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hygiene in some working class households suggests to some extent that the working class housewife is overburdened with work already at hand, and would find it impossible to take up part-time work in addition." *Op. cit.*, p. 184.

The ready replacement of men mobilized early may lead to false expectations about later civilian employment. When single and childless men enter the armed forces, many childless housewives go into industry. By the time fathers are inducted, the remaining men and young unmarried women in most families are working in war industry many hours overtime. Consequently, a great deal of work ordinarily shared with other members of the family has to be done entirely by the housewife—mending, pressing, laundering, shopping, gardening, and caring for children. An added burden falls upon all housewives when labor is shifted from jobs normally performed for the home to essential jobs, for every full-time gainful worker diverted from service for the home to war occupations leaves a full-time job (or more than one) whose doing must be shared among housewives. The latter must choose between performing the jobs themselves and skimping on the living standard of their families. To some extent economizing is the proper alternative. It will not necessarily be accepted for that reason, however, and in many cases, it would sap the efficiency of those in the labor force. Above a certain stage, intensive war mobilization within the labor force itself tends to strengthen resistance to further entries of housewives not already working gainfully.

10 THE LABOR FORCE AFTER THIS WAR

If the apparent rise in the American labor force propensity during World War I was illusory, the events that followed cannot indicate what we may expect after this war. Signs do exist, however, that the additions during this war will not remain in the labor force when peace comes.

Nearly half of the wartime additions have been persons of school age, 14-24. It seems sure that our school attendance after this war will resume its historic upward trend. Indeed, a large portion of the young persons who came into the total labor force were simply students who entered the armed forces and they will doubtless wish to take up education where they left off, in many cases at the high school level. Several factors may join to swell the postwar percentage in school relative to the prewar; e.g., the spread of economic well-being, the urbanization of the population, the widening govern-

ment subsidy of higher education and of elementary and high school education in poor areas, the extending Americanization as the foreign born die off, and this nation's widening cultural awareness. If these factors operate as suggested, the consequent decline in the percentages of young people in the labor force will hardly be cushioned by the sharp rise in employability standards and the re-intensified opposition of unions to child labor.

Another fourth of the war additions have been women over 24 who came into the labor force as males left. Several reasons suggest that women newcomers will go out as men are discharged. A minor factor will be that the patriotic urge to help in the war will give way to the patriotic urge to vacate a job for a service man. More important, employability standards will rise sharply and wage inducements will fall off. Most important, a big percentage of women will not work if their men can support them, as may easily be learned by asking a few working women; and the necessity of many women will be relieved by the return of the men to civilian jobs, assuming of course, that war deaths and other permanent war casualties are not numerous. Nearly as important perhaps, the absence of male companionship has doubtless led many women to take jobs: when normal social life is restored, they will quit. According to a Gallup Poll, half of *all* married women and a seventh of *all* single women in war jobs plan to stop working after the war.⁷³

Most of the other accretions to the labor force during the war have been persons over 54. Though there is less reason for assuming their withdrawal, some will leave the labor force because of higher employability standards or lower wage rates.

For the later postwar period up to, say, 1950, indications are about the same. No change from 1940 may be expected in the age and sex composition of the population that would affect the size of the labor force, and the expected trends in labor force propensities of different groups promise largely to cancel out. The labor force propensity of the young will undoubtedly decline somewhat, for reasons already discussed. That of mature women will probably rise, but only slightly; for the net birth rate will probably not fall below prewar levels, and the larger incomes and widening social security of primary workers, will, by reducing pressure on wives and daughters to earn, tend to countervail any multiplication of job opportunities for women. The

⁷³ American Institute of Public Opinion, *The Views of the American War Worker*, Summer 1943. The survey was made by 92 field representatives in 62 cities in 15 states.

labor force propensity of old persons is not likely to go below prewar levels. Declines for this group were due in the past to the widening of social security (Sec. 5), but the extension of old age insurance in the postwar period cannot, so far as the number covered is concerned, do more than take the place of charity in the prewar.

All in all, a peacetime return to prewar labor force propensities is foreseeable, provided permanent casualties are not extreme. The labor force, therefore, is likely to be larger than before this war only in proportion to the population growth. Our prospective problem is to find jobs in peacetime industry for those members of the normal labor force who are in the service or in civilian jobs that end with the war.

Even if the wartime additions to the labor force do withdraw, their jobs cannot all be turned over to the returning soldiers, because a great many of these jobs also will evaporate with the war. Many jobs, however, that have temporarily been filled by civilian newcomers, will be restored to the primary wage earners and many of the persons withdrawing from the *total* labor force will be service men themselves who leave to go back to school. The withdrawals that do occur, moreover, will relieve the pressure for jobs at a very crucial time. As the standards of employability rise again, the percentage of unemployables among these wartime additions, considering who they are, would surely become quite big and the exodus from the labor force will avert a considerable part of the unemployment certain to occur even in the face of a strong demand for labor.

CONCLUSIONS

The main conclusion of this paper is that the possibilities of net additions to the normal labor force in wartime have been exaggerated. When from a tenth to a third of the normal labor force goes into the military services the civilian labor force apparently suffers a net loss. If American, British, and German peacetime experience is typical, the labor force is not very sensitive to economic shocks; and differences in labor force propensities among nations are accounted for in large part by traditional differences in social structures, and do not reflect disparities in national management.

The wartime evidence supports five conclusions. First, most of the supposed additions to the normal labor force in World War I were illusory. Perhaps in none of the three countries was the illusion greater than in the United States.

Second, in this war some real net increases in the total labor force