

Futures Prices as Risk-Adjusted Forecasts of Monetary Policy*

Monika Piazzesi
University of Chicago & NBER

Eric Swanson
Federal Reserve Board

May 27, 2004

Abstract

Many researchers have used federal funds futures rates as measures of financial markets' expectations of future monetary policy. However, to the extent that federal funds futures reflect risk premia, these measures require some adjustment to account for these premia. In this paper, we document that excess returns on federal funds futures have been positive on average and strongly countercyclical. In particular, excess returns are surprisingly well predicted by macroeconomic indicators such as employment growth and financial business-cycle indicators such as Treasury yield spreads and corporate bond spreads. Excess returns on eurodollar futures display similar patterns. We document that simply ignoring these risk premia has important consequences for the expected future path of monetary policy. We also show that risk premia matter for some futures-based measures of monetary policy surprises used in the literature.

*We are particularly indebted to Charlie Evans and Frank Schorfheide (our discussants at the 2004 Stanford/FRBSF conference), and Donald L. Kohn for helpful suggestions. We thank Claire Hausman for excellent research assistance, and Lou Crandall, Andy Levin, Brian Sack, Martin Schneider, Jonathan Wright, and seminar participants at the Federal Reserve Board, the IMA Workshop at the University of Minnesota, and the University of Mannheim for comments. The views expressed in this paper, and any errors and omissions, are those of the authors, and are not necessarily those of the individuals listed above, the Federal Reserve Board, or any other individuals within the Federal Reserve System.

1 Introduction

A number of recent papers (e.g., Krueger and Kuttner 1996, Rudebusch 1998, Brunner 2000, Kuttner 2001, Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson 2002, 2003, Bernanke and Kuttner 2003, Faust, Swanson and Wright 2004) have used federal funds futures rates to measure financial markets' expectations about the future course of monetary policy. Guided by studies that did not find any predictable variation in excess returns on fed funds futures (e.g., Krueger and Kuttner 1996, Sack 2002, Durham 2003), these papers assume the expectations hypothesis. This approach is also standard at central banks—see, for example, the European Central Bank's "Monthly Bulletin" (2004, p. 22) and Greenspan's "Monetary Policy Report to Congress" (2004, p. 20). However, there is by now a large and well accepted body of evidence against the expectations hypothesis for Treasury yields (e.g., Fama and Bliss 1987, Stambaugh 1988, Campbell and Shiller 1991, and Cochrane and Piazzesi 2002b). Excess returns on Treasury securities over a very wide range of sample periods and maturities have been positive on average and predictable over time.

In this paper, we show that the expectations hypothesis also fails for federal funds futures. In particular, excess returns on fed funds futures contracts at even short horizons have been positive on average, time-varying, and significantly predictable. The R^2 s depend on the holding period and range from 8% for a 2-month horizon, 15% for a 3-month horizon, up to 35% for a 6-month horizon. We find that macroeconomic indicators such as employment growth capture this predictability surprisingly well. We also find that financial business-cycle indicators such as Treasury yield spreads and corporate bond spreads do well in predicting excess returns. These patterns are robust both pre- and post-1994, are evident in rolling regressions, and are also displayed by eurodollar futures. Interestingly, we document that noncommercial (non-hedging) market participants tend to go long in futures when expected excess returns are high, while they tend to go short in times when expected excess returns are low.

We exploit the significant predictability of excess returns on futures to propose a risk adjustment to forecasts of monetary policy. We find that not implementing our risk adjustment can produce very misleading results. Specifically, forecasts based on the expectations hypothesis make large mean errors and large mean-squared errors. Moreover, errors from unadjusted forecasts vary systematically over the business cycle; futures rates tend to overpredict in recessions and underpredict in booms. Also, the forecasts tend to lag behind around economic turning points, adapting too slowly to changes in the direction of monetary policy. For example, right before recessions, when the Fed has already started easing, fed fund futures keep forecasting high funds rates. As a consequence, forecast errors using unadjusted futures rates are more highly autocorrelated than are forecast errors using our risk-adjusted futures rates.

Our findings also suggest that monetary policy shocks may not be accurately measured by the difference between the realized funds rate target and market expectations based on fed funds futures. Indeed, we document that the amount by which we need to adjust these shocks can be substantial, at least relative to the size of the shocks themselves. However,

risk premia seem to change primarily at business-cycle frequencies, which suggests that we may be able to “difference them out” by looking at one-day changes in near-dated federal funds futures on the day of a monetary policy announcement. Indeed, our results confirm that differencing improves these policy measures.

Throughout this paper, we will often use the label “risk premia” to refer to “predictable returns in excess of the riskfree rate.” This use of language should *not* be interpreted as taking a particular stance on the structural interpretation of our results. The existing literature has proposed several appealing explanations for why excess returns on these contracts might be predictable. Some of these explanations are based on the utility function of investors: for example, investors may exhibit risk aversion which varies over the business cycle, or care about the slow-moving, cyclical consumption of items like housing. Other explanations are based on beliefs that do not satisfy the rational expectations assumption, for example because of learning or just incorrect beliefs. It is not easy to make the case for just one of these explanations: beliefs and other preference parameters can often not be identified separately. We therefore set aside these issues as beyond the scope of the present paper.

Our findings on fed funds futures complement those for Treasuries along several dimensions. First, we find that the most important predictive variable is a macroeconomic variable: nonfarm payroll employment. Previous studies found significant results mainly for financial variables (such as term spreads). Second, fed funds futures are actually traded securities, while the zero-coupon yield data used in Fama and Bliss (1987) and many other papers are data constructed by interpolation schemes. While the predictability patterns in this artificial data may not lead to profitable trading rules based on actual securities, investors can implement our results directly by trading in fed funds futures. Third, the Treasury and federal funds futures markets are potentially very different markets with very different participants, and the fact that we find similar patterns of predictable excess returns across the two markets is interesting in itself.¹ Finally, fed funds futures contracts have maturities of just a few months and may therefore be less risky than Treasury notes and bonds, which have maturities of several years; moreover, the holding periods relevant for measuring excess returns on fed funds futures are less than one year, while the results for Treasuries typically assume that the investor holds the securities for an entire year.² Given the short maturities and required holding periods to realize excess returns in the fed funds futures market, one might think that risk premia in this market would be very small or nonexistent. We find that this is not the case.

The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 measures excess returns in federal funds futures, and shows that these excess returns have varied over time and

¹The largest participants in the fed funds futures market (and eurodollar futures and swaps markets) are financial institutions looking to “lock in” funding at prespecified rates (to hedge their own commercial and industrial loan portfolio, for example). The portfolios and hedging demands of these institutions are potentially very different from those of the largest participants in the Treasury bond markets: foreign governments, state and local governments, insurance companies, and the like. See Stigum (1990) for additional details on the Treasury and money markets.

²There are a few exceptions. For example, Stambaugh (1988) considers risk premia on Treasury bills rather than Treasury notes and bonds.

can be predicted using business cycle indicators such as employment growth or financial indicators such as Treasury yields or corporate bond spreads. Section 3 shows that these excess returns were predictable in real time as well as ex post. Section 4 shows that failing to adjust futures rates for risk can lead to substantial errors in forecasting the future course of monetary policy, so that the predictability of excess returns is economically as well as statistically significant. Section 5 investigates whether time-varying risk premia matter for futures-based measures of monetary policy shocks, and finds that some measures perform better than others. Section 6 concludes. The Appendix investigates the approximation accuracy of our return definition for futures.

2 Excess Returns on Federal Funds Futures

Federal funds futures contracts have traded on the Chicago Board of Trade exchange since October 1988 and settle based on the average federal funds rate that prevails over a given calendar month.³ Let $f_t^{(n)}$ denote the federal funds futures contract rate for month $t + n$ as quoted at the end of month t . We will refer to $n = 1$ as the one-month-ahead futures contract, $n = 2$ as the two-month-ahead contract, and so on. Let r_{t+n} denote the ex post realized value of the federal funds rate for month $t + n$, calculated as the average of the daily federal funds rates in month $t + n$ for comparability to the federal funds futures contracts.

The buyer of a fed funds futures contract locks in the contracted rate $f_t^{(n)}$ for the contract month $t + n$ on a \$5 million deposit. The contracts are cash-settled a few days after expiration (with expiration occurring at the end of the contract month). At that time, the buyer receives \$5 million times the difference between $f_t^{(n)}$ and the realized funds rate r_{t+n} converted to a monthly rate.⁴ As is standard for many futures contracts, there is no up-front cost to either party of entering into the contract; both parties simply commit to the contract rate and each posts a relatively small amount of securities as margin collateral. Note that there is essentially no “alternative use of funds” or “opportunity cost” for the collateral, since margin requirements are typically posted with interest-bearing U.S. Treasury securities.

We can therefore define the ex post realized excess return to the buyer of the futures contract as

$$rx_{t+n}^{(n)} = f_t^{(n)} - r_{t+n}. \quad (1)$$

Since we will consider futures contracts with maturities n ranging from 1 to 6 months, the excess returns in (1) will correspond to different holding periods for different values of n . To make excess returns on these different contracts more directly comparable, we also

³The average federal funds rate is calculated as the simple mean of the daily averages published by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and the federal funds rate on a non-business day is defined to be the rate that prevailed on the preceding business day.

⁴This means that $f_t^{(n)} - r_{t+n}$ gets multiplied by (number of days in month/360), since the quoting convention in the spot fed funds and fed funds futures markets use a 360-day year. See the CBOT web site for additional details.

report statistics for annualized excess returns, which are computed by multiplying the excess returns in (1) by $12/n$. Also, we measure returns in basis points. These conventions will apply throughout the paper.

Equation (1) represents a slight simplification, because it neglects that futures contracts are “marked to market” every day. The appendix shows that the difference between definition (1) and actual excess returns on futures contracts is extremely small and does not matter for any of our results below. For simplicity, we therefore use equation (1) as the definition of excess returns. The advantage of this simplification is that excess returns are easily linked to forecasting. Under the expectations hypothesis, futures are expected future short rates: $f_t^{(n)} = E_t(r_{t+n})$. Thus, equation (1) not only represents excess returns, but also minus the forecast error under the expectations hypothesis. This coincidence makes it easy to see how we can adjust futures-based forecasts for risk premia.

2.1 Constant Risk Premia

To check whether the average excess returns are zero, we run the regression

$$rx_{t+n}^{(n)} = \alpha^{(n)} + \varepsilon_{t+n}^{(n)} \quad (2)$$

for different contract horizons n .

Table 1 presents results from regression (2) for the forecast horizons $n = 1, \dots, 6$ months over the entire sample period for which we have federal funds futures data: October 1988 through December 2003. This period will be the baseline for all of our regressions below. We run the regression at monthly frequency, sampling the futures data on the last day of each month t .⁵ We compute standard errors using the heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent procedure described in Hodrick (1992), allowing for $n - 1$ lags of excess returns to be serially correlated due to contract overlap. Specifically, we use standard errors (1A) from Hodrick (1992), which generalizes the Hansen-Hodrick (1988) procedure to heteroskedastic disturbances. Throughout this paper, we report HAC t -statistics based on these standard errors. To facilitate comparison across contracts with different maturities, we report annualized average excess returns in the bottom row of the table.

As can be seen in Table 1, average excess returns on fed funds futures have been significantly positive over our sample, ranging from about 3.5 to 6 basis points per month (41 to 73bp per year). For example, buying the 6-month-ahead fed fund futures contract

⁵We restrict attention to monthly data in order to avoid variations in the maturity of the contracts that would arise over the course of each month: for example, with daily data, the one-month ahead contract could have as few as 28 and as many as 61 days until maturity, which is a significant variation in the holding period required to realize the excess return on the contract. These differences in maturities and holding periods determine the size and time variation of risk premia, as we will show below. Also, these variations would translate into different forecasting horizons when we later use our results to forecast the funds rate. Nonetheless, our results are all similar when we sample the data at daily rather than monthly frequency.

and holding it to maturity is a strategy that generated a return of 73.4bp per year on average.⁶ Longer-horizon contracts have had greater excess returns even on a per-month or per-year basis. The averages for the post-1994 period are a little lower but still significantly positive at 32.3, 35.0, 38.2, 43.6, 49.4, and 56.5bp per year.

TABLE 1: CONSTANT RISK PREMIA

n	1	2	3	4	5	6
$\alpha^{(n)}$	3.4	7.4	12.5	19.2	27.6	36.7
(t-stat)	(3.9)	(3.6)	(3.2)	(3.2)	(3.2)	(3.1)
annualized	41.2	44.6	49.9	57.5	66.3	73.4

NOTE: The sample is 1988:10-2003:12. The observations are from the last day of each month. The regression equation is (2). $\alpha^{(n)}$ is measured in basis points. HAC t-statistics are reported in parentheses.

2.2 Time-varying Risk Premia

Previous work using federal funds futures has generally stopped at this point, and proceeded under the assumption that expected excess returns on federal funds futures are constant. However, in studies of long- and short-term Treasury securities, it has been well-documented (Fama and Bliss 1987, Cochrane and Piazzesi 2002b) that excess returns in Treasury markets are significantly time-varying and predictable. In particular, expected excess returns on Treasuries are correlated with the business cycle: they are high in economic recessions and low in expansions.

Figure 1 graphs the realized excess return $rx_{t+4}^{(4)}$ on the 4-month-ahead federal funds futures contract from October 1988 through December 2003. Certainly, the time-variation in these realized excess returns has been large, ranging from -315 to 413 bp at an annualized rate. The graph also suggests that there have been several periods during which fed funds futures generated particularly large excess returns: the years 1991–2, early 1995, the fall of 1998, and the years 2001–2 (these are also the periods during which the Federal Reserve lowered interest rates). Two of these periods, 1991–2 and 2001–2, coincided with the two recessions in our sample. The other two periods were not recessions, but were also periods with slower economic growth.

As a first step to understanding the predictability of excess returns of fed fund futures, we therefore regress these excess returns on a constant and a recession dummy D_t :

$$rx_{t+n}^{(n)} = \alpha^{(n)} + \beta^{(n)} D_t + \varepsilon_{t+n}^{(n)} \quad (3)$$

⁶Note that these are not percentage excess returns, because the cost of purchasing the contract is zero, as discussed previously. In other words, the unannualized excess return on the six-month-ahead contract is, on average, \$5 million times .367% times (number of days in contract month/360). The annualized excess return is just double this amount (multiplying by 12/6).




Figure 1: Annualized excess returns on the federal funds futures contract 4 months ahead. The step function represents the fitted values from a regression of $rx_{t+4}^{(4)}$ on a constant and a recession dummy.

Figure 1 shows the fitted values from this regression (as a step function) together with the realized excess returns. Table 2 shows that the recession dummy is significant for all contracts with maturities longer than just 1 month. The estimated coefficient on the recession dummy suggests that excess returns are about 3 to 5 times higher in recessions than they are on average during other periods. (Note that annualizing the excess returns is a normalization that does not affect the t-statistics or R^2 in any of our regressions.)

Of course, recession dummies are only rough indicators of economic growth and, moreover, are not useful as predictive variables. The reason is that recessions are not known in real time, since the NBER's business cycle dating committee declares recession peaks and troughs as long as 2 years after they have actually occurred. In other words, recession dummies do not represent information that investors can condition on when deciding about their portfolios. Figure 1 suggests, however, that any business cycle indicator may be a good candidate for forecasting excess returns. In what follows, we consider several business cycle indicators, including employment, Treasury yield spreads and the corporate bond spread.

TABLE 2: EXCESS RETURNS AND RECESSIONS

n	1	2	3	4	5	6
constant	2.8	5.4	8.9	13.8	20.4	30.4
(t-stat)	(3.5)	(3.0)	(2.5)	(2.5)	(2.6)	(2.8)
dummy	6.0	20.9	36.1	53.8	69.8	78.6
(t-stat)	(1.3)	(2.0)	(3.0)	(4.8)	(6.0)	(4.3)
R^2	0.02	0.10	0.13	0.15	0.16	0.13
Annualized						
constant	34.1	32.1	35.4	41.3	49.1	60.8
dummy	71.9	125.7	144.6	161.3	167.5	157.2

NOTE: The sample is 1988:10-2003:12. The observations are from the last day of each month. The regression equation is (3), where D_t is a recession dummy. Excess returns are measured in basis points. HAC t-statistics are reported in parentheses.

2.3 Employment

To investigate which variables forecast excess returns on fed funds futures, we run predictive regressions of the form:

$$rx_{t+n}^{(n)} = \alpha^{(n)} + \beta^{(n)} X_t + \varepsilon_{t+n}^{(n)}, \quad (4)$$

where X_t is a vector of variables known to financial markets in month t . Since GDP data are only available at quarterly frequency, they do not provide a very useful variable for forecasting monthly excess returns. We therefore turn to a closely related measure of real activity: employment.

More precisely, we use the year-on-year change in log nonfarm payrolls. Two data issues arise if we wish to run the predictive regressions (4) with data that were available to financial market participants in real time.⁷ First, nonfarm payroll numbers for a given month are not released by the Bureau of Labor Statistics until the first Friday of the following month. Thus, to perform the predictive regressions (4) with data that were available at the end of month t , we must lag the employment numbers by an entire month. Second, nonfarm payroll numbers are revised twice after their initial release and undergo an annual benchmark revision every June, so the final vintage numbers are not available for forecasting in real time. We therefore collected the real-time nonfarm payroll numbers, and use the first release of nonfarm payrolls for month $t - 1$ and the revised value for nonfarm payrolls for month $t - 13$ to compute the year-on-year change.⁸

⁷In earlier versions of this paper, we performed the analysis with the most recent revised vintage of the data, and our results were very similar: in particular, we found that employment growth predicted excess returns with R^2 values of 1, 7, 14, 20, 28 and 37%. The results are also similar if we use contemporaneous rather than lagged nonfarm payrolls growth as a regressor.

⁸Even the revised value for month $t - 13$ is not quite equal to the final vintage of data for that month, because of some subsequent data revisions.

Table 3 reports the forecasting results based on these real-time nonfarm payroll numbers, which were available to market participants as of the last day of month t . The regression also includes the futures rate itself on the right-hand side. The results show that employment growth is a significant predictor of excess returns for contracts with two months or more to maturity. As we would expect from our results using the recession dummy, excess returns and employment growth are inversely related. The estimated slope coefficients in Table 3 increase with the maturity of the contract and lie between -0.17 and -0.71 for annualized returns.

TABLE 3: EXCESS RETURNS AND NONFARM PAYROLLS

n	1	2	3	4	5	6
constant	0.8	1.5	0.2	-2.6	-8.9	-16.9
(t-stat)	(0.4)	(0.3)	(0.0)	(-0.2)	(-0.6)	(-1.1)
$f_t^{(n)}$	0.01	0.03	0.06	0.10	0.15	0.21
(t-stat)	(1.4)	(1.8)	(2.4)	(3.5)	(5.3)	(8.2)
ΔNFP_{t-1}	-0.01	-0.06	-0.12	-0.20	-0.29	-0.36
(t-stat)	(-1.4)	(-2.7)	(-3.4)	(-4.6)	(-6.7)	(-10.6)
R^2	0.02	0.08	0.15	0.22	0.28	0.35
Annualized						
constant	9.8	9.2	0.8	-7.8	-21.3	-33.8
$f_t^{(n)}$	0.11	0.17	0.24	0.30	0.37	0.41
ΔNFP_{t-1}	-0.17	-0.36	-0.50	-0.61	-0.70	-0.71

NOTE: The sample is 1988:10-2003:12. The observations are from the last day of each month. The regression equation is (4), where X_t contains $f_t^{(n)}$ and nonfarm payroll employment growth ΔNFP_{t-1} from $t-13$ to $t-1$, computed using real-time vintage of data. ΔNFP_{t-1} is measured in basis points. HAC t-statistics are reported in parentheses.

To understand the magnitude of these coefficients, note that employment growth is measured in basis points, which means that a 1 percentage point drop in employment growth increases expected excess returns by about 17 to 71 basis points per year. Over our sample, the mean and standard deviation of employment growth were 135 and 132 basis points, respectively, which means that a one-standard deviation shock to employment makes us expect around 94 bp more in annualized excess returns on the 6-month-ahead futures contract. The own futures contract rate $f_t^{(n)}$ is also a significant predictor of excess returns for contracts with 3 months to maturity or more, and the positive coefficient implies that, all else equal, excess returns are lower when the level of interest rates is lower.

The R^2 in Table 3 suggest that we can predict up to 35% of the variation in excess returns on fed funds futures with employment growth and the futures rate itself. This result is remarkable, since these R^2 are comparable in size to those reported in Cochrane

and Piazzesi (2002b), who study excess returns on Treasuries over much longer holding periods (one year, as compared to just one to six months for our fed funds futures regressions above).

Figure 2 shows that employment growth forecasts high excess returns not only in the two recessions, but also in 1989, 1995 and 1998, and forecasts low excess returns in 1994 and 1999. The fit in the most recent recession would perhaps be more remarkable if not for the terrorist attacks in September 2001, which led to a surprise period of high excess returns on these contracts that was not directly related to the business cycle.




Figure 2: Annualized excess returns on the federal funds futures contract 4 months ahead. The gray (green in color) function represents the fitted values from a regression of $rx_{t+4}^{(4)}$ on a constant, employment growth and $f_t^{(4)}$ itself.

2.4 Yield Spreads and Corporate Spreads

In studies of long- and short-term Treasury markets, it has been well-documented (Fama and Bliss 1987, Cochrane and Piazzesi 2002b) that expected excess returns on Treasury securities can be forecasted with the Treasury yield curve. For example, Cochrane and Piazzesi show that a simple tent-shaped function of 1 through 5-year forward rates explains excess returns on holding long Treasuries securities for 1 year with an R^2 of 35–40%. Of

course, these findings are related to the fact that yields have been used as business cycle indicators. For example, the Stock and Watson (1989) leading index is mainly based on term spreads. A natural question is therefore whether yields also forecast excess returns on fed funds futures.

Table 4 reports results from predictions based on a set of yield spreads. We select four different term spreads based on differences of the 6 month Treasury bill rate and the 1, 2, 5, and 10 year zero-coupon Treasury yields.⁹ As can be seen in Table 4, there is significant evidence that excess returns on federal funds futures contracts have been significantly predictable with yield spreads for contracts with 3 months to maturity or more: R^2 values range from 8–22% for the longer horizon contracts and many t-statistics are well above 2. Although generally not statistically significant at the 5% level for shorter horizons, we consistently estimate the same pattern of coefficients for the shorter-horizon contracts as for the longer-horizon contracts, with the magnitudes of the coefficients increasing monotonically with the horizon of the contract n (except for the $n = 6$ loading on the 2–1 year spread). This pattern is not just due to differences in holding periods, as these results are obtained with annualized returns.

TABLE 4: ANNUALIZED EXCESS RETURNS AND TREASURY SPREADS

n	1	2	3	4	5	6
constant	55.6	62.8	80.1	99.8	133.1	168.0
(t-stat)	(2.1)	(2.0)	(2.3)	(2.6)	(2.9)	(3.5)
1yr–6mo	0.16	-0.23	-0.47	-0.66	-1.27	-2.21
(t-stat)	(0.1)	(-0.2)	(-0.4)	(-0.5)	(-1.0)	(-1.8)
2–1yr	-0.86	-1.17	-1.74	-2.19	-2.38	-1.96
(t-stat)	(-0.6)	(-0.7)	(-1.1)	(-1.7)	(-1.7)	(-1.3)
5–2yr	1.18	1.67	2.63	3.49	4.43	4.64
(t-stat)	(0.9)	(1.4)	(2.3)	(3.7)	(3.4)	(3.6)
10–5yr	-1.13	-1.38	-2.21	-3.03	-4.13	-4.67
(t-stat)	(-1.1)	(-1.4)	(-2.5)	(-3.9)	(-3.7)	(-4.4)
R^2	0.01	0.02	0.05	0.08	0.15	0.22

NOTE: The sample is 1988:10-2003:12. The observations are from the last day of each month. The regression equation is (3), where X_t consists of yield spreads on zero-coupon Treasuries (measured in basis points). The maturities of the Treasuries are 6 months, 1 year, 2 years, 5 years, and 10 years, with spreads taken between adjacent maturities. The Treasury yield data are from the Federal Reserve Board. HAC t-statistics are reported in parentheses.

Figure 3 plots realized excess returns on the four-month-ahead fed funds futures contract together with the fitted values from Table 4 (where realized returns are shifted

⁹We also considered other Treasuries and the own federal funds futures contract rate, but none of these entered significantly. We also performed the analysis using 1 through 5-year forward rates, as in Cochrane and Piazzesi (2002b), and got R^2 values very similar to those in Table 4.




Figure 3: The top line are annualized excess returns $rx_{t+4}^{(4)}$ on the 4-month ahead futures contract (shifted up by 500 bp), the middle line are fitted values from the regression on Treasury yield spreads (Table 4) and the bottom line are fitted values from the regression on the corporate bond spread (Table 5, shifted down by 500 bp).

up by 500 bp to more clearly present both in the same graph). The yield spreads seem to be most successful at capturing the rise in excess returns in 2001 and the runups in 1990 through 1992, suggesting that the estimated linear combination of yields may indeed capture the relationship between excess returns and the business cycle.

We also investigate whether another financial indicator of the business cycle, the spread between 10-year BBB-rated corporate bonds and 10-year Treasuries, also helps predict excess returns on fed funds futures. Results are reported in Table 5, and corroborate the hypothesis that measures of business cycle risk in general may be useful predictors of excess returns in the fed funds futures market. The estimated coefficients on the corporate bond spread in these regressions are significant for fed funds futures contracts with two months or more to maturity, with R^2 of 11–16% for the longer-horizon contracts. The fitted values from this regression for the four-month-ahead contract (shifted down by 500bp) are also plotted in Figure 3.

To sum up, we find substantial evidence for time variation in expected excess returns on fed funds futures. Surprisingly, the strongest evidence comes from conditioning on employment growth—a macroeconomic variable—instead of lagged financial data. How-

ever, our sample is short, just 15 years, and so we have to treat this result with the appropriate degree of caution.

TABLE 5: ANNUALIZED EXCESS RETURNS AND CORPORATE BOND SPREADS

n	1	2	3	4	5	6
const.	-28.0	-56.5	-79.2	-94.2	-115.6	-128.7
(t-stat)	(-0.6)	(-1.2)	(-1.5)	(-1.7)	(-1.9)	(-1.9)
$f_t^{(n)}$	0.04	0.05	0.07	0.10	0.14	0.17
(t-stat)	(0.8)	(0.7)	(1.1)	(1.6)	(2.0)	(2.2)
BBB	0.29	0.48	0.59	0.65	0.72	0.76
(t-stat)	(1.4)	(2.3)	(2.5)	(2.6)	(2.7)	(2.4)
R^2	0.02	0.06	0.09	0.11	0.15	0.16

NOTE: The sample is 1988:10-2003:12. The observations are from the last day of each month. The regression equation is (3), where X_t consists of the own futures contract rate $f_t^{(n)}$ and the BBB-Treasury corporate bond spread. Data on BBB corporate bond yields with 10 years to maturity are from Merrill Lynch; data on 10-year Treasury par yields (the comparable Treasury yield) are from the Federal Reserve Board. HAC t-statistics are reported in parentheses.

2.5 One-Month Holding Period Returns

Our sample period only spans 15 years, which results in as few as 30 independent windows for our longest-horizon (6-month-ahead) fed funds futures contracts. A way to reduce this problem and check on the robustness of our results is to consider the excess returns an investor would realize from holding an n -month-ahead federal funds futures contract for just one month—by purchasing the contract and then selling it back as an $(n - 1)$ -month-ahead contract in one month’s time—rather than holding the contract all the way through to maturity. By considering one-month holding period returns on fed funds futures, we reduce potential problems of serial correlation and sample size for the longer-horizon contracts, and give ourselves 182 completely independent windows of data (under the null hypothesis of no predictability of excess returns) for all contracts.

We thus consider regressions of the form:

$$f_t^{(n)} - f_{t+1}^{(n-1)} = \alpha^{(n)} + \beta^{(n)} X_t + \varepsilon_{t+1}^{(n)} \quad (5)$$

where $f_t^{(n)}$ denotes the n -month-ahead contract rate on the last day of month t , $f_{t+1}^{(n-1)}$ denotes the $(n - 1)$ -month-ahead contract rate on the last day of month $t + 1$, and the difference between these two rates is the ex post realized one-month holding period return on the n -month-ahead contract.¹⁰ Using specification (5), the residuals are serially uncorrelated under the null hypothesis of no predictability of excess returns, because all

¹⁰The investor’s realized monetary return on this transaction is \$5 million times the difference in rates

variables in equation (5) are in financial markets' information set by the end of month $t + 1$.

Table 6 presents the results of our previous analysis applied to this alternative specification, where the regressors are the own contract rate and employment growth. Although the R^2 values are uniformly lower, as is to be expected from quasi-first-differencing the left-hand side variable, our previous results are robust to this alternative specification. Results for term spreads and corporate bond spreads are similarly robust across specifications (not presented to preserve space).

TABLE 6: ONE-MONTH EXCESS RETURNS AND NONFARM PAYROLLS

n	1	2	3	4	5	6
const.	9.8	9.1	0.9	10.8	12.1	-40.5
(t-stat)	(0.4)	(0.2)	(0.0)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(-0.5)
$f_t^{(n)}$	0.11	0.23	0.33	0.38	0.42	0.62
(t-stat)	(1.4)	(2.3)	(2.7)	(2.7)	(2.6)	(3.1)
ΔNFP_{t-1}	-0.17	-0.55	-0.76	-0.89	-0.97	-1.08
(t-stat)	(-1.4)	(-3.7)	(-4.7)	(-5.1)	(-4.8)	(-4.5)
R^2	0.02	0.07	0.09	0.10	0.09	0.11

NOTE: The sample is 1988:10-2003:12. The observations are from the last day of each month. The regression equation is (5), where X_t contains $f_t^{(n)}$ and nonfarm payroll employment growth ΔNFP_{t-1} from $t - 13$ to $t - 1$. ΔNFP_{t-1} is measured in basis points. One-month excess returns are annualized by multiplying them by 12 and measured in basis points. HAC t-statistics are reported in parentheses.

2.6 Eurodollar Futures

We also check whether our predictability results hold for eurodollar futures. Some advantages of considering eurodollar futures in addition to federal funds futures are that eurodollar futures contracts are more liquid (they are currently the most actively traded futures contracts in the world), eurodollar futures are available over a slightly longer sample period (our data begin in March 1985), and eurodollar futures have maturities that extend out to several years, providing an intermediate horizon between fed funds futures and longer-dated Treasury securities.

Eurodollar futures have traded on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange since 1981 and settle based on the spot three-month LIBOR eurodollar time deposit rate prevailing on

$f_t^{(n)} - f_{t+1}^{(n-1)}$ times (number of days in contract month/360). Since these contracts are “marked to market” essentially every day, the investor realizes the full monetary return to this transaction in month $t + 1$; in particular, the investor does not need to wait until the contracts mature at the end of month $t + n$ to realize the return. As before, the opportunity cost of engaging in this transaction is negligible, so the realized return is also the realized excess return.

the date of expiration.¹¹ In contrast to federal funds futures, eurodollar futures have maturities that are denominated in quarters rather than months, so we let $ef_t^{(n)}$ denote the eurodollar futures contract rate in quarter t for a contract expiring at the end of quarter $t + n$. The corresponding realized rate er_{t+n} is the spot three-month eurodollar rate that prevails on the day of expiration of the futures contract $ef_t^{(n)}$. The ex post excess return realized from holding the n -quarter-ahead contract to maturity is $ef_t^{(n)} - er_{t+n}$, and the ex post realized excess return to holding the n -quarter-ahead contract for one quarter is $ef_t^{(n)} - ef_{t+1}^{(n-1)}$. Regression equations for analyzing these excess returns are otherwise identical to equation (3) for federal funds futures.

TABLE 7: RESULTS FOR EURODOLLAR FUTURES

PANEL A: AVERAGE EXCESS RETURNS (ANNUALIZED)

n	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
const.	56.9	81.1	94.2	102.5	104.4	102.8	99.1	105.8
(t-stat)	(2.5)	(2.7)	(2.8)	(2.8)	(2.7)	(2.7)	(2.7)	(3.0)

PANEL B: PREDICTIVE REGRESSIONS W/NONFARM PAYROLLS

const.	-21.6	-44.3	-51.1	-62.9	-74.9	-75.8	-77.4	-90.3
(t-stat)	(0.4)	(-0.9)	(-0.8)	(-0.8)	(-0.7)	(-0.7)	(-0.7)	(-0.7)
$ef_t^{(n)}$	0.44	0.52	0.51	0.50	0.48	0.44	0.40	0.39
(t-stat)	(3.3)	(6.0)	(5.0)	(4.0)	(3.3)	(2.9)	(3.0)	(2.7)
ΔNFP_{t-1}	-1.03	-1.07	-0.99	-0.90	-0.80	-0.69	-0.59	-0.43
(t-stat)	(-5.5)	(-6.9)	(-6.2)	(-6.9)	(-8.5)	(-9.2)	(-7.0)	(-4.2)
R^2	0.24	0.34	0.38	0.40	0.42	0.41	0.38	0.38

NOTE: The sample is 1985Q2-2003Q4. The observations are from the last day of each quarter. The regression equations are the same as in Tables 1 and 3, but now estimated with data on Eurodollar futures. n refers to quarters, $ef_t^{(n)}$ is the eurodollar futures rate, and ΔNFP_{t-1} denotes year-on-year nonfarm payroll employment growth lagged one month. ΔNFP_{t-1} is measured in basis points. HAC t-statistics are reported in parentheses.

Table 7 presents the results of our previous analyses applied to eurodollar futures contracts with maturities of $n = 1, \dots, 8$ quarters ahead. Panel A shows that excess

¹¹The spot three-month London Interbank Offered Rate for three-month time deposits of U.S. dollars in London is collected and published daily by the British Bankers' Association. The spot eurodollar market is a very active one, thus these rates match three-month time deposit rates in the U.S. very closely. The March, June, September, and December eurodollar futures contracts are by far the most actively traded, with expiration on these contracts near the middle of those months. Contracts are cash-settled a few days after expiration with the purchaser receiving \$1 million times the difference $ef_t^n - er_{t+n}$ times (91/360). See the CME web site for additional details.

returns on eurodollar futures have averaged between 57 and 106 basis points per year over our sample, 1985Q2 through 2003Q4. Excess returns for eurodollar futures also display the same patterns of predictability as fed funds futures: Panel B shows that nonfarm payroll employment growth is statistically significant at all horizons, with R^2 values ranging from 24 to 42%. (Note that in these regressions, ΔNFP_{t-1} refers to year-on-year employment growth lagged one month rather than one quarter, as this data was available to financial market participants in real time.)

Results for Treasury yield spreads and corporate bond spreads (not reported) are also significant and similar to those for fed funds futures, and all of these results are robust to considering one-quarter holding periods for eurodollar futures rather than holding the contracts all the way through to maturity.

These results show that, if anything, risk premia are even more important for eurodollar futures than what we have estimated for federal funds futures.

3 Predictability of Excess Returns in Real Time

We have documented that excess returns on federal funds futures were predictable by business-cycle indicators such as employment growth, Treasury yield spreads, or corporate bond spreads. To what extent could an investor have predicted these returns in real time? To answer this question, we perform a set of rolling “out-of-sample” regressions. To see whether market participants may have based their investment strategies on similar forecasts, we also provide some intriguing historical evidence on actual positions of traders in the fed funds and eurodollar futures markets.

3.1 Rolling Endpoint Regressions

Figure 4 shows real-time forecasts together with full-sample forecasts from Table 2 based on employment growth and the own futures contract rate. The real-time forecasts for month $t + 1$ are constructed by estimating the slope coefficients with data from October 1988 up through what was available at the end of the current month t . Figure 4 graphs these forecasts starting in October 1990, when we have only 24 months of data to estimate three parameters. The graph suggests that the real-time fitted values are quite close to the full-sample fitted values over most of the sample—indeed, the two series are essentially identical from the beginning of 1994 onward. The middle and lower panels in Figure 4 show the rolling estimates of the slope coefficients together with their full sample counterparts (the horizontal black line), and again suggest that the rolling point estimates have largely converged to their full-sample values by 1994.




Figure 4: The top panel shows real-time and full-sample forecasts of $rx_{t+4}^{(4)}$. The middle panel shows the rolling estimates of the coefficient on the own futures rate $f_t^{(4)}$. The flat line is the full-sample coefficient from Table 2. The lower panel shows the rolling estimates of the coefficient on employment growth. Again, the flat line is the full-sample coefficient from Table 2.

3.2 Data on Market Participants' Long and Short Positions

The previous section shows that excess returns on fed funds and eurodollar futures were potentially predictable to investors in real time using rolling regressions. In this section, we present some evidence indicating that informed investors at the time actually *did* correctly forecast the excess returns that were subsequently realized.

The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) requires all individuals or institutions with positions above a certain size to report their positions to the CFTC each week, and the extent to which each position is hedged. In the eurodollar (fed funds) futures markets, about 90% (95%) of open interest is held by individuals or institutions that must report to the CFTC as a result of this requirement. The CFTC reports the aggregates of these data with a three-day lag, broken down into hedging and non-hedging categories and into long and short positions, in the weekly Commitments of Traders report available on the CFTC's web site.




Figure 5: The upper panel shows net positions in eurodollar futures. The lower panel shows long and short positions separately.

The lower panel in Figure 5 plots the percentage of long and short open interest in eurodollar futures held by noncommercial market participants—those market participants that are classified by the CFTC as *not* hedging offsetting positions that arise out of their normal (non-futures related) business operations.¹² The number of open long positions in these contracts held by noncommercial market participants (as a percentage of total reportable open interest) is plotted in the bottom panel in black, and the number of open short positions (as a percentage of reportable open interest) held by these participants is plotted in gray (green in color). Analogous data are available for fed funds futures, but we focus on eurodollar futures positions here as this market is thicker and contracts run off less frequently—only once per quarter rather than every month—which reduces some high-frequency variation in the percentage long and short series.¹³ The patterns in federal funds futures noncommercial holdings look very similar, albeit noisier for the reasons just cited. The upper panel of Figure 5 plots the difference between the non-commercial percentage long and short series as the “net long position” of noncommercial market participants.

¹²The primary example of a *commercial* participant in the fed funds or eurodollar futures market would be a financial institution seeking to hedge its commercial and industrial loan portfolio.

¹³Open interest is almost always highest in the front-month or front-quarter contract, so the running off of these contracts can create jumps.

Just from eyeballing the figure, we can see that net positions forecast subsequent excess returns in both the fed funds futures and eurodollar futures markets: noncommercial market participants began taking on a huge net long position in late 2000, only a few months before excess returns in these contracts began to soar. Noncommercial market participants also took on substantial net long positions from mid-1990 through mid-1991 and in late 1995, again correctly forecasting excess returns over these periods, and noncommercial participants took on a very substantial net *short* position in late 1993 through mid-1994, correctly anticipating the strongly negative excess returns that were realized when the Fed began tightening in 1994.

Regression analysis (not reported) confirms that this variable is highly significant as a predictor of excess returns in the fed funds futures market at horizons of 3 months or more (and in the eurodollar futures markets at all horizons), with R^2 values ranging from 7–21% (8–40% for eurodollar futures). Interestingly, the statistical significance of the net long position variable disappears if we include any of employment growth, term spreads, or corporate risk spreads in the regression, suggesting that the information content of noncommercial market participants’ net long position is spanned by the business cycle indicators we considered earlier.

The obvious interpretation of these findings is that noncommercial market participants at the time were well aware of the upcoming excess returns on these contracts and positioned themselves accordingly, at the expense of those engaged in hedging other financial activities. The hedgers—commercial firms—essentially paid an insurance premium to noncommercial participants for providing hedging services. There are two main explanations for why these premia were not “competed away.” First, the futures market may not be perfectly competitive, with barriers to entry and noncommercial market participants facing limits on the size of the positions that they may take; commercial participants with hedging demand thus do not face a perfectly elastic supply curve for either the long or short side of these futures contracts. Second, noncommercial market participants may themselves be risk averse. For example, futures traders in these markets may be most averse to taking on risky positions precisely when their own jobs are most in jeopardy, around the times of depressed aggregate economic activity. The hypothesis that excess returns in these markets would be competed away requires both an assumption of perfectly competitive futures markets and of risk-neutral market participants—both of these assumptions are suspect and may not apply.

4 Risk-Adjusted Monetary Policy Expectations

How misleading would it be to ignore risk premia on fed funds and eurodollar futures—or to allow for constant risk premia but to ignore the time-variation in these premia—and treat the unadjusted (or constant risk-adjusted) prices of these securities as measures of monetary policy expectations? Using futures, the forecast errors are just minus the excess returns on the fed funds futures contract:

$$r_{t+n} - f_t^{(n)} = -rx_{t+n}^{(n)} \quad (6)$$

To the extent that excess returns on fed funds and eurodollar futures are forecastable, we are making systematic forecast errors when we use unadjusted futures forecasts.

However, we can risk-adjust these forecasts using our previous results. To do that, we take expectations of both sides of equation (4) and solve for the expected n -month-ahead federal funds rate:

$$E_t[r_{t+n}] = f_t^{(n)} - (\alpha^{(n)} + \beta^{(n)} X_t). \quad (7)$$

From Tables 1 and 7, we know that the expected excess return, $\alpha^{(n)} + \beta^{(n)} X_t$, is on average positive. This suggests that risk-adjusted forecasts lie on average below the futures rate. Moreover, Tables 3 and 7 show that expected excess returns are countercyclical. This suggests that risk-adjusted forecasts subtract a countercyclical term from the futures rate or, equivalently, add a procyclical term to the futures rate: risk-adjusted forecasts will tend to lie above the unadjusted futures rate in booms and below the futures rate in recessions.

These features of our risk-adjustment are illustrated in Figure 6, which plots forecasts of the federal funds rate out to a horizon of 12 months on two different dates: December 1993 and December 2000. We plot a number of alternative forecasts based on federal funds and eurodollar futures rates:

1. Unadjusted futures: $\alpha^{(n)} = 0$ and $\beta^{(n)} = 0$.
2. Constant-adjusted futures: rolling OLS estimate of $\alpha^{(n)}$, with $\beta^{(n)} = 0$ imposed, as in Table 1 for fed funds futures and Table 7 for eurodollar futures.
3. Rule-of-thumb-adjusted futures: a constant risk adjustment of 1 bp/month, which is a rule of thumb currently used by staff at the Federal Reserve Board at the short end of the yield curve,¹⁴ so $\alpha^{(n)} = n$ and $\beta^{(n)} = 0$. For eurodollar futures, the rule of thumb is 13bp plus 3bp/quarter: $\alpha^{(n)} = 3n + 13$ and $\beta^{(n)} = 0$.
4. Risk-adjusted futures: rolling OLS estimates of $\alpha^{(n)}$ and $\beta^{(n)}$, where X_t includes the own futures rate $f_t^{(n)}$ and NFP growth ΔNFP_{t-1} , as in Table 3 for fed funds futures and Table 7 for eurodollar futures.

Note that unadjusted futures forecasts will always be higher than forecasts adjusted by a constant, because the estimated coefficients $\alpha^{(n)}$ from Tables 1 and 7 are positive. The rule-of-thumb adjusted futures end up somewhere between these two forecasts, because the estimated $\alpha^{(n)}$ in Table 1 adjusts forecasts by roughly 5.4 bp per month, while the rule-of-thumb forecast adjusts fed funds futures by only 1 bp/month (5.4 bp/month is the coefficient we get when we regress $\alpha^{(n)}$ on the month n).

¹⁴In private communication, Donald L. Kohn mentioned that staff at the Federal Reserve Board came up with this adjustment factor informed by their reading of the historical data on ex post errors in the fed funds and eurodollar futures markets and in interest-rate surveys. Although this adjustment factor is currently 1bp/month at the short end, it has not always been that and would change as events warrant.




Figure 6: Federal funds rate forecasts on two illustrative dates, and subsequent realized funds rate. Funds rate forecasts are constructed from unadjusted and risk-adjusted futures rates, and using three different risk adjustments: an estimated constant adjustment, a rule-of-thumb constant adjustment, and a time-varying risk adjustment based on employment growth.

The graphs suggest that in times when the funds rate is expected to rise—such as December 1993—the higher, unadjusted futures do better than forecasts adjusted by a constant. However, the lower, constant-adjusted futures do better in times when the funds rate is expected to fall, such as December 2000. The rule-of-thumb-adjusted futures do better on dates (not shown in the figure) when the direction of the interest rate development is not as clear. But this is exactly the mechanism exploited by our time-varying risk adjustment: in December 1993, our risk-adjusted futures forecast (the blue x-line) is closer to the unadjusted futures forecast, while in December 2000, the blue x-line is closer to the constant risk-adjusted futures forecast. In other periods, the risk adjustment makes forecasts lie somewhere in between the two, similar to the rule-of-thumb-adjusted futures forecast.

Instead of varying the forecasting horizon for a given date, we can also fix the forecasting horizon at 4 months and vary the date. The upper panel in Figure 7 shows the realized funds rate, r_{t+4} , while the lower panel shows forecast errors made with unad-




Figure 7: The upper panel shows the actual federal funds rate. The lower panel shows the 4-month ahead forecast error using the unadjusted and the risk-adjusted federal funds rate. Forecast errors are smoothed using a 6 month moving average.

justed futures, $r_{t+4} - f_t^{(4)}$, and with risk-adjusted futures. (To focus attention on the systematic patterns in the figure rather than the high-frequency variation, we smooth the errors with a 6-month moving average.) The 1991 and 2001 recessions are both characterized by negative unadjusted forecast errors. The risk-adjustment improves upon these forecasts by adjusting the raw futures rate downward in both episodes.

Figures 6 and 7 suggest that unadjusted futures rates, or futures adjusted by a constant, can be wrong over long periods of time. The forecast errors tend to be negative during periods of falling rates and positive during periods of rate hikes. The forecast errors are largest when the funds rate changes direction, and keep being large for substantial amounts of time. The reason is that unadjusted or constant-adjusted futures rates only slowly adapt to changes in direction. As a result, these forecasts tend to *lag behind actual market expectations* around economic turning points; they generate forecast errors that are more autocorrelated than forecast errors from risk-adjusted futures.

To see this point more clearly, Table 8 reports some summary statistics on forecast errors. We compute forecast errors from futures-based forecasts and also from an AR(1) as a benchmark.¹⁵ We compute forecasts for the n -month-ahead federal funds rate as it

¹⁵We also considered forecasts from a random walk. The resulting forecasts, however, were consistently

would have been made at time t , using real-time data and rolling endpoint regressions. For example, when we compute forecasts for r_{t+n} using the AR(1) benchmark, we estimate the autoregressive parameters with data on the average funds rate up to time t and then use the current rate r_t as conditioning variable. Similarly, we use our rolling “out-of-sample” forecasts for risk premia based on nonfarm payrolls to make our risk adjustments. The forecast errors are computed over the October 1990 to December 2003 period, so that we have two years of data to estimate the parameters for the October 1990 forecast.

TABLE 8: FORECASTS OF THE FEDERAL FUNDS RATE

PANEL A: FEDERAL FUNDS FUTURES

BENCHMARK				FUTURES-BASED FORECASTS								
n	AR(1)			Unadjusted			Rule-of-thumb-adj			Risk-Adjusted		
	ME	SE	ρ_n	ME	SE	ρ_n	ME	SE	ρ_n	ME	SE	ρ_n
1	-3	20	0.52	-4	12	-0.01	-3	12	-0.01	-1	13	0.08
2	-6	35	0.55	-9	21	0.11	-7	20	0.11	-3	21	0.18
3	-8	49	0.46	-15	31	0.20	-12	30	0.20	-5	31	0.18
4	-10	63	0.36	-22	44	0.21	-18	42	0.21	-9	41	0.13
5	-11	75	0.37	-29	57	0.27	-24	55	0.27	-11	49	0.12
6	-10	84	0.43	-37	71	0.29	-31	68	0.29	-12	52	0.11

PANEL B: EURODOLLAR FUTURES

1	-11	61	0.41	-16	51	0.18	0	49	0.18	0	50	0.09
2	-23	101	0.45	-42	96	0.20	-23	89	0.20	-9	79	0.25
3	-37	135	0.33	-74	137	0.20	-52	127	0.20	-20	103	0.18
4	-49	167	0.21	-105	179	0.18	-80	166	0.20	-36	128	-0.01
5	-61	193	0.08	-135	217	0.11	-107	201	0.11	-53	150	-0.17
6	-75	216	-0.05	-162	250	0.02	-131	232	0.02	-73	165	-0.24
7	-90	235	-0.19	-185	276	-0.07	-151	254	-0.07	-96	182	-0.22
8	-130	257	-0.20	-222	305	-0.09	-185	280	-0.09	-75	185	-0.07

NOTE: n is the forecasting horizon, in months for fed funds futures and quarters for eurodollar futures. ME is the mean error (in basis points), SE is the root-mean-squared error (in bp), and ρ_n is the n th autocorrelation of the forecast error.

Table 8 reports mean forecast errors (ME), root-mean-squared-errors (SE), and the n th autocorrelation (ρ_n) for the n -month-ahead forecast. (Note that even for efficient n -month-ahead forecasts, the forecast errors will have $MA(n-1)$ autocorrelation because of

outperformed by the AR(1), so we did not include them in Table 8. Another alternative are Taylor-rule forecasts. For forecasts up to 3 months ahead, Evans (1998) documents that they tend to be dominated by forecasts based on (unadjusted) futures.

overlap; Table 8 therefore reports the n th autocorrelation which, ideally, should be zero.) The last column of Table 8 shows that risk-adjusted futures still made autocorrelated forecast errors over our sample, but the *autocorrelation is much smaller* than for any other forecast in the table. This is especially true for longer forecasting horizons. Moreover, risk-adjusted futures generate smaller average errors and lower squared errors.

Interestingly, Panel A makes a strong case for fed funds futures in general, even on a risk-unadjusted basis. The futures-based forecasts produce lower root-mean-squared errors than an AR(1). However, unadjusted futures made large, negative errors on average which range from -4 to -37 basis points. The rule-of-thumb-adjusted futures improve upon this: average forecast errors are lower by exactly the amount of the adjustment, and the adjustment also lowers squared errors. However, this adjustment only represents a small improvement over unadjusted forecasts. The risk-adjusted forecasts we estimate in this paper generate forecast errors that are always smaller on average and almost always smaller in root-mean-square terms, especially for longer forecasting horizons. Panel B confirms these findings for longer-horizon forecasts using eurodollar futures. Again, risk-adjusted futures do much better than unadjusted futures or the rule-of-thumb-adjusted futures.

5 Monetary Policy Shocks

Federal funds futures have been used by a number of recent authors to separate systematic changes in monetary policy from monetary policy “shocks”.¹⁶ The idea is to use fed funds futures market forecast errors as measures of exogenous, unforecastable changes in the stance of monetary policy.¹⁷ The fed funds futures market expectation is measured assuming the expectations hypothesis. Since we have shown in the previous section that futures rates should be adjusted for time-varying risk premia, we now investigate whether these risk premia also matter for the definition of monetary policy shocks.

Computing the futures market’s forecast error of the next policy move is less straightforward than it may seem, because of some institutional features of the federal funds market. For example, the futures contract settles based on the average funds rate during the contract month, and not on the value of the funds rate on a particular date, such as the day following an FOMC meeting. Moreover, the Fed sets a target for the funds rate, but does not completely control the funds rate itself, and the difference between the actual funds rate and the target can be nonnegligible, even for monthly averages. In the

¹⁶We cite these in the Introduction. All of the studies treat the federal funds rate as the monetary policy instrument, as in Bernanke and Blinder (1992), and attempt to improve upon the earlier, VAR-based identification of monetary policy shocks surveyed in Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1999).

¹⁷Faust, Swanson, and Wright (2004) describe the procedure in detail and test many of the required assumptions. Alternatively, Piazzesi (2004) and Cochrane and Piazzesi (2002a) measure market expectations from high-frequency data on short-term interest rates instead of fed funds futures. Piazzesi (2004) computes $E_t[r_{t+1}]$ from an arbitrage-free model of the term structure of interest rates. Cochrane and Piazzesi (2002a) use the change in the 1-month eurodollar rate and unrestricted regressions of r_{t+1} on a set of interest rates.

literature, these complications have led to alternative approaches on how policy shocks are computed from futures rates.

Here, we consider three approaches that have been used in the literature. First, Rudebusch (1998) defines the monetary policy shock as the difference between the realized federal funds rate target and the expected federal funds rate derived from fed funds futures. While this might seem to be the most natural definition of the market’s forecast error, it can suffer from the technical issues described above (that can cause the market expectation of the future realized funds rate to differ from the market expectation of the future target rate). Moreover, the shocks will be contaminated by risk premia in the futures contract even if those risk premia are constant. The second definition of monetary policy shocks we consider, used by Kuttner (2001) and Faust, Swanson, and Wright (2004), differences out both the technical factors in the federal funds market and any constant risk premia by using the *change* in the current-month or one-month-ahead federal funds futures contract rate on the day of an FOMC announcement. This approach uses daily fed funds futures data to make the interval $[t, t + 1]$ around the FOMC announcement small and assumes that risk premia do not change over this small interval.¹⁸ Finally, we consider a third definition of monetary policy shock proposed by Rigobon and Sack (2002) that uses the change in the current-quarter eurodollar futures contract on the day of the FOMC announcement rather than the change in the current-month fed funds futures contract. This measure is identical in concept to our second monetary policy shock measure, but uses the longer horizon of eurodollar futures contracts to try to reduce the influence of “timing” surprises in the setting of monetary policy (monetary policy actions that were only a surprise to the extent that they occurred at one FOMC meeting rather than the next, say). Of course, a potential disadvantage of considering a longer forecast horizon is that risk premia may be more of an issue.

We compute these three measures of monetary policy shocks over the sample period 1994 to 2003, when the Federal Reserve was explicitly announcing changes in its target for the federal funds rate. We include every FOMC meeting and every intermeeting policy move by the FOMC over this sample. Table 9 reports summary statistics for all three measures of policy shocks. From Panel A it is apparent that the first measure of monetary policy shocks, labeled “actual–futures”, is larger and more volatile than the other two: the mean, standard deviation, and extremes of the shocks are all the largest of the three shock series. Our second measure of monetary policy shocks (based on the change in fed funds futures) is the least volatile of the three, and our third measure, based on eurodollar futures, lies somewhere in between. The three shocks series do generally agree on the days of large monetary policy shocks, however—for example, the min and max of the three series all occur on the same day.

We perform a basic risk-adjustment of the three monetary policy shock series by regressing them on a set of conditioning variables that were known to financial markets right before the FOMC announcement—for this exercise, we pick Treasury yields as the

¹⁸This assumption is at least loosely consistent with the finding by Evans and Marshall (1998) that risk premia in Treasuries are not affected much by monetary policy shocks, which tend to occur at FOMC meetings.

regressors (as in Table 5), because we have high-frequency data on these yields.¹⁹ Under the expectations hypothesis, each of the three monetary policy shock measures should be unpredictable on the basis of these conditioning variables.

TABLE 9: RISK-ADJUSTING MEASURES OF MONETARY POLICY SHOCKS

PANEL A: SUMMARY STATISTICS OF POLICY SHOCKS							
	Actual –Futures		Change in FF Futures		Change in ED Futures		
	original	adjustment	original	adjustment	original	adjustment	
mean	-3.9	-3.9	-1.5	-1.5	-2.4	-2.4	
std dev	11.9	3.4	7.8	2.0	8.4	2.3	
min	-43.8	-13.2	-42.0	-6.5	-41.8	-7.8	
max	17.1	5.0	12.5	3.5	16.0	2.7	

PANEL B: T-STATS FROM REGRESSIONS W/TREASURY SPREADS							
	const.	1yr-6mo	2-1 yr	5-2 yr	10-5 yr	R^2	p -value
Actual –Futures	-2.0	-1.8	2.4	-2.1	1.8	0.08	.028
Change in FF Futures	-1.7	-0.6	1.7	-1.6	1.3	0.07	.355
Change in ED Futures	-2.0	0.2	1.4	-1.5	1.3	0.07	.110

NOTE: Daily observations on days of FOMC meetings and intermeeting policy moves, 1994-2003.

Results for each of these three regressions are summarized in Panel B of Table 9, which reports the t-statistics, regression R^2 , and p -value for the exclusion F-test that all of the coefficients and the constant term in each regression are jointly equal to zero. As can be seen from the exclusion tests, our first measure of monetary policy shocks (the realized target rate minus the futures market expectation) is significantly predictable, suggesting that risk premia may be a significant problem for that measure. By contrast, our second and third policy shock measures (based on changes in futures rates) seem to do much better, with the “change in FF futures” shocks being the cleanest of the three. Although the R^2 for the “actual–futures” shock regression is not much larger than for the other two, this is probably due to the first shock measure also being substantially more volatile than the other two (as noted in Panel A of the table).

Panel A of Table 9 also reports basic statistics for our estimated risk adjustments to each of the three monetary policy shock series. The risk adjustments for the “actual–futures” shock has a standard deviation of 3.4bp, which seems substantial relative to the

¹⁹We reestimate the regression coefficients for the monetary policy shock series, because risk premia depend on the maturity of the contract and FOMC meetings are typically not scheduled for the end of the month. The current-month or 1-month ahead fed funds futures contract therefore has a different maturity on FOMC meeting dates than the same contract in Table 5. Moreover, the nature of the risk associated with monetary policy shocks (and therefore the risk premia associated with these shocks) may have changed after 1994, when the Fed started announcing its policy moves at FOMC meetings, as argued in Piazzesi (2004).

standard deviation of the shock series itself of 11.9bp. The risk adjustment ranges from -13.2 to 5bp over our sample, which again seems substantial compared to -44 to 17bp for the shock series itself. By contrast, the estimated risk adjustments to our second and third measures of monetary policy shocks seem to be smaller (as well as statistically insignificant), with the risk adjustments to the “change in FF futures” shock measure being the smallest of the three.

While Table 9 suggests that risk adjustments to these series may be important, particularly for our first measure of policy shocks, our sample is too short to investigate the importance of these differences for the impulse responses of macro variables. For example, the reaction of employment to monetary policy shocks peaks after 2 years, and we have only 10 years of data. The estimated impulse responses based on different policy shocks have confidence bounds that have a hard time staying away from zero, let alone from each other. It will be interesting, however, to come back to this issue in the future, when we have more data.

6 Conclusions

We document substantial and predictable time-variation in excess returns on federal funds futures. We show that excess returns on these contracts are strongly countercyclical and can be predicted with R^2 of up to 35% using real-time business cycle indicators such as employment growth, Treasury yield spreads, or corporate bond spreads. We also present evidence that suggests that noncommercial market participants were net buyers of these contracts in times of high expected excess returns, and net sellers in times of low or negative expected excess returns. These time-varying premia have important consequences for computing market expectations from fed funds futures. For example, we find that ignoring these premia leads to larger forecast errors, both on average and in the root-mean-squared sense. Moreover, unadjusted futures make forecast errors that are more autocorrelated, because unadjusted futures-based forecasts lag behind risk-adjusted forecasts around economic turning points. Finally, we show that measures of monetary policy shocks based on the realized funds rate target minus the ex ante unadjusted fed funds futures rate are significantly contaminated by risk premia. Instead, a measure of monetary policy shocks based on the one-day change in fed funds futures around FOMC announcements seems to be more robust, perhaps because it “differences out” risk premia that are moving primarily at lower, business-cycle frequencies.

Appendix: Marking to Market

Actual excess returns on fed funds futures contracts are not exactly equal to (1), because futures contracts are “marked to market” every day. This means that the two parties to a fed funds futures contract must post (or may withdraw) collateral every day as the contract is marked to the market price that day. The party that receives (pays) collateral then receives (pays) interest on this collateral at the overnight interest rate all the way through to contract settlement.




Figure 8: Each panel plots the actual annualized excess returns on the n -month ahead federal funds futures contract as black line and our return definition (1) as gray line (green in color).

The definition of ex post realized excess returns on the n -month-ahead fed funds futures contract, including the effects of marking to market every day over the life of the contract, is thus:

$$rxmm_{t+n}^{(n)} = - \sum_{d=1}^T \Delta f_{t,d}^{(n)} \cdot R_{t,d}^T \quad (8)$$

where d indexes days from the last day of month t to the day T the contract expires (the last day of month $t+n$), $\Delta f_{t,d}^{(n)}$ is the one-day change in the contract rate on day d , and $R_{t,d}^T \equiv \prod_{i=d}^T (1 + or_{t,i})$, where $or_{t,i}$ is the risk-free overnight interest rate on day i after the end of month t . For the risk-free overnight interest rate, we used the rate on overnight

repurchase agreements for U.S. Treasury securities, which is less risky, less volatile and less affected by calendar days (such as settlement Wednesdays) than the overnight federal funds rate.

Figure 8 compares the more exact definition of excess returns (8) to our baseline approximation (1). Throughout the figure, approximation (1) is plotted as the black line and excess returns including the effects of marking to market (8) is plotted as the gray line. In fact, it is very difficult to distinguish between the two lines for any of the contract horizons that we consider, which shows that our approximation (1) to excess returns is extremely good.

As a final check, we re-estimate our main equations with actual returns. We can see that the results in Panels A and B of Table A1 are almost identical to those in Tables 1 and 3, respectively. This comparison confirms that the approximation (1) works extremely well.

TABLE A1: ANNUALIZED EXCESS RETURNS, MARKING TO MARKET

PANEL A: CONSTANT RISK PREMIA						
n	1	2	3	4	5	6
$\alpha^{(n)}$	42.4	45.9	51.1	58.6	67.4	72.5
(t-stat)	(3.9)	(3.6)	(3.2)	(3.2)	(3.2)	(3.1)

PANEL B: EXCESS RETURNS AND NONFARM PAYROLLS						
n	1	2	3	4	5	6
constant	13.6	14.2	4.9	-5.7	-21.1	-34.1
(t-stat)	(0.5)	(0.4)	(0.1)	(-0.2)	(-0.6)	(-1.1)
$f_t^{(n)}$	0.11	0.16	0.23	0.30	0.37	0.42
(t-stat)	(1.3)	(1.7)	(2.3)	(3.4)	(5.2)	(8.9)
ΔNFP_{t-1}	-0.17	-0.36	-0.50	-0.62	-0.70	-0.72
(t-stat)	(-1.4)	(-2.6)	(-3.4)	(-4.6)	(-6.7)	(-10.9)
R^2	0.02	0.08	0.15	0.22	0.28	0.36

NOTE: The sample is 1988:10-2003:12. The observations are from the last day of each month. The regression equations are those from Tables 1 and 3, but now returns are defined by equation (8). HAC t-statistics are reported in parentheses.

References

- [1] Bernanke, Ben S. and Alan S. Blinder, 1992, "The Federal Funds Rate and the Channels of Monetary Transmission," *American Economic Review* 82, 901-921.
- [2] Bernanke, Ben S. and Kenneth Kuttner 2003. "What Explains the Stock Market's Reaction to Federal Reserve Policy?" Forthcoming *Journal of Finance*.
- [3] Brunner, Allan D. 2000. "On the Derivation of Monetary Policy Shocks: Should We Throw the VAR Out with the Bath Water?" *Journal of Money, Credit and Banking* 32, 252-79.
- [4] Campbell, John Y. and Robert J. Shiller 1991. "Yield Spreads and Interest Rate Movements: A Bird's Eye View." *Review of Economic Studies*, 58, 495-514.
- [5] Christiano, Lawrence, Martin Eichenbaum and Charles Evans, 1999 "Monetary Policy Shocks: What Have We Learned and to What End?" in Michael Woodford and John Taylor, eds., *Handbook of Macroeconomics*, North Holland.
- [6] Cochrane, John Y. and Monika Piazzesi 2002a. "The Fed and Interest Rates: A High-Frequency Identification." *American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings*, May 2002, 92, pp. 90-95.
- [7] Cochrane, John Y. and Monika Piazzesi 2002b. "Bond Risk Premia." *NBER Working Paper* 9178.
- [8] Durham, Benson 2003. "Estimates of the Term Premium on Near-Dated Federal Funds Futures Contracts." FEDS Working paper 2003-19, Federal Reserve Board.
- [9] European Central Bank 2004. "Monthly Bulletin: May 2004." European Central Bank web site.
- [10] Evans, Charles 1998. "Real-time Taylor Rules and the Federal Funds Futures Market." Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, *Economic Perspectives*, 2, 44-55.
- [11] Evans, Charles and David Marshall 1998. "Monetary Policy and the Term Structure of Nominal Interest Rates: Evidence and Theory." *Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy* 49, 53-111.
- [12] Fama, Eugene F. and Robert R. Bliss 1987. "The Information in Long-Maturity Forward Rates." *American Economic Review*, 77, 680-692.
- [13] Faust, Jon, Eric Swanson and Jonathan Wright 2004. "Identifying VARs Based on High-Frequency Futures Data." Forthcoming *Journal of Monetary Economics*.
- [14] Greenspan, Alan 2004. "Monetary Policy Report to the Congress, February 11, 2004." Federal Reserve Board of Governors web site.

- [15] Gürkaynak, Refet, Brian Sack, and Eric Swanson 2002. "Market-Based Measures of Monetary Policy Expectations." FEDS working paper 2002-40, Federal Reserve Board.
- [16] Gürkaynak, Refet, Brian Sack, and Eric Swanson 2003. "The Excess Sensitivity of Long-term Interest Rates: Evidence and Implications for Macro Models." FEDS working paper 2003-50, Federal Reserve Board.
- [17] Hansen, Lars Peter and Robert J. Hodrick, 1988. "Forward Exchange Rates as Optimal Predictors of Future Spot Rates: An Econometric Analysis." *Journal of Political Economy*, 88, 829-53.
- [18] Hodrick, Robert J., 1992. "Dividend Yields And Expected Stock Returns: Alternative Procedures For Influence And Measurement." *Review of Financial Studies*, 5, 357-86.
- [19] Krueger, Joel T. and Kenneth N. Kuttner 1996. "The Fed Funds Futures Rate as a Predictor of Federal Reserve Policy." *Journal of Futures Markets* 16, 865-879.
- [20] Kuttner, Kenneth N. 2001. "Monetary Policy Surprises and Interest Rates: Evidence from the Federal Funds Futures Market." *Journal of Monetary Economics* 47, 523-544.
- [21] Piazzesi, Monika 2004. "Bond Yields and the Federal Reserve." Forthcoming *Journal of Political Economy*.
- [22] Rigobon, Roberto and Brian Sack 2002. "The Impact of Monetary Policy on Asset Prices." *NBER Working Paper* 8794.
- [23] Rudebusch, Glenn 1998. "Do Measures of Monetary Policy in a VAR Make Sense?" *International Economic Review* 39, 907-931.
- [24] Sack, Brian 2002. "Extracting the Expected Path of Monetary Policy from Futures Rates." FEDS working paper 2002-56, Federal Reserve Board.
- [25] Stambaugh, Robert F., 1988. "The Information in Forward Rates: Implications for Models of the Term Structure." *Journal of Financial Economics* 21, 41-70.
- [26] Stigum, Marcia 1990. *The Money Market*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- [27] Stock, James H. and Mark W. Watson, 1989. "New Indexes of Coincident and Leading Indicators," in Olivier Blanchard and Stanley Fischer, Eds., 1989 *NBER Macroeconomics Annual*, Cambridge MA: MIT Press.