Marrying Up: the Role of Sex Ratio in Assortative Matching*

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Abstract

We investigate the effect of a change in sex ratio on assortative matching in the marriage market using a large negative exogenous shock to the French male population due to WWI casualties. We analyze a unique marriage-level dataset, which is linked to both French censuses of population and to data on military mortality. We take advantage of exogenous geographic variation in military mortality and instrument the potentially endogenous sex ratio with military mortality. We find that men married women of higher social class than themselves (married up) more in regions that experienced a larger decrease in the sex ratio due to higher military mortality. A decrease of sex ratio from one man for every woman to 0.90 men for every woman increased the probability that men marry up by 8.2 percentage points. These findings shed light on individuals' preferences for spouses: rather than preferring to marry spouses with similar characteristics, individuals seem to prefer to marry higher-class spouses, but cannot do so when the sex ratio is balanced.

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I. Introduction

Positive assortative matching in the marriage market by spouse's characteristics such as income, education, occupation, age, religion, and ethnicity is a well-known and widespread phenomenon (e.g., Hout 1982, Mare 1991, Kalmijn 1998, Blossfeld and Timm 2003).[1] Moreover, the tendency of individuals to marry others of similar traits has important implications for social inequality, income redistribution, fertility, education, and labor supply (e.g., Fernandez and Rogerson 2001). However, there is little understanding about what generates this assortative matching. One possibility is that individuals have horizontal preferences. That is, they may choose spouses sharing similar characteristics simply because they derive more utility from marrying people like themselves.[2] Alternatively, individuals may have vertical preferences, meaning they prefer to marry "up," i.e. to marry someone exhibiting better characteristics (such as higher income or higher education) but cannot, simply because they do not receive marriage proposals from such people.[3] Finally, individuals may have the opportunity to meet only people who share their characteristics. Using unique data on a negative exogenous shock to the male population, we investigate which of these preferences and constraints are responsible for assortative matching, or marriage by "class."

Identifying which of the above mechanisms underlies the equilibrium matching outcomes in the marriage market is challenging: they all generate observationally equivalent outcomes, i.e. assortative matching whereby people marry by "class." Our identification strategy relies on the fact that under different preferences an exogenous change in the sex ratio has a different impact on equilibrium marriage outcomes. Specifically, if individuals get married by class because they intrinsically prefer a spouse with similar characteristics, or because they only meet potential partners with the same background, an exogenous decrease in the proportion of men in the population would have a limited effect on the assortative matching: men would continue to marry women of the same class. If instead individuals prefer spouses of higher class than themselves, the same decrease in the proportion of men would improve the position of men in the marriage market and enable them to marry women from higher classes who were previously inaccessible.

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[1] See Pencavel (1998) and Rose (2001) for trends in assortative matching in the U.S.

[2] Aristotle noted that people "love those who are like themselves" (Aristotle 1934, p. 1371). Sociologists believe that "the homophily principle structures network ties of every type, including marriage, friendship, work, advice, support, information transfer, exchange, comembership, and other types of relationship" (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and James M Cook 2001).

[3] See, for example, Burdett and Coles 1997.

We exploit the regrettable fact that World War I (WWI), one of the deadliest conflicts in recent human history, produced an exogenous and unusually large shock in the French male population. By the end of the war, approximately 16.5% of French soldiers, including men from all ranks and social backgrounds, had been reported dead or missing (Huber, 1931). As a result, the ratio of men aged 18 to 59 to women aged 15 to 49 decreased from 1,087 men per 1,000 women in 1911 to 992 men per 1,000 women in 1921. Military mortality varied substantially across regions ranging from 5% to 23% of men aged 18 to 59 (see Figure 1.1), largely because of different regiment call-ups; some regions with high mortality rates had their sex ratios pushed as low as 864 men per 1,000 women. The change in sex ratio was associated with increases in female celibacy and in male marriage rates. We analyze the impact of this massive decrease in the male population on marriage by class in France using a unique marriage-level dataset, which is linked to both French censuses of population and to data on military mortality.

Classes are assigned to individuals using marriage certificate data that provide information on the occupations of brides and grooms as well as the place and date of their marriage. Based on their occupations, we allocate individuals into 7 ordered social classes (class 1 being the highest) using the Historical International Social Class Scheme (HISCLASS) developed by van Leeuwen and Maas (2005a). There is considerable assortative matching by social class before WWI: 43% of men married women of the same social class, and the distance between the social classes of spouses is 1 or less for 68% of the couples. Based on the locations of the marriages, we merge the marriage-level dataset with the French censuses of 1911, 1921 and 1926, which contain region-level information that allows us to construct the sex ratio for all the French départements (regional unit), as well as other département-level control variables.[4] We also use military mortality data from the French ministry of defense to compute, for each département, the military mortality rate corresponding to the number of dead soldiers as the percentage of the pre-war male population.[5]

We use two methods to analyze the effect of the change in sex ratio. First, we compare the distribution of brides' classes for each class of grooms before and after the war. Second, we exploit the exogenous regional variation in sex ratios due to war mortality to investigate more directly the relationship between sex ratio and marriage outcomes. We use four alternative dependent variables to capture whether and to what degree men married women of higher classes. As alternative independent variables of interest we use département-specific sex ratios and mortality rates. We also use mortality

[4] Departments are administrative units similar to counties. In 1870-1914, France had 87 départements. After WWI, the number increased to 90 as territories from Alsace-Lorraine lost in the 1870s were recovered.

[5] Three départements of these 90 were acquired by France at the close of WWI; for these we only have département-level data from the census from the post-war period. We also do not have reliable military mortality data for them.

rates as an instrument for sex ratio, which may be endogenous because of the possible selection of internal migrants.

We include region fixed effects and linear time trends to control for permanent and time-changing differences across French départements. The analysis also controls for other marriage-level characteristics that might affect assortative matching such as the groom's class, the spouses' ages, and whether the marriage took place in a rural locality. We also control for the pre and post war distribution of brides with various occupations to account for possible changes in the labor force due to the war, as well as for the possibility that foreign men (mainly Italians) migrated to France after the war to marry local brides.

Overall, we find that the decrease in sex ratio caused by war-related mortality allowed men to marry higher class women. Specifically, a decrease in the (instrumented) sex ratio from one man for every woman to 0.90 men for every woman corresponds to (a) an increase in the average class of bride for a given class of groom of 0.27. For instance, if class 4 men married, on average, class 4 women when the sex ratio was even, they would marry on average class 3.73 women under a 0.90-to-1 sex ratio; (b) an increase in the probability that men would marry women of (weakly) higher class than themselves of 8.2 percentage points; and (c) a decrease in the probability that a given groom would marry a low class bride, meaning a bride of one of the three lowest classes according to HISCLASS classification, of 18.5 percentage points. As a robustness check, we test whether the effect of sex ratio on assortative matching is different in rural locations, where search frictions, meeting technology and preferences might be different compared with urban locations. We find a similar effect of sex ratio in rural and urban localities.

We view these findings as evidence that individuals prefer higher-class partners. This favors the hypothesis that assortative matching occurs because in equilibrium individuals cannot marry higher-class people, although they may wish to do so. In addition, we find heterogeneity in the effect of the sex ratio by groom's class, with men of the lowest classes, namely low-skilled and unskilled farm workers, benefiting the least from the sex ratio imbalance. A possible explanation is that while high and middle-class women were willing to marry men from lower social classes, they were not willing to propose to men with a very low social class.

While the main focus of this paper is assortative matching by social class, we also look at the effect of a change in sex ratio on assortative matching according to another variable that has been put forward by the literature: age. Specifically, we ask: does the decrease in sex ratio due war mortality change the spousal age gap? We employ the same empirical strategies described above, and find a

higher decrease in the age gap between brides and grooms in départements with higher mortality. These results are consistent with men preferring women who are closer to their own age.

This paper is related to the empirical literature that studies preferences for spouses or dates.[6] A first recent strand of this literature is based on speed dating experiments (Fisman et al. 2006, Belot and Francesconi 2006) and online dating (Ariely, Hitsch and Hortacsu 2006, Lee 2007). A major issue analyzed by this strand of the literature is whether assortative matching results from preferences for partners sharing similar traits or from the lack of opportunities to meet people from other backgrounds.[7] In our paper, we take into consideration an additional form of constraint in marriage decisions: individuals meet and prefer higher-class potential partners but do not receive proposals from them. Our analysis supports this third hypothesis in post-WWI France. A second strand of this literature (e.g., Wong 2003, Bisin et al. 2004) estimates structural marital preferences in surveys. While we do not provide direct estimates of marital preferences' parameters, our results suggest that individuals' utility functions are increasing in their spouse's social class.

This paper is also related to the empirical literature on the relationship between the sex ratio and the marriage market (e.g., Cox 1940, Easterlin 1961, Guttentag and Secord, 1983). A potential problem of these studies, mitigated to a large extent in Angrist (2002), Charles and Luoh (2005), and Lafortune (2008) is that there may be reverse causality between sex ratios and marriage market outcomes. The exogenous geographic variation of sex ratio due to the war mortality allows us to overcome this problem.

This paper sheds light on possible adjustments in the marriage market induced by a change in the relative scarcity of men or women. While Rao (1993), Grossbard-Shechtman (1993), Botticini (1999, 2003) and Edlund (2000) suggest that one adjustment in the marriage market is through dowries, we propose marrying above one's own class as another possible and potentially complementary adjustment when the scarcity of men increases. By showing that men married up, this paper supports the idea that marriage may be a potentially important mean of social mobility,[8] complementing the existing literature on inter-generational occupational mobility (e.g. Miles 1993, Mitch 1993, Long 2005, Long and Ferrie 2007, and Long 2008). The social ascension of men in post-WWI France we document also enhances our understanding of the economic and social history of France after the Great War. Imbalance in sex ratio is, however, far from being limited to the past. Our

[6] For a review of the economics of marriages, see Weiss (1997).

[7] An exception is Fisman et al. (2006) who focus on each gender's valuation of attributes (e,g, intelligence, physical attractiveness) and selectivity as a function of the number of potential partners.

[8] See also Glenn et al. 1974, van Leeuwen and Ineke Maas 1997, Pélissier et al. 2005.

paper suggests that we may observe social ascension of women in countries like China and India where there are disproportionably more men than women in the marriage market.

Finally, testing the effect of the change in sex ratio on assortative matching sheds light on people's preferences for interacting with others similar to themselves and may thus provide insights on the effectiveness of social integration programs based on mixing people from different backgrounds (e.g., Boisjoly et al. 2006, Sanbonmatsu et al. 2006).

This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the historical context surrounding WWI in France. In Section 3 we present the theoretical framework that motivates our empirical analysis of marriage by social class. The data are described in Section 4. In Sections 5 and 6 we present the empirical strategy and main results. Section 7 describes the results of assortative matching by age.

2. Historical Context

WWI, or the Great War, was a global and deadly military conflict that lasted from 1914 until 1918. In this section, we present a brief description of the war-related mortality and its implications for marriage and celibacy rates in France.

2.1 Mobilization and mortality during WWI in France: a global phenomenon

Throughout the war, France undertook a universal mobilization. Over the war period, about 8 million Frenchmen born between 1867 and 1899 were drafted or voluntarily enrolled in the army (Huber, 1931).[9] To highlight the scope of this mobilization, note that 8.8 million men aged 18 to 51 were registered in the 1911 census, and that the overall French population in 1911 was approximately 33.2 million.[10] Younger cohorts were more heavily drafted than older cohorts: more than 90% of men born between 1894 and 1896, 80% of those born between 1876 and 1896 and about 60% of the older cohorts were drafted in the army. Exemptions were extremely rare. During the war, the French army reviewed all exempt cases and drafted a large proportion of men who were initially exempted, including those who had been injured at the beginning of the war.

As a result of this general mobilization and the violence of the conflict, military casualties were enormous. 1.397 million men, or 16.5% of the enrolled soldiers and officers, were reported dead or missing in action at the end of the war. Military mortality was quite homogenous across military ranks:

[9] About 7.8 million men were drafted and 0.2 million enrolled voluntarily. In addition, 0.5 million foreigners and men from the French colonies joined the French army.
[10] All the figures presented in this subsection are taken from Huber (1931) unless otherwise noted.

about 16% of French soldiers and 19% of French officers died or were reported missing. Similarly, mortality across occupations seems to have been quite uniform. Tables 2.1 presents the distribution of fatalities by occupations at age 20 while Table 2.2 shows the distribution of the labor force by economic sectors from the 1906 and 1921 censuses.[11] Although the occupation categories differ slightly between the two tables, the distribution of fatalities by occupations is very similar to that of men in the labor force. For example, 41.5% of the casualties worked in agriculture at age 20 while the 1906 census shows that 43% of men in the labor force were hired in the agricultural sector. Similar striking comparisons can be made with sales, industry and liberal professions.[12] Moreover, the comparison between the 1906 and 1921 censuses in Table 2.2 shows that there were only minor changes in the distribution by sector during that period. The most noticeable facts are the increases in the proportion of men working in the industrial sectors and of individuals in the labor force.

While mortality was uniform across military rank and occupations, there is some heterogeneity in mortality rates by age and geographical region. Younger men were more likely to die. Men born between 1892 and 1895 were the most affected (27 to 29% of them died), while men born between 1883 and 1891 experienced mortality rates from 19.2% to 24.1%. Older cohorts of men aged 40 and above at the beginning of the war suffered from the lowest mortality rates (10% or less). Across geographical regions, mortality rates ranged from 11.9% in the military region of Marseille to 20% in the military regions of the cities of Le Mans and Orléans (Huber 1931).

In addition to military casualties, deaths among civilians amounted to 3.7 million during the period 1914 to 1918, with the peak of mortality being caused by the 1918 Spanish flu epidemic. This total number of deaths is equivalent to an average of 623 thousand deaths per year over the years 1914 to 1919, which can be compared with 587.4 thousand deaths in total in 1913 (Huber 1931). We can similarly evaluate the impact of the war on civilian deaths by comparing the number of deaths per 10,000 inhabitants, which increased from 179 in 1913 to 215 during the war.[13] Among the civilian population, the mortality rate was higher for men than women (256 versus 186 per 10,000), and the increase in mortality rate was the most striking for men aged 15 to 45.

2.2 Marriage market in France

[11] Mortality data on soldiers' occupations when drafted are not available. Occupations data at age 20 were recorded during the military service.
[12] Anecdotal evidence also stresses that many elites and white collar workers perished during the conflict. 450 writers from the "Societe des gens de letters", a writers' organization, 833 former students of the Ecole Polytechnique and 230 from the Ecole Normale, both of which were prestigious universities, were killed during the conflict.
[13] The death rate for the war refers to the years 1915-1918.

The 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century were characterized by a high proportion of people getting married and a stable celibacy rate of 10% to 13.5% (Dupaquier, 1988). The marriage rate, which measures the number of new spouses per 10,000 inhabitants, was approximately 150 at the end of the 19th century. In 1907, it reached 160, which may have been the result of a new law simplifying the formalities associated with getting married. The average marriage rate of the 1908 to 1913 period was 158, which puts France at a high rank among European nations.[14]

After the onset of the war, the total number of marriages diminished sharply, reaching its lowest value in 1915 (75,200 marriages compared with 247,900 in 1913). After 1915, the marriage rate started to increase again, though at a slow pace, as a system of regular permissions took place. By 1919, the marriage rate exceeded its 1913 value. More than 2 million marriages took place in the 4 years following the end of the war (Armangaud, 1965). While the marriage rate increased everywhere after the war, there was heterogeneity by regions, with higher marriage rates on the Atlantic coast and in the industrial regions of Paris and Northern France (Huber, 1931).

Figure 2.1 shows the total number of first marriages for women by cohort for the period 1900 to 1950 and highlights how the war disturbed women's marriage patterns. For women born in 1891 to 1895, the distribution of marriages is literally cut in half with a first part of the distribution before the conflict and the second part concentrated on a few years after the war. To some extent, the cohort 1886-1890 experienced a similar effect. For women born in 1896-1900, the distribution of marriages is characterized by a large and narrow peak after the war.

In addition to the change of the timing of marriages due to the war, the marriage market was deeply affected by the sharp drop in the male population. The war mortality changed the sex ratio dramatically: while there were 997 men for every 1,000 women in 1911, the ratio became 909 for 1,000 in 1921 (Huber, 1931). If we restrict to the population of marriageable age (18 to 59 years old for men and 15 to 49 years old for women[15]), the sex ratio decreased from 1,087 men per 1,000 women in 1911 to 992 men per 1,000 women in 1921, reaching 864 in some regions with high mortality rates.[16] If we focus on singles, widows and divorcees who were 30 or less but of marriageable age, there were approximately 4 men for every 6 women (Huber, 1931).

As a consequence, many women remained single in the post-war period. Figure 2.2 emphasizes the huge increase in female celibacy rates (as measured by the percentage of singles at age 50) as a result of the imbalance. Similarly, the figure shows a large decrease in male celibacy rates among the

[14] Only oriental Europe and the Balkans experience higher rates (Dupaquier, 1988).
[15] 15 and 18 years old are the legal age for getting married for women and men respectively.
[16] Author's calculation from French census data.

individuals in cohorts affected by the war. This suggests that, to compensate for the shortage of men, some men who would otherwise have remained single got married. Henry (1966) emphasizes two other mechanisms of compensation: an increase of marriages to foreigners, and a change in the age gap between spouses with men getting married to older women. The change in age gap means that men who died during the war were to some extent replaced by younger men, which also implies that the war had a long-term effect on the marriage market faced by younger women.

3. Theoretical Framework

A robust prediction of marriage models is that the position of men in the marriage market improves with a reduction in the sex ratio. Depending on preferences, men could marry up or they could improve their bargaining position inside the marriage even if they continue to marry the same class women. In the framework suggested by Burdett and Coles (1997) and Block and Ryder (2000), individuals prefer to marry up, and a decrease in the sex ratio allows them to do so. In Becker's (1973, 1974 and 1981) frictionless model of the marriage market, an increase in men's scarcity induces a decrease in the supply of men in the marriage market, implying that men appropriate more of the surplus generated by their marriage. More recently, Chiappori, Fortin and Lacroix (2001) presented a model of household bargaining and distribution of resources inside the family. In their model, a reduction in the sex ratio increases men's bargaining power within the household and in the marriage market.[17]

In this section, we consider the impact of a change in the sex ratio on marriage by class under different assumptions about individuals' preferences for characteristics in a spouse and constraints they face in the marriage market. For concreteness, we focus on a sudden decrease in the sex ratio when initially the number of men and women in the population is balanced. Consider first the cases in which (i) individuals prefer partners with similar characteristics to themselves, i.e., men and women prefer to marry within class (horizontal preferences) and (ii) individuals only meet partners from the same class. In both cases, the analysis of the impact of a change in the sex ratio on marriage by class is straightforward. Men continue to marry women of the same class. The difference relative to the initial situation is that now a fraction of women in each class remains single.[18]

To analyze the effect of changes in the sex ratio on marriage behavior when individuals prefer to marry up rather than within class, we consider the framework of Burdett and Coles (1997) and

[17] Iyigun and Walsh (2007) provide a model in which asymmetries in the sex ratios in the marriage markets produce gender differences in premarital investments and consumption.
[18] An additional potential effect is that men appropriate more of the surplus generated by marriage (Becker 1973, 1974 and 1981).

Block and Ryder (2000) who apply to the marriage market the matching framework pioneered by Mortensen (1982), Diamond (1982) and Pissarides (1990). Burdett and Coles (1997) and Block and Ryder (2000) consider a marriage market where search frictions are present and agents are heterogeneous. Each individual, man or woman, is characterized by a real number; this number corresponds to an attractiveness index that measures how attractive the individual is to potential partners. If a man and a woman marry, the woman's gain from the marriage equals the man's index and man's gain from the marriage equals the woman's index. So, individuals gain more by marrying higher-index individuals. A crucial aspect of the model is that singles in the market meet singles of the opposite sex only every now and then − the search friction. When two singles meet, they observe each other's attractiveness index and decide whether to propose or not. A marriage occurs if both singles propose. If at least one of the singles does not propose, they separate and continue searching for another partner. Search costs are embodied in a discount factor that captures individuals' impatience to get married. A single's decision to propose given contact with a potential partner depends on (i) the partner's index, (ii) the rate at which the single meets other singles of the opposite sex, and (iii) the single's expectation about who will propose to her (or him) upon contact.

In this marriage market, proposing today as opposed to waiting introduces a tradeoff. Waiting allows the possibility of a higher index match, but is costly since individuals discount the future. Classes emerge endogenously in equilibrium. Singles partition themselves into classes according to their index levels. To illustrate why this is the case, suppose that the attractiveness indices of men and women lie in the interval [0,1]. Consider now the problem faced by a man with the highest index. Every woman proposes to this man, thus he faces an unconstrained search problem. Consequently, his optimal strategy is a threshold strategy, i.e., to propose to women whose indices are above a given value, and not propose to other women. Let $w_1<1$ denote this threshold value. A consequence of this behavior on the men's side is that women with index in $(w_1,1]$ are accepted by the highest-quality men and therefore by every type of men. Thus, all women in $(w_1,1]$ face the same unconstrained search problem. As such, their optimal strategy is to accept men with indexes above a certain threshold value and reject all others. Let m_1 denote that threshold. Men with indices in $(m_1,1]$ form a class − they are the men of class one; and women with indices in $(w_1,1]$ also form a class--they are the women of class one. In equilibrium, men of class 1 only marry women of class 1, and vice versa. Consider now the highest-index woman w_1 and the highest-index man m_1 who remains on the market. Woman w_1 is accepted by any man in $[0, m_1]$ and man m_1 is accepted by any woman in $[0, w_1]$. We can thus apply the same reasoning as above to obtain threshold values w_2 and m_2. Men with indices in $(m_2, m_1]$ and women with indices in $(w_2, w_1]$ form another class, class two. Again, women of class two only marry

man of class two, and vice versa. Applying the same argument in a recursive way, we can obtain all the other classes. Therefore, in equilibrium there is assortative matching; men and women only marry individuals of the same class. Still, in this model men and women would like to marry singles of higher classes, but they cannot.

We now analyze the impact of a sudden reduction in the male population on equilibrium marriage behavior in this model. A reduction in the male population affects the marriage market by affecting the rate at which singles meet. Assuming that a reduction in the male population (while keeping the female population constant) reduces the total number of meetings between singles, one immediately obtains that the meeting rate for single women decreases. Since a reduction in the meeting rate reduces a woman's prospects of meeting potential partners in the future, her valuation of rejecting a man in a contact and remaining single decreases. Thus, women become less selective and are willing to accept men of lower quality. Formally, with a reduction in the male population, there is a re-definition of the men's classes. Let m_1, m_2, m_3..., m_n denote the thresholds that initially define men's classes. A reduction in the male population implies a reduction in those thresholds. If that reduction is sufficiently severe, the number of classes of men may decrease.[19] If we additionally assume that with a reduction of the number of men the rate at which single men meet single women increases, then women's classes also change. With a higher rate of meeting single women, a man's valuation of rejecting a woman in a given match and remaining single increases. As a consequence, men can afford to become more selective. Formally, this implies an increase in the thresholds w_1, w_2, w_3...,w_n that define women's classes. A consequence of a decrease in thresholds m_1, m_2, m_3...,m_n and/or an increase in thresholds w_1, w_2, w_3...,w_n is that men tend to marry higher-quality women. Putting it in terms of classes, and fixing classes as being those prior to the change in the sex ratio, this means that men of a given class now marry women of higher classes and women of a given class now marry men of lower classes than they did before the decrease in the male population.

4. Data

The data we use in this paper come from several sources. In this section, we present the various datasets.

4.1. The TRA dataset

[19] For a formal analysis of the impact of a change in the number of men on men's classes see Bloch and Ryder (2000).

The TRA dataset is the result of a survey, "l'enquête des 3,000 familles", that collects data on the descendants of 3,000 couples who got married between 1803 and 1832 in metropolitan France. This project, undertaken by the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, aims at analyzing social and geographical mobility in France in the 19th and 20th centuries. Dupaquier (2004) presents in detail the sampling design and logistics of the data collection. We briefly summarize these below.

The 3,000 families selected between 1803 and 1832 were representative of the French population at the time (one family per 10,000 inhabitants). Data on birth, marriage and death certificates were collected.[20] Geographical quotas were used to ensure geographical representativeness: the number of couples sampled per département was proportional to its population from the 1806 census.[21] Then, in each département, a random sample of couples was drawn among those whose name starts with the letters "TRA," such as Trarieux, Trabit, etc… The letters TRA were chosen to allow names from various local dialects to be represented in the sample, as well as to ensure representativeness of all the social classes (Pélissier et al., 2005). The descendants of the TRA families and their spouses were followed until 1986. To avoid an exponential growth of the sample size through time, the descendants of women (who lost their TRA name upon marriage) are not included in the sample. Dupaquier (2004) points out two potential selections of the TRA dataset. The aristocracy might be under-represented,[22] and foreign migrants who came after 1832 are not included in the sample.[23]

In this paper, we use data from marriage certificates from two periods around WWI: 1909-1914 and 1918-1928. Marriage certificates contain the following information: year and département of marriage, ages and occupations of both spouses, and occupations of their parents. In addition, we know whether the marriage took place in a rural area. We have observations on 1,688 marriages before the war and 4,509 after it.[24]

We use the data on occupations to allocate brides and grooms to classes. To do this, we first match each occupation present in our dataset to a code from the Historical International Standard Classification of Occupations (HISCO). HISCO is a detailed coding system designed to facilitate the

[20] A separate project, the "TRA patrimoine" has also been undertaken to collect data on the bequests left by the TRA families (see for example Bourdieu et al., 2004). We however do not have access to those data.
[21] Départements are administrative units similar to counties. France had 87 départements before WWI and 90 after WWI.
[22] Nobles may sometimes be classified at the letter D (because they are called "de Tra" rather than "Tra"). Some nobles might thus have escaped the original design.
[23] Farmers seem also to be over-represented in the resulting sample for the period 1970-1986. While the proportion of farmers is correct when considering the whole period of the study, this raises some additional issues of selectivity. To deal with this, 3,000 additional "TRA" couples who got married between 1803 and 1832 have been followed. The sample we use is based on the use of these 6,000 TRA families (source: email conversation with Pélissier).
[24] Occupations are missing for about 5% of the grooms and 12% of the brides, and for about 40% of their parents.

comparison of historical international data. It is based on the 1968 International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO68), and customized for historical data (van Leeuwen et al., 2002). HISCO allocates each occupation to one of 7 sectors: (1) Professional, (2) Technical and Related Workers Administrative and Managerial Workers, (3) Clerical and Related Workers, (4) Sales Workers, (5) Service Workers, (6) Agricultural, Animal Husbandry and Forest Workers, Fishermen and Hunters and (7) Production and Related Workers, Transport Equipment Operators and Laborers. Each of these sectors is itself divided into smaller sub-sectors. For example, codes of the type 6-xx.xx correspond to the agricultural sector. Codes of the type 6-2x.xx refer to agricultural workers. This last group includes codes of the type 6-22.xx for field crop and vegetable farm workers and these, in turn, contain more specific occupational categories such as wheat farm workers (coded as 6-22.30) (van Leeuwen and Maas, 2005). The HISCO classification contains about 1,600 occupations characterized by 5-digit codes. We allocate to all the occupations in our dataset a 5-digit HISCO code using a mapping available on the History of Work Information System website (http://historyofwork.iisg.nl/).

The HISCO classification refers to economic sectors, which do not necessarily correspond to homogenous "social" classes. To map occupations into social classes, we use the Historical International Social Class Scheme (HISCLASS) developed by van Leeuwen and Maas (van Leeuwen and Maas, 2005a). The HISCLASS system allocates all the HISCO occupations into 12 social classes, where a "social class" is defined by van Leeuwen and Maas (2005) as "*a set of persons with the same life chances*." The mapping of occupations into social class takes into account whether the occupation is manual, requires special skills and supervision. To increase the sample size in each class, in this paper we use the version of HISCLASS condensed into the following **7 social classes**:

- Class 1: Higher managers and professionals
- Class 2: Lower managers and professionals, clerical and sales personnel
- Class 3: Foremen and skilled workers
- Class 4: Farmers and fishermen
- Class 5: Lower-skilled workers
- Class 6: Unskilled workers
- Class 7: Lower-skilled and unskilled farm workers

This 7-classes classification has been used in other works, and in particular in works using the TRA dataset, to study social mobility and endogamy (Pélissier et al. 2005, Holt 2005, Bull 2005, Schumacher and Lorenzetti 2005, Arrizabalaga 2005, Lanzinger 2005, Dribe and Christer Lundh 2005, Van de Putte et al. 2005, Bras and Kok 2005, van Leeuwen and Maas, 2005b).

In table 4.1, we present the distribution of brides and grooms when classified according to the above 7 social classes (class 1 being the highest, and class 7 being the lowest). Note that it represents the distributions of classes only among individuals who married, not the entire population. For men, classes 2 to 5 are the most numerous. For women, there is an increase of the proportion of class 2 women after the war, which may reflect the fact that men were able to marry higher class women after the war.[25]

4.2 The French censuses

The French census data for the years 1906, 1911 and 1921 are available from Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (2007). The 1926 census data are available from archives at the library of the National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE). We link the year and département of each marriage in the TRA dataset to département-level information available from the censuses. In particular, we construct for these three years the sex ratio of males aged 18 to 59 to females aged 15 to 49 in each département. The average sex ratio is 1.12 in 1911 and 1.02 in 1921, when it ranges from 0.86 to 1.23.

We also construct indicators of female occupations. Specifically, the proportion of females who are: (i) managers, (ii) employees, (iii) workers, (iv) self-employed and (v) unemployed.[26] Finally, to account for the role of foreigners in the marriage market (see Section 2 and Henry, 1966), we construct a variable measuring the excess of foreign males over foreign females in 1911, 1921 and 1926. Table 4.2 presents descriptive statistics of these variables for before the war (1906 or 1911) and after the war (1921).[27] It shows that there were few changes in the occupation structure of women. The most noticeable change is a shift from self-employment to employees. Note also our indicator of excess of foreign males captures the increase of immigration that followed WWI.

We also constructed département-specific proportion of women in given age categories as percentages of the female population aged 15 to 49. Pre-war proportions are based on the female age distribution from the 1911 census, while post-war proportions are based on the 1921 census.

4.3 Military mortality

[25] About 35 to 40% of the brides report having no occupation in their marriage certificate. They are excluded from our central regression analysis, but included in the robustness checks we conduct in section 6.3.5.
[26] We construct these indictors for the years 1906, 1921 and 1926 because comparable occupations are not available in the 1911 census.
[27] We present the average over 87 départements for 1906 and 90 départements for 1921 since France's territories increased after the war.

We use military mortality data from the French ministry of defense.[28] About 1.3 million men were classified as "dead for France" ("*mort pour la France*") during WWI. This denomination includes men who died in combat, and men who died because of injuries or illness contracted in the battlefield.

In the empirical analysis, we use information about the number of dead soldiers by département of birth (a total of 1,227,796 soldiers in continental France and Corsica for whom we observe birth département[29]). Specifically, we use it to compute, for each département, the military mortality rate which is defined as the number of dead soldiers as a percentage of the present male population aged 18 to 59 in 1911. Figure 1.1 shows the geographical variation in the military mortality rate across France. This mortality rate ranges from 5 percent in the southern département of Alpes-Maritime to 23 percent in the département of Lozere. The mean and median mortality rates are about 12.5 percent.

In addition to the natural randomness associated with war casualties, a few other factors may explain the regional heterogeneity in military mortality rate. Until 1915, men residing in the same military regions were typically sent together to the same war zones.[30] This was because soldiers were supposed to serve in their military regions of residence and because men living in regions with high population density were sent together to the battlefront to complement the troops of the northeastern regions where most of the fighting was taking place (Boulanger, 2001).[31] The heterogeneity in military mortality may thus be partially explained by the fact that men from different départements participated in battles of different violence levels. Military mortality before 1916 constitutes about 31 percent of the total military deaths during WWI: 13 percent of the overall war casualties occurred in 1914, and 18 percent in 1915 (Huber, 1931). Starting in 1915 but only fully implemented in 1916, the army adopted a national rather than regional recruitment scheme to improve the allocation of men and skills to war zones (Boulanger, 2001). As a result, after 1916, men from different military regions were more mixed together at the battlefront.

However, the 1915 modification of conscription, putting it at the national level, did not fully eliminate these regional differences in mortality. One possible reason for this seems to be that participation rates in the military varied by region. Explanations for this phenomenon remain speculative. Boulanger (2001) points out some factors. First, while draft policies were national, ultimate authority lay with the general of the military region. Generals' personal interpretations or

[28] Data and documentation are available at http://www.memoiredeshommes.sga.defense.gouv.fr/.
[29] This number excludes military deaths of soldiers born in the three départements acquired at the end of WWI (Moselle, Bas-Rhin and Haut-Rhin) because the French records for these départements are incomplete.
[30] During WWI, continental France was separated into 22 military regions (Boulanger, 2001).
[31] For example, soldiers from Bretagne were sent to the Parisian region, while soldiers from the Parisian region went further east.

applications of directives may have differed, generating regional variations in exemption rates and rates of recovery of initially exempted men. Second, the rate of voluntary engagement was unequal, with higher proportions volunteering closer to the front and in places where entering the army was highly regarded by society.[32] Finally, regional differences in labor force specialization may have contributed to some extent to this heterogeneity because the army required specific skills during the war (e.g., knowledge about how to work leather or wood, or how to raise horses).

5. Empirical Strategy

For ease of exposition, we illustrate in this section the empirical strategy for the analysis on assortative matching by social class. We follow a similar strategy when investigating the impact of a change in sex ratio on assortative matching by age. If men and women prefer higher class spouses, then we would expect men (women) to marry higher class women (men) when the sex ratio, i.e. the ratio of men of marriageable age to women of marriageable age, is lower (higher). The exogenous change in sex ratio due to the war allows us to address the question of how the sex ratio affects marital assortative matching.

We first establish that in pre-WWI France marriage was not random, i.e. people tended to marry within class. Second, we test the hypothesis that men married brides of higher class after the war (than before the war). Finally, we test the hypothesis that men married women of higher class than themselves (married up) more in regions where more men died and where the sex ratio was lower.

Pre-WWI assortative matching Our first test aims to determine whether prior to WWI brides and grooms tended to be of similar class. If class was irrelevant for marriage, the distribution of bride classes would be the same for each groom class. The null hypothesis is that pre-war grooms chose brides randomly from the class distribution of pre-war brides.

To implement this test, we compare the realized distribution of social distance, defined as the class of the groom minus the class of the bride, with the distribution we would expect under the null hypothesis (that pre-war grooms married randomly). Using a bootstrapping method, we construct 95% confidence intervals for the distribution of social distance under the null hypothesis. Specifically, denote the number of pre-war marriages in our sample by N. From the distribution of groom classes, we draw N grooms randomly with replacement; from the distribution of bride classes we draw N brides randomly with replacement. We match the list of grooms with the list of brides, and derive the distribution of social distances for this simulated set of marriages. We repeat this process 1000 times.

[32] According to Boulanger (2001), in some parts of France, conscription was an important step in a man's life. Entry to the army was usually celebrated with folkloric parties. In those places, being classified as inept was shameful.

For each possible value of social distance, namely for every integer from -6 to +6, we order the 1000 simulated proportions of marriages with that social distance, and take the middle 950 as the 95 percent confidence interval.

An observed distribution of social distance with a higher peak and lower tails than the confidence intervals would indicate that grooms tended to marry brides of similar class to themselves, as opposed to matching randomly.

Change in distribution of brides' classes Second, we test whether, for each class of groom, the distribution of classes of brides was the same after WWI as before WWI. For each groom class, we plot the CDFs of bride class before the war and after the war. We then construct 95% confidence intervals for the CDFs using a bootstrapping method similar to that explained above.

Impact of change in sex ratio and military deaths on marriage by class Last, we subject the hypothesis that men married up after the war to regression analysis. The regressions also allow us to test the hypothesis that men married up more in regions where more men died or where the sex ratio was lower.

OLS specifications We run the OLS regressions both separately for each class of grooms and pooling all groom classes (in which case we include dummy variables for each groom class). The most general form of the regressions is:

$$Y_{ijt} = \alpha_j + \beta t + \lambda M_{jt} + \mu X_{jt} + \delta Z_{ijt} + \varepsilon_{ijt}, \qquad (1)$$

where *i* is a marriage, *j* is a département (county), and *t* is the year of the wedding. We use four alternative dependent variables *Y*: (1) the difference between the class of the bride and the class of the groom; (2) a dummy for whether the groom married a bride of his class or higher; (3) a dummy for whether the groom married a low class bride, meaning a bride of class 5, 6, or 7; (4) a categorical variable that takes three values: the value 0 if the groom married a bride of strictly lower class than himself, the value 1 if he married a bride of his own class, and the value 2 if he married a bride of strictly higher class than himself. *M* is the explanatory variable of interest, which we take to be either the sex ratio, or military mortality as a percentage of the pre war (1911) male population, or the predicted sex ratio instrumented with military mortality. We set military mortality to zero for marriages that occurred before the war. Throughout the analysis, we cluster standard errors at the level of variation in *M*.

The α_j are coefficients on the département dummies and β is the coefficient on the linear time trend. X_{jt} are other controls that vary across geography and time, such as variables capturing the occupational distribution of the population of women in the area and the excess of foreign men over

foreign women. Z_{ijt} are additional controls that vary at the individual level such as whether the marriage took place in a rural location. The variables used in the analysis are described in more detail in Appendix A.

Note that the lowest class is class 7 and the highest class is class 1 (see section 4). Thus, men marry better when they marry a lower-index class bride. Note also that when the dependent variable is a dummy for whether the groom marrying a bride of class at least as high as his own, observations of the lowest groom class, class 7, must be dropped because this class necessarily marries weakly up.

Instrumental variable specifications. As pointed in the literature (e.g., Angrist 2002, Kerwin and Luoh 2005), studies that analyze the impact of the sex ratio on the marriage market may suffer from omitted variable bias and possible reverse causality. For example, in our context, a low sex ratio may indicate strong male out-migration. If migrants are selected positively or negatively according to unobservable variables that are relevant for marriage outcomes (e.g., groom's ability or health), the random error term in the equation above may be correlated with the sex ratio. Take for example the case of health (denoted here by H_{ijt}) as omitted variable correlated with sex-ratio because of migration. The correct OLS specification should be:

$$Y_{ijt} = \alpha_j + \beta t + \lambda M_{jt} + \mu X_{jt} + \delta Z_{ijt} + \eta H_{ijt} + \varepsilon_{ijt}. \quad (2)$$

If equation (2) is the correct specification but we omit H_{ijt} from the estimation, the expected value of the estimator of λ will be:

$$E\left(\hat{\lambda}\right) = \lambda + \eta \frac{\operatorname{cov}\left(M_{jt}, H_{ijt}\right)}{\operatorname{var}\left(M_{jt}\right)}.$$

We expect good health to improve the groom's position in the marriage market, i.e. if Y_{ijt} denotes the probability of marrying up, we expect $\eta > 0$. The direction of the omitted variable bias depends thus on the sign of $\operatorname{cov}\left(M_{jt}, H_{ijt}\right)$, where M_{jt} denote the sex ratio. If migrants are more likely to be in better health than non-migrants, we expect to find men in better health than average in places with high sex-ratios ($\operatorname{cov}\left(M_{jt}, H_{ijt}\right) > 0$), in which case the estimator of λ will be biased upward. If migrants are more likely to be in poorer health than non-migrants, the estimator of λ will be biased downward.[33]

[33] Note that the exact same reasoning applies when we use as dependent variable the categorical variable for whether the groom married a bride of strictly lower class, of his own class, or of strictly higher class than himself. However, when we use the difference between the class of the bride and the class of the groom or a dummy for whether the groom married a low class bride as dependent variables, we expect $\eta < 0$ to capture that good health improves the groom's position in the

In order to deal with this potential issue, we use an instrumental variable (IV) approach. For our strategy to be valid, we need an instrument that predicts sex ratio but is not directly related to the marriage outcome. We use département-level military mortality, which exhibits exogenous geographical variation (see Section 4.3), as an instrument for the département-level sex ratio. Given the universality of the military draft, military mortality is correlated with the post-war sex ratio. However, we do not expect military mortality to have a direct effect on marriage outcomes. This instrument is zero before the war and equal to the département-level mortality rates after the war. The instrumental variable specification uses (in both the first and the second stage) the same controls as the OLS specification presented above.

6. Assortative matching by social class

6.1. Testing pre-WWI assortative matching

We first use pre-war data to test whether people marry within class as opposed to randomly. We do so by examining the distribution of social distance, defined as the class of the groom minus the class of the bride, among pre-war marriages. For example, when people marry within class, the social distance is zero. When a groom of class 1 (the highest class) marries a bride of class 7 (the lowest class), the social distance is -6. The *observed* points in Figure 6.1 show the actual distribution of pre-war social distance for the marriages in our sample. The 95% confidence interval was derived by bootstrapping under the null hypothesis that grooms match randomly from the class distribution of observed brides.

The observed distribution lies outside the confidence interval for most social distances. For brides and grooms of the same class (i.e. at social distance zero), the observed proportion is nearly twice as large as the upper boundary of the confidence interval. For the other social distances between -4 and +4, the observed proportions lie at or below the lower bounds of the confidence intervals. For the extreme social distances, the observed proportions are approximately zero.

Overall, the figure clearly rejects the null of random matching. Grooms in the pre-war period were much more likely to marry brides of their own class than chance would dictate, and were much less likely to marry brides who were socially distant from them.

6.2. Change in distribution of brides' classes

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marriage market. In the regressions with those dependent variables, we therefore expect a downward bias if migrants are more likely to be in better health than non-migrants, and an upward bias if migrants are more likely to be in poorer health.

Having established that men chose brides non-randomly from women of different classes and that the ratio of men to women was lower after WWI than before it, we now consider whether men of different classes married women of higher class after the war relative to before it, as theory would predict.

The seven panels of Figure 6.2 show, for each class of groom, the cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) of bride classes before and after the war. For these figures we use data only from the départements with military mortality rates above the median, where we expect the pre-war/post-war difference to be the most pronounced.[34] A dashed red post-war line that lies above the solid black pre-war line indicates the groom class tended to marry higher class brides after the war than before it. The figure illustrates that grooms of all classes (besides the highest class 1 and the lowest class 7) married brides of higher class after the war than before it. To formally test whether this difference is statistically significant, we construct 95% confidence intervals of the pre-war CDFs using a bootstrapping approach. For classes 2 to 6, we can reject the hypothesis that the pre-war and post-war CDFs are equal in favor of the alternative hypothesis that post war grooms were more likely to marry higher class brides.[35]

Overall, it appears that, if we do not take into account other factors that changed between the pre-war and post-war periods, groom of classes 2 to 6 married higher class brides after the war than before it.

6.3. Impact of change in sex ratio and military deaths on marriage by class

We next subject the hypothesis that men married up after the war to regression analysis. The regressions also allow us to use the exogenous geographical variation in military mortality in WWI. If improvements in the marriage outcomes of men after the war are caused by the mechanism we propose, these improvements will be greatest in regions where military mortality or the change in the sex ratio was largest.

To examine the direct relationship between military mortality and marriage outcomes, we run OLS regressions that use either military mortality or sex ratio, as well as IV regressions that instrument for the sex ratio with military mortality, to predict whether and to what extent men married up. For the two dependent variables that takes only values of zero or one, namely marry up dummy (second

[34] We also include the three departements from Alsace-Lorraine for which mortality rates are known to be very high but on which we do not have exact mortality data.

[35] We also test this hypothesis using Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) tests. The KS tests reject the null for class 4 grooms only, probably because of small sample sizes which are: class 1: 25; class 2: 152; class 3: 217; class 4: 481; class 5: 161; class 6: 67; class 7: 59.

dependent variable) and a low class bride dummy (third dependent variable), we also run probit regressions in addition to OLS. Tables B1 and B2 of Appendix B show that the results are robust when probit is used instead of OLS.

Across the specifications with our four different dependent variables, namely the class difference between the bride and the groom, a dummy variable for low bride class, a dummy variable for marrying up, and a categorical variable for whether the groom married down, within class or up, the coefficient on mortality, the sex ratio, or the instrumented sex ratio is of the expected sign and always significant at all conventional significance, including when département dummies, a linear time trend, and a full set of controls are included.

6.3.1. Mortality rate

Tables 6.1 and 6.2 present the results for different specifications of the OLS regression using the four alternative dependent variables of marrying up and using département-level mortality rate as the main independent variable.[36] All specifications include département dummies and dummy variables for the class of the groom to reflect differences in marriage patterns for men of different classes.

As theory predicts, the coefficient on mortality has the right sign and it is significant in nearly all specifications, including specifications containing département dummies, linear time trends and a full set of additional controls. The regressions suggest that men were more likely to marry up in places with higher mortality rate.[37] For all four dependent variables, the coefficient on mortality has the expected sign and is significant at all conventional significance levels for all specifications. For example, in the regressions predicting whether the groom married up, the coefficient on military mortality is 0.005, which implies that a département having military mortality of 15 percent of the male population instead of 10 percent would increase the probability a given groom married up by 2.5 percentage points. Another example is the regression predicting whether the bride is low class, where the coefficient on military mortality is -0.010, which implies that a departement having military mortality of 15 percent of the male population instead of 10 percent would decrease the probability a given groom married a low class bride by 5 percentage points.[38]

We take this as evidence that on average men prefer women of higher class. This favors the hypothesis that assortative matching occurs because in equilibrium individuals cannot marry higher-

[36] As mentioned earlier, the mortality variable is defined as zero for pre-WWI marriages and military mortalities as a percentage of the pre-war male population for post-WWI marriages.
[37] Recall that class 1 women are the highest class.
[38] Our results are robust to the use of a probit model rather than OLS for the binary dependent variables. See appendix B.

class people, although they may wish to do so. Note that such a result cannot be driven solely by a change in how grooms meet partners after the war. If grooms had horizontal preferences, a change in search frictions, enabling men to meet women from a more heterogeneous background, would not lead grooms to marry up more. It would either leave the assortative matching unchanged if grooms care only about social classes. Or it would potentially increase both the probability that a groom marry up or down in a symmetric manner in the presence of preferences for other desirable attributes that are orthogonal to social class such as natural beauty.

The second and third specifications of each dependent variable include various controls in addition to the region dummies and linear time trends. We control for rural and urban marriages, where marriage patterns might be different. One possible concern is that grooms after WWI might be marrying brides of higher class because there were more women of higher class in the population after the war. We attempt to control for this effect in specifications including controls for the percentages of the female labor force in different occupations that reflect different classes. Unfortunately the available breakdown by occupation for the female population is at a higher level of aggregation than the class data for brides and grooms, so these controls are imperfect. We also control for the excess of foreign males in the region over foreign females, which is calculated as the percentage of males who are foreign minus the percentage of females who are foreign.[39] The rationale for including excess foreign men is that the post-war shortage of French men caused an inflow of foreign men into France, which help balance the sex ratio. If foreign men differed from French men in their desirability as husbands, the effect of competing with foreign men instead of French men could affect how high class brides men are able to obtain. We also control for grooms and brides' age to address the fact that older grooms or brides may potentially have better occupation, and thus be of higher class.

The coefficients on the dummy for rural marriages are statistically significant in the regressions predicting class difference and marrying up, within class or down, with signs that imply grooms in rural areas marry lower class brides than grooms in urban areas. The coefficients on the percentage of employee and unemployed women indicate that men tend to marry women of lower class where more unemployed women are present and to marry women of higher class when more employees are present.[40] The coefficient on excess foreign males is significant in the regressions predicting marrying up or a low bride class, with signs that suggest that in regions of France where there are more foreign males relative to the number of foreign females, men tend to marry brides of lower class. This is

[39] We also experimented with including the percentages of foreign females and foreign males separately. In most cases the coefficients on these two variables were of opposite sign, and comparable magnitude.
[40] Note that the omitted category of female occupations is workers.

consistent with the idea that foreign males represented additional competition in the marriage market. The coefficients associated with the age of the groom and the bride are not statistically significant, and the age controls do not change the magnitude of the coefficients associated with mortality.[41]

6.3.2. Sex ratio

Next, we run regressions that directly use the sex ratio to predict whether and to what extent men married women of higher class than themselves. Tables 6.3 and 6.4 present the results of OLS regressions using the sex ratio as the main independent variable of interest. These regressions include the same sets of additional controls as presented above in Tables 6.1 and 6.2. The sex ratio variable varies by département and over three census periods. The IV regressions, where we instrument the potentially endogenous sex ratio with département-level military mortality rate, are presented in tables 6.5 and 6.6. Panel A of these tables presents the first stage regressions of the sex ratio on military mortality. Panel B presents the second stage regressions using the instrumented sex ratio as the main independent variable.

For each of the four different dependent variables that we consider, the OLS coefficient associated with sex ratio is statistically significant at standard significance level and has the sign predicted by theory. The IV coefficient is of similar magnitude, though larger, than the OLS coefficient. For example, in the most complete class difference regression which includes linear time trends, département dummies, département-level controls, and also marriage-level controls, the IV coefficient associated with sex ratio is 2.685 compared to an OLS coefficient of 1.633. To keep the example discussed in Section 5, this is consistent with migrants being in better health than non-migrants. The instrumented sex ratio's coefficient is always very precisely estimated. Note that in the first stage of the IV estimation, military mortality–our instrument–appears as a strong predictor of the sex ratio.[42]

The most general IV regression predicting class difference (column 3 of Table 6.5) suggest that a decrease in the sex ratio from one man for every woman to 0.90 men for every woman would improve the expected class of bride married by a given groom by 0.27, from an average class difference of 0.21 to -0.06. Columns 4 to 6 of table 6.5 present the IV regression results predicting whether the groom married up. In the most general specification (column 6), the coefficient on the sex ratio is -0.822, implying that a decrease in the sex ratio from one man for every women to 0.90 men for every woman

[41] In other regressions, we also add an indicator for whether the groom or the bride is re-marrying. The coefficients associated with those indicators are not statistically significant, and they do not change the magnitude of the coefficient associated with mortality (tables not shown).
[42] The F-statistics for the identifying instruments as a group are all 20 or higher.

would increase the probability a given groom married up by 8.2 percentage points. Table 6.6 suggests that a similar decrease in the sex ratio would decrease the probability a given groom married a low class bride by 18.5 percentage points.

For all the specifications, the other control variables have similar effects to in the mortality regressions described in the previous section.

6.3.3. Differential impact of the sex imbalance by groom's class

The previous regressions show that on average men were able to marry up compared to pre-WWI standards in places with higher mortality or lower sex ratio. An important related question is whether the social ascension was homogenous across groom classes. To address this issue, we allow a different effect of the sex ratio on marrying up by interacting sex ratio and mortality with the seven grooms' classes. The results are presented in tables C1-C4 of Appendix C.

The regressions suggest a differential impact of a change in sex ratio (or mortality) by groom class on marriage outcomes. Specifically, while grooms of higher and middle social class benefited from the sex imbalance, grooms of the lowest social classes (classes 6 and 7) appear to have benefited the least from the decrease in sex ratio. Such grooms were not substantially more likely to marry brides whose social class is much higher than theirs. In particular, the coefficients associated with the sex ratio or mortality are usually not statistically significant. The one exception for this is that even grooms from the lowest social class were less likely to marry a bride of low social class in departements that experienced higher mortality rates. One possible explanation for why very low class men did not marry up is that women have a lower threshold on their spouses' class below which they prefer to stay single. That is, while high and middle-class women were willing to marry men from lower social classes, they were maybe not willing to accept proposals of men with a very low social class.

This heterogeneity in the impact of the change in sex ratio on marriage outcome by class, with men in low classes benefiting the least, may be the results of various effects: (i) a mechanical effect due to different class sizes, or (ii) difference in the relative desirability of various social classes. We investigate this possibility in Appendix D, where we show that, under some relatively weak assumptions, if grooms could have married as high as possible after the war, classes 6 and 7 actually should have been those improving the most in the marriage market. This suggests that differences in class sizes do not explain the differential impact of a change in sex ratio across classes.

[44] Unemployed women may consider themselves as "without occupation." Table 4.2 shows that a very small proportion of women in the labor force are categorized as unemployed.

6.3.4. Urban versus rural

Marriage behavior in rural localities may be different than in urban localities. For example, rural places are smaller and people in a village may be more likely to interact with people from different classes. As a result, search frictions and meeting technology may differ in rural places. In addition, preferences for spouses might be different compared with urban locations. To test the robustness of our findings, we examine whether the effect of sex ratio on assortative matching is different in rural localities compared with urban localities. The regressions presented in Tables E1 to E4 in Appendix E show that the imbalanced sex ratio had an effect both in rural and urban localities, and that the effect was similar in magnitude.

6.3.5. Class imputations for brides with missing occupation

In our dataset, a substantial proportion of the brides are reported as having no occupation in their marriage certificates: 34.4% of the brides are without occupation before the war and 40.5% after the war (see Table 4.1). This proportion is lower than the proportion of overall women out of the labor force: 61% in the 1906 census, and 57.4% in the 1921 census (see table 2.2). This difference probably reflects a tendency of women to drop out of the labor force upon marriage or giving birth.[44] In addition, 12% of the brides have missing occupations overall. A missing occupation could reflect that a bride had no occupation at the time of marriage or that she simply did not report her professional activity.

Thus far, the brides without occupation have been excluded from our analysis, as we do not observe an occupation to allocate them into a class. Figure G1 in Appendix G presents the marriage outcomes of brides with no occupation and missing occupation. It shows that brides with no occupation are more likely to marry grooms of classes 1 and 2 than brides with occupations. Moreover, they are as likely to marry class 3 and 4 men, and less likely to marry grooms from classes 5 to 7. Relative to brides with occupations, women with missing occupation are much more likely to marry class 1 grooms, somewhat more likely to marry class 4, and less likely to marry classes 3 and 5. This heterogeneity in marriage outcomes suggests that brides with no or missing occupation may be of various types. For example, they may be wealthy women who do not need to work, women involved in household production such as working on the family farm and who consider themselves as not having an occupation, or unemployed women. An alternative explanation is that women without occupation

are simply younger women who are not yet employed. However, this does not seem to be the case since the mean and median age of brides with and without occupation before the war are very similar.[45]

Marriage certificates provide information on the occupations of the parents of the grooms and brides. A natural approach to allocate a bride without occupation into a class is to use the occupation of one of her parents. However, this approach is problematic for three reasons. First, parents' occupations are missing for a very large proportion of the data (e.g., pre war: 41% of fathers and 60% of mothers; post-war 44% of fathers and 67% of mothers). Second, they may not be missing at random. A common reason for parents' occupation to be missing is that they have died. Since there is differential mortality by socioeconomic status (see for example Smith 1999), parents' occupations are more likely to be missing for lower classes and the resulting sample selected. Third, parents' and children's classes are not perfectly correlated. For example, for brides whose own and father's occupation are reported in the marriage certificate, only 43% are in the same social class as their father.

We have nevertheless replicated the estimations presented in Sections 6.3.1 and 6.3.2 using (i) the class of the bride's father as a proxy for her class, and (ii) the classes of the fathers of both groom and bride as proxies for their classes. Although the coefficients have usually the right sign, they are not statistically significant in some of the specifications (tables not shown).

As an alternative approach for dealing with missing occupations and brides with no occupation, we have imputed class for all brides with missing classes. We use the predicted class obtained from an OLS regression of bride's class on the following variables: indicators of mother's and father's class,[46] an indicator for rural, interactions of rural with the indicators for parents' classes, bride's age and age squared, dummies for the size of the city where the marriage occurred, and a linear time trend. The various indicators for missing class of parents allow us to deal with the fact that those observations are potentially not missing at random. We control for age since age and occupation may be related. The city size and rural dummies allow for classes to be associated with geographic location. With this approach, the determination of a bride's class incorporates more information than that provided by her parent's class. Table F1 presents the results of this OLS regression. Most of the explanatory variables we use are strong predictors of brides' class. The average imputed class for those brides is 3.85.

[45] The pre-war mean age of brides without occupation is 24.6 compared to 24.9 for brides with occupation. We cannot reject that the average prewar age of brides class 1 to 7 is different to the average age of brides without occupation at any reasonable significance level. Moreover, the 25th percentile, median and 75th percentile of the distribution of age are 20, 23 and 27 in both groups.

[46] More precisely, a set of dummy variables, one for each identified class, that are also zero if the parent's class is unknown, an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if the parent's class is missing because he/she is dead, and an indicator variable for the parent's class being missing because he/she has no occupation. The omitted category is the parent has no class for an unknown reason.

In Tables F2 to F5, we evaluate the impact of mortality and sex ratio on our measures of marrying up using bride's actual class for brides with occupations and brides' imputed class for those without occupations or with missing occupations.[47] The coefficient associated with sex ratio or mortality has the sign predicted by theory in all the specifications, and is statistically significant in nearly all. The magnitude of the coefficients is similar to in the regressions without imputation when we use mortality as dependent variable, but they are somewhat smaller when we use sex ratio. When interacting sex ratio or mortality with rural, we find, as earlier, a similar effect in rural places than urban (tables not shown).

6.4 Effect of change in sex ratio and military deaths on marriage rates

Another implication of the shortage of men is that women were more likely to remain single after the war, especially in départements with high mortality rates. Table 6.7 presents the results of regressions of the percentage of single women on mortality (or sex ratio).[48] The regressions show that more women remained single in department with higher mortality rates. An increase in the mortality rate from 5% to 10% implied that women were 3.5 percentage points more likely to remain single. Our hypothesis that men married up implies the women who remained single would have tended to be low class women. We are currently coding the census occupations into classes to check if this was indeed the case.

7. Assortative matching by age

We now analyze the impact of a change in sex ratio on assortative matching by age.

7.1. Testing pre-WWI assortative matching

We first use pre-war data to test whether people sort according to age in the marriage market. We do so by examining the distribution of the age difference between brides and grooms among pre-war marriages. The *observed* points in Figure 7.1 show the actual distribution of pre-war age gap for the marriages in our sample. The 95% confidence interval was derived by bootstrapping under the null hypothesis that grooms match randomly from the age distribution of observed brides.

[47] Because bride classes are imputed as predicted class from an OLS regression, they are generally not whole numbers. In the regression predicting class difference, bride classes are not rounded. However, in creating the variables married up, low class bride, and married up, within class, or down, we first round predicted class to the nearest whole number. Thus, for example, a class 3 groom marrying a bride with imputed class 3.4 will be taken to be marrying within class.

[48] We classify as single all women who have never been married, are widowed, or are divorced.

The observed distribution reaches its highest density levels when the value of brides' age minus groom's age is between -2 and -5, emphasizing that grooms are typically slightly older than their brides. Overall, for about 46% of the pre-WWI marriages in our data this age difference lies between -5 and 0 inclusive. Figure 7.1 shows that the observed distribution lies outside the confidence interval for many age differences. In particular, the observed distribution lies above the 95% confidence interval when the groom is just slightly older than the bride, and lies below the confidence interval for larger age gaps. Thus, the null hypothesis of random matching according to age is clearly rejected. Grooms in the pre-war period were much more likely to marry brides who were a couple of years younger than themselves than chance would dictate.

7.2. Change in distribution of age difference

Having established that grooms and brides match non-randomly according to age, we now investigate the impact of a change in sex ratio on this assortative matching.

The three panels of Figure 7.2 show the CDFs of age difference between brides and grooms before and after the war. The first graph in each panel uses data from the départements with military mortality rates above the median, where we expect the pre-war/post-war difference to be the most pronounced. The second graph in each panel uses data from départements with below-median mortality rates. A dashed red post-war line that lies below the solid black pre-war line indicates that grooms tend to marry older brides after the war than before it.

The first panel shows the CDFs for grooms aged 18-59. It illustrates that in high-mortality départements, the age difference between brides and grooms is smaller when compared with pre-war levels. For example, while in those départements the bride is at least 5 years younger than her groom before the war in 49% of the marriages, this proportion decreases to 37% after the war. To formally test whether this difference is statistically significant, we construct 95% confidence intervals of the pre-war CDFs using a bootstrapping approach and we can reject the hypothesis that the pre-war and post-war CDFs are equal in favor of the alternative hypothesis that post war grooms were more likely to marry older brides. As expected, this effect is smaller in départements with below-median mortality rates, where in 42% of the pre-war marriages the bride is at least 5 years younger than her groom and this proportion decreases to 34% after the war.

The next two panels show similar CDFs for two different age groups: men aged 18-27 and men aged 28-59. Both graphs present a similar pattern to that described above. However, they highlight that the change in the age difference is stronger for younger men. The pre and post-WWI difference in CDF is clearly statistically significant for men aged 18-27 in both high and low-mortality départements. The

change in age difference is less marked among men aged 28 to 59. This finding is consistent with the fact that younger men experienced higher mortality rates in the war than older men, and so we expect more adjustments in the marriage patterns of those men. Overall, this suggests that even a small change in sex ratio has an impact on assortative matching by age.

7.3. Impact of military deaths and change in sex ratio on assortative matching by age

We now examine the direct relationship between sex ratio and age-related marriage outcomes. We run OLS regressions that use bride's age minus groom's age as dependent variable, and either military mortality or sex ratio as the main explanatory variable. We also conduct IV regressions that instrument for the sex ratio with military mortality.

The first three columns of Table 7.1 present the result of the OLS regression using département-level mortality rate as the main independent variable. The three specifications include département dummies, a linear time trend and the groom's age to reflect differences in marriage patterns for men of different ages. To capture the distribution of women's age faced by grooms, we control for the proportion of women of different age groups in each departement. Finally, we take into account the excess foreign males who may be additional competition to men in the marriage market.

The coefficient associated with mortality is positive and statistically significant suggesting a higher decrease in the age gap between brides and grooms in places with higher mortality. Consider a difference of bride's age minus groom's age equal to -4 before the war. Everything else equal, this difference would increase to -2.94 in places with mortality rate equal to 10%, and to -2.41 in places with mortality rates equal to 15%.

Since older women may have better occupations, the results highlighted above might just reflect men's preferences for higher class women. To address this issue, we control for brides and grooms' class in column (2). We find the same effect: men tend to marry older brides in places with higher mortality, and the coefficient is statistically significant.

The last column allows for differential impact of mortality by groom's age category. The effect of mortality on the age gap is statistically significant at the 5 percent level for grooms aged 22 to 33, and is the largest in magnitude for groom aged 25 to 30.

A decrease in the age difference between grooms and brides could be driven by grooms being younger or brides being older on average after the war than before. Figure 7.3 presents the distribution of age of brides and grooms before and after the war. While the distribution of brides' age did not change, grooms are getting married at a younger age after the war. Overall, our results are consistent with men below 44 preferring women who are closer to their own age, while women prefer older men.

The shortage of men allows them to reduce the age gap and therefore to find brides who would have rather married an older man before the war. The fact that men marry at a younger age after the war is consistent with several plausible explanations. Men may prefer to marry at a younger age but are turned down before the war by women who prefer older men. Alternatively, due to the change in sex ratio, men may receive more marriage proposals after the war and spend thus less time searching for a mate.

Looking at the other coefficients in columns 1 to 3 of Table 7.1, one can notice that the age gap between brides and grooms increases with groom's age. The coefficient associated with rural is negative and statistically significant in all specifications. This suggests that the age difference between the brides and the grooms is more negative in rural places than in urban places.

The last three columns of table 7.1 present similar results using sex ratio as the main explanatory variable. Results are similar to those for military mortality. The coefficient associated with sex ratio is negative and statistically significant at 1%. Allowing for a differential impact of sex ratio by age category provides also similar results as for mortality, with the magnitude of the coefficients being the largest in absolute values for grooms aged 25 to 33.

Table 7.2 provides the results of the IV regressions predicting age difference. The instrumented sex ratio has a negative coefficient and is statistically significant at 1%. The coefficient is much larger in magnitude than the OLS coefficients, implying that the OLS estimator is biased upward. Using the specification controlling for grooms' and brides' classes suggests that a decrease in sex ratio from 1 to 0.9 decreases the age difference between brides and grooms by 2 years. Thinking about health as omitted variable potentially biasing our results (see discussion in Section 5), this upward bias is consistent with migrants being healthier than non-migrants (i.e., $\text{cov}\left(M_{jt}, H_{ijt}\right) > 0$) and healthier men marrying younger brides than men in poorer health (i.e., $\eta < 0$).

8. Conclusion

Although the similarity of spouses to each other along various dimensions has been documented, we know little about its causes. This paper uses an exogenous shock to the sex ratio created by WWI mortality in France to identify the underlying mechanisms responsible for marital assortative matching. Overall, we find that the decrease in the proportion of men in the population due to war-related mortality allowed men to marry higher class women. Men experienced "social ascension" by marrying women from classes they would have had few chances to marry before the war. Similarly, the change in sex ratio led women of higher classes to marry grooms from lower

classes than they would have under pre-WWI standards. A decrease in the sex ratio, instrumented for by military mortality, from one man for every woman to 0.90 men for every woman: (a) increased the probability that men married women of weakly higher class than themselves by 8.2 percentage points, (b) improved the expected value of bride's class minus groom's class for a given groom by 0.27 (from an average of 0.21 to -0.06), and (c) decreased the probability a given groom would marry a low class bride by 18.5 percentage points. This effect differs by grooms' class, with low-class men benefiting the least from the change in the sex ratio. Our results favor the hypothesis that assortative matching occurs because, although individuals would rather marry higher-class people, they do not receive marriage proposals from them.

This paper illustrates a forgotten consequence common to brutal wars and imbalances in the sex ratio such as the one observed nowadays in China: the change in social mobility through change in marriage behavior. In France, the post-war period was also associated with more international marriages, which probably eased the integration of migrants within the French society. One may wonder whether the war induced a transitional or permanent change in social mobility and social integration. This is left for future research. In this specific front, an obstacle to overcome is the occurrence of WWII which may hinder the analysis of the long-term implications of WWI on social mobility. Another natural extension is to examine the extent of marrying up in other countries that participated in WWI. Such a study could shed light on the different degree of social mobility in different countries.

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Figure 1.1: The geographic variation in military mortality rates



This map shows the geographic variation in military mortality rates, defined as military deaths as a percentage of the male population aged 18 to 59 in 1911. Totally white corresponds to a mortality rate of 6.2%, the 5th percentile; totally red corresponds to a mortality rate of 17.0%, the 95th percentile. Blue denotes missing data.

Table 2.1: Distribution of fatalities by occupation at age 20 (in %)

Source: Huber (1931)

Occupations	% dead
Agriculture	41.5
Industry/Alimentation/Construction/Transportation	35.7
Sales	9.5
Liberal professions	2.4
Civil servant	1.3
Domestic	4.2
Clergy	0.2
Without profession	0.5
Others	4.6
Total	100.0

Table 2.2: Distribution of the labor force by sectors (in %)

Source: Huber (1931). Repartition using 1906 territory for both years

	1906		1921	
Sectors	males	females	males	females
Fishing	0.6	0.1	0.6	0
Agriculture and forestry	43.8	43.2	39.9	45.9
Industry and transportation	37.9	32.7	41.8	28.7
Sales	10.4	10.1	10.4	11.7
Liberal professions	2.4	2.5	2.3	3.4
Public service	3.5	1.3	4.2	2.3
Domestic	1.4	10.1	0.8	8
% of the pop. in the labor force	68.2	39.0	71.2	42.6

Figure 2.1: Number of first marriages per 1,000 women by birth cohorts and years

Source: Henry (1966)



Figure 2.2: Percentage of singles at age 50 by birth cohorts

Source: Roussel (1971)



Table 4.1: Distribution of grooms and brides by class

	Grooms		Brides	
Classes	Pre-WWI	Post-WWI	Pre-WWI	Post-WWI
1	5.4	7.1	0.7	1.2
2	17.8	20.3	6.3	10.5
3	24.1	24.2	20.1	13.3
4	22.9	22.3	9.8	10.5
5	19.9	16.8	21.9	18.2
6	5.4	5.4	4.2	4.1
7	4.0	3.2	2.7	1.8
No occupation	0.6	0.8	34.4	40.5
N	*1,605*	*4,254*	*1,482*	*3,950*

Table 4.2: Summary statistics

	Pre War		Post War	
	Mean	*Standard deviation*	Mean	*Standard deviation*
Mortality	0	*0*	12.5	*3.0*
Sex ratio	1.12	*0.09*	1.02	*0.08*
% Female managers	43.3	*13.0*	41.5	*12.5*
% Female employees	3.8	*1.2*	7.6	*3.3*
% Female workers	29.3	*7.7*	29.9	*7.9*
% Self-employed females	23.1	*7.2*	19.6	*5.5*
% Unemployed females	0.5	*0.5*	1.4	*1.4*
Excess foreign males	0.3	*0.6*	1.1	*1.4*
% Females aged 15 to 19	16.2	*1.4*	16.7	*1.4*
% Females aged 20 to 29	29.9	*1.4*	29.1	*1.2*
% Females aged 30 to 39	28.3	*1.0*	27.6	*0.9*
% Females aged 40 to 49	25.6	*1.6*	26.6	*1.7*

The pre-war statistics are from 1911 for all variables except the female occupations, which are from 1906; the post-war values are all from 1921.

Figure 6.1: Pre-WWI matching was assortative



Figure 6.2: The distribution of bride classes for each class of groom before and after WWI in departements with mortality rates above the median

Panel 1



Panel 2



Panel 3



Panel 4



Panel 5

Panel 6

Panel 7

Table 6.1: Men marry up more where military mortality was higher, OLS

Dependent variable:	class diff	class diff	class diff	married up	married up	married up
Military Mortality	-0.016**	-0.012**	-0.012*	0.006***	0.005**	0.005**
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Rural		0.195***	0.186***		-0.031	-0.032
		(0.064)	(0.064)		(0.021)	(0.020)
% Female Managers		-0.010	-0.007		-0.006**	-0.006**
		(0.008)	(0.008)		(0.003)	(0.003)
% Female Employees		-0.049***	-0.048***		0.008**	0.007*
		(0.010)	(0.009)		(0.004)	(0.004)
% Female Self-Employed		-0.021**	-0.018*		-0.012***	-0.012***
		(0.009)	(0.010)		(0.003)	(0.003)
% Female Unemployed		0.094***	0.098***		-0.047***	-0.045***
		(0.016)	(0.016)		(0.005)	(0.006)
Excess Foreign Males		-0.055	-0.051		-0.024**	-0.025**
		(0.040)	(0.041)		(0.011)	(0.011)
Groom's Age			0.004			0.002
			(0.003)			(0.001)
Bride's Age			-0.006			-0.001
			(0.004)			(0.001)
Groom Class Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Departement Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Linear Time Trend	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-Squared	0.241	0.241	0.243	0.271	0.273	0.273
Observations	3158	3132	3117	3033	3008	2994

Notes: The dependent variable for the first three columns is the class of the bride minus the class of the groom, where a higher value for class corresponds to a lower class. The dependent variable for the fourth to sixth columns is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the bride was at least as high class as the groom. Military mortality is the mortality rate of soldiers as a percentage of the male population aged 18 to 59 in 1911, and is zero for marriages that occurred before the war. The omitted category for female occupations is workers. Excess foreign males is defined as the percentage of males who are foreign minus the percentage of females who are foreign. Standard errors, given in parentheses, are clustered at the level of variation in the variable military mortality. Asterisks indicate: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Table 6.2: Men marry up more where military mortality was higher, OLS

Dependent variable:						
	low bride	low bride	low bride	up/within/dn	up/within/dn	up/within/dn
Military Mortality	-0.011***	-0.010***	-0.010***	0.007**	0.006*	0.006*
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Rural		-0.033	-0.034		-0.089**	-0.089**
		(0.023)	(0.022)		(0.035)	(0.035)
% Female Managers		0.002	0.003		-0.005	-0.006*
		(0.003)	(0.003)		(0.003)	(0.003)
% Female Employees		-0.016***	-0.016***		0.017***	0.017***
		(0.004)	(0.004)		(0.005)	(0.005)
% Female Self-Employed		0.005	0.006*		-0.002	-0.001
		(0.003)	(0.003)		(0.004)	(0.004)
% Female Unemployed		0.052***	0.054***		-0.053***	-0.053***
		(0.007)	(0.007)		(0.007)	(0.007)
Excess Foreign Males		0.034***	0.035***		-0.009	-0.009
		(0.011)	(0.011)		(0.014)	(0.015)
Groom's Age			0.002			0.000
			(0.001)			(0.002)
Bride's Age			-0.001			0.001
			(0.002)			(0.002)
Groom Class Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Departement Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Linear Time Trend	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-Squared	0.234	0.235	0.236	0.346	0.349	0.348
Observations	3158	3132	3117	3158	3132	3117

Notes: The dependent variable for the first three columns is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the bride was of low class (class 5, 6 or 7). The dependent variable for the fourth to sixth columns is a categorical variable that takes the value 0 if the bride was strictly lower class than the groom, the value 1 if the bride and groom were of the same class, and the value 2 if the bride was strictly higher class than the groom. Military mortality is the mortality rate of soldiers as a percentage of the male population aged 18 to 59 in 1911, and is zero for marriages that occurred before the war. The omitted category for female occupations is workers. Excess foreign males is defined as the percentage of males who are foreign minus the percentage of females who are foreign. Standard errors, given in parentheses, are clustered at the level of variation in the variable military mortality. Asterisks indicate: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Table 6.3: Men marry up more when the sex ratio is lower, OLS

Dependent variable:						
	class diff	class diff	class diff	married up	married up	married up
Sex Ratio	0.847**	1.635**	1.633**	-0.448***	-0.641**	-0.658**
	(0.410)	(0.660)	(0.688)	(0.153)	(0.284)	(0.285)
Rural		0.212***	0.203***		-0.041*	-0.042*
		(0.071)	(0.071)		(0.024)	(0.024)
% Female Managers		-0.017	-0.015		0.002	0.002
		(0.015)	(0.015)		(0.006)	(0.006)
% Female Employees		-0.007	-0.006		-0.004	-0.004
		(0.023)	(0.023)		(0.007)	(0.007)
% Female Self-Employed		-0.003	-0.002		-0.005	-0.005
		(0.019)	(0.019)		(0.006)	(0.006)
% Female Unemployed		0.021	0.021		-0.004	-0.004
		(0.020)	(0.020)		(0.006)	(0.006)
Excess Foreign Males		0.002	0.002		-0.008	-0.006
		(0.063)	(0.063)		(0.016)	(0.016)
Groom's Age			0.002			0.002
			(0.005)			(0.002)
Bride's Age			-0.005			-0.001
			(0.005)			(0.002)
Groom Class Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Departement Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Linear Time Trend	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-Squared	0.232	0.237	0.239	0.270	0.272	0.272
Observations	3208	3190	3175	3080	3062	3048

Notes: The dependent variable for the first three columns is the class of the bride minus the class of the groom, where a higher value for class corresponds to a lower class. The dependent variable for the fourth to sixth columns is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the bride was at least as high class as the groom. Sex ratio is defined as the number of men aged 18 to 59 divided by the number of women aged 15 to 49. The omitted category for female occupations is workers. Excess foreign males is defined as the percentage of males who are foreign minus the percentage of females who are foreign. Standard errors, given in parentheses, are clustered at the level of variation in the variable sex ratio. Asterisks indicate: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Table 6.4: Men marry up more when the sex ratio is lower, OLS

Dependent variable:						
	low bride	low bride	low bride	up/within/dn	up/within/dn	up/within/dn
Sex Ratio	0.714***	1.273***	1.302***	-0.523**	-0.957***	-0.943***
	(0.207)	(0.270)	(0.280)	(0.213)	(0.347)	(0.354)
Rural		-0.025	-0.026		-0.101***	-0.101***
		(0.027)	(0.026)		(0.034)	(0.035)
% Female Managers		-0.008	-0.008		0.006	0.006
		(0.006)	(0.006)		(0.008)	(0.008)
% Female Employees		-0.001	-0.000		-0.003	-0.003
		(0.009)	(0.009)		(0.012)	(0.012)
% Female Self-Employed		0.002	0.002		-0.006	-0.005
		(0.008)	(0.008)		(0.010)	(0.010)
% Female Unemployed		0.017**	0.017**		-0.010	-0.009
		(0.007)	(0.007)		(0.009)	(0.010)
Excess Foreign Males		0.008	0.007		-0.008	-0.008
		(0.020)	(0.020)		(0.027)	(0.027)
Groom's Age			0.001			0.001
			(0.002)			(0.002)
Bride's Age			-0.001			0.000
			(0.002)			(0.002)
Groom Class Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Departement Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Linear Time Trend	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-Squared	0.226	0.231	0.232	0.345	0.348	0.348
Observations	3208	3190	3175	3208	3190	3175

Notes: The dependent variable for the first three columns is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the bride was of low class (class 5, 6 or 7). The dependent variable for the fourth to sixth columns is a categorical variable that takes the value 0 if the bride was strictly lower class than the groom, the value 1 if the bride and groom were of the same class, and the value 2 if the bride was strictly higher class than the groom. Sex ratio is defined as the number of men aged 18 to 59 divided by the number of women aged 15 to 49. The omitted category for female occupations is workers. Excess foreign males is defined as the percentage of males who are foreign minus the percentage of females who are foreign. Standard errors, given in parentheses, are clustered at the level of variation in the variable sex ratio. Asterisks indicate: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Table 6.5: Men marry up more when the sex ratio is lower, IV

Panel A: Stage 1 regressions with sex ratio as the dependent variable

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Military Mortality	-0.010***	-0.007***	-0.007***	-0.010***	-0.007***	-0.007***
	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Rural		-0.000	-0.000		-0.000	-0.000
		(0.001)	(0.001)		(0.001)	(0.001)
% Female Managers		0.006***	0.006***		0.006***	0.006***
		(0.001)	(0.001)		(0.001)	(0.001)
% Female Employees		-0.005**	-0.005**		-0.005**	-0.005**
		(0.002)	(0.002)		(0.002)	(0.002)
% Female Self-Employed		-0.002	-0.002		-0.002	-0.002
		(0.002)	(0.002)		(0.002)	(0.002)
% Female Unemployed		-0.003**	-0.003**		-0.003**	-0.003*
		(0.001)	(0.001)		(0.001)	(0.001)
Excess Foreign Males		0.021***	0.021***		0.022***	0.022***
		(0.004)	(0.004)		(0.004)	(0.004)
Groom's Age (/10)			0.001			0.000
			(0.000)			(0.000)
Bride's Age (/10)			-0.001*			-0.001*
			(0.000)			(0.001)
Groom Class Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Departement Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Linear Time Trend	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-Squared	0.889	0.951	0.950	0.886	0.950	0.950
Observations	3132	3114	3099	3008	2990	2976

Notes: Standard errors, given in parentheses, are clustered at the level of variation in the variable sex ratio. Asterisks indicate: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Panel B: Stage 2 regressions

Dependent variable:	class diff	class diff	class diff	married up	married up	married up
Predicted Sex Ratio	1.660***	2.705**	2.685**	-0.599***	-0.818**	-0.822**
	(0.626)	(1.082)	(1.132)	(0.216)	(0.386)	(0.393)
Rural		0.202***	0.193***		-0.032	-0.033
		(0.071)	(0.070)		(0.024)	(0.024)
% Female Managers		-0.027*	-0.025		0.003	0.003
		(0.016)	(0.016)		(0.006)	(0.006)
% Female Employees		-0.006	-0.005		-0.002	-0.002
		(0.023)	(0.023)		(0.007)	(0.007)
% Female Self-Employed		-0.006	-0.006		-0.003	-0.003
		(0.019)	(0.020)		(0.006)	(0.006)
% Female Unemployed		0.025	0.025		-0.007	-0.007
		(0.021)	(0.021)		(0.006)	(0.006)
Excess Foreign Males		-0.052	-0.051		-0.003	-0.002
		(0.065)	(0.065)		(0.018)	(0.018)
Groom's Age (/10)			0.032			0.017
			(0.048)			(0.015)
Bride's Age (/10)			-0.053			-0.010
			(0.048)			(0.015)
Groom Class Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Departement Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Linear Time Trend	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-Squared	0.236	0.241	0.243	0.270	0.272	0.272
Observations	3132	3114	3099	3008	2990	2976

Notes: These regressions use military mortality as a instrument for the sex ratio in IV regressions predicting bride class minus groom class, or whether the groom married a bride of at least as high class as his own. Panel A presents the stage 1 regressions, in which the dependent variable is the sex ratio. Military mortality is the mortality rate of soldiers as a percentage of the male population aged 18 to 59 in 1911, and is zero for marriages that occurred before the war. The sex ratio is defined as the number of men aged 18 to 59 divided by the number of women aged 15 to 49. Panel B presents the stage 2 regressions, in which the dependent variable is the bride's class minus the groom's class for columns one to three, and an indicator variable for the groom marrying a weakly higher class bride for the fourth to sixth columns. The omitted category for female occupations is workers. Excess foreign males is defined as the percentage of males who are foreign minus the percentage of females who are foreign. Standard errors, given in parentheses, are clustered at the level of variation in the variable sex ratio. Asterisks indicate: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Table 6.6: Men marry up more when the sex ratio is lower, IV

Panel A: Stage 1 regressions with sex ratio as the dependent variable

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Military Mortality	-0.010***	-0.007***	-0.007***	-0.010***	-0.007***	-0.007***
	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Rural		-0.000	-0.000		-0.000	-0.000
		(0.001)	(0.001)		(0.001)	(0.001)
% Female Managers		0.006***	0.006***		0.006***	0.006***
		(0.001)	(0.001)		(0.001)	(0.001)
% Female Employees		-0.005**	-0.005**		-0.005**	-0.005**
		(0.002)	(0.002)		(0.002)	(0.002)
% Female Self-Employed		-0.002	-0.002		-0.002	-0.002
		(0.002)	(0.002)		(0.002)	(0.002)
% Female Unemployed		-0.003**	-0.003**		-0.003**	-0.003**
		(0.001)	(0.001)		(0.001)	(0.001)
Excess Foreign Males		0.021***	0.021***		0.021***	0.021***
		(0.004)	(0.004)		(0.004)	(0.004)
Groom's Age (/10)			0.001			0.001
			(0.000)			(0.000)
Bride's Age (/10)			-0.001*			-0.001*
			(0.000)			(0.000)
Groom Class Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Departement Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Linear Time Trend	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-Squared	0.889	0.951	0.950	0.889	0.951	0.950
Observations	3132	3114	3099	3132	3114	3099

Notes: Standard errors, given in parentheses, are clustered at the level of variation in the variable sex ratio. Asterisks indicate: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Panel B: Stage 2 regressions

Dependent variable:	low bride	low bride	low bride	up/within/dn	up/within/dn	up/within/dn
Predicted Sex Ratio	1.157***	1.811***	1.849***	-0.756**	-1.215**	-1.159**
	(0.295)	(0.424)	(0.446)	(0.299)	(0.518)	(0.536)
Rural		-0.032	-0.033		-0.092***	-0.092***
		(0.026)	(0.026)		(0.034)	(0.034)
% Female Managers		-0.012**	-0.012**		0.007	0.007
		(0.006)	(0.006)		(0.008)	(0.008)
% Female Employees		0.000	0.001		-0.003	-0.003
		(0.009)	(0.009)		(0.012)	(0.012)
% Female Self-Employed		0.001	0.001		-0.005	-0.004
		(0.008)	(0.008)		(0.010)	(0.011)
% Female Unemployed		0.020***	0.019***		-0.012	-0.011
		(0.007)	(0.008)		(0.010)	(0.010)
Excess Foreign Males		-0.016	-0.017		0.002	0.001
		(0.019)	(0.019)		(0.028)	(0.029)
Groom's Age (/10)			0.014			0.006
			(0.018)			(0.022)
Bride's Age (/10)			-0.006			0.005
			(0.017)			(0.022)
Groom Class Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Departement Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Linear Time Trend	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-Squared	0.229	0.235	0.236	0.346	0.349	0.348
Observations	3132	3114	3099	3132	3114	3099

Notes: These regressions use military mortality as a instrument for the sex ratio in IV regressions predicting bride class minus groom class, or whether the groom married a bride of at least as high class as his own. Panel A presents the stage 1 regressions, in which the dependent variable is the sex ratio. Military mortality is the mortality rate of soldiers as a percentage of the male population aged 18 to 59 in 1911, and is zero for marriages that occurred before the war. The sex ratio is defined as the number of men aged 18 to 59 divided by the number of women aged 15 to 49. Panel B presents the stage 2 regressions, in which the dependent variable is an indicator for the bride being one of the three lowest classes (5, 6 and 7) for the first three columns, and a categorical variable that takes the value 0 if the bride was strictly lower class than the groom, the value 1 if the bride and groom were of the same class, and the value 2 if the bride was strictly higher class than the groom for the fourth to sixth columns. The omitted category for female occupations is workers. Excess foreign males is defined as the percentage of males who are foreign minus the percentage of females who are foreign. Standard errors, given in parentheses, are clustered at the level of variation in the variable sex ratio. Asterisks indicate: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Table 6.7: Women were more likely to be unmarried in areas with higher mortality rates and lower sex ratios

Dependent variable: fraction of women who aren't married

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Military Mortality	0.003***	0.003***	0.005***	0.003***				
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)				
Sex Ratio					-0.300***	-0.295***	-0.255***	-0.028
					(0.032)	(0.023)	(0.036)	(0.026)
Departement Dummies	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Census Period Dummies	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
R-Squared	0.136	0.914	0.208	0.974	0.254	0.911	0.293	0.967
Observations	254	254	254	254	260	260	260	260

Notes: An observation is a departement in a census period (1911, 1921 or 1926). The sex ratio is defined as men aged 18-59 divided by women aged 15-49. Military mortality is the mortality rate of soldiers as a percentage of the male population aged 18 to 59 in 1911, and is zero for marriages that occurred before the war. Unmarried women include women who have never been married, widowed women, and divorced women. Standard errors are given in parentheses. Asterisks indicate: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Figure 7.1: Pre-WWI matching was assortative according to age



Note: For ease of presentation, the figure contains only marriages in which the bride was aged 15 to 49 and the groom was aged 18 to 59. This excludes 3.4% of pre-WWI marriages.

Figure 7.2. The distribution of age difference before and after WWI

Panel 1





Panel 2


Cumulative distribution of age difference
grooms aged 18-27 in high-mortality departements
cumulative proportion
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
-20
-10
0
10
20
bride's age minus groom's age
95% pre-war confidence interval
pre war
post war


Cumulative distribution of age difference
grooms aged 18-27 in low-mortality departements
cumulative proportion
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
-20
-10
0
10
20
bride's age minus groom's age
95% pre-war confidence interval
pre war
post war

Panel 3


Cumulative distribution of age difference
grooms aged 28-59 in high-mortality departements
cumulative proportion
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
-20
-10
0
10
20
bride's age minus groom's age
95% pre-war confidence interval
pre war
post war


Cumulative distribution of age difference
grooms aged 28-59 in low-mortality departements
cumulative proportion
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
-20
-10
0
10
20
bride's age minus groom's age
95% pre-war confidence interval
pre war
post war

Table 7.1: Predicting bride's age minus groom's age, OLS

Dependent variable: bride's age minus groom's age	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Military Mortality	0.106***	0.112***				
	(0.019)	(0.021)				
Mortality, Grooms 21 and younger			0.101*			
			(0.054)			
Mortality, Grooms 22 to 24			0.104***			
			(0.022)			
Mortality, Grooms 25 to 27			0.141***			
			(0.027)			
Mortality, Grooms 28 to 30			0.114***			
			(0.029)			
Mortality, Grooms 31 to 33			0.086**			
			(0.035)			
Mortality, Grooms 34 to 44			0.092*			
			(0.048)			
Mortality, Grooms 45 and older			0.081			
			(0.072)			
Sex Ratio				-6.693***	-6.970***	
				(2.203)	(2.306)	
Sex Ratio, Grooms 21 and younger						-6.607
						(4.037)
Sex Ratio, Grooms 22 to 24						-5.073**
						(2.510)
Sex Ratio, Grooms 25 to 27						-9.885***
						(2.560)
Sex Ratio, Grooms 28 to 30						-8.726***
						(2.398)
Sex Ratio, Grooms 31 to 33						-7.749*
						(3.991)
Sex Ratio, Grooms 34 to 44						-2.751
						(3.809)
Sex Ratio, Grooms 45 and older						-6.075
						(6.045)
Grooms 22 to 24 yrs	-1.982***	-1.939***	-1.964***	-1.993***	-1.959***	-3.518
	(0.262)	(0.240)	(0.631)	(0.200)	(0.203)	(3.137)
Grooms 25 to 27 yrs	-3.571***	-3.503***	-3.810***	-3.542***	-3.475***	-0.129
	(0.376)	(0.353)	(0.721)	(0.237)	(0.236)	(2.771)
Grooms 28 to 30 yrs	-4.813***	-4.735***	-4.847***	-4.779***	-4.702***	-2.564
	(0.411)	(0.388)	(0.842)	(0.279)	(0.278)	(3.591)
Grooms 31 to 33 yrs	-6.222***	-6.141***	-6.048***	-6.274***	-6.191***	-5.043
	(0.329)	(0.317)	(0.701)	(0.351)	(0.338)	(3.561)
Grooms 34 to 44 yrs	-7.689***	-7.580***	-7.526***	-7.599***	-7.486***	-11.364***
	(0.418)	(0.399)	(0.914)	(0.326)	(0.324)	(4.022)
Grooms 45+ yrs	-11.529***	-11.451***	-11.316***	-11.459***	-11.366***	-11.901*
	(0.441)	(0.422)	(0.626)	(0.485)	(0.490)	(6.701)
Rural	-0.600***	-0.445***	-0.444***	-0.537***	-0.383**	-0.377**
	(0.154)	(0.126)	(0.127)	(0.163)	(0.173)	(0.170)
Excess Foreign Males	-0.222**	-0.235***	-0.242***	-0.121	-0.129	-0.135
	(0.087)	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.186)	(0.184)	(0.183)
% Females 20-29	0.288***	0.321***	0.343***	0.294	0.328	0.318
	(0.093)	(0.089)	(0.095)	(0.303)	(0.306)	(0.305)
% Females 30-39	0.464***	0.517***	0.536***	0.279	0.322	0.339
	(0.078)	(0.079)	(0.083)	(0.224)	(0.227)	(0.226)
% Females 40-49	0.135	0.180*	0.208**	0.056	0.102	0.105
	(0.103)	(0.098)	(0.098)	(0.279)	(0.281)	(0.283)
Groom Class Dummies	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Bride Class Dummies	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Departement Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Linear Time Trend	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-Squared	0.265	0.270	0.270	0.259	0.265	0.266
Observations	5832	5832	5832	6067	6067	6067

Notes: The dependent variable is the age of the bride minus the age of the groom. Military mortality is the mortality rate of soldiers as a percentage of the male population aged 18 to 59 in 1911, and is zero for marriages that occurred before the war. Sex ratio is defined as the number of men aged 18 to 59 divided by the number of women aged 15 to 49. The omitted category for groom age is 21 and younger. Excess foreign males is defined as the percentage of males who are foreign minus the percentage of females who are foreign. The female population age groups are calculated as percentages of the female population aged 15 to 49. The omitted category is age 15 to 19. Pre-war marriages take the female age distribution from 1911; post-war marriages take the female age distribution from 1921. Female occupation distribution controls are the percentages of the female labour force who are: managers, employees, workers, self-employed and unemployed. In the sex ratio regressions, female occupations and excess foreign males vary over the three census periods. In the mortality regressions, female occupations and excess foreign males vary pre/post war. Class dummies include, for bride and groom, six dummies for actual class (omitting one class), a "no occupation" dummy, and an "other missing" dummy. Standard errors, given in parentheses, are clustered at the level of variation in either the sex ratio or military mortality. Asterisks indicate: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Figure 7.3: Distribution of grooms' and brides' ages before and after the war





Table 7.2: Predicting bride's age minus groom's age, IV

Panel A: Stage 1 regressions with sex ratio as the dependent variable

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Military Mortality	-0.007***	-0.007***	
	(0.001)	(0.001)	
Grooms 22 to 24 yrs	0.001	0.001	
	(0.001)	(0.001)	
Grooms 25 to 27 yrs	0.001	0.001	
	(0.001)	(0.001)	
Grooms 28 to 30 yrs	0.001	0.002	
	(0.001)	(0.001)	
Grooms 31 to 33 yrs	0.001	0.001	
	(0.001)	(0.001)	
Grooms 34 to 44 yrs	0.001	0.001	
	(0.001)	(0.001)	
Grooms 45+ yrs	0.001	0.001	not
	(0.001)	(0.001)	presented
Rural	-0.000	0.000	
	(0.001)	(0.001)	
Excess Foreign Males	0.020***	0.020***	
	(0.002)	(0.002)	
% Females 20-29	0.039***	0.039***	
	(0.009)	(0.009)	
% Females 30-39	0.009	0.009	
	(0.006)	(0.006)	
% Females 40-49	0.004	0.004	
	(0.009)	(0.009)	
Groom Class Dummies	No	Yes	
Bride Class Dummies	No	Yes	
Departement Dummies	Yes	Yes	
Linear Time Trend	Yes	Yes	
R-Squared	0.934	0.934	
Observations	5802	5802	

Notes: Standard errors, given in parentheses, are clustered at the level of variation in the variable sex ratio. Asterisks indicate: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Panel B: Stage 2 regressions with dependent variable bride's age minus groom's age

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Sex Ratio	-18.839***	-19.942***	
	(3.888)	(4.045)	
Sex Ratio, Grooms 21 and younger			-14.174
			(12.866)
Sex Ratio, Grooms 22 to 24			-18.557***
			(5.764)
Sex Ratio, Grooms 25 to 27			-25.955***
			(5.912)
Sex Ratio, Grooms 28 to 30			-18.784***
			(5.438)
Sex Ratio, Grooms 31 to 33			-13.416
			(8.526)
Sex Ratio, Grooms 34 to 44			-14.708
			(11.152)
Sex Ratio, Grooms 45 and older			-9.454
			(27.910)
Grooms 22 to 24 yrs	-1.959***	-1.914***	2.511
	(0.203)	(0.206)	(14.111)
Grooms 25 to 27 yrs	-3.557***	-3.489***	8.487
	(0.245)	(0.244)	(14.479)
Grooms 28 to 30 yrs	-4.783***	-4.704***	-0.053
	(0.287)	(0.285)	(14.276)
Grooms 31 to 33 yrs	-6.219***	-6.138***	-6.895
	(0.354)	(0.338)	(14.484)
Grooms 34 to 44 yrs	-7.690***	-7.580***	-7.015
	(0.332)	(0.328)	(16.986)
Grooms 45+ yrs	-11.483***	-11.405***	-16.095
	(0.491)	(0.494)	(31.080)
Rural	-0.599***	-0.435**	-0.429**
	(0.162)	(0.173)	(0.169)
Excess Foreign Males	0.238	0.253	0.228
	(0.170)	(0.169)	(0.174)
% Females 20-29	0.743**	0.829***	0.861**
	(0.313)	(0.322)	(0.361)
% Females 30-39	0.742***	0.808***	0.835***
	(0.242)	(0.253)	(0.268)
% Females 40-49	0.338	0.393	0.439
	(0.265)	(0.276)	(0.316)
Groom Class Dummies	No	Yes	Yes
Bride Class Dummies	No	Yes	Yes
Departement Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes
Linear Time Trend	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-Squared	0.263	0.268	0.267
Observations	5802	5802	5802

Notes: These regressions use military mortality as a instrument for the sex ratio in IV regressions predicting the age of the bride minus the age of the groom. Panel A presents the stage 1 regressions, in which the dependent variable is the sex ratio. The sex ratio is defined as the number of men aged 18 to 59 divided by the number of women aged 15 to 49. The instrument, military mortality, is the mortality rate of soldiers as a percentage of the male population aged 18 to 59 in 1911, and is zero for marriages that occurred before the war. Panel B presents the stage 2 regressions, in which the dependent variable is the bride's age minus the groom's age. The stage 1 regressions for specification 3, in which there are seven instruments, are not presented. The omitted category for groom age is 21 and younger. Excess foreign males is defined as the percentage of males who are foreign minus the percentage of females who are foreign. The female population age groups are calculated as percentages of the female population aged 15 to 49. The omitted category is age 15 to 19. Pre-war marriages take the female age distribution from 1911; post-war marriages take the female age distribution from 1921. Female occupation distribution controls are the percentages of the female labour force who are: managers, employees, workers, self-employed and unemployed. In the sex ratio regressions, female occupations and excess foreign males vary over the three census periods. In the mortality regressions, female occupations and excess foreign males vary pre/post war. Class dummies include, for bride and groom, six dummies for actual class (omitting one class), a "no occupation" dummy, and an "other missing" dummy. Standard errors, given in parentheses, are clustered at the level of variation in the sex ratio. Asterisks indicate: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Appendix A: Variable definitions

Dependent variables:

Assortative matching by class (see class definition in section 4.1)
Bride minus groom class: This variable is the class of the bride minus the class of the groom, which is a marriage-level variable.
Married up: The variable the groom married up is a marriage-level dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the bride is in at least as high a class as the groom.
Low bride class: This is a marriage-level dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the bride is class 5, 6 or 7. That is, if she is a low-skilled or unskilled manual or farm worker.
Married down/up/within: This is a marriage-level variable that takes the value 0 if the bride is strictly lower class than the groom, the value 1 if the bride and groom are of the same class, and the value 2 if the bride is strictly higher class than the groom.

Assortative matching by age
Bride minus groom's age: This variable is the age of the bride minus the age of the groom, which is a marriage-level variable.

Main independent variables:

Sex ratio: The sex ratio is defined as the number of men aged 18 to 59 years divided by the number of women aged 15 to 49 years. It is defined at the *département* level for each census period, namely 1911, 1921 and 1926. Thus marriages in the period 1909 to 1914 take the value from 1911, marriages in the period 1918 to 1923 take the value from 1921, and marriages in the period 1924 to 1928 take the value from 1926.
Military mortality: We use military mortality data from the French ministry of defense.[1] Military mortality is defined at the département-level as a percentage of the male population aged 18 to 59 in 1911; we set its value to zero for marriages that occurred before WWI.

Other control variables:

Départements: We use the 90 historical *départements* that existed at the end of WWI. These départements include Moselle, Bas-Rhin and Haut-Rhin, which were gained from Germany in 1919. However, we do not have département-level data from the census for the pre-war period for these three départements. Consequently, when we include département dummies, observations from these three départements do not contribute to the estimation of the coefficient on military mortality, and have a limited influence on the coefficient on the sex ratio.
Female occupation variables (% managers, % employees, % unemployed, % self-employed): In the censuses of 1906, 1921 and 1926, the female labor force is categorized into five groups: managers, employees, workers, unemployed and self-employed. With workers as the omitted category, we use four variables for the percentage of the female labor force that falls into each of the other categories at the *département* level. Marriages in the period 1909 to 1914 take the values from the 1906 census. Marriages in the period 1918 to 1923 take the values from the 1921 census. Marriages in the period 1924 to 1928 take the values from the 1921 census in regressions where the mortality rate and not the sex ratio is included as an explanatory variable, and take the values from the 1926 census in the IV

[1] Data and documentation are available at http://www.memoiredeshommes.sga.defense.gouv.fr/.

regressions and the other regressions where the sex ratio and not the mortality rate is included as an explanatory variable.

Female population age groups (% Females 20-29, % Females 30-39, % Females 40-49): They are calculated at the *département* level as percentage of the female population aged 15-49. Women aged 15 to 19 is the omitted category. Marriages in the period 1909 to 1914 take the values from the 1911 census. Marriages in the period 1918 to 1928 take the values from the 1921 census.

Excess foreign males: This variable is defined as foreign males as a percentage of total males minus foreign females as a percentage of total females at the *département* level. We define as foreign all individuals classified by the census as *foreign* or *naturalised French*, regardless of their place of birth. Individuals classified as *French* by the census are considered to not be foreign, regardless of whether they were born in France or not. Marriages in the period 1909 to 1914 take the values from the 1911 census. Marriages in the period 1918 to 1923 take the values from the 1921 census. Marriages in the period 1924 to 1928 take the values from the 1921 census in regressions where the mortality rate and not the sex ratio is included as an explanatory variable, and take the values from the 1926 census in the IV regressions and the other regressions where the sex ratio and not the mortality rate is included as an explanatory variable.

Rural: This a dummy variable defined at the marriage level. It is defined in terms of the administrative status of the place of marriage, which may take the values *chef lieu de département*, *chef lieu d'arrondissement*, *chef-lieu de canton*, and *rural*. We consider the category *rural* to indicate a rural marriage, and the other three categories to indicate urban marriages.

Groom's age: The age of the groom is constructed from three marriage-level variables: the age of the groom, the year of the marriage and the groom's year of birth. If the stated age of the groom falls in the range 10 to 89, this is the value used. If it does not, or the age of the groom is missing, we use the difference between the year of marriage and the groom's year of birth if this falls in the range 10 to 89. Otherwise the groom's age is missing.

Bride's age: Same as groom's age.

Appendix B: Probit regressions

Table B1: Men marry up more where military mortality was higher, probit

Dependent variable:						
	married up	married up	married up	low bride	low bride	low bride
Military Mortality	0.008***	0.007***	0.007***	-0.015***	-0.014***	-0.014***
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Rural		-0.041	-0.042		-0.043	-0.045
		(0.026)	(0.026)		(0.028)	(0.027)
% Female Managers		-0.007*	-0.008**		-0.001	0.000
		(0.004)	(0.004)		(0.005)	(0.005)
% Female Employees		0.010**	0.008*		-0.022***	-0.023***
		(0.004)	(0.004)		(0.006)	(0.006)
% Female Self-Employed		-0.013***	-0.013***		0.004	0.005
		(0.004)	(0.004)		(0.004)	(0.005)
% Female Unemployed		-0.054***	-0.053***		0.063***	0.066***
		(0.007)	(0.007)		(0.009)	(0.009)
Excess Foreign Males		-0.025*	-0.026*		0.045***	0.046***
		(0.014)	(0.015)		(0.015)	(0.015)
Groom's Age			0.002			0.002
			(0.002)			(0.001)
Bride's Age			-0.000			-0.001
			(0.002)			(0.002)
Groom Class Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Departement Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Linear Time Trend	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3000	2978	2964	3103	3080	3065

Notes: The dependent variable for the first three columns is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the bride was at least as high class as the groom. The dependent variable for columns four to six is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the bride was of low class (class 5, 6 or 7). Marginal effects are presented; the coefficients for the dummy variable rural are for a discrete change from 0 to 1. Military mortality is the mortality rate of soldiers as a percentage of the male population aged 18 to 59 in 1911, and is zero for marriages that occurred before the war. The omitted category for female occupations is workers. Excess foreign males is defined as the percentage of males who are foreign minus the percentage of females who are foreign. Standard errors, given in parentheses, are clustered at the level of variation in the variable military mortality. Asterisks indicate: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Table B2: Men marry up more when the sex ratio is lower, probit

Dependent variable:						
	married up	married up	married up	low bride	low bride	low bride
Sex Ratio	-0.573***	-0.892**	-0.901**	0.912***	1.713***	1.761***
	(0.186)	(0.351)	(0.353)	(0.262)	(0.352)	(0.366)
Rural		-0.053*	-0.054*		-0.034	-0.036
		(0.030)	(0.031)		(0.032)	(0.032)
% Female Managers		0.003	0.003		-0.012	-0.012
		(0.008)	(0.008)		(0.008)	(0.008)
% Female Employees		-0.007	-0.008		-0.002	-0.002
		(0.009)	(0.009)		(0.010)	(0.011)
% Female Self-Employed		-0.006	-0.007		0.002	0.002
		(0.007)	(0.007)		(0.009)	(0.009)
% Female Unemployed		-0.004	-0.003		0.023***	0.023***
		(0.007)	(0.007)		(0.008)	(0.009)
Excess Foreign Males		-0.003	-0.001		0.008	0.007
		(0.021)	(0.021)		(0.025)	(0.025)
Groom's Age			0.002			0.001
			(0.002)			(0.002)
Bride's Age			-0.001			-0.001
			(0.002)			(0.002)
Groom Class Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Departement Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Linear Time Trend	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3050	3032	3018	3156	3138	3123

Notes: The dependent variable for the first three columns is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the bride was at least as high class as the groom. The dependent variable for columns four to six is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the bride was of low class (class 5, 6 or 7). Marginal effects are presented; the coefficients for the dummy variable rural are for a discrete change from 0 to 1. Sex ratio is defined as the number of men aged 18 to 59 divided by the number of women aged 15 to 49. The omitted category for female occupations is workers. Excess foreign males is defined as the percentage of males who are foreign minus the percentage of females who are foreign. Standard errors, given in parentheses, are clustered at the level of variation in the variable sex ratio. Asterisks indicate: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Appendix C: Effect of sex ratio by social class

Table C1: The effect of mortality on marrying up by groom class

Dependent variable:						
	class diff	class diff	class diff	married up	married up	married up
Military Mortality, Class 1 Grooms	-0.013	-0.008	-0.008	0.012	0.010	0.010
	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Military Mortality, Class 2 Grooms	-0.034*	-0.032*	-0.032*	0.013*	0.012	0.012
	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Military Mortality, Class 3 Grooms	-0.008	-0.006	-0.006	-0.003	-0.005	-0.004
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Military Mortality, Class 4 Grooms	-0.015**	-0.011	-0.010	0.006**	0.006*	0.006*
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Military Mortality, Class 5 Grooms	-0.019*	-0.018*	-0.018*	0.008***	0.008**	0.008**
	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Military Mortality, Class 6 Grooms	-0.017	-0.013	-0.010	0.002	0.003	0.003
	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Military Mortality, Class 7 Grooms	0.002	0.004	-0.001			
	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.018)			
Rural	0.200***	0.199***	0.189***	-0.030	-0.032	-0.033
	(0.064)	(0.065)	(0.064)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)
% Female Managers		-0.012	-0.008		-0.006**	-0.007**
		(0.008)	(0.008)		(0.003)	(0.003)
% Female Employees		-0.048***	-0.048***		0.008**	0.007*
		(0.011)	(0.011)		(0.004)	(0.004)
% Female Self-Employed		-0.019	-0.017		-0.013***	-0.013***
		(0.012)	(0.012)		(0.004)	(0.004)
% Female Unemployed		0.096***	0.100***		-0.046***	-0.045***
		(0.016)	(0.016)		(0.005)	(0.005)
Excess Foreign Males		-0.036	-0.033		-0.027**	-0.028**
		(0.043)	(0.043)		(0.013)	(0.013)
Groom's Age			0.004			0.002
			(0.003)			(0.001)
Bride's Age			-0.006			-0.001
			(0.004)			(0.001)
Groom Class Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Departement Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Linear Time Trend	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-Squared	0.244	0.242	0.244	0.275	0.277	0.277
Observations	3158	3132	3117	3033	3008	2994

Notes: The dependent variable for the first three columns is the class of the bride minus the class of the groom, where a higher value for class corresponds to a lower class. The dependent variable for the fourth to sixth columns is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the bride was at least as high class as the groom. Military mortality is the mortality rate of soldiers as a percentage of the male population aged 18 to 59 in 1911, and is zero for marriages that occurred before the war. "Military mortality, class 1 grooms" is the interaction of military mortality with a dummy for class 1 grooms, and similarly for the other classes. The omitted category for female occupations is workers. Excess foreign males is defined as the percentage of males who are foreign minus the percentage of females who are foreign. Standard errors, given in parentheses, are clustered at the level of variation in the variable military mortality. Asterisks indicate: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Table C2: The effect of mortality on marrying up by groom class

Dependent variable:						
	low bride	low bride	low bride	up/within/dn	up/within/dn	up/within/dn
Military Mortality, Class 1 Grooms	-0.005	-0.003	-0.003	0.015	0.012	0.012
	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Military Mortality, Class 2 Grooms	-0.015**	-0.014**	-0.014**	0.018**	0.018**	0.017**
	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Military Mortality, Class 3 Grooms	-0.009***	-0.009***	-0.009***	0.000	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Military Mortality, Class 4 Grooms	-0.011***	-0.009***	-0.010***	0.007*	0.006	0.005
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Military Mortality, Class 5 Grooms	-0.009**	-0.009**	-0.010**	0.010*	0.010*	0.009
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Military Mortality, Class 6 Grooms	-0.013***	-0.012***	-0.012***	0.003	0.001	-0.001
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Military Mortality, Class 7 Grooms	-0.015***	-0.013**	-0.014***	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Rural	-0.030	-0.031	-0.033	-0.089**	-0.091***	-0.090**
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.035)
% Female Managers		0.002	0.003		-0.005	-0.005
		(0.003)	(0.003)		(0.003)	(0.003)
% Female Employees		-0.016***	-0.017***		0.016***	0.016***
		(0.004)	(0.004)		(0.005)	(0.005)
% Female Self-Employed		0.005	0.005		-0.003	-0.003
		(0.004)	(0.004)		(0.005)	(0.005)
% Female Unemployed		0.052***	0.054***		-0.053***	-0.053***
		(0.007)	(0.007)		(0.007)	(0.007)
Excess Foreign Males		0.037***	0.038***		-0.017	-0.017
		(0.013)	(0.013)		(0.017)	(0.018)
Groom's Age			0.002			0.000
			(0.001)			(0.002)
Bride's Age			-0.001			0.001
			(0.002)			(0.002)
Groom Class Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Departement Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Linear Time Trend	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-Squared	0.235	0.236	0.236	0.350	0.351	0.351
Observations	3158	3132	3117	3158	3132	3117

Notes: The dependent variable for the first three columns is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the bride was of low class (class 5, 6 or 7). The dependent variable for the fourth to sixth columns is a categorical variable that takes the value 0 if the bride was strictly lower class than the groom, the value 1 if the bride and groom were of the same class, and the value 2 if the bride was strictly higher class than the groom. Military mortality is the mortality rate of soldiers as a percentage of the male population aged 18 to 59 in 1911, and is zero for marriages that occurred before the war. "Military mortality, class 1 grooms" is the interaction of military mortality with a dummy for class 1 grooms, and similarly for the other classes. The omitted category for female occupations is workers. Excess foreign males is defined as the percentage of males who are foreign minus the percentage of females who are foreign. Standard errors, given in parentheses, are clustered at the level of variation in the variable military mortality. Asterisks indicate: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Table C3: The effect of sex ratio on marrying up by groom class

Dependent variable:						
	class diff	class diff	class diff	married up	married up	married up
Sex Ratio, Class 1 Grooms	3.794**	4.960***	4.923***	-0.019	-0.274	-0.284
	(1.880)	(1.859)	(1.847)	(0.629)	(0.669)	(0.653)
Sex Ratio, Class 2 Grooms	2.237***	3.400***	3.353***	-1.046***	-1.308***	-1.343***
	(0.816)	(1.020)	(1.029)	(0.292)	(0.420)	(0.422)
Sex Ratio, Class 3 Grooms	0.539	1.630*	1.653*	-0.477*	-0.730*	-0.765*
	(0.609)	(0.873)	(0.884)	(0.252)	(0.391)	(0.389)
Sex Ratio, Class 4 Grooms	0.608	1.503*	1.456*	-0.575*	-0.790**	-0.791**
	(0.665)	(0.820)	(0.853)	(0.309)	(0.367)	(0.371)
Sex Ratio, Class 5 Grooms	1.081	2.138**	2.138**	-0.243	-0.494	-0.519
	(0.831)	(0.951)	(0.958)	(0.273)	(0.387)	(0.387)
Sex Ratio, Class 6 Grooms	-1.362	-0.517	-0.487	0.479**	0.258	0.232
	(1.477)	(1.486)	(1.508)	(0.240)	(0.323)	(0.323)
Sex Ratio, Class 7 Grooms	-0.390	0.493	0.746			
	(1.734)	(1.787)	(1.788)			
Rural	0.206***	0.207***	0.198***	-0.039	-0.039	-0.041*
	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)
% Female Managers		-0.017	-0.015		0.002	0.002
		(0.015)	(0.015)		(0.006)	(0.006)
% Female Employees		-0.002	-0.001		-0.005	-0.006
		(0.023)	(0.023)		(0.007)	(0.007)
% Female Self-Employed		-0.002	-0.001		-0.006	-0.006
		(0.018)	(0.019)		(0.006)	(0.006)
% Female Unemployed		0.026	0.025		-0.005	-0.004
		(0.020)	(0.021)		(0.006)	(0.006)
Excess Foreign Males		-0.009	-0.009		-0.006	-0.005
		(0.063)	(0.064)		(0.016)	(0.016)
Groom's Age			0.002			0.002
			(0.005)			(0.002)
Bride's Age			-0.005			-0.001
			(0.005)			(0.002)
Groom Class Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Departement Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Linear Time Trend	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-Squared	0.238	0.240	0.242	0.274	0.275	0.275
Observations	3208	3190	3175	3080	3062	3048

Notes: The dependent variable for the first three columns is the class of the bride minus the class of the groom, where a higher value for class corresponds to a lower class. The dependent variable for the fourth to sixth columns is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the bride was at least as high class as the groom. Sex ratio is defined as the number of men aged 18 to 59 divided by the number of women aged 15 to 49. "Sex ratio, class 1 grooms" is the interaction of sex ratio with a dummy for class 1 grooms, and similarly for the other classes. The omitted category for female occupations is workers. Excess foreign males is defined as the percentage of males who are foreign minus the percentage of females who are foreign. Standard errors, given in parentheses, are clustered at the level of variation in the variable sex ratio. Asterisks indicate: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Table C4: The effect of sex ratio on marrying up by groom class

Dependent variable:						
	low bride	low bride	low bride	up/within/dn	up/within/dn	up/within/dn
Sex Ratio, Class 1 Grooms	1.818***	2.533***	2.550***	0.247	-0.275	-0.248
	(0.586)	(0.533)	(0.540)	(0.701)	(0.768)	(0.757)
Sex Ratio, Class 2 Grooms	0.907***	1.646***	1.665***	-0.952***	-1.479***	-1.469***
	(0.325)	(0.396)	(0.399)	(0.351)	(0.493)	(0.497)
Sex Ratio, Class 3 Grooms	0.735***	1.415***	1.463***	-0.556	-1.064**	-1.064**
	(0.255)	(0.342)	(0.347)	(0.338)	(0.471)	(0.472)
Sex Ratio, Class 4 Grooms	0.805***	1.321***	1.334***	-0.607	-1.071**	-1.042**
	(0.290)	(0.334)	(0.342)	(0.409)	(0.462)	(0.470)
Sex Ratio, Class 5 Grooms	0.585*	1.245***	1.271***	-0.712	-1.209**	-1.194**
	(0.352)	(0.383)	(0.389)	(0.511)	(0.601)	(0.598)
Sex Ratio, Class 6 Grooms	-0.115	0.446	0.480	0.686	0.273	0.259
	(0.494)	(0.463)	(0.473)	(0.611)	(0.656)	(0.666)
Sex Ratio, Class 7 Grooms	0.305	0.870	0.964	-0.373	-0.790	-0.798
	(0.591)	(0.581)	(0.588)	(0.623)	(0.672)	(0.684)
Rural	-0.026	-0.027	-0.029	-0.098***	-0.098***	-0.098***
	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.035)
% Female Managers		-0.008	-0.008		0.007	0.007
		(0.006)	(0.006)		(0.008)	(0.008)
% Female Employees		0.001	0.001		-0.004	-0.004
		(0.009)	(0.009)		(0.012)	(0.012)
% Female Self-Employed		0.002	0.002		-0.006	-0.006
		(0.007)	(0.008)		(0.010)	(0.010)
% Female Unemployed		0.018**	0.018**		-0.011	-0.011
		(0.007)	(0.007)		(0.010)	(0.010)
Excess Foreign Males		0.003	0.002		-0.008	-0.007
		(0.019)	(0.019)		(0.028)	(0.028)
Groom's Age			0.001			0.001
			(0.002)			(0.002)
Bride's Age			-0.001			0.000
			(0.002)			(0.002)
Groom Class Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Departement Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Linear Time Trend	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-Squared	0.229	0.234	0.234	0.348	0.350	0.349
Observations	3208	3190	3175	3208	3190	3175

Notes: The dependent variable for the first three columns is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the bride was of low class (class 5, 6 or 7). The dependent variable for the fourth to sixth columns is a categorical variable that takes the value 0 if the bride was strictly lower class than the groom, the value 1 if the bride and groom were of the same class, and the value 2 if the bride was strictly higher class than the groom. Sex ratio is defined as the number of men aged 18 to 59 divided by the number of women aged 15 to 49. "Sex ratio, class 1 grooms" is the interaction of sex ratio with a dummy for class 1 grooms, and similarly for the other classes. The omitted category for female occupations is workers. Excess foreign males is defined as the percentage of males who are foreign minus the percentage of females who are foreign. Standard errors, given in parentheses, are clustered at the level of variation in the variable sex ratio. Asterisks indicate: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Appendix D: Investigating the magnitude of men's social ascension

We point out in Section 6.3.3 that there is heterogeneity in the impact of the change in sex ratio on marriage outcome by class, with men in lowest classes benefiting the least. This heterogeneity may be the results of various effects: (i) a mechanical effect due to different class sizes, or (ii) difference in the relative desirability of various social classes. We investigate here in a stylized framework whether the mechanical effect would imply that middle class men improve their marriage outcomes the most. We start with an economy where the sex ratio is equal to 1 and consider a set-up where men and women desire to marry the highest classes they can. If the number of men and women in each class were identical, there would be perfect assortative matching. However, if we look at the distribution of occupation classes in France for the pre-war period among married individuals, we see that there is some imbalance (see Table D1). For example, out of each 100 marriages, there are 1.1 brides of class 1 and 5.5 grooms of class 1. This implies that out of these 5.5 grooms, only 1.1 grooms can marry class 1 brides, while the remaining 4.4 class will marry class 2 brides. This leaves only 5.2 class 2 brides to marry class 2 grooms. A large proportion of the class 2 grooms will thus marry class 3 brides. We repeat this exercise for each grooms' class and obtain the average class of the bride for each grooms' class for what we call the 'pre-shock' period (see Table D2). For example, the theoretical pre-shock average class of brides for groom of class 3 is 3.3 (while this average is equal to 3.9 in our data).

We then introduce a demographic shock by reducing uniformly across classes the number of men by 8.74%. Thus, the economy has now a sex-ratio of 91.3%, implying that 8.74% of the women will remain single. We construct marriage outcomes using the same algorithm presented above. Table D2 presents the new post-shock average class of the brides. We can see that due to the shortage of men in higher classes, classes 5, 6 and 7 grooms are now able to marry exclusively classes 5 brides. When we compute the theoretical average gain due solely to the mechanical effect (the theoretical post-shock average class of the brides minus the theoretical pre-shock average class of the brides), we see that classes 6 and 7 mechanically are the big winners from the shock. As a comparison, we present the average gain implied by regression where sex ratio is interacted with class of the grooms with a similar decrease in sex ratio, and conclude, as was pointed out earlier, that in terms of magnitude, classes 2, 4 and 5 benefited the most from the change in sex ratio, while classes 6 and 7 did not improve their marriage outcomes.

This stylized framework suggests that the mechanical effect may not be solely responsible for the differential impact of a change in sex ratio across classes.

Table D1: Distribution of classes in France 1909-1914 among married individuals

Class	Brides	Grooms
1	1.1	5.5
2	9.6	17.9
3	30.6	24.2
4	14.9	23.0
5	33.3	20.1
6	6.4	5.4
7	4.1	4.0

Table D2: Average class of brides for each class of grooms

Groom's class	Theoretical pre-shock	Theoretical post-shock	*Theoretical average gain*	Pre-war in the data	Post-war in the data	*Average gain from estimation of table C3 (third columns)*
1	1.79	1.77	*0.02*	2.80	2.60	0.43
2	2.71	2.65	*0.06*	3.46	3.05	0.29
3	3.26	3.09	*0.16*	3.89	3.73	0.14
4	4.62	4.39	*0.23*	4.28	4.14	0.13
5	5.05	5.00	*0.05*	4.35	4.14	0.19
6	6.02	5.00	*1.02*	4.74	4.78	-0.04
7	7.00	5.00	*2.00*	5.20	5.44	0.07

Appendix E: Effect of sex ratio in urban and rural localities

Table E1: The effect of mortality on marrying up is similar in rural and urban areas

Dependent variable:						
	class diff	class diff	class diff	married up	married up	married up
Urban Military Mortality	-0.015*	-0.012	-0.013*	0.005*	0.004	0.004
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Rural Military Mortality	-0.016**	-0.012*	-0.012*	0.006***	0.005**	0.005**
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Rural	0.206***	0.194***	0.175***	-0.031	-0.035	-0.039*
	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.021)
% Female Managers		-0.010	-0.007		-0.006**	-0.007**
		(0.008)	(0.008)		(0.003)	(0.003)
% Female Employees		-0.049***	-0.048***		0.009**	0.007**
		(0.010)	(0.009)		(0.004)	(0.004)
% Female Self-Employed		-0.021**	-0.019*		-0.012***	-0.013***
		(0.009)	(0.010)		(0.003)	(0.003)
% Female Unemployed		0.094***	0.098***		-0.047***	-0.046***
		(0.016)	(0.016)		(0.005)	(0.005)
Excess Foreign Males		-0.055	-0.051		-0.024**	-0.025**
		(0.040)	(0.041)		(0.011)	(0.011)
Groom's Age			0.004			0.002
			(0.003)			(0.001)
Bride's Age			-0.006			-0.001
			(0.004)			(0.001)
Groom Class Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Departement Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Linear Time Trend	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-Squared	0.243	0.241	0.243	0.271	0.273	0.273
Observations	3158	3132	3117	3033	3008	2994

Notes: The dependent variable for the first three columns is the class of the bride minus the class of the groom, where a higher value for class corresponds to a lower class. The dependent variable for the fourth to sixth columns is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the bride was at least as high class as the groom. Military mortality is the mortality rate of soldiers as a percentage of the male population aged 18 to 59 in 1911, and is zero for marriages that occurred before the war. Urban military mortality is an urban dummy interacted with military mortality; rural military mortality is a rural dummy interacted with military mortality. The omitted category for female occupations is workers. Excess foreign males is defined as the percentage of males who are foreign minus the percentage of females who are foreign. Standard errors, given in parentheses, are clustered at the level of variation in the variable military mortality. Asterisks indicate: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Table E2: The effect of mortality on marrying up is similar in rural and urban areas

Dependent variable:	low bride	low bride	low bride	up/within/dn	up/within/dn	up/within/dn
Urban Military Mortality	-0.009**	-0.009***	-0.009***	0.010**	0.009**	0.009**
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Rural Military Mortality	-0.012***	-0.010***	-0.011***	0.006*	0.005	0.004
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Rural	-0.010	-0.020	-0.024	-0.056**	-0.052*	-0.049*
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.026)
% Female Managers		0.002	0.003		-0.005	-0.005
		(0.003)	(0.003)		(0.003)	(0.003)
% Female Employees		-0.016***	-0.016***		0.017***	0.017***
		(0.004)	(0.004)		(0.005)	(0.005)
% Female Self-Employed		0.005	0.006*		-0.001	-0.001
		(0.003)	(0.003)		(0.004)	(0.004)
% Female Unemployed		0.052***	0.054***		-0.052***	-0.052***
		(0.007)	(0.006)		(0.007)	(0.007)
Excess Foreign Males		0.034***	0.035***		-0.009	-0.010
		(0.011)	(0.011)		(0.015)	(0.015)
Groom's Age			0.002			0.000
			(0.001)			(0.002)
Bride's Age			-0.001			0.001
			(0.002)			(0.002)
Groom Class Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Departement Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Linear Time Trend	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-Squared	0.235	0.235	0.236	0.348	0.349	0.349
Observations	3158	3132	3117	3158	3132	3117

Notes: The dependent variable for the first three columns is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the bride was of low class (class 5, 6 or 7). The dependent variable for the fourth to sixth columns is a categorical variable that takes the value 0 if the bride was strictly lower class than the groom, the value 1 if the bride and groom were of the same class, and the value 2 if the bride was strictly higher class than the groom. Military mortality is the mortality rate of soldiers as a percentage of the male population aged 18 to 59 in 1911, and is zero for marriages that occurred before the war. Urban military mortality is an urban dummy interacted with military mortality; rural military mortality is a rural dummy interacted with military mortality. The omitted category for female occupations is workers. Excess foreign males is defined as the percentage of males who are foreign minus the percentage of females who are foreign. Standard errors, given in parentheses, are clustered at the level of variation in the variable military mortality. Asterisks indicate: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Table E3: The effect of sex ratio on marrying up is similar in rural and urban areas

Dependent variable:						
	class diff	class diff	class diff	married up	married up	married up
Urban Sex Ratio	0.749	1.675*	1.728*	-0.450**	-0.688*	-0.706*
	(0.525)	(0.928)	(0.944)	(0.190)	(0.368)	(0.367)
Rural Sex Ratio	0.979*	1.618**	1.592**	-0.455**	-0.619**	-0.635**
	(0.555)	(0.682)	(0.707)	(0.229)	(0.300)	(0.301)
Rural	-0.024	0.270	0.343	-0.035	-0.111	-0.115
	(0.739)	(0.862)	(0.851)	(0.289)	(0.336)	(0.335)
% Female Managers		-0.017	-0.015		0.002	0.002
		(0.015)	(0.015)		(0.006)	(0.006)
% Female Employees		-0.007	-0.006		-0.004	-0.005
		(0.023)	(0.023)		(0.007)	(0.007)
% Female Self-Employed		-0.003	-0.002		-0.005	-0.005
		(0.019)	(0.019)		(0.006)	(0.006)
% Female Unemployed		0.022	0.022		-0.005	-0.004
		(0.021)	(0.022)		(0.006)	(0.006)
Excess Foreign Males		0.002	0.001		-0.007	-0.006
		(0.062)	(0.063)		(0.016)	(0.016)
Groom's Age			0.002			0.002
			(0.005)			(0.002)
Bride's Age			-0.005			-0.001
			(0.005)			(0.002)
Groom Class Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Departement Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Linear Time Trend	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-Squared	0.235	0.237	0.239	0.271	0.272	0.272
Observations	3208	3190	3175	3080	3062	3048

Notes: The dependent variable for the first three columns is the class of the bride minus the class of the groom, where a higher value for class corresponds to a lower class. The dependent variable for the fourth to sixth columns is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the bride was at least as high class as the groom. Sex ratio is defined as the number of men aged 18 to 59 divided by the number of women aged 15 to 49. Urban sex ratio is an urban dummy interacted with sex ratio; rural sex ratio is a rural dummy interacted with sex ratio. The omitted category for female occupations is workers. Excess foreign males is defined as the percentage of males who are foreign minus the percentage of females who are foreign. Standard errors, given in parentheses, are clustered at the level of variation in the variable sex ratio. Asterisks indicate: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Table E4: The effect of sex ratio on marrying up is similar in rural and urban areas

Dependent variable:	low bride	low bride	low bride	up/within/dn	up/within/dn	up/within/dn
Urban Sex Ratio	0.475**	1.058***	1.111***	-0.565**	-1.127**	-1.135**
	(0.230)	(0.364)	(0.369)	(0.262)	(0.458)	(0.462)
Rural Sex Ratio	0.973***	1.366***	1.384***	-0.488	-0.883**	-0.859**
	(0.236)	(0.284)	(0.293)	(0.300)	(0.367)	(0.375)
Rural	-0.533*	-0.339	-0.306	-0.179	-0.351	-0.382
	(0.304)	(0.342)	(0.337)	(0.369)	(0.434)	(0.435)
% Female Managers		-0.008	-0.008		0.006	0.006
		(0.006)	(0.006)		(0.008)	(0.008)
% Female Employees		-0.002	-0.001		-0.004	-0.004
		(0.009)	(0.009)		(0.011)	(0.012)
% Female Self-Employed		0.002	0.002		-0.006	-0.005
		(0.008)	(0.008)		(0.010)	(0.010)
% Female Unemployed		0.016**	0.016**		-0.011	-0.011
		(0.008)	(0.008)		(0.010)	(0.010)
Excess Foreign Males		0.011	0.010		-0.006	-0.005
		(0.020)	(0.020)		(0.027)	(0.027)
Groom's Age			0.001			0.001
			(0.002)			(0.002)
Bride's Age			-0.001			0.000
			(0.002)			(0.002)
Groom Class Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Departement Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Linear Time Trend	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-Squared	0.228	0.232	0.232	0.347	0.348	0.348
Observations	3208	3190	3175	3208	3190	3175

Notes: The dependent variable for the first three columns is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the bride was of low class (class 5, 6 or 7). The dependent variable for the fourth to sixth columns is a categorical variable that takes the value 0 if the bride was strictly lower class than the groom, the value 1 if the bride and groom were of the same class, and the value 2 if the bride was strictly higher class than the groom. Sex ratio is defined as the number of men aged 18 to 59 divided by the number of women aged 15 to 49. Urban sex ratio is an urban dummy interacted with sex ratio; rural sex ratio is a rural dummy interacted with sex ratio. The omitted category for female occupations is workers. Excess foreign males is defined as the percentage of males who are foreign minus the percentage of females who are foreign. Standard errors, given in parentheses, are clustered at the level of variation in the variable sex ratio. Asterisks indicate: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Appendix F: Class imputations for brides with missing occupation

Figure F1: Marriage outcomes of brides with missing and no occupation



Table F1: The imputation of bride class, OLS

Dependent variable: Bride's class

	Coefficient	Std. Error
Class 1 Father	-0.801***	0.228
Class 2 Father	-0.548***	0.126
Class 3 Father	-0.096	0.114
Class 4 Father	0.205	0.133
Class 5 Father	0.313***	0.118
Class 6 Father	0.500	0.125
Class 7 Father	0.468	0.317
Class 1 Mother	-0.525	0.347
Class 2 Mother	-0.735***	0.176
Class 3 Mother	-0.656***	0.148
Class 4 Mother	0.023	0.152
Class 5 Mother	0.229**	0.098
Class 6 Mother	0.541***	0.150
Class 7 Mother	-0.929	1.301
Father is Dead	0.073	0.089
Mother is Dead	0.015	0.088
Father has no Occupation	-0.100	0.243
Mother has no Occupation	-0.302***	0.092
Rural	0.522***	0.142
Rural Interacted With:		
Class 1 Father	0.219	0.379
Class 2 Father	-0.273	0.288
Class 3 Father	-0.561***	0.219
Class 4 Father	-0.273	0.181
Class 5 Father	-0.219	0.207
Class 6 Father	0.110	0.330
Class 7 Father	-0.227	0.360
Class 1 Mother	0.226	0.561
Class 2 Mother	0.202	0.398
Class 3 Mother	0.641**	0.326
Class 4 Mother	-0.189	0.191
Class 5 Mother	0.121	0.155
Class 6 Mother	0.276	0.366
Class 7 Mother	1.521	1.317
Father is Dead	-0.157	0.145
Mother is Dead	0.146	0.142
Father has no Occupation	1.162*	0.689
Mother has no Occupation	-0.166	0.180
Paris	-0.382***	0.075
Big City	-0.160	0.106
Medium Sized City	0.044	0.079
Bride's Age	-0.068***	0.016
Bride's Age Squared	0.098***	0.024
Linear Time Trend	-0.008**	0.004
Observations	3312	
R-squared	0.1705	

Notes: The omitted category for parent's class is missing class for unknown reason. The omitted category for city size is small city or other area. Asterisks indicate: * 10%, ** 5%, ***1%.

Table F2: Men marry up more where military mortality was higher, OLS including imputed bride classes

Dependent variable:	class diff	class diff	class diff	married up	married up	married up
Military Mortality	-0.009**	-0.008**	-0.009**	0.004***	0.004***	0.004***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Rural		0.307***	0.303***		-0.068***	-0.069***
		(0.034)	(0.034)		(0.011)	(0.011)
% Female Managers		-0.017***	-0.016***		0.001	0.000
		(0.004)	(0.004)		(0.002)	(0.002)
% Female Employees		-0.034***	-0.035***		0.012***	0.011***
		(0.005)	(0.005)		(0.002)	(0.002)
% Female Self-Employed		-0.017***	-0.016***		0.002	0.001
		(0.004)	(0.004)		(0.002)	(0.002)
% Female Unemployed		0.036***	0.039***		-0.016***	-0.015***
		(0.008)	(0.008)		(0.003)	(0.003)
Excess Foreign Males		0.025*	0.027*		-0.037***	-0.038***
		(0.014)	(0.014)		(0.005)	(0.005)
Groom's Age			0.003			0.002
			(0.002)			(0.001)
Bride's Age			-0.003			-0.002
			(0.003)			(0.001)
Groom Class Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Departement Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Linear Time Trend	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-Squared	0.212	0.221	0.222	0.417	0.418	0.418
Observations	5593	5515	5498	5408	5334	5318

Notes: The dependent variable for the first three columns is the class of the bride minus the class of the groom, where a higher value for class corresponds to a lower class. The dependent variable for the fourth to sixth columns is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the bride was at least as high class as the groom. The class of the bride is actual class where this is not missing, and imputed class if the bride had no occupation or had missing class for another reason. Military mortality is the mortality rate of soldiers as a percentage of the male population aged 18 to 59 in 1911, and is zero for marriages that occurred before the war. The omitted category for female occupations is workers. Excess foreign males is defined as the percentage of males who are foreign minus the percentage of females who are foreign. Standard errors, given in parentheses, are clustered at the level of variation in the variable military mortality. Asterisks indicate: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Table F3: Men marry up more where military mortality was higher, OLS including imputed bride classes

Dependent variable:	low bride	low bride	low bride	up/within/dn	up/within/dn	up/within/dn
Military Mortality	-0.008***	-0.008***	-0.008***	0.005**	0.005**	0.005**
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Rural		0.063***	0.063***		-0.138***	-0.139***
		(0.017)	(0.017)		(0.018)	(0.018)
% Female Managers		-0.011***	-0.011***		0.004*	0.003*
		(0.002)	(0.002)		(0.002)	(0.002)
% Female Employees		-0.014***	-0.014***		0.014***	0.014***
		(0.003)	(0.003)		(0.003)	(0.003)
% Female Self-Employed		-0.005*	-0.004*		0.008***	0.008***
		(0.002)	(0.002)		(0.002)	(0.002)
% Female Unemployed		0.021***	0.022***		-0.008*	-0.008*
		(0.004)	(0.004)		(0.005)	(0.005)
Excess Foreign Males		0.025***	0.026***		-0.031***	-0.031***
		(0.007)	(0.007)		(0.006)	(0.006)
Groom's Age			-0.000			0.001
			(0.001)			(0.001)
Bride's Age			0.000			-0.001
			(0.001)			(0.001)
Groom Class Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Departement Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Linear Time Trend	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-Squared	0.162	0.166	0.166	0.509	0.511	0.511
Observations	5593	5515	5498	5593	5515	5498

Notes: The dependent variable for the first three columns is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the bride was of low class (class 5, 6 or 7). The dependent variable for the fourth to sixth columns is a categorical variable that takes the value 0 if the bride was strictly lower class than the groom, the value 1 if the bride and groom were of the same class, and the value 2 if the bride was strictly higher class than the groom. The class of the bride is actual class where this is not missing, and imputed class if the bride had no occupation or had missing class for another reason. Military mortality is the mortality rate of soldiers as a percentage of the male population aged 18 to 59 in 1911, and is zero for marriages that occurred before the war. The omitted category for female occupations is workers. Excess foreign males is defined as the percentage of males who are foreign minus the percentage of females who are foreign. Standard errors, given in parentheses, are clustered at the level of variation in the variable military mortality. Asterisks indicate: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Table F4: Men marry up more when the sex ratio is lower, OLS including imputed bride classes

Dependent variable:	class diff	class diff	class diff	married up	married up	married up
Sex Ratio	0.514**	0.747**	0.775**	-0.311***	-0.281	-0.299*
	(0.248)	(0.370)	(0.380)	(0.110)	(0.180)	(0.179)
Rural		0.309***	0.306***		-0.069***	-0.070***
		(0.038)	(0.038)		(0.013)	(0.014)
% Female Managers		-0.015*	-0.014*		0.002	0.002
		(0.008)	(0.008)		(0.004)	(0.004)
% Female Employees		-0.014	-0.013		-0.000	-0.001
		(0.011)	(0.011)		(0.005)	(0.005)
% Female Self-Employed		-0.004	-0.003		-0.002	-0.003
		(0.008)	(0.008)		(0.004)	(0.004)
% Female Unemployed		0.015	0.014		-0.001	-0.001
		(0.010)	(0.010)		(0.004)	(0.004)
Excess Foreign Males		0.028	0.028		-0.016*	-0.015
		(0.027)	(0.027)		(0.009)	(0.009)
Groom's Age			0.002			0.002
			(0.003)			(0.001)
Bride's Age			-0.002			-0.002
			(0.003)			(0.001)
Groom Class Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Departement Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Linear Time Trend	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-Squared	0.205	0.218	0.218	0.419	0.422	0.422
Observations	5729	5699	5682	5532	5502	5486

Notes: The dependent variable for the first three columns is the class of the bride minus the class of the groom, where a higher value for class corresponds to a lower class. The dependent variable for the fourth to sixth columns is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the bride was at least as high class as the groom. The class of the bride is actual class where this is not missing, and imputed class if the bride had no occupation or had missing class for another reason. Sex ratio is defined as the number of men aged 18 to 59 divided by the number of women aged 15 to 49. The omitted category for female occupations is workers. Excess foreign males is defined as the percentage of males who are foreign minus the percentage of females who are foreign. Standard errors, given in parentheses, are clustered at the level of variation in the variable sex ratio. Asterisks indicate: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Table F5: Men marry up more when the sex ratio is lower, OLS including imputed bride classes

Dependent variable:	low bride	low bride	low bride	up/within/dn	up/within/dn	up/within/dn
Sex Ratio	0.443***	0.665***	0.673***	-0.380***	-0.418**	-0.424**
	(0.125)	(0.188)	(0.191)	(0.143)	(0.212)	(0.213)
Rural		0.062***	0.061***		-0.134***	-0.134***
		(0.017)	(0.017)		(0.020)	(0.021)
% Female Managers		-0.009**	-0.009**		0.005	0.005
		(0.004)	(0.004)		(0.005)	(0.005)
% Female Employees		-0.000	-0.000		0.001	0.000
		(0.006)	(0.006)		(0.007)	(0.007)
% Female Self-Employed		0.001	0.001		-0.004	-0.004
		(0.004)	(0.005)		(0.005)	(0.005)
% Female Unemployed		0.005	0.005		-0.003	-0.003
		(0.004)	(0.005)		(0.005)	(0.005)
Excess Foreign Males		0.011	0.010		-0.020	-0.020
		(0.011)	(0.011)		(0.014)	(0.014)
Groom's Age			-0.000			0.002
			(0.001)			(0.001)
Bride's Age			0.000			-0.001
			(0.001)			(0.002)
Groom Class Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Departement Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Linear Time Trend	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-Squared	0.157	0.162	0.162	0.513	0.518	0.518
Observations	5729	5699	5682	5729	5699	5682

Notes: The dependent variable for the first three columns is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the bride was of low class (class 5, 6 or 7). The dependent variable for the fourth to sixth columns is a categorical variable that takes the value 0 if the bride was strictly lower class than the groom, the value 1 if the bride and groom were of the same class, and the value 2 if the bride was strictly higher class than the groom. The class of the bride is actual class where this is not missing, and imputed class if the bride had no occupation or had missing class for another reason. Sex ratio is defined as the number of men aged 18 to 59 divided by the number of women aged 15 to 49. The omitted category for female occupations is workers. Excess foreign males is defined as the percentage of males who are foreign minus the percentage of females who are foreign. Standard errors, given in parentheses, are clustered at the level of variation in the variable sex ratio. Asterisks indicate: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.