This paper opens up what promises to be a whole new approach to macroeconomic research. Market-based forecasts of macroeconomic variables provide a promising way to neatly sidestep the intractable, insoluble, and semi-theological debates about how expectations are formed that have plagued macroeconomics since Keynes first speculated that “animal spirits“ were a driving force in business cycles.

So you might say I’m a fan.

In fact, the first part of my discussion will argue that the results of the paper are even more important than one might conclude from the authors’ own analysis, because they focus on the (microscopic) differences between survey-based forecasts and market-based forecasts, rather than on the impressive similarities between them. The brief latter part of the discussion raises some reasons for caution about the institutional design and operation of these markets.

1. Comparing Survey and Auction Based Expectations

A substantial part of the paper (Tables 1–3) compares expectations as revealed by the auction market to the mean forecasts of a survey of professional forecasters. An incautious reader might get the impression that these results suggest the market-based expectations are notably better than those of the survey. In fact, I think the opposite interpretation is the right one: When used to measure the same thing, survey-based expectations are, for analytical purposes, indistinguishable from market-based expectations.

Consider, for example, the non-farm payrolls data, which are for most purposes the most important single U.S. data release. The authors present the following comparative statistics about the two. (These are taken from their Table 1).
Table 1
Prediction errors from auction and survey (non-farm payrolls)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mean absolute error (AbsErr)</th>
<th>Root mean squared error (RMSE)</th>
<th>Correlation with actual outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Auction</td>
<td>0.723</td>
<td>0.907</td>
<td>0.700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survey</td>
<td>0.743</td>
<td>0.929</td>
<td>0.677</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table speaks for itself.

The authors emphasize the results for their other data series, which could be described as providing a smidgen of evidence that the market forecasts are more accurate than the survey forecasts. I will shortly express some quibbles with this interpretation. But before doing so, I would like to point out that even under the authors' interpretation, the superiority of the auction forecast is generally small.

This is important because the macroeconomic derivatives markets have been operating only for a short time. Since, according to the NBER Business Cycle Dating Committee, the average postwar business cycle in the U.S. has had a duration of about eight years, the usefulness of these data for macroeconomic analysis will arguably be modest for at least a decade. If instead we draw the conclusion that the macroeconomic derivatives markets have definitively revealed the impressive qualities of survey-based expectations, the scope of the paper's usefulness is vastly expanded, since various kinds of survey-based expectations have been collected for a very long time (for example, the Survey of Professional Forecasters has been conducted since 1968).

1.1 Quibbles

As the authors note, the auctions they analyze do not provide any real opportunity for hedging macroeconomic risks in the sense Shiller (1993) originally proposed because they are generally conducted only a few hours (or at most a few days) before the data are released.

This timing, however, means that participants in the auctions have more recent information than survey participants, whose views are collected every Friday. In the case of a data series released on a Thursday, the auction participants' information set could incorporate nearly a week's worth of extra knowledge about the state of the economy.

This problem is particularly serious for initial claims for unemployment insurance, since this is a weekly series released on Thursday
mornings. Indeed, it is remarkable that the almost week-old surveys do almost as well as the previous-day auctions in forecasting this weekly series.

An alternative way of analyzing the authors' data (and one that is fairer to the forecasters) would be to hypothesize that both forecasters' and auction participants' views are rational; in that case, Hall (1978) taught us that the auction results should equal the survey results plus a random expectational error that reflects the forecasters' extra information:

$$A_t = S_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t$$  \hspace{1cm} (1)

which can be tested by estimating a regression

$$A_t = z_0 + z_1 S_{t-1}$$  \hspace{1cm} (2)

and testing $z_0 = 0$ and $z_1 = 1$.

To test this proposition as an overall characterization of the authors' data, it is necessary to put the various statistics on a common footing in the sense of having comparable means and measures of variability. I did so by subtracting, for each series, the mean realized value over the sample period, and dividing by the gap between the maximum and minimum realized sample values.\(^2\)

Results are plotted in Figure 1. As the figure illustrates, there is a very strong association between the survey and the auction predictions.

The point is illustrated statistically by Table 2, which reports the results of a regression like the one contemplated in equation (2). The hypotheses that $z_0 = 0$ and $z_1 = 1$ cannot be rejected at standard significance levels, and the $R^2$ for the regression is over 90 percent. When the sample is restricted to the crucial non-farm payrolls data, similar results obtain.

One way of testing whether the more up-to-date information held by auction market participants could plausibly explain a modest superiority in their forecasts is to see whether auctions that are held closer to the date of the data release produce forecasts that are more accurate. Unfortunately, the authors' dataset contains only a few auctions that were held earlier than the day on which a data series was released. Most of these were for the ISM data. Table 3 calculates the size of the absolute error for the 21 auctions that were held on the morning of the data release, the four auctions that were held one day before, and the three auctions that were held three days before. (There seem to be no examples of auctions conducted two days before the release). The mean absolute error is notably larger for the auctions conducted rela-
Figure 1
Survey expectations versus auction expectations

Table 2
Regression of auction on survey expectations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data series</th>
<th>$z_0$</th>
<th>$z_1$</th>
<th>$R^2$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>1.055</td>
<td>0.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.039)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Payrolls</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>1.096</td>
<td>0.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.014)</td>
<td>(0.052)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table 3
Absolute error for different ISM auction horizons

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Days between auction and data release</th>
<th>Number of auctions</th>
<th>Mean absolute error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
tively earlier, as would be true if significant news generally arrives in the period leading up to the release (though separate tests (not shown) indicate that these differences are not statistically significant).

The authors emphasize the results of a final horse race (in Table 2) between the two series. They show (convincingly) that financial market reactions to the actual data release are stronger when the "surprise" is measured as the deviation from the auction forecast than when it is measured as the deviation from the survey forecast, at least for the payrolls data.

Again a possible explanation is the later date of the auction than the survey. Another possibility that the authors suggest is that the participants in the auctions are precisely the same people whose financial transactions, post-release, will determine the market reaction. If this is true, it would be puzzling if their opinions did not have more influence on financial market outcomes than the opinions of bystanders like the economists participating in the surveys.

None of this is meant to dispute the proposition that the auction based forecasts are a superior source of information, when both auction and survey data exist. As the authors show, the auction data paint a much richer picture of expectations than is available from the surveys, particularly with respect to the probability distribution over possible outcomes, which can be condensed (as the authors show) in any of several ways to measure uncertainty. In 30 years there may be no reason to use survey data at all because a sufficient amount of auction data will be available. But for the time being, the authors' results provide compelling evidence that surveys capture an enormous amount of useful information.

This richness is used in section 4 of the paper to examine a question that heretofore has been a matter of speculation: whether disagreement among survey participants can be interpreted as a measure of uncertainty.

On the whole their conclusion is that such an interpretation is problematic. Table 4 reproduces the key results from their analysis of this question, in which they regress measures of uncertainty on measures of disagreement. The absolute magnitudes of the coefficients are not meaningful, because there is no obvious mapping between the cross-forecaster standard deviation of forecasts of the mean value of the release, and the standard deviation of the released data itself. The right questions are the degree of statistical significance of the relationship
between uncertainty and disagreement, and the total proportion of uncertainty that can be measured by disagreement. Except for the ISM series, the authors find a highly statistically significant relationship between disagreement and uncertainty.

They tend to emphasize, however, the finding that the $R^2$ is well below one in all cases. But there is clearly sampling error in the survey of forecasters; how to think about this is not entirely obvious, since there are forecasters who exist but are not in the survey and the survey participants vary over time. By itself this would be enough to prevent an $R^2$ equal to one even if the authors' measures of uncertainty were perfect.

My own sense is that the more important question is whether disagreement can be interpreted as a statistically reliable indicator of the degree of uncertainty, rather than a direct measure. One way to make the question concrete is to ask whether the regression the authors report can be thought of as the first stage of a two-stage least squares regression of uncertainty on disagreement. One could then use the prediction of the estimated equation as a contemporaneous measure of appropriately calibrated uncertainty. Judged in this way, the $R^2$'s for the first stage regressions and the high statistical significance of the coefficients are plenty good enough to interpret the prediction of the model as an (instrumented) measure of uncertainty. (Of course, careful econometrics would have to make sure that this cross-section disagreement is not perfectly correlated with some other macro variable (like the inflation rate).)

Table 4
Uncertainty versus disagreement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Series</th>
<th>$\beta$</th>
<th>$R^2$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Payrolls</td>
<td>0.66**</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.29)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retail sales</td>
<td>0.44**</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initial claims</td>
<td>0.27***</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISM</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2. Caveats about Macro Markets

Despite their many attractive properties, it is worth worrying a little bit (at this early stage) about the longer term consequences of the creation of macro markets, especially for the data collection process.

I have the fullest faith in the integrity and objectivity of the staff at the agencies that produce economic data. But there can be no doubt that the creation of macro markets will increase both the pressure on the staff and the ease with which an unscrupulous employee could exploit inside information. Data security procedures need not only to be objectively rigorous but also to be transparently seen to be rigorous. Possibly there should be a systematic ongoing program (by the Securities and Exchange Commission?) to monitor trading in macro markets for any signs of insider trading.

Another concern is that if macro markets become sufficiently popular (and lucrative), the economic agencies may have a problem of retaining senior staff. If senior officials were regularly lured away from their posts by the offer of salaries many times higher than the government can provide, it might be difficult to preserve the institutional memory and expertise necessary for guaranteeing the consistency and high quality of U.S. statistics. Probably the only appropriate measure that could be taken to prevent this (in addition to paying appropriately high salaries to the senior staff) would be to impose strict ethics rules that require a substantial waiting period (say, five years) between the time of departure from a statistical agency and any employment that exploits that expertise in the context of macro markets.

Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the existence of macro markets could influence the data collection procedures themselves. Although the currently existing auction markets probably do not pose much risk in this dimension, when markets are created for longer-term forecasts (as they inevitably will be), the holders of those auction contracts will have the incentive to become lobbying groups for or against changes in the methods of data collection. Imagine, for example, that macro markets had existed at the time of the Boskin Commission on reform of the CPI in the mid-1990s, or the redefinition of the unemployment rate in the early 1990s. If each decision a commission announces results in immediate capital gains or losses of billions of dollars for holders of contingent securities, there will be extraordinary incentives to subvert the objectivity of the decision makers. Good institutional design could
certainly circumvent these pressures, but if data collection procedures are perceived to be able to be influenced by the appointment of ad hoc committees nominated by politicians there is reason to worry.

This risk could perhaps be alleviated if the agencies that produce the data were to create standing committees of scientific advisors associated with each of the major statistical releases for which macro markets exist or are in contemplation. For example, a panel of distinguished labor economists might be recruited to monitor proposed changes to the non-farm payrolls survey. These committees might borrow the model of the NBER Business Cycle Dating Committee: Meetings only when warranted by some event, but a committee that is always well defined. This would provide some transparent insulation against the political forces that might otherwise mobilize to have commissions appointed whose members would be picked to reach preordained conclusions.

It is important to resolve these issues early, because the whole superstructure of macro markets will be undermined if the integrity of the data collection process comes into question. But if addressed early, these problems should not be serious.

3. Conclusions

All quibbles aside, this paper, and the macro markets that it is the first to explore, represent a tremendous innovation in macroeconomic analysis. I look forward with great anticipation to the literature that will undoubtedly flow from them.

Notes

1. Like the authors, Fleming and Remolona 1997 find that this data release moves the bond market more than any other, and more recently Faust et. al. 2003 have found that this data release moves exchange rates even more than monetary policy surprises.

2. Results were similar when the data were scaled, following the authors, by the presample standard error; the resulting figure is slightly more legible using my scaling method.

References

