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view of its supposedly arbitrary powers. When it finally dawned on the Germans that the industrial base was too narrow, there was no longer time to broaden it; to do so would have taken manpower and steel from immediate output and worsened the shortages. The Nazis did not, therefore, draw upon all their reserves, at least not until late 1944: at first because it seemed unnecessary in view of their successes in the field and apparent abundance of foreign labor; subsequently because it was obviously too late. It is tempting to conclude that countries do not exert more effort in war than they have to, that the Germans were in the end partly undone by their early conquests and the resulting trainloads of prisoners and booty.⁴¹

6 INCREASE IN HOURS DURING WORLD WAR II: UNITED STATES

Gains from a longer workweek are estimated by deducting employment measured in persons from employment measured in equivalent fulltime workers (Table 9). These accretions reached a maximum in 1943 of 7.6 million equivalent workers (line 14), then declined to 5.5 million in 1945. Why were some of the gains that had been made during 1940-43 lost during 1944-45?

The answer may be found by separating parttime from overtime work. Little was gained or lost during 1940-43 as a result of changes in the extent of parttime employment but during 1944-45 the time lost rose (Table 10), apparently in some degree because young people and women had become a larger element in the civilian labor force and men a smaller element. Many young people could work only after school and on Saturdays. Some women, burdened by children and home duties, could spare no more than a few days a week; and women always take more time off for ill health than men. Finally, keen demand for labor is usually accompanied by higher absenteeism and turnover. The gains

⁴¹ Germany used foreign labor not only directly but also indirectly: it confiscated commodities or bought them at low prices; an eighth of its pig iron and about 5 percent of its machine tools came from occupied Poland, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands; early it captured stocks of oil, copper, and other strategic materials. During 1939-44 foreign contributions to national product ranged from 16 to 25 percent (*Strategic Bombing Survey*, pp. 21, 22, 260). These imports, even though all were not costless, unquestionably took the place of some native labor. Nevertheless, its plunder was not enough to meet its war needs and, though it faced desperate labor scarcities from 1942 on, it was unable or unwilling to call on its substantial reserves among its own nationals.

Table 9

Wartime Gain in Equivalent Fulltime Employment due to Increase in Hours
(parttime and overtime combined): United States, April 1940-1946

	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944	1945	1946
AGRICULTURE							
1 Av. weekly hours	54.0	55.0	56.7	60.0	56.1	53.5	52.6
2 Employed persons (millions)	8.7	8.9	9.1	8.8	8.4	8.7	8.2
3 Manhours (millions)	470	490	516	528	471	465	431
4 Equivalent fulltime em- ployed (millions)	8.9	9.2	9.7	10.0	8.9	8.8	8.1
5 Equivalent fulltime compared with actual employed (millions)	+0.2	+0.3	+0.6	+1.2	+0.5	+0.1	-0.1
NONAGRICULTURE							
6 Av. weekly hours	40.0	41.5	43.5	46.5	46.1	45.6	42.9
7 Employed persons (millions)	37.3	39.6	43.7	45.0	45.3	44.9	45.9
8 Manhours (millions)	1492	1643	1901	2093	2088	2047	1969
9 Equivalent fulltime em- ployed (millions)	35.5	39.1	45.3	49.8	49.7	48.7	46.9
10 Equivalent fulltime compared with actual employed (millions)	-1.8	-0.5	+1.6	+4.8	+4.4	+3.8	+1.0
TOTAL CIVILIAN							
11 Employed persons (millions)	46.0	48.5	52.8	53.8	53.7	53.6	54.1
12 Equivalent fulltime employed (millions)	44.4	48.3	55.0	59.8	58.6	57.5	55.0
13 Equivalent fulltime compared with actual employed (millions)	-1.6	-0.2	+2.2	+6.0	+4.9	+3.9	+0.9
GAIN IN EMPLOYMENT DUE TO HOURS INCREASES							
14 Compared with 1940 (millions)	+1.4	+3.8	+7.6	+6.5	+5.5	+2.5
15 Compared with 1941 (millions)	+2.4	+6.2	+5.1	+4.1	+1.1

Source of data on which the calculations were based: Bureau of Census, Current Population Surveys. Fulltime hours were assumed to be 53 a week in agriculture, 42 a week in nonagriculture.

due to overtime (Table 11, line 4) rose rapidly during 1940-43, slightly in 1944, and fell off somewhat by 1945, though they were offset in some degree during 1944 and 1945 by the time lost through continued dilutions of the labor force with women and young people.

7 DEMOBILIZATION

Between mid-1944 and 1945, Canada's armed forces discharged a fifth of their personnel. Its labor force failed to keep pace with population