Does interaction affect racial prejudice and cooperation? Evidence from randomly assigned peers in South Africa

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Abstract

We exploit random assignment of roommates in double rooms at University of Cape Town to investigate whether having a roommate of a different race affects inter-ethnic attitudes and cooperative behavior. Our outcomes include Implicit Association Tests (IATs), survey-based measures and experimental games. We find that living with a roommate of a different race has heterogeneous effects on prejudice -as measured by IAT: it reduces prejudice against blacks for whites (though not significantly) and increases it for blacks (significantly). We also find increases in the frequency with which respondents talk about race and report to have experienced discrimination. In terms of social interactions, exposure to a roommate of a different race increases the number of friends and study mates of a different race, both actual and desired. In our prisoner dilemma and trust games we exploit variation both in the race of the roommate and in the race of the game player that the individual is (randomly) matched with. Again we find heterogeneous effects across groups. Overall, the random allocation policy seems to have affected social interactions to a larger extent than it affected prejudice and implicit attitudes, as measured by IATs.

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1 Introduction

Ethnic diversity has been shown to negatively correlate with economic growth, public good provision, trust and the quality of institutions. Ethnic tensions are also believed to play a major role in violent conflict in many developing countries. These negative effects appear to be particularly pronounced in contexts where formal market transactions are limited, such as many developing countries. Despite the vivid debate on the above findings, it is difficult to find rigorous evidence exists on which *policies* may help to reduce the costs of ethnic divisions. Understanding which policies might influence racial attitudes and behaviors is particularly important in the context of South Africa, a country where the experience of Apartheid made people relatively prone to stereotyping and led to the economic marginalization of the black population. In addition, South Africa constitutes a reference point for a large part of Sub-Saharan Africa in terms of economic growth and market development.

The goal of this paper is to evaluate if and how a policy of random allocation of students to roommates across university residences can contribute to improving inter-ethnic attitudes and cooperative behavior. Specifically, it addresses the following questions: (i) are an individual's prejudice and inter-ethnic attitudes influenced by those of her peers? (ii) does increased interaction with members of other groups lead to a reduction in prejudice and an increase in inter-ethnic cooperation?

We address the above questions by rigorously evaluating the impact of a policy which randomly allocates students to roommates and across university residences that the University of Cape Town (UCT) started implementing in 2006 with the aim of promoting integration. This random allocation system provides a unique opportunity to test the effect of peers (i.e. those who share the same room) on students' behavior and outcomes. The random assignment is crucial since students cannot choose with whom they want to live, allowing us to identify the causal impact of peer characteristics, eliminating the selection bias that may be present if students chose their roommates. We can thus rigorously identify the effect of living with a student of the same race or with a student of a different race on several outcomes.

We conducted surveys, implicit association tests (IATs) and experimental games, namely trust games and prisoner dilemma games, among 543 freshmen students living in University residences at the beginning and at the end of the academic year . In particular, in addition to

administering the typical "Population IAT" which elicits associations between generally "positive" concepts (e.g., happy, reliable, etc.) and race, we designed an IAT to elicit associations between academic ability and race - we refer to this as the "Academic IAT". These broad sets of outcomes allow us to complement subjective perceptions of inter-ethnic attitudes with more "objective" measures of racial bias. While the existing literature has explored some of these effects looking at self-reported attitudes and survey measures (see section 2), to our knowledge this is the first paper that also looks at IAT's and experimental game outcomes.

Our findings can be summarized as follows. Regarding Population IAT scores, we find that being exposed to a roommate of different race has no significant effect on average. When we distinguish between respondents of different races, exposure to a roommate of different race seems to reduce racial prejudice for whites (though not significantly), but it decreases the score of blacks, who become more prejudiced against their own group. This effect is driven by blacks sharing the room with Coloureds. The magnitude of the estimated coefficient suggests that treatment closes about two thirds of the gap between whites and blacks in Population IAT. We do not find a significant effect of the roommate's own IAT score, thus no evidence of direct "social effects" in prejudice.

Turning to the Academic IAT, we find a significant deterioration in the score for blacks paired with white roommates, possibly suggesting that the interaction among these two groups may reinforce a negative stereotype for academic ability among blacks.

Turning to attitudinal and behavioral measures, we find that living with a roommate of different race: (i) has no significant effect on self-reported trust; (ii) increases the frequency with which respondents talk about topics of racial prejudice and discrimination, but (iii) does not make them feel more or less comfortable in talking about these issues; and (iv) increases the frequency with which individuals report having been threatened or harassed because of their race.

Having a roommate of a different race also exerts significant influence on the pattern of social interactions and friendships, in particular: (i) it increases the number of students from a different race that the respondent would ideally want in study and leisure groups. A similar effect is found for the number of students that the respondent actually studied with over the past year: white respondents in mixed rooms report a higher number of black students and a

lower number of white students in their study group, as well as among their "friends", defined as the people that the respondent could turn to for help if needed.

Finally, we have a number of results on experimental outcomes. *On average*, levels of cooperation in the prisoners dilemma game or the amount sent and returned in the trust game are not significantly different for participants in mixed race as opposed to same race dorm rooms, nor between mixed race game pairs as opposed to same race game pairs (with the exception of the share returned by player B in the trust game, which is lower for mixed race pairs). However, if one examines individual behavior more closely, this lack of a significant effect reflects counterbalancing effects of different behavioral tendencies by members of different race groups.

When we consider the race of the roommate, cooperation levels in the prisoner dilemma are significantly lower amongst Indian/Other participants in mixed race rooms, who also exhibit lower beliefs that the other player will cooperate. When we analyze the combined effect of race of the roommate and race of the game partner, we find that blacks are more likely to cooperate if their game partner and roommate are from the same race group, while the opposite holds for Coloured students.

In the trust game, white players A make significantly lower offers when paired with a non-white game partner, and this is exacerbated for white players with same race roommates. Coloured players A make lower offers in the trust game when their partner in the game and their roommate are from the same race group. In terms of return offers made by Player B, the average share returned is lower for players B matched with game partners of a different race.

Finally, when examining the probability to switch partner and play with another partner chosen by the respondent among three subjects of three race groups, we find effects on interactions among sub-groups broadly in line with the rest of the results.

Overall, our findings suggest that the random allocation policy only marginally affected prejudice (IAT scores) over the period of our study, and not always in the "desired" direction. But we also find that the policy did lead to changes in certain behaviors, most notably on friendships and interactions with study mates from different races, as well as on trust and willingness to cooperate in strategic settings - although several of the estimated effects are significant only for certain racial pairings.

The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 relates our paper to the existing literature in economics and social psychology. Section 3 provides a background of the study setting and describes the random allocation policy in UCT residences. Section 4 describes the data collected. Section 5 shows some descriptive statistics and discusses the identifying assumption underlying our work. In section 6 we present our empirical strategy. Section 7 contains the main results of the paper and section 8 concludes.

2 Related literature

This paper fits into two broad strands of literature in economics. The first is the literature investigating the importance of peers on human capital formation. Most of this literature studies the effect of peers' ability and academic performance (Sacerdote 2001, Lyle 2009, Garlick 2011) and derives implications for policies such as tracking (Duflo et al. 2011). Our paper contributes to a better understanding of the interplay between peers' ability, income and ethnic identity. More similarly to our work, Boisjoly et al. (2006) show evidence that random matching to roommates of different races increases support for affirmative action policies in the context of a US university. In another paper, Colette Van Laar et al. (2004) using housing assignments of first-year college students at University of California found that having a roommate from another ethnic group tended to decrease levels of prejudice. Using a similar identification strategy, our work will allow us to assess the impact of integration policies on a much broader set of outcomes, and to directly measure prejudice through the implicit association tests. Furthermore, by separately conducting IATs for generic positive associations and for academic ability we will be able to disentangle, at least to some extent, statistical discrimination from prejudice.

The second strand of literature considers the determinants of social capital and cooperation. Some authors have pointed out a positive relation between economic and social status and trust or social capital (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002; Knack and Keefer, 1997). By reducing transactions costs, higher trust may be associated with higher cooperation, particularly in resolving social dilemmas (Messick and Brewer, 1983, Coleman, 1990), and may even enhance economic growth and the performance of a society's institutions (Knack and Keefer, 1997; Coleman, 1990). However, in segmented societies, trust may depend on group affiliation, with trust being inversely related to the social distance between groups (Zak and Knack, 2001;

Bouckaert and Dhaene, 2003; Akerlof, 1997; Barr, 2003). Thus, while inter- and intra-group trust may affect the economic success or failure of the society as a whole, it may also affect the relative economic outcomes for different groups within that society (Fershtman, and Gneezy, 2001). Indeed, the literature identifies religious and ethnic heterogeneity as being particularly important in this regard (Falk and Zehnder (2007), Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002). The negative correlation between heterogeneity and trust may reflect the fact that each ethnic and religious groups are characterized by specific cultural and social norms. In a similar vein, we document whether cooperation and trust depends on prejudices towards another ethnic group.

The paper also builds on a long line of social psychology literature, which affirms that group identity or affiliation matters for outcomes in society, particularly since individuals tend to favor members of their own group over outsiders. The ground breaking work in this area is due to Tajfel and his colleagues (1971) who demonstrated that the simple categorization of individuals into groups, on the basis of some trivial criteria, such as the tendency to over- or under-estimate the number of dots on a screen, or a preference for the artistic work of Kandinsky over Klee, was sufficient to induce a favorable bias in behavior by subjects towards in-group members. The startling results of the minimal group experiments conducted by Tajfel et al (1971) suggested that simple categorization of individuals into groups, even on the basis of some trivial criterion, was sufficient to induce in-group bias in behavior. Moreover, Tajfel et al (1971) also found that not only did subjects favour in-group members, but they also actively tried to maximize the difference in the rewards to in-group members relative to outgroup members, even if this required that the total amount of resources for the in-group be sacrificed. This stood in stark contrast to previous work in this area, which had attributed in-group favoritism to perceived similarities in attitudes and beliefs amongst in-group members relative to outgroup members (Byrne, 1969), inter-group conflict over resources (Sherif et al, 1961), or a common identity forged through a common shared fate (Rabbie and Horwitz, 1969).

More recent experimental evidence from games which mimic social dilemmas confirms that individuals are more likely to cooperate with an in-group member than an outsider (Orbell, van der Kragt and Dawes, 1988; Brewer and Kramer, 1986; Kollock, 1997; Kramer and Brewer, 1994; Wit and Wilke, 1992), however the "group" is defined. (Lazarsfeld, 1954; Thibaut, 1959; Homans, 1958; Bowles, 2001; Loury, 2001). Even relatively superficial contexts or frames

affects behavior significantly, as long as the status of the parties involved in the interaction is publicly revealed. (Ball et al, 2001; Hoff and Pandey, 2003; Eckel and Grossman, 1996;). While some group identities may be a matter of choice for an individual, others may be inherited as in the case of ethnicity, but irrespective, these group identities matter because an individual's choice may impact their interactions with other members of their social network, and vice-versa. (Akerlof, 1997).

In the limited information setting of social exchange, that publicly revealed identity should matter makes sense. Individuals rely on costlessly observable cues such as race and gender to distinguish between individuals, especially in segmented societies where such characteristics hold some social significance. Moreover, because they are costlessly observable, these visual cues are likely to be privileged over other categorizations, such as class or educational background, even when the latter might be more relevant. (Chandra, 2003; Cornell and Welch, 1996). Evidence from experiments and audit studies suggest that race and ethnicity also play a significant role in social interactions. For example, Ayres and Siegelman (1995) find that white males are quoted lower prices than black or female buyers in bargaining outcomes in the second hand car market. These differences are not attributable to differences in bargaining tenacity. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) used a field experiment to examine the question of racial discrimination in the labour market, and found that the callback rate for white applicants was significantly higher than for blacks. In this study, the researchers responded to job advertisements with almost identical fictional resumes, the only difference being the race of the applicant which was conveyed via typically white and African-American sounding surnames. Moreover, resume quality was varied. A high quality resume applicant would typically have some kind of degree and a very complete record of past job experiences. A low quality resume would not have any tertiary education and the record of job experiences would be full of gaps. While resume quality had the desired effect for white applicants, with high quality individuals receiving a significantly higher callback rate than low-quality individuals, no such effect existed for black applicants, suggesting that African Americans benefit little if at all from improving their credentials. Hoff and Pandey (2003) provide evidence from experiments in India that caste identity, when it is publicly known, inhibits the motivation of low-caste subjects in maze-solving experiments. This effect is attributed to an expectation on the part of low caste subjects that

their efforts will be poorly rewarded. Their key result is that making an individual's social identity public affects the way they respond to economic incentives - members of lower status groups expect to be mistreated and this hinders their motivation.

A vast literature built on Allport's (1954) seminal contribution on the contact hypothesis, namely the idea that -under certain conditions- inter-personal contact among groups should lead to a reduction in prejudice. Our work cannot be seen as a rigorous test of Allport's hypothesis, as we cannot guarantee that the criteria identified by Allport are present in our context.[1] On the other hand, some caveats have recently been put forward regarding the possibility of a "negative contact hypothesis" (e.g., Barlow et al., 2012) and our findings point towards the interpretation that the effects of contact are complex and heterogeneous across groups.

3 Institutional setting

The University of Cape Town (UCT) is a public research university located in Cape Town, Western Cape province of South Africa. UCT is the oldest and most prestigious university in South Africa and it enrols approximately 5000 incoming freshmen every year, nearly 35 percent of whom live in university residences.[2] Incoming students were historically tracked into dormitories to live with students whose academic performances in standardized high school graduation tests was similar to their own. This tracking regime was replaced in 2006 with a policy of randomly assigning incoming students to dormitories and roommates.

Students submit applications to the university between July and October to start studying in January of the following year. UCT's admission policy is mainly based on a measure called Admission Points Score (APS), computed from the high school grades in the last year, but, it is also designed in order to have a student body reflecting the diversity of the South African population. In the application form, students may request to live in the university residences. Only students living outside the Cape Town area can apply for accommodation. Exceptions are made for disadvantaged students or for those with great academic merit. The policy and criteria for admission to UCT student housing assume that a student will initially enter a first-tier (catering) residence and subsequently move to a second-tier (senior catering or self-catering)

[1] Briefly, these criteria include the following: (i) groups should work towards a common goal; (ii) there should be no competition among them; (iii) a mutually recognized third party (authority) should support the interaction; and (iv) the groups should enjoy equal status in the interaction.

[2] In 2011, UCT had enrolled 4945 students, 3226 were living in dorms and 1719 in private accomodations.

residence or into third-tier (semi-autonomous self-catering) accommodation. While second year students may express preference for the residence to be assigned to, freshmen assignment to residences relies on a random allocation system. Freshmen's accommodation is completely managed by the Student Housing Office which randomly allocated, through a lottery system, each first year student in one of the 15 university residences. All students who are allocated to the first-tier residences should complete an accommodation acceptance form and return it to the Student Housing Office.

Once first year students are assigned to residence, they are assigned to a room, which can be either single or double occupancy. Allocation to specific rooms within the residence, either double or single, is managed by the Warden or by his/her nominee within the residence and it varies slightly by residence.

Our analysis focuses exclusively on ten residences with double rooms which, according to discussions with the wardens, implement a random allocation mechanism, conditional on gender. Approximately one week before the beginning of the academic year, each residence organizes an "Open Day" with the first year students to introduce residence's rules and benefits. During the open day each student is assigned a room. In some residences the random assignment takes the form of extracting a number from an urn, which indicates the room number to which the student has been assigned. If the room extracted is a single room, the number is removed from the urn. If it is a double room, it is placed back in the urn so that a roommate may extract it again. In other residences the wardens randomly select students and their roommates from the list of students' surnames enrolled in the residence. It is possible that wardens may "adjust" the composition of some rooms, e.g. to ensure that each floor or wing has a certain composition. While this was not described to us as a standard procedure, we cannot rule it out. We will however provide evidence that such deviations, if they occurred, did not lead to significant deviations from a random allocation in terms of observable characteristics.

Approximately 50% of undergraduate students at UCT will be in shared rooms in their first year in residence. The Residence Management Services (RMS) is in charge of residence applications, which records, for each student, her room number and the dates in which she moved in or out of residence. Rooms are never reserved irrevocably and may be switched. First year students may also decide to swap residences. In our sample 20 percent of the students

interviewed at follow-up declare that they changed roommate since the beginning of the year. In all our analysis we will use the initial assignment, thus reporting "intention to treat" estimates.

4 Data

Our original sample includes 526 freshmen students who joined UCT in 2012 and who live in double rooms in 10 out of 15 first-tier residences, selected on the basis of conversations with administrative staff indicating that they applied the random allocation policy.

For this sample of students, we conducted two rounds of data collection: a baseline and a follow-up survey. The baseline survey was conducted in February 2012, at the beginning of the academic year and the follow-up survey was conducted in September 2012, at the end of the academic year, just before students took their final first year exams. As part of the data collection, we conducted a series of implicit association tests (IATs) both at baseline and in follow up survey. During the follow up survey, besides collecting data through questionnaires and IATs, we also conducted two types of experimental games with the same subjects who took the baseline survey: a trust game and prisoner dilemma.

Students were recruited to participate in the project through a variety of channels. First, the project was advertised during the weekly residence meeting among wardens and students. Our field coordinator visited each participating residence before the beginning of the project to garner support from residences' warden. The warden was requested to hold a meeting to introduce the goal of the project. Second, posters advertising the project were hang up in visible places (i.e. residence hall) about one week before the project's kick-off. Third, we send email to all the students in the participating residences to schedule appointment for the survey at their most convenient time.

The survey questionnaire, the IATs and the experimental games were conducted in each residence on laptops and under the supervision of about two enumerators per residence. We did our best to ensure no communication among students during the survey. To try not to contaminate the IATs scores, we conducted them first, followed by the survey questionnaire and by the experimental games. For their participation in the survey, every student received a monetary incentive, worth approximately 7 US dollars.

Our initial sample size was 643 freshmen who were enrolled in the baseline survey in February 2012. Of these, 526 were traced successfully for the follow-up survey in October 2012, with a

tracking rate of 82%. Appendix Table A1 summarizes the study sample and attrition. The p-value reported in column (7) indicates that there is no statistically significant difference in the attrition rate across students allocated to a roommate of a different race (treatment) and students allocated to a roommate with the same ethnic background (control). In Appendix Table A2 we examine the correlates of the decision to participate in the follow-up round. As shown in table A1, there is no differential attrition between respondents in the treatment and control groups (columns 1-2). Furthermore, we also note that the attrition does not depend on the population IAT score (columns 3-4) and academic IAT score (columns 5-6). Looking at additional controls, it emerges that white and Coloured students are less likely of participating in the follow-up survey and foreign students are instead more likely.

4.1 Implicit association tests

The IAT is an experimental method, widely used in social psychology, which relies on the idea that respondents who more easily pair two concepts in a rapid categorization task more strongly associate those concepts (e.g., how fast do people pair images of black versus white people with descriptions of leadership roles). Slower speed in associating certain pairs denotes mental processes that tend to perceive those pairs as less common. The seminal contributions that introduced IATs in the scientific literature were those of Greenwald and Banaji (1995) and Greenwald et al. (1998). This tool has been widely employed in social psychology to understand implicit cognition, that is, cognitive processes of which an individual may not be aware and that include among others perception, stereotyping, and memory. For our purposes, a particularly useful feature of IAT's is that they implicitly reveal attitudes that individuals may be uncomfortable disclosing, such as racial prejudice. We thus use IATs to complement subjective and self-reported perceptions of inter-ethnic attitudes with more "objective" measures of racial bias.

As explained in detail in Appendix 1, we conducted two types of IAT's. The first was a standard test in which tasks involved pairing positive and negative attributes (e.g., "happy", "good", "terrible", "failure") with the racial categories of White Southafrican and Black Southafrican. Different combinations of race and qualities appeared in the top corners of the screen, for example "Black/Positive" on the left and "White/Negative" on the right. Respondents would then see a series of pictures of people of different gender and race in the middle of the screen and

had to press the left or the right-hand key depending on which category the picture belonged to. The time taken to complete a given task is inversely related to how strongly the respondent commonly associates those categories. In the paper we refer to this as the *Population IAT*.

The second IAT was instead less standard and was designed elicit associations between academic ability and race. We asked people to match pictures of different gender and race with different exam scores (percentile of the grade distribution). In the paper we denote this as the *Academic IAT*. The goal of conducting this second IAT was to test whether differential interaction or cooperation with members of the opposite race may reflect priors on how much one can benefit in terms of learning and academic success, based on the beliefs that one holds about the academic performance of the other race. This notion is closer to that of statistical discrimination, as opposed to taste based discrimination or prejudice.

4.2 Attitudinal and behavioral measures

Through the survey questionnaire, we collected information on student's socioeconomic characteristics, parental background, income, consumption, beliefs and knowledge (i.e. subjective estimates of population shares of the different groups and of their academic performance), friendships (characteristics and behaviors) and attitudes (trust, attitudes towards other ethnic groups, support of integration policies). More specifically, we elicited information about the following attitudes: (i) trust: we asked "Generally speaking, would you say most people can be trusted or we must be very careful?"; (ii) frequency and comfort in discussing about race with friends: we asked: "In the last month, how often did you talk with any friends of yours about topics of discrimination and racial bias?" and "How comfortable do you feel in talking to people about these issues?; (iii) passive discrimination: we elicited information on whether in the last year the student was threatened or harassed in any way because of her race; (iv) propensity to have friends from different ethnic groups. We explored the latter dimension through several questions: a dummy variable to indicate when students report hanging out more or equally with friends different ethnicity than with friends from their own ethnic background; the self-reported preferred number of people of different ethnicity in a study group and or a leisure group formed by 7 people; the share of reported (actual) best friends who are black or white; the share of reported (actual) study mates who are black or white. Descriptive statistics for these variables can be found in Table 2.

4.3 Experimental games

In order to examine the impact of racial identity on exchange and cooperation, a series of trust and prisoner dilemma games in which the racial identity of participants is revealed using photographs, were conducted during the follow-up survey in September 2012 among all the students who participated in the baseline survey.[3]

We implemented a standard Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (BDM) trust game. Participants were randomly assigned to participate either as Player A or Player B. Both players were endowed with 50 rand (approximately 5US$). Player A was shown a photograph of Player B and asked what portion (if any) of this endowment she would like to pass on to Player B). The offer made by the first mover is tripled before passing it on to the second mover, who must then decide how much, if anything, to return to Player A. Player B also sees a photograph of Player A. We interpret the amount sent by the first mover as an indication of trust, while the amount returned by the second mover as an indication of reciprocity or trustworthiness. These experiments allow us to test whether choices in the task differ when an individual is paired with a player of the same race compared to a player of a different race, and whether these effects differ according to the race of the roommate that participants were paired with (in real life).[4]

In the prisoners dilemma task, two students are paired and randomly assigned to their position as player A and player B. Each player sees a photograph of their partner. In this task, each player must choose whether to Cooperate with or Block their partner. The final payment in this task depends both on the choice that player B makes, as well as the choice made by player A. If both players choose cooperate, both will earn R50 each. If both players choose Block, both will earn R40 each. If one player chooses Block while the other chooses cooperate, then the Player who chooses "Block" will earn R75, and the Player who chooses "Cooperate" will earn R25.

We played the prisoner dilemma and the trust game in random order, that is, for half of the sample the prisoner dilemma was played first and the trust game second, and for the other half the reverse occurred.

[3] Experimental instructions available from the authors upon request.

[4] To control our estimates for the fact that the two players may know each other, we asked to player A whether she knows player B after revealing her photo. On average, 10 percent of the players know the partner they were matched with. We include a dummy for knowing your partner among the controls in all regressions for the Trust and Prisoner Dilemma games.

In addition to the standard prisoner dilemma and trust games described above, we designed an additional experiment where respondents were allowed to choose their partner for a third game among three (exogenously given) partners of different races: Black, White and Coloured. This game was played last and had the same structure as the second game that participants had played. Participants were informed of this and that their role would also stay the same as in the second game, e.g. if a participant was player B in the second game, he/she would also be player B in the 3rd game.

The overall game sequence was therefore:

- Trust game; Prisoner's dilemma; Prisoner's dilemma (for half of the sample)

- Prisoner's dilemma; Trust game; Trust game (for the other half).

The goal of this "Switch" game is to help us detect possible bias in strategic interactions, i.e. to test whether people who were paired with a roommate of a different race (in real life) exhibit different behavior when they can choose who to interact with in a strategic setting. For example, they may be relatively less likely to choose a game partner of their own race.

5 Descriptive statistics and randomization

[Insert Table 1]

Table 1 presents the characteristics of our sample in terms of racial composition and distribution across rooms. The population shares of the different groups in our sample are .67 for blacks, .24 for whites, .04 for Coloureds and .04 for Indians, Asians and Others (column 1). These shares are basically the same as one would get under random allocation across residences (column 2).

In order to test whether the different groups are differentially allocated to mixed race versus same race roommates, it is necessary to take into account that some differences will mechanically emerge due to the relative scarcity of certain groups in the population. For example, because Coloureds are a relative minority in the sample, one should not expect many pairs of Coloured-Coloured to emerge under random allocation. On the other hand, a large number of same race pairs would be predicted for blacks, who are the most numerous group in the population.

To formalize this idea, in columns 4 to 9 of Table 1, panel A, we compare the distribution of races across mixed race and same race rooms as observed in our data (columns 4

and 7), and compare it to what would be predicted based on the population shares in each residence under perfect random matching (columns 5 and 8).[5] Put it differently, the values in column 4 should be read as follows: Among the students living in mixed race rooms, what share is black/white/Coloured/Indian? The values in column 5, on the other hand, answer the question: Among the students living in mixed race rooms, what share should be black/white/Coloured/Indian if each residence implemented a perfect random allocation policy? The p-values for the differences between the two are shown in columns 6 and 9.

Columns 4 to 6 show that in mixed race rooms, the distribution of races is statistically the same as the predicted one for every group except whites, whose share is 9 percentage points lower than would be predicted. This may be driven by a lower response rate of this group to our survey and, as we show below, is not correlated with the levels of prejudice or academic performance of these individuals. In same race rooms (columns 7 to 9) the observed shares are identical to the predicted ones for whites and blacks, while they are different for Coloureds and Indians/Asians. Given the population size of these groups, the predicted shares under random matching (.008 and .006) would correspond to two individuals per group. A discrepancy of this order of magnitude is likely to emerge in a finite sample like ours.

Panel B of Table 1 presents the information from a different angle, and answers the question: Among blacks/whites/Coloureds/Indians, what fraction lives with a roommate of a different race? This fraction is .22 for blacks, .35 for whites, .46 for Indians/Asians and 1 for Coloureds, who all happen to be allocated to non-Coloured roommates in our sample.

[Insert Table 2]

Table 2 shows summary statistics for our outcome variables of interest as well as the controls and tests for balance between treatment (i.e., mixed room) and control students using baseline data for the sample used in the analysis, that is, those successfully interviewed in the baseline and in the follow-up. Panel A reports balance on individual socio-demographic characteristics, Panel B on IATs scores and Panel C on self-reported attitudes and behaviors.

We have a sample of 466 students for which the relevant variables are non-missing, 142 are allocated to a roommate of a different race and 324 are sharing the room with a student of their

[5] Note that to compute population shares we employ administrative records of all first year students registered in the dorms as occupying double rooms at the beginning of the year, and not only the sample that responded to our survey.

own race. Overall, baseline characteristics are similar for students allocated to a mixed versus a non-mixed room, suggesting that the randomization policy was successfully implemented. Particularly interesting is the fact that the UCT admission score, a proxy for academic ability at baseline, is on average identical for students in mixed and non-mixed rooms. As for other controls, it is worth noting that in our sample the share of females is higher (67%) compared to men (33%). The income distribution shows that more than half of the sample reports a household monthly income lower than 40,000 Rands (approximately 4,000 Dollars).

Looking at the IATs scores (Panel B), the mean of the Population IAT score is $-.23$, while that of the academic IAT score is -0.21. Negative values of the IATs scores indicate prejudice against blacks. Prejudice against blacks is found both among respondents who have a roommate of a different race, and among those who have a roommate of the same race, without statistical difference.

Panel C reports the mean in the attitudes and behaviors elicited in the survey questionnaire. Only approximately 15% of the sample think that most people can be trusted, and this share is (marginally) higher in mixed rooms. The distribution of our categorical variables for experiencing racial discrimination, talking about race, and comfort in talking about race is also overall balanced. The survey also elicited information about the favorite composition of a study group and leisure activities in terms of race. In a study group of 7 respondents, the sample mean is to have almost 3 students of a different race. Similarly, respondents declare to prefer, on average, 3 students from a different race for leisure activities, both in mixed and non-mixed rooms..

[Insert table 3]

As additional check, in table 3, we report the correlations between own pre-treatment characteristics regressed on roommate pre-treatment characteristics. For our key outcome variables, the Population and Academic IAT scores, no evidence of sorting appears at baseline, and this is true also for academic ability, as proxied by the UCT admission score. Most of the other coefficients are also not statistically significant, with some exceptions being the preferred members in study and leisure groups and two of the four income dummies.

6 Empirical strategy

In the first part of the analysis, we focus on the effects of exposure to a roommate of a different race on measures of prejudice, i.e. IAT scores, on self-reported attitudes and behaviors. For each dependent variable, we estimate *three* specifications. In the first we estimate the average effect across respondents of different races, specifically we estimate:

$$Y_{ikt} = \alpha Y_{ik0} + \beta MixRoom_{ik0} + \boldsymbol{\gamma} Race_i + \boldsymbol{\lambda} X_{ik0} + \delta_k + \varepsilon_{ikt} \tag{1}$$

where Y_{ikt} is the outcome for student i in the follow-up survey (time t) and Y_{ik0} is the baseline (time 0) value of the same variable; $MixRoom$ is a dummy equal to 1 if at baseline the student was assigned a roommate of a race different from his/her; $Race_i$ is a vector of race dummies (White, Coloured, Indian or Asian or Other, with Black as omitted category); X_{ik0} is a set of individual controls measured at baseline which include gender, the UCT admission score, income categories, and foreign nationality;[6] δ_k is a set of residence dummies, and ε_{ikt} is the error term. Our coefficient of interest is β: a positive value of this coefficient indicates a reduction in prejudice against blacks (recall that negative values of IATs indicate prejudice against blacks and positive values prejudice in favor of blacks).

In the second specification we estimate (1) augmented with an interaction between $Race$ and $MixRoom$, to test whether exposure to a roommate of a different race has heterogeneous effects depending on the race of the respondent:

$$Y_{ikt} = \alpha Y_{ik0} + \beta MixRoom_{ik0} + \boldsymbol{\gamma} Race_i + \boldsymbol{\mu} Race_i * MixRoom_{ik0} + \boldsymbol{\lambda} X_{ik0} + \delta_k + \varepsilon_{ikt}. \tag{2}$$

In the third specification we include a full set of interactions between the race of the respondent and that of the roommate, to test if there are effects that are specific to certain race pairs. With a slight abuse of notation, our model can be written as:

[6] We also tried controlling for mother's and father's education and employment, but these controls were mostly insignificant and did not significantly affect our estimates, and are missing for some individuals, hence we omit them from the main specifications.

$$Y_{ikt} = \alpha Y_{ik0} + \sum_{ij} \boldsymbol{\gamma}_{ij} Race_i * Race_j + \boldsymbol{\lambda} X_{ik0} + \delta_k + \varepsilon_{ikt}. \quad (3)$$

In all three models, we report estimates without and with controls for roommate baseline characteristics (the same set of variables X_{jk0} used for the respondent.

We estimate specifications (1) to (3) using OLS with robust standard errors. For those attitudinal variables that are categorical (and ordered), we employ an ordered logit model.

We then analyze prosocial behavior as captured by our experimental measures. In this case we consider the following dependent variables Y :

- $CooperatePD$, which is a dummy equal to 1 if the individual decided to cooperate in the prisoner dilemma game;
- $Trust\_A$, which is the amount sent by the sender (player A) in the trust game;
- $Trust\_B$, which is the amount returned by the received (player B), expressed as a share of the total endowment available to B. This total endowment includes the initial endowment of 50 plus three times the amount that A sent;
- $Belief\_A$, which is the amount that player A expects player B to return in the trust game;
- $SwitchPD$, which is a dummy equal to 1 if the individual decided to switch partner for the prisoner dilemma game;
- $SwitchT$, which is a dummy equal to 1 if the individual decided to switch partner for the trust game.

For each of the above dependent variables, we estimate the effects of two different treatments. The first treatment is external to the game and comes from the random roommate allocation policy. This is the exposure to a roommate of a different race, captured by the dummy $MixRoom$. The second treatment is instead built in the experiment and refers to the race of the player that the respondent is matched with in each game. We denote this variable $MixPlayer_{ig}$, which is a dummy equal to one if the partner that player i is matched with in game g is of a different race from his/hers.

The specifications we estimate for the games are thus:

$$
\begin{aligned}
Y_{ikg} &= \beta MixRoom_{ik0} + \gamma Race_i + \lambda X_{ik0} + \delta_k + \varepsilon_{ikg} \\
Y_{ikg} &= \beta MixRoom_{ik0} + \gamma Race_i + \mu Race_i * MixRoom_{ik0} + \lambda X_{ik0} + \delta_k + \varepsilon_{ikg} \\
Y_{ikg} &= \alpha MixPlayer_{ig} + \gamma Race_i + \lambda X_{ik0} + \delta_k + \varepsilon_{ikg} \\
Y_{ikgt} &= \alpha MixPlayer_{ig} + \beta MixRoom_{ik0} + \mu(Player\&RoommateSameRace_{ikg}) + \boldsymbol{\gamma} Race_i + \boldsymbol{\lambda} X_{ik0} + \delta_k +
\end{aligned}
$$

In the last equation, the coefficient μ is meant to capture whether those individuals who have interacted with a roommate of a different race for the past year behave differently when they play with an individual who is also of that race. We also estimate this specification with a set of interactions for the race of player i.

7 Results

7.1 Implicit association tests

Figures 1 and 2 show the correlation between IATs scores at baseline and follow-up, for the full sample of students and separately for those allocated to a mixed versus a non-mixed room. On the horizontal axis we show the IATs score of each student in the baseline survey, on the vertical axis we report the IATs score at follow-up. The dashed line is the 45° line and the solid line represents the regression line.

[Insert Figures 1 to 3]

Figure 1 (a) suggests that students starting with a high level of prejudice versus blacks at baseline (lower population IAT score) see a decrease in their levels of prejudice in the follow-up round. On the other hand, students reporting low prejudice at baseline increase their prejudice in the follow-up round. This emerges also looking at figures 1 (b) and (c), where we show the correlation between baseline and follow-up population IAT score for students in mixed versus non mixed room. This constitutes prima facie evidence that the gap in prejudice towards black is closing over time in the population, but it is not systematically correlated with being allocated to a mixed versus a non-mixed room. Figure 3 shows a similar breakdown, looking specifically

at whether the roommate's race is black or not. This is because the IAT score measures the differential prejudice towards blacks vis-a-vis whites, hence one may expect to find stronger differences when focusing on black roommates. However, the pattern in the graphs is very similar to that obtained with MixRoom.

[Insert Table 4]

Table 4 reports the estimated coefficients for equations (1) and (2) and shows that being exposed to a roommate of different race has no significant effect on prejudice on average. This zero effect is found also when controlling for roommate characteristics other than race (column 4). When we distinguish between respondents of different races in column 5, we find that exposure to a roommate of different race reduces prejudice for whites (although the coefficient is not significant) and increases it for blacks and Indians/Others, compared to the reference category of blacks with black roommates. Once we control for roommate characteristics the effect on blacks becomes stronger at $-.19$. Considering that the coefficient on the White dummy is $-.30$, this suggests that sharing a room with a non-black person closes about $2/3$ of the gap between blacks and whites.

[Insert Table 5]

In Table 5 we break down the effect of exposure to a roommate by race of the respondent and race of the roommate. We can see that the negative effect for blacks is driven by those who have a Coloured roommate. Whites with Coloured roommates also increase their prejudice against blacks, as do Coloureds with black roommates. We can also observe that whites and Indians display more prejudice against blacks compared to blacks, and this is true regardless of the roommate they are paired with (column 1).

[Insert Table 6]

In Table 6 we test whether an individual's prejudice may be affected not only by the race of their roommate, but by his or her level of prejudice. In fact, one may change attitudes towards other races even when sharing the room with someone of their own race, if this person has an outlook very different from theirs. The low correlation between baseline and follow-up values of IAT scores observed in the previous graphs would in principle be consistent with

this interpretation. However, this conjecture does not find support in the data. Neither the roommate's IAT score at baseline (column 1), nor a dummy for whether the roommate is less prejudiced than self (column 2), are significant predictors of an individual's IAT score at follow-up. No significant differential effect is found across race categories (column 3) or mixed versus non-mixed rooms (column 4).

[Insert Tables 7-8]

In Tables 7 and 8 we employ as outcome variable the Academic IAT score as opposed to the Population IAT. While the coefficient on MixRoom indicates a worsening of the beliefs about relative academic ability of blacks on average for those in mixed rooms, the effect is insignificant. When we break down the race pairs in Table 8, we find a negative and significant effect on blacks paired with white roommates. Blacks in our sample have a UCT admission score that is about one standard deviation lower than that of whites. One possible interpretation is that the interaction among these two groups may reinforce a negative stereotype for academic ability among blacks, although it has no significant impact on whites.

7.2 Attitudinal and behavioral measures

We now turn to a series of attitudinal and behavioral measures that we collected through our survey.

[Insert Table 9]

Table 9 examines the effect of living with a roommate of difference race on self-reported attitudes. In columns 1-2 we show the impact of the random allocation policy on students' level of trust. More specifically, we asked the following question: "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or you need to be very careful in dealing with people?". In columns 1-2, the dependent variable assumes values two, one and zero if "most people can be trusted", "depends", "you need to be very careful", respectively. We estimate this regression using an ordered logit model. Results show that living with a roommate of different race has no significant effect on self-reported trust. No statistically significant effect is also found when we look at the interaction between respondent's race and "Mixed Room". On average, white students report a higher degree of trust compared to black students.

In columns (3) and (4), we estimate the effect of the policy on the probability that respondents talk about topics of discrimination, prejudice and racial bias. In the latter, the dependent variable range from a 1 to 5 scale, where 5 means "always talk" and 1 "never talk". Being assigned to a roommate of a different race is not associated with talking more about issues of race on average, but the effect becomes positive and statistically significant for blacks (column 4): black students having a non-black roommate are more likely to talk about discrimination and related issues compared to blacks paired with blacks. However, they do not feel more or less comfortable in talking about these issues (columns 5-6). In the last two columns of table 9, we report the impact of the policy on discrimination experienced. The question we asked was "In the last year, were you threatened or harassed in any way by anyone because of your race?", with answers ranging from 1 ("never") to 5 ("more than ten times"). In columns 7-8, the dependent variable is a binary indicator assuming values one if the respondent has been discriminated at least once and zero otherwise. The mean of this variable is .16. Results show that living with a roommate of different race is associated with a higher likelihood of experiencing discrimination. The effect is stronger for blacks (columns 8). These results are consistent with the possibility that exposure to a roommate of a different race may generate conflictual situations where race comes up as an issue, or it may be that the level of conflict is unaltered, but people become more sensitive about issues related to race.

[Insert Table 10]

We next turn to examine the effect of living in mixed room on social interactions and friendships. In columns 1-2, the dependent variable indicates the number of times in the last month that the respondent hang out with a person of different race. Answers vary from "Never" to "More than 10 times". Order logit estimates show that living with a student of a different race significantly increases the probability of hanging out with people of a different race (column 1). The effect is statistically significant both for black and white students (column 2).

In columns 3-14, we investigate the effects of the roommate allocation policy on "actual" friends and study group members. Friends were defined as "those you can turn to for help if needed", and we asked respondents to list the first name, gender, age and race of up to five friends. The results in columns 3-4 show that the number of reported friends of a different race than one's own significantly increases for students allocated in a mixed room. Once again,

looking at the interaction terms in columns 4 both blacks and whites are affected by the policy, with a stronger effect for white students: whites increase the number of non-white friends by .78, compared to .27 for blacks. Columns 6 and 8 suggest that whites in mixed rooms on average substitute .5 of a white friend for .5 of a black friend.

We also find an interesting result when looking at the number of classmates with whom the respondent mainly studies (columns 9-14): respondents in mixed rooms report a higher share of study mates of a race different from their own, white respondents in mixed rooms report a higher number of black students (column 12) and a lower number of white students in their study group (column 14). These findings suggest that the random allocation policy, although it does not significantly affect prejudice (IAT scores), does lead to some changes in certain behaviors.

Finally, we investigate how living with a roommate of different race influences preferences for the racial composition of a study or leisure group. In columns 15-16 we report the impact of the policy on the "ideal" (as opposed to actual) number of people of different race in a hypothetical study group. Respondents could choose a number between 0 to 6 for a group of size 7 (including themselves). On average, having been paired with a roommate of a different race does not influence the dependent variable (column 15) while white students are less likely to choose study mates of different races, compared to black students. When looking at the interaction terms between $MixRoom$ and one's own race (column 16) we see that black respondents who have been paired with non-black roommates increase the preferred number of students of a different race in a study group. This is coherent with the negative impact on Academic IAT that we found for this group, who may perceive increased benefits from studying with non-black students. When analyzing the results on the desired composition of a group for leisure activities, we note that students in mixed rooms are on average more likely to choose a more racial heterogenous group compared to students with a same race roommate (column 17). In column 18 the coefficient on White*Mixed Room, although not significant, is of the same order of magnitude as the interaction between Black*Mixed Room, suggesting no differential impact of treatment on leisure group formation for these two groups.

In Table A3 in the appendix, we use alternative measures of friendship as dependent variable. In columns 1-2, we investigate the effect of the policy on the total number of best friends. Living

with a roommate of different race does not affect the social network size. However, it affects the racial composition of the network: in columns 3-8 we analyze the extensive margin and find that those in mixed rooms are more likely to mention at least one friend from a different race, at least one black friend and at least one white friends. These effects are driven by whites students in mixed rooms (the coefficient on the interaction $White * Mixed\ Room$ is positive and statistically significant at 1% level in columns 4 and 6 but not in column 8). Similarly, the policy also influences the number of study mates (columns 9-14) and even in this case, the effect is driven by white students in mixed room.

7.3 Experimental results

[Insert Figure 4]

Figure 4 presents cooperation levels conditional on the ethnicity of the participant's roommate or the ethnicity of their partner in the decision task. As is evident from panel (a), there are no significant differences in the propensity to cooperate in the prisoner's dilemma for participants living with same race roommates compared to those living with roommates from a different race group. Panel (b) suggests that cooperation levels are higher in same race pairs compared to mixed race pairs, but these differences are not significant at conventional levels (p-value .11). Finally, there are no significant differences in cooperation levels in mixed race pairs in the game conditional on the ethnicity of their roommate. In contrast, cooperation levels in the prisoners dilemma are higher in same race pairs amongst participants in mixed race rooms, albeit the differences are not significant.

[Insert Figure 5]

Figure 5 presents the distribution of offers made by Player A's in the trust game, conditional on their roommates' race, the race of their partner in the game or both. There are no significant differences in the distribution of offers conditional on roommate race or game partner race, as revealed by the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of the two distributions. The p-value is .70 for the distributions based on roommate's ethnicity (panel (a) in the figure), and .19 for those based on the race of the other player (panel B). In panel C, the distribution of offers made in same race pairs by partners with roommates from different race does not appear to be

significantly different. This echoes the earlier trend in cooperation responses in the prisoners dilemma.

[Insert Table 11]

Table 11 presents summary statistics of choices made in the two experiments. As is evident, 57% of subjects chose to cooperate in the Prisoner's Dilemma task, with no significant difference between students in mixed race versus same race rooms. In contrast, there is a (marginally significant) higher propensity to cooperate between students allocated to a same race pairing as opposed to a mixed race pairing. However, this difference disappears once we include additional controls in a multivariate regression framework (presented in Table 12). Finally, whilst just over a third of subjects choose to switch partners when offered the chance, neither roommate race nor game partner race significantly affects the likelihood that an individual will choose to switch partners in the Prisoners Dilemma game. However, amongst those students who do opt to switch partners, those allocated same race roommates are significantly more likely to choose a partner from the same race group as their roommate (and themselves) when they opt to switch partners.

Turning to behavior in the trust game, Player A's sent on average 19 Rand (40% of their endowment) to Player B. This does not differ in any significant way contingent on whether the student lives in a mixed race room or is allocated to a mixed race pair. Over 90 percent of player A's sent a positive amount to player B. The average amount they expected player B to return to them was 27 Rand. None of these values differs significantly across treatments. Similarly, there are no significant differences in return offers made by Player B contingent on roommate race or racial characteristics of the game pairing.

[Insert Figure 6]

Figure 6 presents the return schedules that emerge from the return offers recorded by Player B in the trust game. It is important to note that the strategy method was used. Player B's were asked to record the amount they would return to Player A for any given offer A might make during the game. This is the data used to generate the return schedules. As is evident in the figure, there are no significant differences in return schedules contingent on roommate ethnicity. However, in the trust game task, return schedules are higher for participants in mixed

race pairs as opposed to same race pairs. Controlling for both roommate and game partner ethnicity, no strong effects emerge in this regard.

Turning again to table 11, also in the Trust game we find that about 1/3 of the players chooses to switch partners when given the choice. As was the case with the prisoners dilemma game, neither roommate race nor game partner race significantly affects the likelihood that an individual will choose to switch partners in the trust game. Moreover, in contrast to the trust game, roommate race nor game partner race does not affect the choice of partner amongst those who do opt to switch partners on average.

The absence of a strong aggregate effect of roommate ethnicity or game partner ethnicity evident in the graphical exposition are confirmed in a multivariate regression framework as shown in Tables 12-14. On average, levels of cooperation in the prisoners dilemma game or the amount sent and returned in the trust game are not significantly different for participants in mixed race rooms as opposed to same race dorm rooms, nor between mixed race game pairs as opposed to same race game pairs. However, if one examines individual behavior more closely, it would appear that this lack of a significant effect may simply mask the counterbalancing effects of different behavioral tendencies by members of different race groups.

[Insert Table 12]

Column 2 of Table 12 shows that, compared to black players who live with black roommates, Indians and Others who live in mixed race rooms are significantly less likely to cooperate, while whites in mixed race rooms are more likely to cooperate, although the latter effect is not significant. In columns 3 and 4 we consider the race of the individual (randomly) matched with the player in the game, and whether this individual is of the same race as the roommate, but one average these variables do not significantly affect cooperation.

In Column 5 we test whether the effects may be heterogeneous across players of different races. Again, there is mixed evidence here on the impact that roommate assignment has on the decision to cooperate. Black students are significantly more likely to cooperate in this task if their game partner and roommate are from the same race group, whilst the converse holds true for Coloured students.[7]. Interestingly, Coloured students -who are all in mixed race rooms in our sample- hold beliefs of significantly lower cooperation by the other partner (columns 7

[7]The same is true for White students although the coefficient is not significant.

and 10). On the other hand, the decision to switch partners in the Prisoner's Dilemma when offered the chance is not affected by roommate race or game partner race.

[Insert Table 13]

Table 13 presents regression results from the trust game. The number of observations in this table is lower compared to table 12 because half of the subjects played the role of player A, and half the role of player B. Consistent with the summary statistics presented in Table 12, the regressions confirm that neither the race of the game partner nor the roommate alone significantly affect the offers made by Player A in the trust game (Columns 1-4). This result holds even if one models the probability that Player A makes a positive offer as opposed to offering zero in the game (Columns 6-8). However, examining the interaction terms in Regression 5, the results suggest that White Player A's make significantly lower offers when paired with a non-White game partner, and this is exacerbated for White Players with same race roommates. More specifically, for White players in mixed race rooms, offers to same race partners are higher than game partners from different race groups. Similarly, for White Player A's with same race roommates, offers in the trust game are higher to same race partners than game partners from different race groups. Coloured Player A's make significantly lower offers in the trust game when their partner in the game and their roommate are from the same race group. More specifically, the results suggest that Coloured subjects in mixed race rooms make higher offers in the trust game to a same race partner. Conversely, for Coloured students with same race roommates, offers in the trust game are higher to partners from different race groups. These trends also emerge in relation to the probability that Coloured Player A's make a positive offer as opposed to a zero offer.

In terms of return offers made by Player B, column 17 shows that Whites and Indian/Others living in mixed race rooms ceteris paribus return about 10 percentage points lower shares of their endowments. This echoes the earlier results for Coloureds in the prisoners dilemma game. The average share returned is also lower in the aggregate for player B's matched with game partners of a different race (column 18).

[Insert Table 14]

Table 14 presents regressions which model the probability of switching partners in the trust game. On average, neither roommate race nor the race of one's game partner appear to affect

either the decision to switch partners in the first instance, nor the race of the new partner chosen. However, once additional interactions are included, some effects are evident for specific groups. For example, Coloured Players are significantly more likely to switch partners if they are paired with a player from a different race group in the first instance. In contrast, Indian subjects are significantly less likely to switch, especially if their roommate and the player they are initially paired with in the game are from the same race group (Column 5).

Columns 6-15 examine the factors that influence whether or the not the new partner chosen after the switch is from the same race group as the subject. The number of observations on these regressions is substantially lower as they are conditional on having chosen to switch in the first place. Amongst those subjects who decide to switch partners, Black and Coloured subjects initially paired with a player from a different race group are significantly more likely to choose a new partner from their own race group. In contrast, White players initially paired with a partner from a different race group are significantly less likely to choose a new partner who is also White (Column 10). In fact, the results support the notion that White players who choose to switch choose a new partner who shares the same race as their roommate (Column 15).

8 Conclusions

This paper investigates the effect of a policy implemented by the University of Cape Town which randomly allocated students across residence and roommates on inter-ethnic attitudes and cooperative behavior.

We find that living with a roommate of a different race during the first year of university has no significant effect on prejudice -as measured by IAT- on average, but it increases racial prejudice for blacks. The lack of a strong race effect across all groups may suggest that the kinds of transformation initiatives that have happened in post-apartheid South Africa, both at Universities, but in broader society as a whole, have made inroads in removing the salience of race. Under this interpretation, the reason why prejudice is unaffected is that the "transformation" in students' minds had already occurred before they joined UCT.

The lack of a strong race effect here may also reflect the rising importance of other factors, such as class or residence identity. Not everyone can afford the residence fees. Those who can will mostly be from similar socioeconomic backgrounds, and it may be this class identity that

relegates race as being less important. This argument is particularly strengthened by the fact that students knew they were playing with other students from UCT residences (though not necessarily from their residences), so the shared norms and values in the residences may have made race less salient.

On the other hand, it is possible that effects only materialize after long periods of exposure, and our follow-up occurred about nine months after the students joined the residences. Future work on the long term impacts of this policy could shed light on this point.

Appendix 1. Implicit Association Tests

In our survey we implemented a shorter version of Greenwald et al.'s (1998) Implicit Association Test (IAT). The procedure included the following five tasks.

- Task 1: The respondent was asked to categorize stimuli into two categories, Black South-Africans and White South-Africans, which appeared in the top left-hand and top right-hand corner of the screen. In the middle of the screen there was a picture of a person, either Black or White. For each picture that appeared in the middle of the screen, the respondent had to sort it into the appropriate category by pressing the left-hand or the right-hand key.

- Task 2: The respondent had to complete a similar sorting task with a positive/negative attribute in the Population IAT, or with a High/Low academic performance in the Academic IAT. For example, the words "Positive" and "Negative" would appear in the top corners of the screen, and a series of pleasant or unpleasant works appeared in the middle of the screen, e.g.: "good, joy, love, peace, wonderful, pleasure, glorious, laughter, happy" and "bad, agony terrible, horrible, nasty, evil, awful, failure, hurt". For the Academic IAT, categories were defined in terms of grades, e.g. 99%, 85%, 78%, etc., for a total of 12 categories ranging from 50% to 99%. The respondent had to sort each word as being either positive or negative, or high/low performing, by hitting the left or right key.

- Task 3: The respondent had to perform a combined task that included both the categories and attributes from the first two tasks. Different combinations of race and qualities appeared in the top corners, for example "Black/Positive" may appear on the top left and "White/Negative" would appear in the top right. Respondents would then see a series of pictures in the middle of the screen and had to press the left or the right-hand key depending on which category the picture belonged to.

- Task 4: This was a repetition of Task 1, with the variation that the position of the two target words was reversed.

- Task 5: This was a repetition of Task 3, except that race and qualities were paired in the opposite way compared the that task.

A score is produced at the end of the procedure, which reflects the time taken to complete a task in relation to other tasks. If is race is differently associated with the attributes proposed (positive/negative, or high/low performing), then it is expected that the pairing that a respondent implicitly believes in is easier (takes less time), for him or her. The score takes on negative values when the participant is "prejudiced" against blacks, and positive ones when the "prejudice" is in favor of blacks and against whites.

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

(a) Population IAT



(b) Academic IAT

Figure 1: IAT scores, baseline and follow-up



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

(b) Academic IAT

Figure 2: Roommate of different vs same race



(a) Population IAT



(b) Academic IAT

Figure 3: Black vs. non-black roommate



(a) By roommate's race



(b) By other player's race



(c) By roommate's and other player's race

Figure 4: Share who cooperate in Prisoner Dilemma



(a) By roommate's race



(b) By other player's race



(c) By roommate's and other player's race

Figure 5: Trust game, Share of endowment sent by Player A



(a) By roommate's race



(b) By other player's race



(c) By roommate's and other player's race

Figure 6: Trust game, Share of endowment returned by Player B

Table 1A: Distribution of race groups

	Full sample			*Mixed rooms*			*Non mixed rooms*		
	Observed	*Perfect random*	*P-value*	*Observed*	*Perfect random*	*P-value*	*Observed*	*Perfect random*	*P-value*
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Share of race groups:									
Black	0.672	0.662	0.639	0.477	0.444	0.449	0.755	0.755	0.995
White	0.240	0.272	0.103	0.280	0.369	0.025	0.223	0.231	0.712
Coloured	0.036	0.035	0.906	0.121	0.100	0.456	0.000	0.008	0.000
Indian/Asian	0.043	0.034	0.320	0.091	0.097	0.799	0.023	0.006	0.056
No. Obs.	442			132			310		

Notes: In column (7), mean differences between treatment and control groups statistically different at 99 (***), 95 (**) and 90 (*) percent confidence level.

Table 1B: Incidence of mixed race room across race groups

	No. Obs.	*Share w/ MixRoom==1*
	(1)	(2)
Share of race groups:		
Black	314	0.217
White	109	0.349
Coloured	16	1.000
Indian/Asian	25	0.458

Table 2: Summary statistics at baseline and difference in means between treatment and control

	Full sample		*Mixed rooms*		*Non mixed rooms*		*Diff=0*	
	Mean	*Std. Dev*	*Mean*	*Std. Dev*	*Mean*	*Std. Dev*	*Diff*	*P-value*
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Panel A: Socio-demographic characteristics								
Female	0.665	0.472	0.655	0.477	0.670	0.471	0.015	0.76
UCT admission score	457.8	52.0	458.5	56.6	457.5	49.9	-0.972	0.85
Income < R 10,000	0.249	0.433	0.169	0.376	0.284	0.452	0.115	0.01
Income R 10,000-40,000	0.294	0.456	0.310	0.464	0.287	0.453	-0.023	0.62
Income R 40,000-75,000	0.191	0.394	0.204	0.405	0.185	0.389	-0.019	0.63
Income > R 75,000	0.124	0.330	0.183	0.388	0.099	0.299	-0.084	0.01
Income not reported	0.142	0.349	0.134	0.342	0.145	0.353	0.011	0.75
Panel B: Implicit Association Tests								
Population IAT	-0.226	0.496	-0.265	0.484	-0.209	0.502	0.057	0.258
Academic IAT	-0.214	0.492	-0.221	0.516	-0.210	0.482	0.011	0.823
Panel C: Attitudes and behaviors								
Trust: Most people can be trusted	0.153	0.361	0.200	0.401	0.133	0.340	-0.067	0.070
Race discrim.: never	0.837	0.370	0.844	0.364	0.834	0.373	-0.011	0.782
once	0.052	0.222	0.052	0.223	0.052	0.223	0.000	0.991
2-5 times	0.038	0.193	0.044	0.207	0.036	0.186	-0.009	0.665
5-10 times	0.009	0.095	0.007	0.086	0.010	0.099	0.002	0.809
> 10 times	0.005	0.067	0.000	0.000	0.007	0.081	0.007	0.348
Talk about race: never	0.143	0.350	0.156	0.364	0.137	0.344	-0.019	0.605
rarely	0.339	0.474	0.393	0.490	0.316	0.466	-0.077	0.118
sometimes	0.319	0.467	0.296	0.458	0.329	0.471	0.033	0.498
most of the time	0.129	0.336	0.089	0.286	0.147	0.354	0.058	0.096
always	0.070	0.256	0.067	0.250	0.072	0.258	0.005	0.850
Comfort in talking about race:								
extremely uncomfortable	0.079	0.271	0.096	0.296	0.072	0.259	-0.024	0.383
uncomfortable	0.118	0.323	0.119	0.324	0.118	0.323	-0.001	0.979
comfortable	0.585	0.493	0.630	0.485	0.565	0.497	-0.064	0.208
extremely comfortable	0.218	0.413	0.156	0.364	0.245	0.431	0.090	0.036
Preferred no. members of study group different race	2.798	0.994	2.928	0.891	2.743	1.031	-0.185	0.101
Preferred no. members of leisure group different race	2.646	1.084	2.707	1.030	2.619	1.107	-0.087	0.468
Number of observations	466		142		324		466	

Notes: In column (7), mean differences between treatment and control groups statistically different at 99 (***), 95 (**) and 90 (*) percent confidence level. Robust standard errors in parenthesis.

Table 3: Own baseline characteristics regressed on roommate characteristics

	Own characteristics:										Income			
	Population IAT	Academic IAT	UCT admission score	Trust (dummy)	Talks of racism (ordinal)	Comfort (ordinal)	Discriminated (dummy)	Hang out (dummy)	Study group	Leisure group	< R 10000	R 10000 - R 40000	R 40000 - R 75000	> R 75000
Roomate characteristics														
Population IAT	-0.078													
	(0.052)													
Academic IAT		-0.005												
		(0.050)												
UCT entry score			0.098											
			(0.073)											
Trust (dummy)				0.061										
				(0.057)										
Talks of racism (ordinal)					-0.052									
					(0.059)									
Comfort (ordinal)						-0.105**								
						(0.048)								
Discriminated							0.020							
							(0.060)							
Hang out (dummy)								0.013						
								(0.054)						
Study group									0.142**					
									(0.062)					
Leisure group										0.106*				
										(0.056)				
Income											0.205***			
< R 10000											(0.059)			
												0.148**		
R 10000 - R 40000												(0.058)		
													0.010	
R 40000 - R 75000													(0.057)	
														0.044
> R 75000														(0.065)
R2	0.044	0.027	0.097	0.051	0.055	0.035	0.038	0.048	0.030	0.031	0.112	0.043	0.007	0.039
No. Obs.	356	360	304	339	337	335	338	363	258	270	363	363	363	363

Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. Controls include residence dummies

Table 4: Prejudice and exposure to a roommate of different race

Dependent variable: Population IAT						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
MixRoom		-0.067	-0.107	-0.095		
		(0.055)	(0.069)	(0.070)		
Black*MixRoom					-0.123*	-0.190**
					(0.069)	(0.091)
White*MixRoom					0.091	0.099
					(0.105)	(0.124)
Indian/Other*MixRoom					-0.279*	-0.291
					(0.147)	(0.201)
IAT at baseline		0.021	0.008	0.003	0.017	-0.001
		(0.045)	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.045)	(0.051)
White	-0.269***	-0.255***	-0.233**	-0.200**	-0.333***	-0.302**
	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.092)	(0.099)	(0.090)	(0.119)
Coloured[(a)]	0.015	0.070	0.096	0.103	-0.012	-0.008
	(0.121)	(0.128)	(0.142)	(0.144)	(0.122)	(0.135)
Indian/Other	-0.409***	-0.373***	-0.303**	-0.310**	-0.231*	-0.189
	(0.095)	(0.097)	(0.131)	(0.131)	(0.121)	(0.159)
Female	0.034	0.038	0.013	0.013	0.042	0.009
	(0.053)	(0.052)	(0.061)	(0.062)	(0.053)	(0.062)
UCT admission score	0.013	0.012	0.013	0.015	0.011	0.009
	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.027)	(0.031)
Income R 10,000-40,000	0.165**	0.168**	0.098	0.116	0.168**	0.112
	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.078)	(0.075)	(0.068)	(0.076)
Income R 40,000-75,000	0.088	0.091	0.054	0.063	0.104	0.075
	(0.074)	(0.075)	(0.078)	(0.075)	(0.073)	(0.075)
Income > R 75,000	0.242***	0.250***	0.186*	0.185*	0.273***	0.217**
	(0.093)	(0.094)	(0.110)	(0.112)	(0.090)	(0.110)
Income not reported	0.087	0.088	0.028	0.050	0.097	0.062
	(0.082)	(0.082)	(0.090)	(0.087)	(0.081)	(0.087)
Foreign	-0.107	-0.092	-0.201*	-0.190*	-0.095	-0.177
	(0.105)	(0.104)	(0.119)	(0.114)	(0.102)	(0.113)
Roommate controls[(b)]				X		X
Constant	-0.293*	-0.303*	-0.185	-0.105	-0.307*	-0.109
	(0.163)	(0.165)	(0.151)	(0.134)	(0.165)	(0.141)
R-squared	0.117	0.121	0.111	0.123	0.130	0.135
No. Obs.	434	434	298	298	434	298

Notes: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01

All regressions include residence FE. Higher values of the dependent variable (IAT) indicate less prejudice against blacks

(a) In our sample all Coloureds are in mixed race rooms

(b) Controls included for roommate: UCT admission score and income dummies

Table 5: Differential effect by race pairs

Dependent variable: Population IAT	(1)	(2)	(3)
Black*Roommate is White	-0.105	-0.166	-0.127
	(0.080)	(0.114)	(0.116)
Black*Roommate is Coloured	-0.363***	-0.434***	-0.425***
	(0.119)	(0.149)	(0.159)
Black*Roommate is Indian	0.232	-0.009	0.042
	(0.170)	(0.126)	(0.136)
White	-0.327***	-0.326***	-0.278**
	(0.090)	(0.107)	(0.121)
White*Roommate is Black	0.159	0.091	0.066
	(0.124)	(0.131)	(0.134)
White*Roommate is Coloured	-0.360***	-0.282**	-0.292**
	(0.101)	(0.124)	(0.146)
White*Roommate is Indian	0.170	0.474***	0.451**
	(0.164)	(0.177)	(0.193)
Coloured[(a)]	0.368***	0.105	0.107
	(0.140)	(0.078)	(0.116)
Coloured*Roommate is Black	-0.537***	-0.356***	-0.349**
	(0.183)	(0.115)	(0.155)
Coloured*Roommate is White	-0.167	0.441***	0.472***
	(0.327)	(0.142)	(0.174)
Indian/Other	-0.284***	-0.222*	-0.204
	(0.106)	(0.127)	(0.138)
Indian*Roommate is Black	-0.080	-0.223	-0.254
	(0.182)	(0.244)	(0.243)
Indian*Roommate is White	-0.477***	-0.531**	-0.511**
	(0.141)	(0.223)	(0.224)
Indian*Roommate is Coloured	0.575***	0.441***	0.453**
	(0.126)	(0.147)	(0.178)
Roommate controls[(b)]			X
Constant	-0.301*	-0.158	-0.096
	(0.167)	(0.157)	(0.142)
R-squared	0.178	0.172	0.180
No. Obs.	434	298	298

Notes: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01

All regressions include residence FE and the controls listed in column 2 ot Table 4.

Higher values of the dependent variable (IAT) indicate less prejudice against blacks"

(a) In our sample all Coloureds are in mixed race rooms

(b) Controls included for roommate: UCT admission score and income dummies

Table 6: Social effects in prejudice

Dependent variable: Population IAT				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
IAT at baseline	0.010	-0.023	0.009	0.012
	(0.050)	(0.061)	(0.050)	(0.050)
Roommate's IAT at baseline	-0.049			-0.075
	(0.058)			(0.066)
Roommate less prejudiced		-0.062		
		(0.066)		
Black*Roommate's IAT			-0.093	
			(0.062)	
White*Roommate's IAT			0.085	
			(0.143)	
Coloured*Roommate's IAT			0.081	
			(0.137)	
Indian/Other*Roommate's IAT			-0.321	
			(0.247)	
MixRoom				-0.046
				(0.076)
MixRoom*Roommate's IAT				0.089
				(0.122)
White	-0.210**	-0.209**	-0.167	-0.207**
	(0.095)	(0.094)	(0.107)	(0.094)
Coloured[(a)]	-0.034	-0.038	0.000	0.018
	(0.137)	(0.136)	(0.122)	(0.146)
Indian/Other	-0.310***	-0.302**	-0.336***	-0.282**
	(0.118)	(0.118)	(0.125)	(0.123)
Constant	-0.132	-0.105	-0.148	-0.145
	(0.152)	(0.149)	(0.151)	(0.152)
R2	0.083	0.083	0.095	0.088
Number of observations	320	320	320	320

Notes: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01

All regressions include residence FE and the controls listed in column 2 ot Table 4.

Higher values of the dependent variable (IAT) indicate less prejudice against blacks"

(a) In our sample all Coloureds are in mixed race rooms

Table 7: Beliefs on academic performance and exposure to a roommate of different race

Dependent variable: Academic IAT					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
MixRoom	-0.066	-0.045	-0.049		
	(0.050)	(0.065)	(0.066)		
Black*MixRoom				-0.096	-0.117
				(0.062)	(0.091)
White*MixRoom				-0.023	0.015
				(0.091)	(0.119)
Indian/Other*MixRoom				0.026	0.217
				(0.186)	(0.218)
IAT at baseline	0.128***	0.165***	0.164***	0.128***	0.162***
	(0.046)	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.046)	(0.056)
UCT admission score	0.018	0.048	0.044	0.018	0.043
	(0.028)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.028)	(0.035)
Roommate's UCT admission score			0.037		0.044
			(0.032)		(0.033)
White	-0.138**	-0.147*	-0.181**	-0.162**	-0.230**
	(0.064)	(0.081)	(0.082)	(0.082)	(0.104)
Coloured[(a)]	0.140	0.118	0.119	0.067	0.058
	(0.151)	(0.215)	(0.210)	(0.147)	(0.200)
Indian/Other	0.069	-0.054	-0.043	-0.006	-0.241
	(0.099)	(0.133)	(0.133)	(0.158)	(0.176)
Roommate controls[(b)]			X		X
Constant	-0.527***	-0.273	-0.251	-0.529***	-0.248
	(0.197)	(0.201)	(0.218)	(0.197)	(0.226)
R-squared	0.064	0.083	0.091	0.065	0.098
No. Obs.	435	301	301	435	301

Notes: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01

All regressions include residence FE. Higher values of the dependent variable (IAT) indicate a belief of higher academic performance of blacks

(a) In our sample all Coloureds are in mixed race rooms

(b) Controls for roommate include income dummies

Table 8: Beliefs on academic performance and interaction among race pairs

Dependent variable: Academic IAT	(1)	(2)	(3)
Black*Roommate is White	-0.126*	-0.098	-0.168*
	(0.069)	(0.088)	(0.093)
Black*Roommate is Coloured	-0.042	0.010	0.035
	(0.136)	(0.209)	(0.215)
Black*Roommate is Indian	-0.089	-0.119	-0.179
	(0.107)	(0.272)	(0.277)
White	-0.163**	-0.154	-0.235**
	(0.083)	(0.099)	(0.105)
White*Roommate is Black	0.023	-0.001	0.052
	(0.107)	(0.131)	(0.135)
White*Roommate is Coloured	-0.153	-0.198	-0.096
	(0.148)	(0.166)	(0.174)
White*Roommate is Indian	-0.138	-0.147	-0.100
	(0.109)	(0.172)	(0.175)
Coloured[(a)]	0.494**	0.740***	0.678***
	(0.214)	(0.085)	(0.108)
Coloured*Roommate is Black	-0.692***	-0.969***	-0.912***
	(0.259)	(0.219)	(0.226)
Coloured*Roommate is White	(dropped)	-0.122	-0.074
		(0.311)	(0.300)
Coloured*Roommate is Indian/Other	0.110		
	(0.239)		
Indian/Other	0.033	-0.059	-0.081
	(0.146)	(0.209)	(0.206)
Indian*Roommate is Black	0.147	0.092	0.149
	(0.223)	(0.282)	(0.277)
Indian*Roommate is White	-0.217	-0.315	-0.315
	(0.188)	(0.253)	(0.240)
Indian*Roommate is Coloured	-0.067	-0.022	0.003
	(0.147)	(0.201)	(0.213)
Roommate controls[(b)]			X
Constant	-0.523***	-0.270	-0.248
	(0.199)	(0.208)	(0.226)
R-squared	0.094	0.118	0.131
No. Obs.	435	301	301

Notes: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01

All regressions include residence FE and the controls listed in column 2 ot Table 4.

Higher values of the dependent variable (IAT) indicatea belief of higher academic performance of blacks"

(a) In our sample all Coloureds are in mixed race rooms

(b) Controls included for roommate: UCT admission score and income dummies

Table 9: Impact on attitudinal measures

Dependent variable:	*Trust*		*Talks of racism*		*Comfort*		*Ever discriminated*	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Mixed Room	-0.305		0.272		0.194		0.145***	
	(0.251)		(0.223)		(0.249)		(0.054)	
Black*Mixed room		-0.255		0.678**		0.288		0.189***
		(0.310)		(0.288)		(0.289)		(0.066)
White*Mixed room		-0.141		-0.016		-0.179		0.105
		(0.403)		(0.323)		(0.468)		(0.097)
Indian/Asian/Other*Mixed room		-1.975		-2.041***		1.177		
		(1.295)		(0.785)		(1.404)		
White	0.647**	0.594*	-0.212	0.005	0.111	0.281		-0.088
	(0.261)	(0.307)	(0.230)	(0.271)	(0.271)	(0.311)		(0.204)
Coloured[(a)]	-0.135	-0.436	-0.406	-0.042	0.350	0.577	0.006	0.034
	(0.462)	(0.424)	(0.592)	(0.584)	(0.582)	(0.558)	(0.056)	(0.061)
Indian/Asian/Other	0.883	2.169*	-0.406	1.412*	0.070	-0.640		
	(0.542)	(1.193)	(0.445)	(0.729)	(0.594)	(1.336)		
Number of observations	415	415	411	411	400	400	399	399

Notes: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01

All regressions include residence FE and the controls listed in column 2 of Table 4.

Columns 1-6 report ordered logit estimates; columns 7-8 OLS estimates.

(a) In our sample all Coloureds are in mixed race rooms

Trust (ordinal): Generally speaking, would you say most people can be trusted or we must be very careful? 1 Need to be very careful 2 Depends 3 Most people can be trusted

Talks of racism (ordinal): In the last month, how often did you talk with any friends of yours about topics of discrimination and racial bias? 1 Always 2 Most of the times 3 Sometimes 4 Rarely 5 Never

Comfort (ordinal): How comfortale do you feel in talking to people about these issues? 1 Extremely Uncomfortable 2 Uncomfortable 3 Comfortable 4 Extremely Comfortable

Ever discriminated: Dummy=1 if in the past year respondent was threatened or harrassed in any way because of his/her race.

Table 10: Impact on friendships

	Hang out		*Actual Friends*						*Actual Study mates*						*Desidered group composition*			
	# Times hang out w/ person of a different race		*# friends of race different than own*		*# black friends*		*# white friends*		*# study mates of race different from own*		*# black study mates*		*# white study mates*		*# members of different race in a study group*		*# members of different race for leisure activities*	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)
Mixed Room	0.647***		0.426***		0.123		-0.007		0.375***		0.082		-0.058		0.395		0.461*	
	(0.218)		(0.130)		(0.139)		(0.112)		(0.138)		(0.149)		(0.117)		(0.251)		(0.268)	
Black*Mixed room		0.620**		0.271*		-0.057		0.162		0.207		-0.145		0.081		0.619*		0.478
		(0.269)		(0.160)		(0.198)		(0.109)		(0.175)		(0.218)		(0.115)		(0.351)		(0.402)
White*Mixed room		1.030**		0.778***		0.469***		-0.545*		0.724***		0.495***		-0.490*		0.050		0.481
		(0.469)		(0.211)		(0.164)		(0.278)		(0.219)		(0.175)		(0.275)		(0.365)		(0.309)
Indian/Other*Mixed room		-0.905				0.389		0.740*				0.359		0.637		0.379		0.137
		(1.226)				(0.370)		(0.405)				(0.373)		(0.394)		(0.817)		(1.152)
White	0.899***	0.793***	0.055	-0.103	-1.559***	-1.727***	1.879***	2.166***	-0.041	-0.225	-1.693***	-1.918***	1.794***	2.043***	-0.683***	-0.490	-0.229	-0.235
	(0.241)	(0.282)	(0.121)	(0.131)	(0.147)	(0.157)	(0.216)	(0.255)	(0.151)	(0.172)	(0.174)	(0.195)	(0.220)	(0.265)	(0.252)	(0.305)	(0.239)	(0.283)
Coloured[(a)]	1.658**	2.300***			-1.122***	-1.045***	0.003	0.051			-1.158***	-1.135***	0.070	0.063	1.300	1.757**	1.655*	2.120**
	(0.700)	(0.684)			(0.357)	(0.342)	(0.219)	(0.200)			(0.428)	(0.410)	(0.246)	(0.232)	(0.821)	(0.799)	(0.861)	(0.835)
Indian/Other	1.024**	2.221*			-1.588***	-1.841***	0.471*	-0.047			-1.739***	-2.006***	0.367	-0.097	0.394	0.449	1.006*	1.246
	(0.444)	(1.160)			(0.218)	(0.342)	(0.250)	(0.279)			(0.242)	(0.345)	(0.241)	(0.264)	(0.504)	(0.531)	(0.548)	(1.021)
R2	0.152	0.155	0.192	0.200	0.428	0.432	0.608	0.618	0.176	0.184	0.449	0.454	0.648	0.655				
No. Obs.	461	461	449	449	498	498	498	498	398	398	439	439	439	439	346	346	355	355

Notes: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01

All regressions include residence FE and the controls listed in column 2 of Table 4.

(a) In our sample all Coloureds are in mixed race rooms

Table 11: Summary statistics for games and difference in means by race of the roommate and of the other player

	All		*Mixed room*		*Non Mixed room*		*P-value*	*Partner different*		*Partner same*		*P-value*
	Mean	*Std. Dev*	*Mean*	*Std. Dev*	*Mean*	*Std. Dev*		*Mean*	*Std. Dev*	*Mean*	*Std. Dev*	
Prisoner's dilemma												
Cooperate	0.567	0.496	0.597	0.492	0.555	0.498	0.398	0.540	0.499	0.621	0.487	0.098
Believe that partner will cooperate	0.609	0.489	0.597	0.492	0.617	0.487	0.691	0.593	0.492	0.641	0.481	0.324
Switched partner	0.359	0.481	0.350	0.481	0.357	0.481	0.922	0.370	0.484	0.320	0.470	0.465
Partner chosen after switch is:												
same race as self	0.425	0.497	0.286	0.463	0.473	0.504	0.144	0.481	0.504	0.292	0.464	0.120
same race as roommate	0.388	0.490	0.238	0.436	0.473	0.504	0.064	0.426	0.499	0.333	0.482	0.447
white	0.363	0.484	0.429	0.507	0.345	0.480	0.508	0.370	0.487	0.375	0.495	0.969
black	0.400	0.493	0.333	0.483	0.436	0.501	0.421	0.444	0.502	0.292	0.464	0.208
coloured	0.238	0.428	0.238	0.436	0.218	0.417	0.855	0.185	0.392	0.333	0.482	0.156
Knows partner	0.079	0.271	0.086	0.282	0.078	0.268	0.760	0.078	0.268	0.085	0.280	0.784
Trust Game												
Amount sent by Sender	19.132	13.916	18.768	12.988	19.268	14.392	0.804	19.528	13.475	18.373	14.777	0.541
Sender sent positive amount	0.913	0.282	0.913	0.284	0.909	0.289	0.913	0.918	0.275	0.904	0.297	0.703
Belief on trustee behaviour	26.971	24.691	27.536	21.889	26.780	26.227	0.834	27.610	25.606	25.747	22.939	0.578
Average share of endowement sent	0.306	0.226	0.307	0.222	0.310	0.233	0.912	0.320	0.237	0.275	0.199	0.160
n=0	0.806	9.005	0.221	0.392	1.100	11.001	0.511	1.102	11.033	0.219	0.557	0.484
n=5	0.357	0.979	0.263	0.311	0.409	1.178	0.314	0.414	1.152	0.242	0.458	0.208
n=10	0.292	0.338	0.287	0.262	0.300	0.374	0.790	0.289	0.262	0.296	0.458	0.890
n=15	0.367	0.710	0.290	0.241	0.409	0.851	0.255	0.405	0.818	0.287	0.412	0.235
n=20	0.309	0.313	0.301	0.247	0.316	0.346	0.744	0.308	0.240	0.309	0.427	0.981
n=25	0.409	0.670	0.427	0.687	0.411	0.683	0.867	0.447	0.767	0.328	0.410	0.204
n=30	0.311	0.297	0.303	0.225	0.319	0.330	0.712	0.305	0.223	0.319	0.409	0.733
n=35	0.404	0.693	0.414	0.738	0.409	0.694	0.961	0.440	0.796	0.328	0.416	0.245
n=40	0.471	2.171	0.321	0.250	0.550	2.652	0.475	0.526	2.645	0.356	0.398	0.575
n=45	0.400	0.635	0.424	0.727	0.397	0.610	0.776	0.421	0.726	0.355	0.398	0.459
n=50	0.347	0.325	0.336	0.227	0.357	0.367	0.659	0.346	0.283	0.345	0.400	0.973
Switched partner	0.322	0.468	0.275	0.449	0.355	0.480	0.210	0.308	0.463	0.354	0.481	0.470
Partner chosen after switch is:												
same race as self	0.293	0.458	0.273	0.456	0.288	0.457	0.893	0.321	0.471	0.241	0.435	0.456
same race as roommate	0.280	0.452	0.273	0.456	0.288	0.457	0.893	0.321	0.471	0.207	0.412	0.278
white	0.415	0.496	0.318	0.477	0.441	0.501	0.324	0.358	0.484	0.517	0.509	0.167
black	0.268	0.446	0.318	0.477	0.254	0.439	0.571	0.302	0.463	0.207	0.412	0.359
coloured	0.305	0.463	0.318	0.477	0.305	0.464	0.911	0.340	0.478	0.241	0.435	0.362
Knows partner	0.088	0.284	0.065	0.248	0.100	0.300	0.236	0.079	0.270	0.101	0.302	0.426

note: *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10

Notes: in column (7), mean differences between treatment and control groups statistically different at 99(***), 95(**) and 90(*) percent confidence level.

Table 12: Prisoner's dilemma

Dependent variable:	*Cooperate*					*Belief partner will cooperate*					*Switched partner*				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)
MixRoom	0.042			0.042		0			-0.002		0.043			0.011	
	(0.059)			(0.059)		(0.056)			(0.056)		(0.091)			(0.090)	
Black*MixRoom		0.041			0.058		0.1			0.089		0.03			-0.014
		(0.074)			(0.074)		(0.068)			(0.070)		(0.114)			(0.116)
White*MixRoom		0.155			0.17		-0.089			-0.098		0.066			0.079
		(0.104)			(0.106)		(0.102)			(0.104)		(0.158)			(0.165)
Indian/Other*MixRoom		-0.472			-0.402		-0.574			-0.634		0.093			0.024
		(0.178)***			(0.195)**		(0.175)***			(0.183)***		(0.376)			(0.376)
MixPlayer			-0.06	-0.057				-0.048	-0.058				0.058	-0.034	
			(0.052)	(0.069)				(0.051)	(0.066)				(0.073)	(0.096)	
Player&Roommate same race				0.003					0.001					-0.106	
				(0.068)					(0.065)					(0.095)	
Black*MixPlayer					0.048					-0.087					0.019
					(0.087)					(0.080)					(0.134)
Black*Player&Roommate same					0.155					0.002					-0.098
					(0.086)*					(0.082)					(0.134)
White*MixPlayer					-0.095					0.126					-0.205
					(0.133)					(0.129)					(0.194)
White*Player&Roommate same					-0.057					0.073					-0.176
					(0.134)					(0.127)					(0.179)
Coloured*MixPlayer					0.331					-0.077					-0.001
					(0.183)*					(0.323)					(0.519)
Coloured*Player&Roommate same					-1.023					-0.195					-0.48
					(0.072)***					(0.403)					(0.423)
Indian/Other*Player&Roommate same					-0.227					0.201					0.191
					(0.216)					(0.242)					(0.351)
White	0.01	-0.034	-0.003	0.01	0.128	-0.015	0.046	-0.019	-0.016	-0.121	-0.166	-0.178	-0.107	-0.148	-0.015
	(0.066)	(0.079)	(0.064)	(0.066)	(0.165)	(0.063)	(0.075)	(0.062)	(0.064)	(0.155)	(0.107)	(0.117)	(0.107)	(0.110)	(0.239)
Coloured[(a)]	0.009	0.048	-0.024	0.001	0.188	-0.159	-0.135	-0.221	-0.166	-0.114	-0.055	-0.014	0.002	-0.021	0.101
	(0.146)	(0.139)	(0.134)	(0.147)	(0.200)	(0.150)	(0.145)	(0.138)	(0.150)	(0.206)	(0.214)	(0.200)	(0.196)	(0.209)	(0.343)
Indian/Other	-0.112	0.264	-0.067	-0.089	0.35	-0.15	0.295	-0.125	-0.126	0.237	0.025	-0.021	0.065	0.069	-0.065
	(0.112)	(0.151)*	(0.104)	(0.115)	(0.171)**	(0.113)	(0.147)**	(0.109)	(0.116)	(0.164)	(0.173)	(0.353)	(0.166)	(0.177)	(0.359)
Observations	433	433	448	430	430	433	433	448	430	430	200	200	207	198	198
R-squared	0.08	0.09	0.08	0.08	0.12	0.05	0.08	0.05	0.06	0.08	0.11	0.11	0.08	0.12	0.13

Robust standard errors in parentheses

All regressions include residence FE and the controls listed in Table 3

(a) In our sample all Coloureds are in mixed race rooms

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Table 13: Trust game

Dependent variable:	*Amount sent by sender*					*Sender sent positive amount*					*Belief on amount player B will return*					*Avg share of endowment returned by player B*				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)
MixRoom	-1.297			-1.203		0.006			0.012		0.621			0.378		-0.022			-0.019	
	(2.169)			(2.266)		(0.052)			(0.050)		(3.806)			(4.015)		(0.037)			(0.038)	
Black*MixRoom		0.83			1.245		0.01			0.037		2.436			2.823		0.022			0.025
		(2.713)			(2.762)		(0.072)			(0.059)		(3.902)			(3.884)		(0.053)			(0.054)
White*MixRoom		-6.049			-4.107		0.004			-0.019		-4			-2.165		-0.094			-0.076
		(4.115)			(4.253)		(0.069)			(0.073)		(9.010)			(8.962)		(0.050)*			(0.051)
Indian/Other*MixRoom		1.06			1.149		-0.02			-0.057		5.111			6.059		-0.13			-0.125
		(5.416)			(6.015)		(0.075)			(0.093)		(10.106)			(11.132)		(0.060)**			(0.057)**
MixPlayer			-2.054	-2.575				0.023	0.094				-3.622	-4.085				-0.084	-0.046	
			(2.205)	(2.625)				(0.052)	(0.067)				(4.433)	(4.979)				(0.032)***	(0.043)	
Player&Roommate same race				-2.089					0.107					-2.632					0.052	
				(2.418)					(0.057)*					(4.260)					(0.045)	
Black*MixPlayer					1.743					0.124					1.281					0.008
					(3.202)					(0.093)					(5.172)					(0.062)
Black*Player&Roommate same					2.15					0.148					3.901					0.097
					(3.392)					(0.085)*					(5.453)					(0.066)
White*MixPlayer					-8.052					0.075					-10.623					-0.042
					(4.740)*					(0.071)					(12.278)					(0.042)
White*Player&Roommate same					-6.886					0.003					-10.92					0.055
					(4.623)					(0.081)					(9.577)					(0.052)
Coloured*MixPlayer					5.056					0.975					3.065					
					(4.916)					(0.069)***					(6.751)					
Coloured*Player&Roommate same					-21.674					-0.939					-22.589					-0.412
					(4.352)***					(0.097)***					(7.165)***					(0.148)***
Indian/Other*Player&Roommate same					-1.826					0.119					-5.493					-0.007
					(8.057)					(0.103)					(11.170)					(0.074)
White	7.781	10.149	7.348	7.913	19.274	0.071	0.073	0.067	0.046	0.145	19.188	21.438	18.937	19.795	34.314	-0.006	0.037	-0.005	-0.001	0.079
	(2.586)***	(3.063)***	(2.622)***	(2.675)***	(5.848)***	(0.047)	(0.052)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.109)	(5.489)***	(7.055)***	(5.403)***	(5.702)***	(13.786)**	(0.046)	(0.060)	(0.041)	(0.046)	(0.096)
Coloured[(a)]	-4.388	-5.198	-2.526	-3.59	10.783	-0.082	-0.076	-0.041	-0.131	0.219	-8.155	-7.1	-4.344	-6.828	10.837	0.21	0.202	0.174	0.211	0.378
	(4.622)	(4.510)	(4.441)	(4.416)	(4.234)**	(0.185)	(0.181)	(0.158)	(0.180)	(0.103)**	(5.856)	(5.338)	(5.165)	(5.799)	(7.993)	(0.121)*	(0.117)*	(0.11)	(0.117)*	(0.152)**
Indian/Other	6.184	4.967	5.86	6.888	6.946	0.049	0.07	0.036	0.018	0.198	5.359	2.435	6.362	6.787	4.642	0.031	0.114	0.056	0.054	0.158
	(3.472)*	(4.154)	(3.477)*	(3.547)*	(4.990)	(0.071)	(0.040)*	(0.068)	(0.069)	(0.094)**	(5.781)	(8.528)	(5.646)	(5.959)	(10.007)	(0.058)	(0.064)*	(0.052)	(0.064)	(0.086)*
Observations	218	218	222	213	213	218	218	222	213	213	218	218	222	213	213	213	213	222	213	213
R-squared	0.16	0.16	0.14	0.16	0.18	0.12	0.12	0.08	0.13	0.17	0.21	0.21	0.2	0.21	0.22	0.2	0.21	0.22	0.23	0.27

Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

All regressions include residence FE and the controls listed in Table 3

(a) In our sample all Coloureds are in mixed race rooms

Table 14: Trust game, decision to switch partner

Dependent variable:	*Switched partner*					*Partner after switch same race as self*					*Partner after switch same race as roommate*				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)
MixRoom	-0.035			-0.038		-0.019			-0.018		-0.077			-0.062	
	(0.074)			(0.075)		(0.165)			(0.166)		(0.168)			(0.177)	
Black*MixRoom		-0.115			-0.127		0			0.095		-0.075			-0.068
		(0.096)			(0.097)		(0.180)			(0.169)		(0.198)			(0.208)
White*MixRoom		0.06			0.07		-0.043			0.17		-0.161			-0.031
		(0.130)			(0.130)		(0.340)			(0.289)		(0.323)			(0.305)
Indian/Other*MixRoom		0.266			0.37		-0.129			-0.137		0.355			0.293
		(0.271)			(0.283)		(0.240)			(0.276)		(0.359)			(0.382)
MixPlayer			0.002	-0.005				0.013	0.043				-0.002	0.142	
			(0.073)	(0.092)				(0.135)	(0.191)				(0.133)	(0.190)	
Player&Roommate same race				0.048					0.04					0.207	
				(0.090)					(0.203)					(0.182)	
Black*MixPlayer					-0.02					0.362					0.025
					(0.121)					(0.201)*					(0.276)
Black*Player&Roommate same					-0.019					0.245					-0.015
					(0.118)					(0.225)					(0.289)
White*MixPlayer					-0.124					-0.814					0.007
					(0.181)					(0.278)***					(0.310)
White*Player&Roommate same					0.185					-0.014					0.649
					(0.181)					(0.245)					(0.310)**
Coloured*MixPlayer					0.57					1.383					0.306
					(0.294)*					(0.250)***					(0.294)
Coloured*Player&Roommate same					0.33										
					(0.310)										
Indian/Other*Player&Roommate same					-0.547										
					(0.239)**										
White	-0.091	-0.155	-0.065	-0.084	-0.157	0.116	0.131	0.102	0.114	0.838	0.098	0.152	0.043	0.074	-0.226
	(0.084)	(0.099)	(0.083)	(0.085)	(0.224)	(0.175)	(0.252)	(0.153)	(0.187)	(0.358)**	(0.179)	(0.266)	(0.162)	(0.178)	(0.434)
Coloured[(a)]	-0.032	-0.087	-0.09	-0.029	-0.38	0.211	0.193	0.191	0.182	-0.225	-0.207	-0.277	-0.268	-0.337	-0.471
	(0.176)	(0.172)	(0.151)	(0.177)	(0.154)**	(0.510)	(0.510)	(0.494)	(0.531)	(0.302)	(0.228)	(0.171)	(0.169)	(0.240)	(0.391)
Indian/Other	-0.036	-0.247	-0.035	-0.028	-0.258	-0.279	-0.189	-0.295	-0.283	0.09	0.135	-0.199	0.081	0.12	-0.191
	(0.152)	(0.224)	(0.148)	(0.156)	(0.248)	(0.159)*	-0.223	(0.125)**	(0.166)*	-0.238	(0.290)	(0.228)	(0.268)	(0.292)	(0.335)
Observations	233	233	240	231	231	75	75	76	75	75	75	75	76	75	75
R-squared	0.08	0.09	0.07	0.08	0.12	0.2	0.2	0.23	0.2	0.39	0.11	0.12	0.1	0.13	0.19

Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

All regressions include residence FE and the controls listed in Table 3

(a) In our sample all Coloureds are in mixed race rooms

Table A1: Sample Size and Attrition

	All		*Mixed Room*		*Non Mixed Room*		*p-value*
	Obs.	*%*	*Obs.*	*%*	*Obs.*	*%*	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Interviewed at baseline	643		208		435		
Interviewed at follow-up	526	0.82	162	0.78	364	0.84	0.15

Table A2. Correlates of attrition

Dep. Var= 1 if respondent participated in follow-up survey

	coef	*se*	*coef*	*se*	*coef*	*se*
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Mixed room	-0.029	0.039				
Population IAT			0.002	0.033		
Academic IAT					0.043	0.031
Coloured	-0.195**	0.100	-0.201**	0.097	-0.204**	0.095
White	-0.130***	0.045	-0.136***	0.046	-0.128***	0.046
Indian/Asian	0.103*	0.053	0.091*	0.051	0.093*	0.051
Other	0.085	0.062	0.071	0.062	0.085	0.062
Female	0.010	0.035	0.015	0.036	0.021	0.035
UCT admission score	0.010	0.017	0.010	0.017	0.014	0.017
Income R 10,000-40,000	0.005	0.042	0.009	0.043	0.000	0.042
Income R 40,000-75,000	0.022	0.049	0.027	0.049	0.016	0.049
Income > R 75,000	-0.032	0.060	-0.028	0.061	-0.040	0.061
Income not reported	-0.001	0.059	0.013	0.059	0.004	0.058
Foreign	0.124***	0.045	0.120***	0.043	0.125***	0.043
Constant	0.857***	0.040	0.841***	0.041	0.853***	0.041
Number of observations	562		550		556	

Notes: Linear probability model. T-statistics in parenthesis, *** Significantly different from zero at 99% confidence level, ** significantly different from zero at 95% confidence level, * significantly different from zero at 90% confidence level. Controls include residence fixed effects.

Table A3: Impact on friendship

	# of friends		*At least 1 friend of different race*		*At least 1 black friend*		*At least 1 white friend*		*At least 1 study mate of different race*		*At least 1 black study mate*		*At least 1 white study mate*	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)
Mixed Room	0.128		0.183***		0.146***		0.084**		0.157***		0.094**		0.067*	
	(0.187)		(0.058)		(0.040)		(0.041)		(0.053)		(0.042)		(0.041)	
Black*Mixed room		0.043		0.105		0.007		0.093		0.103*		-0.032		0.084
		(0.236)		(0.071)		(0.029)		(0.063)		(0.062)		(0.045)		(0.056)
White*Mixed room		0.232		0.332***		0.414***		0.024		0.279***		0.363***		-0.021
		(0.332)		(0.098)		(0.094)		(0.030)		(0.093)		(0.091)		(0.050)
Indian/Other*Mixed room		0.475				0.119		0.296*				0.166		0.310**
		(0.750)				(0.150)		(0.163)				(0.158)		(0.153)
White	0.281	0.214	0.037	-0.044	-0.567***	-0.712***	0.454***	0.484***	0.080	0.025	-0.513***	-0.641***	0.485***	0.522***
	(0.225)	(0.278)	(0.067)	(0.081)	(0.060)	(0.066)	(0.053)	(0.057)	(0.053)	(0.064)	(0.056)	(0.061)	(0.051)	(0.057)
Coloured[(a)]	0.002	0.107			-0.594***	-0.486***	-0.008	0.082			-0.488***	-0.427***	0.020	0.093
	(0.506)	(0.487)			(0.159)	(0.155)	(0.138)	(0.134)			(0.126)	(0.121)	(0.114)	(0.110)
Indian/Other	0.052	-0.228			-0.721***	-0.740***	0.041	-0.105			-0.610***	-0.700***	0.123	-0.060
	(0.351)	(0.683)			(0.094)	(0.119)	(0.095)	(0.118)			(0.087)	(0.136)	(0.089)	(0.113)
R-squared	0.135	0.136	0.214	0.222	0.557	0.589	0.601	0.604	0.187	0.192	0.400	0.426	0.516	0.521
Number of observations	439	439	360	360	396	396	396	396	449	449	498	498	498	498

Notes: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01

All regressions include residence FE and the controls listed in column 2 of Table 4.

(a) In our sample all Coloureds are in mixed race rooms