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large numbers. Married women without children or with one child, have already been drawn into some kind of war work. To employ married women with two or more children in industry makes it necessary to establish more kindergartens and other services which need buildings, furniture and personnel. Part-time work, however, can be organized for considerable numbers of married women." *The Economist,* March 6, p. 300.

The British and German figures do show greater increases in labor force propensities of females than do the United States figures. But the rise in the labor force propensity of males in the United States during the war has probably far exceeded that in either Britain or Germany: 5 per cent of all males 14 and older came into the labor force between December 1941 and November 1943.

In short, the United States labor force propensity for males and females combined had risen more after 23 months of war[63] than the British after almost three years, assuming, of course, that the British propensity did not change materially between 1931 and 1939. It is possible, as Mr. Bevin claimed, that the British have mobilized their population for greater output over more hours than has any other people at any other time.[64] But so far as paid labor is concerned, mobilization has been largely of the time and energy of persons already in the labor force before the war. There is no evidence of any big increase in the labor force itself.

9 Possibilities for Further Increases in the United States War Labor Force

As suggested by Mr. Bevin, the propensity of the British population to be in the labor force as soldier or worker attained its maximum in 1942: 70 per cent of Britons 14-65. In contrast, in the United States in late 1943 it was only 60 per cent.[65] At first blush this country seems to have still a long way to go before reaching its maximum. The question whether many additional persons can be brought into the labor force is especially interesting in view of the United States program to induct more than a million men in 1944.

The higher propensity in Britain did not begin with the war. Associated both with the traditionally smaller percentage of British children 14 and older in school and with the smaller percentage of British women with children under 14, it exceeded that in the United

[63] For remarks regarding recent census revisions of monthly poll estimates, see Sec. 8; see also Table 17 and App. C.

[64] *Parliamentary Debates,* May 21, 1942, col. 428.

[65] On the basis of recent preliminary revisions of the Census poll for 1941-43, the U.S. labor force propensity in late 1943 was 1 per cent higher than this.

States just as much before the war as at the time of the most recent comparison. When these two factors are expressed as percentages of the population 14-64 and added to the labor force propensities, the British and American totals are just about the same.

The combined percentages of the British population 14-64 (or 65) who were in the labor force in May-October 1943 (70.3), were attending school (1.8)[66], or were women under 40 with children under 14 (7.8)[67] yielded a total percentage of 79.9 who were thus variously occupied. The combined percentages of the United States population 14-64 who in February 1943 were in the labor force (60.2), were attending school (8.4),[68] or were women under 40 with children under 14 (10.8)[69] yielded almost exactly the same total percentage—79.4. It is possible, of course, that proportionately more British than American women with children may have been in the labor force. If so, the British duplicated total must have been relatively inflated; for these women would have been counted again in the labor force propensity. Yet the British total was still barely higher than the United States. The fact that a higher percentage of Americans attend school or are women with children to care for thus seems to account for the lower percentage who are in the labor force. In this connection, though, further comment by Loring Wood ought to be noted here:

"There is another important factor accounting for the difference in the female labor force propensity between the United States and Britain which I feel you have not emphasized sufficiently. The labor force propensity of females in the farm population is only about half as great as for those in the nonfarm population in the United States, and this difference is accounted for only in small part by differences in age structure. But the farm population is relatively two or three times as large in the United States as in Britain. This seems to me an extremely important factor in the interpretation of United States-British differences in labor force propensities. It tends, of course, to

[66] British school attendance was last reported for 1938. A 1943 percentage would undoubtedly be still lower.

[67] The British registration of 1941-42 covered women under 40 with children under 14 (International Labour Office, *Wartime Transference of Labour in Great Britain,* Montreal, 1942, p. 35). Women born during 1903-05 or in 1923 are estimated.

[68] Children outside the labor force and in school in Feb. 1943, Bureau of the Census, *Labor Force Bulletin,* April 1943, p. 14.

[69] The United States figures for women with children under 10 were adjusted to the British age classification by extrapolating the differences between percentages of women with children under 5 and of women with children under 10. The United States percentage for 1943 would differ only negligibly from that of the 1940 census, because the age drift of children just about offset the increase in the birth rate during these three years.

strengthen your general conclusion that the differences are deeply rooted in differences in the social, demographic, and, in this case, the economic structure of the populations."

Probably, however, a major reason why farm women have lower labor force propensities than urban women is the much higher proportion of children they have to care for. Thus what at first glance seems to be an economic factor is really a demographic factor, though perhaps having economic causes.

The above comparison would seem, therefore, to suggest that the United States could bring its labor force propensity up to the British level only by two rather desperate expedients, not likely to be resorted to. One would be to allow its school enrollment to drop to the British level; the other, to urge women with children into the labor force on a larger scale than the British have been willing to do.

We have seen that in the United States 800,000 persons dropped out of school during the twelve months ending February 1943. Half of them were at high school level, and males greatly outnumbered females. School enrollment will continue to fall somewhat, whether thought desirable or not. However, before it goes down much further, it is likely to meet a 'back-to-school' campaign like that in the autumn of 1918 (Sec. 7). In fact, this campaign was well under way in the autumn of 1943. Instead of seeking full-time employment, students will doubtless be encouraged, though guardedly, to seek after-school and summer work.[70]

Indeed, part-time work by students must have risen somewhat during 1942-43. The number of persons 14 and older reported by the monthly poll to be outside the labor force and in school fell about 1,600,000 during the 12 months ending February 1943, 800,000 more than in my estimates. The difference may conceivably reflect an upward bias in my school attendance estimates, but some of it must reflect an increase in the employment of persons continuing in school.

About half of the male students and three-fourths of the female students 14 and older who were outside the labor force during the preceding school term were still outside in the summer of 1942. Indeed, the increase in the vacation labor force of 1942 over that of corresponding vacation months of 1940, or 1941, was hardly larger than the increase in the school-term labor force of 1942 over that of corresponding school-term months of 1940, or 1941.

[70] See Basic National Policy on Employment of Youth, *Monthly Labor Review*, May 1943, pp. 883-4.

On the whole, no mass movement toward part-time or summer work has occurred. Outside the labor force were 2,000,000 male and 3,500,000 female students in July and August 1942; and 3,500,000 male and 4,400,000 female students in February 1943. Except in agriculture, where summer and part-time labor force propensities of young persons have always been high, students are not easy to use economically. With all the limitations on their location, working hours, experience, discipline, and sense of responsibility, they are unemployable from the standpoint of most industrial employers. The chief demand for them will doubtless continue to be in occupations that have always employed them. What these occupations are may be pretty well known, but an analysis of part-time employment among high school students in the District of Columbia, sent me by the school authorities, adds a flavor of definiteness to common observation. Conclusions based on it must be limited by the fact that Washington is not a representative community and that the results of the survey, taken in December 1940, were inflated by the Christmas rush. Yet only one in every seven junior high school students and only one in every four senior high school students was employed. These ratios varied widely among schools:

	NUMBER ENROLLED	NUMBER EMPLOYED	PERCENTAGE
School Divisions 1-9			
Junior high schools	12,578	2,116	16.8
Senior high schools	10,288	2,884	28.0
School Divisions 10-13			
Junior high schools	7,551	915	12.1
Senior high schools	3,303	529	16.0

Of the 6,500 occupied students, 1,500 delivered newspapers, 2,200 worked in grocery or department stores (Christmas rush), 600 in private homes, and 500 for the government. The remaining 1700 worked in a wide assortment of establishments, some of them at rather trivial tasks. Nearly all were thus employed in trade or in personal service industries. Practically none reported factory, transportation, or construction jobs, although these three industries held a third of all employment reported for the District in the 1940 census.

The concentration in the trade and personal service industries does not, of course, mean that part-time and summer employment of students is futile during a war. It may release housewives for gainful work and persons in non-essential occupations for war work. However, it is not at all sure that, even in their customary employments, part-time students can be used effectively on any large scale;

or if they could, that they would be available. Most of them are probably not working because they don't want and don't have to. Their parents too are probably averse to their working, for they are unusually well-off today and few fathers of children in high school have been drafted. Even legal compulsion is not practicable, for most work suitable for this type of employee is rather far removed from the direct war effort. It would not be easy, for example, to compel young girls to enter domestic service so that housewives could take war jobs. On the whole, the task of persuading school children to work part-time or for a summer seems big indeed. It may be bigger than to provide useful work for them.

As for the possibility of bringing more women with children into the labor force, British experience is discouraging. Direct comparison of our labor force with the British is possible only for married women in general, not for women with children. As has been seen, more American women have more children to care for than British. Nevertheless, the percentage of British married women *outside* the labor force has been little lower than that of American, at least in the age group for which comparable data are available. In April 1940, 84.4 per cent of American married women 35-39, with husband present, were outside the labor force; in January 1942, according to data made available shortly before Mr. Bevin's statement about maximum mobilization, 76 per cent of British married women 35 and 36 were outside the labor force.[71] Having weathered more than two years of war these figures do not suggest that the British have compelled or induced any significantly larger proportion of married women into employment than has this country.[72] Frankel has pointed out the difficulties:

"It seems that the importance of nurseries has perhaps been somewhat overemphasized, and that other household duties, mainly cooking, cleaning and laundering, are more likely to prevent married women from taking up part-time work than is the care of children. . . . The relatively lower standard of

[71] Bureau of the Census, Series P-18, No. 13, p. 4; H. Frankel, The Unemployment of Married Women (Institute of Statistics, Oxford, June 27, 1942), p. 183.

[72] Legal compulsion has not even been tried on mothers. British women with children under 14 have been exempt from liability to conscription into the services or industry. Dependency allowances have been somewhat lower, relative to earnings in civil life, than in the United States, but since the British system is administered on a 'needs' basis, it is more flexible than the United States system and probably exercises somewhat less compulsion on women to enter the labor market. See D. C. Cline, Allowances to Dependents of Servicemen in the United States; Helen Tarazov, Family Allowances: An Anglo-American Contrast, *The Annals*, May 1943, pp. 1-21. These remarks apply, however, to the comparison before the United States raised its dependency allowances.

hygiene in some working class households suggests to some extent that the working class housewife is overburdened with work already at hand, and would find it impossible to take up part-time work in addition." *Op. cit.*, p. 184.

The ready replacement of men mobilized early may lead to false expectations about later civilian employment. When single and childless men enter the armed forces, many childless housewives go into industry. By the time fathers are inducted, the remaining men and young unmarried women in most families are working in war industry many hours overtime. Consequently, a great deal of work ordinarily shared with other members of the family has to be done entirely by the housewife—mending, pressing, laundering, shopping, gardening, and caring for children. An added burden falls upon all housewives when labor is shifted from jobs normally performed for the home to essential jobs, for every full-time gainful worker diverted from service for the home to war occupations leaves a full-time job (or more than one) whose doing must be shared among housewives. The latter must choose between performing the jobs themselves and skimping on the living standard of their families. To some extent economizing is the proper alternative. It will not necessarily be accepted for that reason, however, and in many cases, it would sap the efficiency of those in the labor force. Above a certain stage, intensive war mobilization within the labor force itself tends to strengthen resistance to further entries of housewives not already working gainfully.

10 The Labor Force After This War

If the apparent rise in the American labor force propensity during World War I was illusory, the events that followed cannot indicate what we may expect after this war. Signs do exist, however, that the additions during this war will not remain in the labor force when peace comes.

Nearly half of the wartime additions have been persons of school age, 14-24. It seems sure that our school attendance after this war will resume its historic upward trend. Indeed, a large portion of the young persons who came into the total labor force were simply students who entered the armed forces and they will doubtless wish to take up education where they left off, in many cases at the high school level. Several factors may join to swell the postwar percentage in school relative to the prewar; e.g., the spread of economic well-being, the urbanization of the population, the widening govern-