level. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.

<i>Dependent Variable:</i>	<u><i>Has MaMa Indicator</i></u>		<u><i>MaMa Acct. Balance</i></u>	
Snapshot - No. months after win:	6	12	6	12
Prize Category				
R1,000 to R19,999	-0.017** (0.008)	-0.042*** (0.013)	5,842.63*** (2,176.12)	4,071.15 (2,778.05)
R20,000 to R99,999	-0.021 (0.016)	-0.008 (0.022)	30,553.72*** (5,285.80)	24,184.53*** (5,454.80)
R100,000 to R999,999	-0.037 (0.038)	-0.137** (0.065)	26,142.40*** (6,527.38)	20,662.28*** (7,866.34)
R1,000,000	0.054*** (0.014)	0.041 (0.042)	100,586.04** (45,553.33)	17,349.30 (10,560.09)
Prior MaMa balance decile fixed effect	Y	Y	Y	Y
Demographic controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year-Month Fixed Effect	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	439,152	323,714	439,152	323,714
R-squared	0.152	0.150	0.317	0.189