

This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau of Economic Research

Volume Title: The Federal Civil Service System and The Problem of Bureaucracy

Volume Author/Editor: Ronald N. Johnson and Gary D. Libecap

Volume Publisher: University of Chicago Press

Volume ISBN: 0-226-40170-7

Volume URL: <http://www.nber.org/books/john94-1>

Publication Date: January 1994

Chapter Title: Front matter, table of contents, acknowledgments

Chapter Author: Ronald N. Johnson, Gary D. Libecap

Chapter URL: <http://www.nber.org/chapters/c8631>

Chapter pages in book: (p. -11 - 0)

The Federal Civil Service System

and the
Problem of
Bureaucracy

THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS
OF INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE



Ronald N. Johnson & Gary D. Libecap

This Page Intentionally Left Blank

The Federal Civil Service
System and the Problem
of Bureaucracy



NBER Series on Long-term Factors in Economic
Development

A National Bureau of Economic Research Series

Edited by Claudia Goldin

Also in the series

Claudia Goldin

*Understanding the Gender Gap: An Economic History of
American Women* (Oxford University Press, 1990)

Roderick Floud, Kenneth Wachter, and Annabel Gregory
*Height, Health and History: Nutritional Status in the
United Kingdom, 1750–1980* (Cambridge University
Press, 1990)

Robert A. Margo

*Race and Schooling in the South, 1880–1950: An
Economic History* (University of Chicago Press, 1990)

Samuel H. Preston and Michael R. Haines

*Fatal Years: Child Mortality in Late Nineteenth-Century
America* (Princeton University Press, 1991)

Barry Eichengreen

*Golden Fetters: The Gold Standard and the Great
Depression, 1919–1939* (Oxford University Press, 1992)

Naomi R. Lamoreaux

*Insider Lending: Banks, Personal Connections, and
Economic Development in Industrial New England,
1784–1912* (Cambridge University Press, 1994)

Lance E. Davis, Robert E. Gallman, Karin J. Gleiter, and
Teresa D. Hutchins

*In Pursuit of Leviathan: Technology, Institutions,
Productivity, and Profits in American Whaling,
1816–1906* (University of Chicago Press, forthcoming)

The Federal Civil Service System and the Problem of Bureaucracy

The Economics and Politics
of Institutional Change

Ronald N. Johnson
and Gary D. Libecap



The University of Chicago Press

Chicago and London

RONALD N. JOHNSON is professor of economics at Montana State University, Bozeman. GARY D. LIBECAP is professor of economics and director of the Karl Eller Center at the University of Arizona and a research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research.

The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 60637
The University of Chicago Press, Ltd., London

© 1994 by The University of Chicago
All rights reserved. Published 1994
Printed in the United States of America
03 02 01 00 99 98 97 96 95 94 1 2 3 4 5
ISBN: 0-226-40170-7 (cloth)
0-226-40171-5 (paper)

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Johnson, Ronald N.

The Federal Civil Service system and the problem of bureaucracy:
the economics and politics of institutional change / Ronald N. Johnson
and Gary D. Libecap.

p. cm. — (NBER series on long-term factors in economic development)

Includes bibliographical references and index.

1. Civil service—United States—History. 2. Bureaucracy—United States—History. I. Libecap, Gary D. II. Title. III. Series.

JK681.J64 1994

353.001—dc20

94-12539

CIP

ⓈThe paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of the American National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z39.48-1984.

National Bureau of Economic Research

Officers

Paul W. McCracken, *chairman*

John H. Biggs, *vice chairman*

Martin Feldstein, *president and chief executive officer*

Geoffrey Carliner, *executive director and corporate secretary*

Charles A. Walworth, *treasurer*

Sam Parker, *director of finance and administration*

Directors at Large

Peter C. Aldrich

Elizabeth E. Bailey

John H. Biggs

Andrew Brimmer

Carl F. Christ

Don R. Conlan

Kathleen B. Cooper

Jean A. Crockett

George C. Eads

Martin Feldstein

George Hatsopoulos

Karen H. Horn

Lawrence R. Klein

Leo Melamed

Merton H. Miller

Michael H. Moskow

Robert T. Parry

Peter G. Peterson

Richard N. Rosett

Bert Seidman

Kathleen P. Utgoff

Donald S. Wasserman

Marina v. N. Whitman

John O. Wilson

Directors by University Appointment

Jagdish Bhagwati, *Columbia*

William C. Brainard, *Yale*

Glen G. Cain, *Wisconsin*

Franklin Fisher, *Massachusetts Institute of Technology*

Saul H. Hymans, *Michigan*

Marjorie B. McElroy, *Duke*

Joel Mokyr, *Northwestern*

James L. Pierce, *California, Berkeley*

Andrew Postlewaite, *Pennsylvania*

Nathan Rosenberg, *Stanford*

Harold T. Shapiro, *Princeton*

Craig Swan, *Minnesota*

Michael Yoshino, *Harvard*

Arnold Zellner, *Chicago*

Directors by Appointment of Other Organizations

Marcel Boyer, *Canadian Economics Association*

Mark Drabentstott, *American Agricultural Economics Association*

Richard A. Easterlin, *Economic History Association*

Gail D. Fosler, *The Conference Board*

A. Ronald Gallant, *American Statistical Association*

Robert S. Hamada, *American Finance Association*

Charles Lave, *American Economic Association*

Rudolph A. Oswald, *American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations*

James F. Smith, *National Association of Business Economists*

Charles A. Walworth, *American Institute of Certified Public Accountants*

Josh S. Weston, *Committee for Economic Development*

Directors Emeriti

Moses Abramovitz

Emilio G. Collado

George T. Conklin, Jr.

Thomas D. Flynn

Gottfried Haberler

Franklin A. Lindsay

Paul W. McCracken

Geoffrey H. Moore

James J. O'Leary

George B. Roberts

Eli Shapiro

William S. Vickrey

To Cel, Ann, Sarah, and Cap

Contents

	Acknowledgments	xi
1.	The “Problem of Bureaucracy”	1
2.	Replacing Political Patronage with Merit: The Roles of the President and the Congress in the Origins of the Federal Civil Service System	12
3.	The Continuing Political Conflict over Control of Federal Employees and the Requirement for Further Institutional Change	48
4.	The Rise of Federal Employees as an Interest Group: The Early Years	76
5.	The Maturation of Federal Employees as an Interest Group	96
6.	Explaining the Success of Federal Employees as an Interest Group	126
7.	The Implications of a Protected Bureaucracy	154
8.	The Economics and Politics of Institutional Change in the Political Arena	177
	Appendix A: Appendix to Chapter 2	189
	Appendix B: Appendix to Chapter 3	196

Appendix C: Appendix to Chapter 5	198
Appendix D: Appendix to Chapter 6	202
References	205
Index	223

Acknowledgments

As is often true with a project of this sort, the motivation to undertake this volume was derived from the theories, empirical work, and ideas of others. Our work here has been greatly stimulated and guided by the writings of Ronald Coase, William Niskanen, Douglass North, Gordon Tullock, and Oliver Williamson. We have also benefited from the comments of reviewers at the National Bureau of Economic Research and the University of Chicago Press and especially from Claudia Goldin's very useful comments on an earlier draft of the book. John Lott's work has also clarified our thinking on many of the points raised in the volume. Parts of this volume have been presented at university seminars, lectures, and professional meetings, and we express our most sincere appreciation for the many suggestions we have received. We also wish to acknowledge financial support from National Science Foundation grant SES-8508924 and from the Earhart Foundation. Finally, we want to thank Sheila Smith at Montana State University for constructing the tables and figures and Hazel Lord and the staff at the University of Southern California Law Center Library for reference support.

This Page Intentionally Left Blank