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Volume Title: The Labor Force in War and Transition: Four Countries

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Volume Publisher: NBER

Volume ISBN: 0-87014-351-4

Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/long52-1

Publication Date: 1952

Chapter Title: Demobilization

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Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c3136

Chapter pages in book: (p. 46 - 48)

Table 9

Wartime Gain in Equivalent Fulltime Employment due to Increase in Hours (parttime and overtime combined): United States, April 1940-1946

		1940	1941	1942	1943	1944	1945	1946
AG	RICULTURE							
1	Av. weekly hours	54.0	55.0	56.7	60.0	56.1	53.5	52.6
2	Employed persons							
	(millions)	8.7	8.9	9.1	8.8	8.4	8.7	8.2
3	Manhours (millions)	470	490	516	528	471	465	431
4	Equivalent fulltime em-							
	ployed (millions)	8.9	9.2	9.7	10.0	8.9	8.8	8.1
5	Equivalent fulltime							
	compared with actual							
	employed (millions)	+0.2	+0.3	+0.6	+1.2	+0.5	+0.1	0.1
NO	NAGRICULTURE							
6	Av. weekly hours	40.0	41.5	43.5	46.5	46.1	45.6	42.9
7	Employed persons							
	(millions)	37.3	39.6	43.7	45.0	45.3	44.9	45.9
8	Manhours (millions)	1492	1643	1901	2093	2088	2047	1969
9	Equivalent fulltime em-							
	ployed (millions)	35.5	39.1	45.3	49.8	49.7	48.7	46.9
10	Equivalent fulltime							
	compared with actual				140			
	employed (millions)	-1.8	-0.5	+1.6	+4.8	+4.4	+3.8	+1.0
TO	TAL CIVILIAN							
11	Employed persons				<u>.</u>			
	(millions)	46.0	48.5	52.8	53.8	53.7	53.6	54.1
12	Equivalent fulltime		40.2		50.0	50 C	67 E	5 E O
10	employed (millions)	44.4	48.3	55.0	39.8	38.0	57.5	55.0
15	Equivalent fulltime							
	employed (millions)	-16	02	+92	+60	+49	+39	+0.9
	chipioyea (himions)	-1.0	0.2	. 2.2	0.0	1 1.5	1 3.5	10.5
GAI	N IN EMPLOYMENT DUE TO	HOURS I	NGREASI	LS				
14	Compared with 1940							
	(millions)	•••••	+1.4	+3.8	+7.6	+6.5	+5.5	+2.5
15	Compared with 1941			1.0.4	100			
	(millions)			+2.4	+6.Z	+5.1	+4.1	+1.1

Source of data on which the calculations were based: Bureau of Census, Current Population Surveys. Fulltime hours were assumed to be 53 a week in agriculture, 42 a week in nonagriculture.

due to overtime (Table 11, line 4) rose rapidly during 1940-43, slightly in 1944, and fell off somewhat by 1945, though they were offset in some degree during 1944 and 1945 by the time lost through continued dilutions of the labor force with women and young people.

7 DEMOBILIZATION

Between mid-1944 and 1945, Canada's armed forces discharged a fifth of their personnel. Its labor force failed to keep pace with population Table 10

Change in Equivalent Fulltime Employment due to Change in Extent of Parttime: United States, April 1940-1945 (millions)

		1940	1941	1942	1943	1944	1945
nployed less by Avera	than Fulltime ge Hours	•					
orked	Lost						
0*	42*	1.0	0.5	0.8	0.8	1.4	1.3
7	35	1.0	1.2	1.3	1.2	1.5	1.7
25	17	4.9	5.0	5.2	4.1	5.6	6.0
alent Fulltin	ne Workers						
Lost throug	h parttime	3.8	3.5	4.0	3.5	4.9	5.1
d through R	eduction of Partti	ime					
Compared v	with 1940		+0.3	-0.2	+0.3	-1.1	-1.3
Compared v	with 1941			-0.5	0	-1.4	-1.6
	nployed less by Avera 'orked 0* 7 25 alent Fulltin Lost throug cd through R Compared v	hployed less than Fulltime by Average Hours Vorked Lost 0* 42* 7 35 25 17 alent Fulltime Workers Lost through parttime ed through Reduction of Partti Compared with 1940 Compared with 1941	1940nployed less than Fulltime by Average Hours'orkedLost0*42*1.035251725174.9alent Fulltime Workers Lost through parttime3.8cd through Reduction of Parttime Compared with 1940Compared with 1941	1940 1941 nployed less than Fulltime by Average Hours	1940 1941 1942 hployed less than Fulltime by Average Hours 1940 1941 1942 vorked Lost	1940 1941 1942 1943 hyployed less than Fulltime by Average Hours vorked Lost 0* 42* 1.0 0.5 0.8 0.8 7 35 1.0 1.2 1.3 1.2 25 17 4.9 5.0 5.2 4.1 alent Fulltime Workers Image: Second	$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$

Source of data on which calculations are based: Bureau of Census, Current Population Surveys.

*Have a job but not at work.

growth, and during the rest of 1945 shrank rapidly. By autumn 1946 it had returned to the 1941 proportion of population. The armed forces still held a few thousand men (Chart 1).

Britain's combined industrial and military labor force touched its summit in late 1943. When the armed forces began to let personnel go home after V-J Day, it was a quarter demobilized. Many workers leaving manufacturing and mining did not abandon the labor force but shifted to transport, nonessential construction, services, and distribution. By early 1947 the labor force had lost its war gains, though the armed ranks were still somewhat larger than before the conflict.

The United States yielded up a bit of its excess labor force in the two months before V-E Day; by V-J Day a third had disappeared. The armed forces did not stop inducting until almost the end and still held several

Table 11

Wartime Gain in Equivalent Fulltime Employment due to Overtime United States, April 1940-1945 (millions)

		1941	1942	1943	1944	1945
1	Gain due to increased hours (Table 9, line 14) Less gain due to decreased parttime (Table 10, line 5)	1.4	3.8	7.6	6.5	5.5
2 Les		0.3	-0.2	0.3	-1.1	-1.3
GA	IN DUE TO OVERTIME			•		
3	Compared with 1940	1.1	4.0	7.3	7.6	6.8
4	Compared with 1941		2.9	6.2	6.5	5.7

Source of data on which calculations are based: Bureau of Census, Current Population Surveys. million men in late spring 1946 when the labor force had returned to peacetime proportions. As in Canada, the civilian sector was overdisbanded. After 1946 the total labor force stayed above the prewar proportion of population, unemployment was less than 4 percent of the labor force, and the armed forces still retained over a million men. During the 12 or 18 months after victory the labor force tended to anticipate the precipitous flight from military service.

Very little can be discovered about the labor force demobilization of Germany during the months following the defeat. Official enumerations made in 1946 covering all four zones of occupied Germany, plus Berlin, disclosed that the combined labor force proportion of population 14 and older, standardized for age and sex, was 4 percent below the labor force participation in the same areas in May 1939. (Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Institut der Gewerkschaften, *Deutschland in Zahlen*, 1950 [Köln, 1951] pp. 12-13, 31.) The fact, however, that this deficiency was much larger than in the United States, Britain, or Canada could have been due (a) to the postwar industrial disorganization of Germany, (b) to the possession by Germans of far more money than they could spend, in view of the restricted quantity of goods offered at controlled prices, or (c) to the taking of the census in late October, by which time the labor force may have lost many agricultural helpers normally at work in May, the month in which the prewar count was made.

8 The Korean War and Possibilities for Further Expansion

At the threshold of the Korean conflict, in April 1950, the labor force contained 63.5 million workers⁴² of which 1.3 million were in the armed

⁴⁹ The monthly figures for April 1940 through April 1951 are from Census Current Population Surveys and rest on interviews with about 25,000 households. The accuracy of sample surveys is always suspect and the 1950 enumeration of the nation's households does nothing to settle them, for a preliminary release, also resting on a sample though a much larger one, reports 3.5 million fewer in the April 1950 labor force on the basis of the same concept and measurement technique (Series PC-7, No. 2, April 11, 1951, pp. 1-2). The Census ascribed the cause of this paradoxical discrepancy to the poor quality and inexperience of the 130,000 temporary interviewers as well as their responsibility for questions on housing, income, and agriculture. The Survey enumerators, in contrast, were a "small, well-trained group with, on the average, more than 12 months of specialized experience in the enumeration of the labor force. . . As was the case a decade earlier, when the monthly survey results were compared with the 1940 Decennial Census data, it appeared that the more skilled interviewers had had greater success in handling the labor force questions for population groups whose activity is difficult to measure and, in consequence,