Misallocation, Property Rights, and Access to Finance: Evidence from Within and Across African Countries

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- Is capital efficiently allocated across firms within African countries?
 - * If not, what is the extent of this misallocation and underlying reasons?
- ② Does the degree of capital misallocation vary across African countries?
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- Recent studies argue that misallocation of resources across firms is one of the most important causes of underdevelopment (Restuccia and Rogerson (2008)).
- Some studies measure the return to capital (for a given country):
 - * Banerjee and Duflo (2005), Udry and Anagol (2006), Kremer et al (2009)
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Our contribution

- Ours is the first systematic study that measures the extent of misallocation in Africa and explore its determinants using comparable firm-level data from many countries.
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- Important WB initiative between 1999 and 2007 to survey establishments from 80 developed and developing countries, mostly with face-to-face interviews
- 21 African countries from 2 roll-outs in 2006 (13 countries) and 2007 (8 extra countries); single cross section for 12,752 establishments
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- Direct observations on the interest rates firms pay
- Questions on firms' own perceptions of obstacles such as financing constraints, infrastructure, corruption...
 - In most of the literature financing constrains indirectly inferred from the balance-sheet data
- Main disadvantage of the data is that it is a stratified sample and not representative of the aggregate economy.
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Three measures of misallocation

- **Measure 1:** Cost of capital: interest rate and collateral requirement
 - * Does your establishment currently have a line of credit or loan from a financial institution? If so what is the average annual interest rate?
 - * Did your financial institution require collateral? If yes, what type of assets were required?

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Measures of misallocation

 Measure 2: MPK based on Cobb-Douglas production function (value added divided by replacement cost of capital)

$$MPK1_i = \alpha \frac{Y_i}{K_i}, \alpha = 1/3$$

 Measure 3: Index of misallocation from Hsieh and Klenow (2009) (Total cost of labor divided by total capital income)

$$HK_i = \frac{\alpha}{1 - \alpha} \frac{(wL)_i}{RK_i}$$

Their index is 1+HK

 Productivity-Size correlation: Cannot perform Olley-Pakes or Levinssohn-Petrin since we have a single cross-section

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
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
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
Collateral Requirements




Nominal Interest Rates




Distribution of Nominal Interest Rates




Distribution of Real Interest Rates



Germany




South Africa




Descriptive Statistics

	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Median
Nominal R	1667	15.030	5.843	0	40	14
Real R	1667	6.425	6.915	-23.219	32.867	6.745
Y/L	4642	19883.81	449611.1	130.555	30300000	4285.714
repK/L	4642	36833.23	1306243	35.77818	88900000	4285.714
MPK	4642	0.738	1.015	0.014	13.318	0.385
RrepK/Y	4642	0.245	0.341	0.003	3.448	0.129
wL/Y	4642	0.398	0.228	0	3.75	0.377
HK-index	4645	4.033	6.567	0.042	125	1.884

Distribution of MPKs



Distribution of HK-index



- Corruption
- Protection of Investor rights
- Shareholder rights
- Legal rights
- Ease of doing business


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
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Corruption and Misallocation



Doing Business and Misallocation



Misallocation Within Countries: Correlates from Obstacles

Regress firm-level measures of misallocation (HK, MPK, R-spread) on firm-level obstacles:

Do you think the following present any obstacle to the current operations of your establishment?

- Telecommunications, Electricity
- Transportation
- Access to land
- Tax rates, Tax administration
- Customs and Trade Regulations
- Functioning of the courts
- Labor Regulations
- Inadequately educated workforce
- Business licensing and Permits
- Access to finance (availability and cost)
- Political instability, Macroeconomic instability
- Corruption, Crime, Theft and disorder
- Practices of competitors in the informal sector

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
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
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
Main Obstacles




Severity of Obstacles



South Africa




Nigeria



Firm-Level Determinants of Misallocation (log HK-index)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
ccess to Finance	0.089***	0.083***	0.111***	0.082***	0.048**	0.075***	0.039**
ccess to Finance	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.020)	(0.012)	(0.017)
ectricity	(0.011)	0.021*	0.050***	0.039***	-0.021	0.037	-0.019
ectricity		(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.019)	(0.030)	(0.018)
ther Obstacles		(0.013)	-0.258***	-0.213***	-0.097**	-0.196***	-0.088**
thei Obstacles			(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.041)	(0.048)	(0.041)
ge			(0.029)	-0.006***	-0.002	-0.006***	-0.002
Sc.				(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)
mall				0.186***	0.117*	0.083	0.001
iiaii				(0.041)	(0.060)	(0.080)	(0.052)
overnment				-0.010***	-0.008***	-0.009***	-0.006**
Sveriiiieii				(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.000)	(0.002)
oreign				-0.003***	-0.001***	-0.002***	-0.001**
ar cigir				(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
port				0.112	0.231***	0.064	0.165**
.porc				(0.112)	(0.077)	(0.141)	(0.074)
sted				0.215	0.188	0.279	0.254
secu				(0.174)	(0.202)	(0.288)	(0.199)
onstant	0.363***	0.305***	0.638***	0.678***	0.819***	0.541***	0.635***
Silbeane	(0.039)	(0.052)	(0.064)	(0.071)	(0.084)	(0.063)	(0.075)
ountry Dummies	no	no	no	no	yes	no	ves
dustry Dummies	no	no	no	no	no	yes	yes
						, , ,	
2	0.0127	0.0133	0.0291	0.0527	0 1837	0.0857	0.2144
bs.	4636	4636	4636	4519	4519	4519	4519
2	0.0127	0.0133	0.0291	0.0527	0.1837	0.0857	

MPK and Country Effects



- We provide preliminary evidence from 21 African countries and 4500 firms on the extent of capital misallocation
 - \star Many firms borrow at rates as high as 40% (nominal and real), where mean is 15%
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Next to do:

- Go to Africa!
- Time-series data: ORBIS
- Try to understand/differentiate between property rights and access to finance and see what are the country level dummies capturing?
- Work on the comments we will be getting now.