

This PDF is a selection from a published volume from the National Bureau of Economic Research

Volume Title: The Economics of Food Price Volatility

Volume Author/Editor: Jean-Paul Chavas, David Hummels, and Brian D. Wright, editors

Volume Publisher: University of Chicago Press

Volume ISBN: 0-226-12892-X (cloth); 978-0-226-12892-4 (cloth); 978-0-226-12892-4 (eISBN)

Volume URL: <http://www.nber.org/books/chav12-1>

Conference Date: August 15–16, 2012

Publication Date: October 2014

Chapter Title: Introduction to "The Economics of Food Price Volatility"

Chapter Author(s): Jean-Paul Chavas, David Hummels, Brian D. Wright

Chapter URL: <http://www.nber.org/chapters/c12803>

Chapter pages in book: (p. 1 – 11)

Introduction

Jean-Paul Chavas, David Hummels, and Brian D. Wright

Introduction

Historically, food markets have been subject to much instability, and the last few years have seen very large swings in food prices. This price volatility has had large effects on farmers, market participants, and consumers. Higher commodity prices benefit sellers (including grain farmers), but they hurt buyers (including consumers, and dairy/livestock farmers who face higher feed cost). Lower prices have the opposite effects. Market instability makes anticipating future price patterns difficult and creates significant price risk/uncertainty for market participants. It can also lead to hasty and injudicious policy responses that might be difficult to reverse. This puts a premium on understanding the factors that contribute to large price swings as a prelude to designing policy schemes that can help reduce this uncertainty or to ameliorate its effects.

The recent increase in food price volatility raises three important sets of questions:

- What are the main causes of food price instability? Does instability arise primarily from technological or weather-related supply shocks or from demand shocks such as those induced by biofuels? Does financial speculation and globalization lead to increased or decreased volatility?

Jean-Paul Chavas is the Anderson-Bascom Professor of Agricultural and Applied Economics at the University of Wisconsin–Madison and a member of the Board of Directors of the National Bureau of Economic Research. David Hummels is professor of economics in the Krannert School of Management at Purdue University and a research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research. Brian D. Wright is professor of agricultural and resource economics at the University of California, Berkeley.

For acknowledgments, sources of research support, and disclosure of the authors' material financial relationships, if any, please see <http://www.nber.org/chapters/c12803.ack>.

Is the current market instability just a short-term phenomenon or is it the beginning of a longer-term trend?

- What are the welfare effects of increased food price volatility for farmers, traders, and consumers? How does it affect the welfare of poor households in developed as well as developing countries?
- What are the management and policy implications of increased volatility in agricultural markets? What is the role of private stockholding in reducing price instability? How can financial markets help improve the allocation of food price risk? Do existing agricultural, energy, climate, and trade policies mitigate or exacerbate volatility and can reforms of those policies lead to better management of food price volatility and the reduction of food insecurity around the world?

Providing better answers to these questions is the main motivation for this book. This book presents and assesses the latest research on central issues related to recent food price volatility. This research evaluates current knowledge on the causes and effects of food price volatility, examines the extent to which particular current economic conditions contribute to this volatility, and identifies issues that are in need of further investigation. By disseminating new research on food price volatility, it intends to help both private and public decision makers to develop improved management strategies and policies that can address current and future market instability.

Food Price Volatility: Historical Evidence

The evolution of food prices over the last decade is shown in figure I.1 for three agricultural commodities: corn, wheat, and rice. This figure, drawn from the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO 2010), shows very large changes in food prices in 2008. In a period of few months, grain prices basically doubled, followed by a very sharp decline. The changes were most dramatic for rice. These rapid price fluctuations are quite unsettling for any market participant.

Figure I.2, which presents data from the Economic Research Service of the United States Department of Agriculture (ERS USDA 2010), shows longer-term annual data on agricultural prices. It shows the real price of food (nominal dollar prices divided by the US Consumer Price Index [CPI]) over the last century for three farm commodities: corn, milk, and wheat. There is a long-term declining trend in real prices. Over the last ninety years, the average annual rate of change in real price was -1.8 percent for corn, -1.9 percent for wheat, and -0.8 percent for milk. This is a remarkable fact: agriculture has been able to feed the growing world population at a lower price for consumers.

Figure I.2 also shows that prices exhibit substantial variability. Two periods are particularly noteworthy: the 1930s (during the Great Depression)




Fig. I.1 Nominal prices of food, 2000–2010 (US \$/ton)




Fig. I.2 Real prices of food, 1913–2011 (US 1983\$)

when food prices were very low, and the early 1970s when food prices were very high. The 1970s was a period exhibiting high population growth and increased resource scarcity. But it was followed by three decades of fairly steady decline in real prices for food, which has been good news for consumers. However, the last few years have seen a large increase in price variability.




Fig. I.3 Evolution of agricultural yields, United States, 1913–2012

Source: ERS USDA (2012).

For example, the real price of milk in the United States has declined by 34 percent from 2007 to 2009, followed by a 48 percent increase from 2009 to 2011. Similarly, the real price of corn in the United States has doubled from 2005 to 2007, followed by a 19 percent decline from 2007 to 2009, and then by a 70 percent rise from 2009 to 2011. These large fluctuations create significant challenges to market participants. They also raise questions about what is coming next.

Since the Great Depression, the main source of the long-term decline in real food prices has been improvements in agricultural productivity. Figures I.3 and I.4 illustrate the evolution of agricultural yields over the last few decades. Figure I.3 shows how US yields have changed for three commodities: corn, wheat, and milk. Over the last eighty years, the average annual growth rate in yield was 2.0 percent per year for corn and 1.4 percent per year for wheat, reflecting very large increases in land productivity. Similarly, the last eighty years have seen an average annual growth rate in milk production per cow of 1.9 percent per year. Recently, we have seen several unusual shortfalls in grain yields. For example, the US Corn Belt suffered a widespread drought in 2012: US corn yield in 2012 was 16 percent lower than in 2011 and 25 percent lower than in 2009. To the extent that such supply shocks are associated with climate change, they may become more frequent and contribute to greater instability in agricultural markets. Figure I.4 shows the




Fig. I.4 Evolution of agricultural yields, France, 1862–2007

Source: The figure is from Agreste Primeur (2008).

Note: The yields are in quintals (100 kg) per hectare. “Maïs grain” is corn/maize, “Blé tendre” is bread wheat, “Orge” is barley, and “Blé dur” is durum wheat.

evolution of yield for selected farm commodities in France. Like figure I.3, it shows a large and steady increase in land productivity over the last fifty years. Since 1930, the average annual growth rate in yield was 2.3 percent per year for corn and 1.9 percent per year for soft wheat. These are very large increases that were crucial in increasing food production.

How much of these increases came from technological change? Part of the historical increases in food production came from increased input use (e.g., fertilizer, pesticides, capital). But the evidence shows that most of these increases came from technological improvements (Ball et al. 1997; Gardner 2002; Fuglie 2008). For example, Ball et al. (1997) documented that US agricultural production grew at an average rate of 2 percent annual rate over the last few decades, most of it (1.94 percent) coming from productivity growth (as measured by a total factor productivity [TFP] index). Remarkably, such changes took place while US agricultural labor input was declining at an average rate of 2.7 percent a year (reflecting both rural-urban migration and increased mechanization). In addition, Fuglie (2008) found that, over the last four decades, agricultural productivity has been growing at fairly high rates in most regions of the world. This reflects the important role played by innovations in farming systems, fertilizer use, pest control methods, mechanization, and genetic improvements. It means that technological change has been the principal factor responsible for increased food production around

the world. Although the rates of growth in yields of rice and wheat appear to have declined recently, at this point there is no definitive evidence of a general slowdown in agricultural productivity growth. What is less clear is what is coming next. Is the recent increase in food price volatility a short-term issue? Or is it a sign of significant and longer-term changes in agricultural markets? To the extent that climate change is contributing to increasing both the frequency and severity of adverse weather shocks on crop yields and food supply, increased price volatility may become a permanent feature of food markets. In addition, other factors (besides supply shocks) may also play a role. Could financial speculation and globalization also be contributing factors? What can be done to improve the functioning of food markets? How does food price volatility affect welfare and income distribution? What are the policy implications? The objective of this book is to present the latest research and inquiries addressing these questions.

Overview of the Book

The book includes nine chapters that investigate the economics of food price volatility along five directions of inquiry. First, they document the recent and historical patterns in food price volatility, including the evolving food supply and demand conditions. Second, they study how food price volatility relates to linkages between food markets and energy markets, with special attention given to the role of biofuel policy. Third, they assess the impact of storage and speculation on food price volatility. Fourth, they examine the role of international markets, with a focus on the role of trade policy. Finally, they evaluate the distributional and welfare effects of food price volatility and their effects on the poor around the world.

The role of innovation and technological progress in agriculture has been significant. As noted above, large productivity gains in the food sector have been major drivers of the long-run decline in food price. The chapter by Alston, Martin, and Pardey evaluates the role of agricultural technology and its effects on food price volatility. Technological change affects the variability of food prices by changing the sensitivity of aggregate farm supply to external shocks. After reviewing patterns of production, yields, and prices for the major cereal grains—wheat, maize, and corn—over the last fifty years, the Alston, Martin, and Pardey chapter studies how technological change can help reduce food price variability. It also shows how technical change has contributed to reducing the importance of food price variability for the poor, especially by reducing the number of poor.

The chapter by Berry, Roberts, and Schlenker presents estimates of the elasticity of aggregate supply and demand for food and the implications for agricultural price volatility. These estimates are important because price volatility depends not just on the magnitude of shocks but the elasticity of response to them. The chapter also provides important insights on two sets

of issues: (a) the effects of ethanol and biofuel policy on the food sector, and (b) the effects of weather shocks on food supply. The first issue is timely given current biofuel policy. The United States is now diverting about 30 percent of the food or feed value of corn to bioethanol production, and Europe and the United States are using a substantial amount of oilseeds to generate biodiesel. This new demand contributes to diverting agricultural land away from food production, thus reducing food supply and increasing food prices. Finally, the issue of evaluating weather shocks is particularly relevant as agriculture is a sector most vulnerable to climate change. The chapter examines how adverse weather conditions in 2012 have contributed to a 14 percent decline in US maize production. It predicts that such effects may become the new normal under anticipated climate change.

The chapter by Abbott provides a refined analysis of the effects of recent biofuel policy and its implications for linkages with the food and energy markets. The chapter argues that current biofuel policy has created incentives to increase ethanol plant capacity, thus creating a new and persistent demand for corn and upward pressure on corn and food prices. It also provides evidence that these effects vary over time, depending in part on whether the capacity of ethanol plants is binding or not. The chapter argues that apparent corn price volatility is due in part to switching between alternative policy regimes.

In a period of globalization, market linkages across sectors are important. The dynamic linkages between agricultural, energy, and other markets are studied in the chapter by Enders and Holt. Relying on refined multivariate time series models, the chapter examines the factors that contributed to recent changes in the grain markets. It documents how energy prices, exchange rates, and interest rates have affected grain prices. It also examines how the introduction of ethanol as an important fuel source has contributed to the run-up in grain prices. Finally, economic growth in emerging economies such as China, India, and Brazil is identified as a contributing factor.

The recent increase in food price volatility has raised questions about its relationship with the functioning of markets. One question is about the role of storage as a means of reducing price volatility. The chapter by Bobenrieth, Bobenrieth, and Wright examines what the theory of stock holding offers on this issue. The chapter studies the implications of storage behavior for the time series properties of market prices. In this context, the analysis rules out “bubbles” as defined in financial economics. Yet, it shows the presence of price runs that could be characterized as “explosive” and might seem to be bubble-like. This warns us not to interpret observations of large price increases as evidence of excessive speculation.

With the rapid development of financial markets over the last decade, there have been some concerns about the “financialization” of commodity futures markets (Domanski and Heath 2007). This has generated a debate on the role of financial markets in the recent increase in market volatility.

The chapter by Irwin, Garcia, and Aulerich examines this issue in the context of the food markets. It provides a refined analysis of the market impact of financial index investment on agricultural futures markets. The analysis is applied to twelve agricultural markets. It shows that buying pressure from financial index investment in recent years did not cause massive bubbles in agricultural futures prices.

In a period of globalized exchange, the role of trade and its effects of food price volatility has been the subject of much interest. If domestic shocks are large and uncorrelated with foreign shocks, trade can reduce domestic volatility. But trade can also transmit volatility from foreign shocks into an otherwise tranquil domestic market. When food price spikes in countries with large numbers of poor people, public interventions involving both domestic and trade policies can help alleviate hunger and malnutrition. This has raised many questions. How effective can domestic economic policy be in reducing price instability? How does trade liberalization relate to price volatility? What has been the quantitative impact of ad hoc export restrictions in transferring volatility from domestic to foreign markets? Are certain trade instruments especially problematic in transmitting or helpful in diminishing volatility? Are temporary trade restrictions beneficial to individual nations even as they distort and destabilize global markets?

The chapter by Gouel evaluates the relationships between food price volatility and domestic stabilization policies in developing countries. The chapter analyzes the trade-off existing between government interventions in the domestic markets to stabilize food prices (e.g., storage and restrictive trade policies) and greater reliance on international trade. It evaluates the economic and policy challenges to balance the benefits of greater integration in world markets and the domestic welfare effects of economic and trade policy. It stresses the need for better integration between public and private agents involved in food markets.

The chapter by Anderson, Ivanic, and Martin investigates the effects of the 2008 world food price crisis, with implications for welfare distribution. Many governments pursued policies intended to insulate domestic prices from changes in world prices. But such policies also substantially increased world prices for key food crops such as rice, wheat, maize, and edible oilseeds. High food prices benefit food sellers but hurt food buyers and consumers. In the absence of domestic policy interventions, the consequences are particularly severe for low-income households who spend a large share of their income on food. The Anderson, Ivanic, and Martin presents evidence showing that once we account for equilibrium effects on prices, insulation is not effective in reducing poverty. Indeed, its net effect was to increase global poverty in 2008 by 7.5 million persons. This raises the challenge of designing effective policies that can reduce the impact of higher food prices on the poor.

Finally, the chapter by Do, Ravallion, and Levchenko provides a theoretical analysis of this issue. It evaluates conditions under which trade insulation can provide social protection against food price volatility. It shows that in the presence of consumer preference heterogeneity, implementing an optimal social protection policy can potentially induce higher food price volatility. The chapter urges caution against policy positions that would condemn trade insulation practices, and it calls for a reassessment of food stabilization policies.

Challenges Ahead

The recent increase in food price volatility has stimulated much academic research. The chapters presented in this book provide a broad overview of the current state of academic inquiries on the economics of food price volatility. They document the progress made in identifying the factors that have contributed to the 2008 food crisis, along with their economic and policy implications. Yet more research is needed to refine our understanding of evolving food markets and to address current challenges to improving food security around the world. Below, we briefly discuss a few directions for future inquiries.

It is important to distinguish between price volatility and high prices. Under price instability, prices are at times high (benefiting producers and hurting consumers) and at times low (benefiting consumers and hurting producers). It is possible to have an increase in the price level without changes in price volatility. It is also possible to have both simultaneously (which may have been the case in the food crisis of 2008). The distinction appears to be important for at least two reasons.

First, price changes might or might not be anticipated by market participants. If price changes are anticipated, economic and econometric analyses can focus on analyzing structural change issues. But the situation becomes more complex when (at least part of the) price changes are not anticipated by producers, consumers, or traders. In this case, the econometrician needs to distinguish between what is known versus what is not known to market participants. The changes in what is not known can be captured by changes in the distribution of price volatility. In econometrics, this means examining changes in variance (or higher moments) of the price distribution, as seen from the viewpoint of market participants. This raises the issue of empirically evaluating both changes in market conditions and changes in the information available to market participants. For example, how much of the 2008 food crisis was due to poor information available to market participants about food stocks? To the extent that there was no obvious food shortage in 2008, could better information about food stocks have prevented the large increase in food prices observed in 2008? These questions stress the need

to have good information about the causes and nature of evolving market conditions. Unfortunately, access to such information by economists and policymakers is often limited. This reduces our ability to provide an in-depth analysis and evaluation of price volatility issues. This argument emphasizes that future progress on understanding the economics of food price volatility must rely on access to good data.

Second, the distinction between anticipated versus nonanticipated price changes is important for an economic and policy viewpoint. Anticipated changes are easier to manage by both private agents and policymakers. For example, if a supply shock is anticipated, then production, consumption, and storage behavior can adjust ahead of time and reduce the economic and welfare effects of the shocks on market participants. But if the shock is not anticipated, the economic implications are quite different. First, the welfare and distributional effects can be stronger. Second, the adjustments must be contingent on the particular shock, implying state-contingent decisions that are in the realm of insurance and risk markets. But insurance and risk markets are known to be incomplete. For populations for whom food constitutes a minor share of the budget, this is not important. For people so poor that food has a major expenditure share, why such markets tend to be incomplete remains an interesting question. Recent experience indicates that insurance markets in agriculture do not develop easily (in the absence of heavy government subsidies). This suggests that the welfare costs of volatility are not large enough to justify paying the full cost of insurance, including administrative expenses. If this is so, there is no problem of underprovision of insurance. Is it possible to improve on the welfare outcome-associated current food price volatility? What is the role of markets? What is the role of government policies (including both domestic policy and trade policy)? As discussed above, free trade can help reduce the welfare effects of location-specific shocks in food supply (e.g., the case of a drought, flood, heat wave, or cold spell in a given region). But it would be less effective in addressing the effects of worldwide shocks to the food sector.

Two sources of shocks are of particular interest. First, globalization has strengthened the linkages between food markets, energy markets, and financial markets. It means that shocks to the energy or financial markets now have stronger effects on the food sector. How are the food markets adjusting to these shocks? Second, climate change is increasing the prospects of seeing significant weather shocks in agriculture. The implications for food markets and agricultural and trade policies remain unclear. While we know that markets and free trade can help improve aggregate efficiency, the issue of private and public risk management schemes associated with unanticipated shocks to the food sector needs further investigation. This is particularly crucial when considering that large food price increases can have devastating effects on the welfare of poor households around the world.

References

- Agreste Primeur. 2008. *La Statistique Agricole*. Numéro 210. Montreuil-sous-Bois, France: Service Central des Enquêtes et Etudes Statistiques, Ministère de l'Agriculture et de la Pêche.
- Ball, V. E., J. C. Bureau, R. Nehring, and A. Somwaru. 1997. "Agricultural Productivity Revisited." *American Journal of Agricultural Economics* 79:1045–63.
- Domanski, D., and A. Heath. 2007. "Financial Investors and Commodity Markets." *BIS Quarterly Review* March:53–67.
- Economic Research Service, United States Department of Agriculture. (ERS USDA). 2010. *Data Sets*. Washington, DC: ERS USDA. <http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data>.
- Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). 2010. *Global Information and Early Warning Systems*. Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization, United Nations. <http://www.fao.org/giews/pricetool2>.
- Fuglie, K. O. 2008. "Is a Slowdown in Agricultural Productivity Growth Contributing to the Rise in Commodity Prices?" *Agricultural Economics* 39:431–41.
- Gardner, B. L. 2002. *American Agriculture in the Twentieth Century*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.