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PART I / NATURE OF THE  
DEMOGRAPHIC SWINGS AND THEIR CAUSAL  
INTERRELATIONS WITH ECONOMIC SWINGS

## CHAPTER 2 / HISTORICAL PATTERNS AND PRELIMINARY CAUSAL ANALYSIS


This chapter summarizes evidence on the historical characteristics of long swings, or Kuznets cycles, in the growth of U.S. population and labor force, chiefly for the period through 1950. It then explores the cause-effect relations between immigration waves, the principal factor in the demographic movements prior to World War I, and similar movements in the rate of economic development, as the basis for developing a fuller analytical model in the next chapter.

As noted in the Preface, most of the results summarized in this chapter are drawn from a larger manuscript prepared at an early stage of the project. While it is not possible to include all of the supporting evidence here, an attempt has been made to present a representative proportion. Many of the findings for population and labor force are based on the decennial population censuses 1870 to 1950. The timing of the censuses during this period (but not before) occurred close enough to turning points in the demographic swings to permit use of such intermittent observations for analysis of the swings. This is illustrated in Figure 1, which shows how observations confined to census dates (the broken line) reproduce in rough form the pattern of fluctuation revealed in fuller detail by annual data.<sup>1</sup> Although analysis of timing and amplitude patterns is not possible with such fragmentary data, the wealth of detail in the census permits an exploration of a number of other characteristics. Among those covered here are color-nativity, place of residence (farm-nonfarm, urban-rural, and standard metropolitan area), geographic division and state, industry, and

<sup>1</sup> A ten-year average of annual data is employed because decade changes in the stock of population or labor force, derived from successive censuses, are equivalent to observations at decade intervals on a ten-year moving average of annual changes.

FIGURE 1

TEN-YEAR MOVING AVERAGE OF NET IMMIGRATION AND OF ANNUAL CHANGE IN TOTAL POPULATION AND GROSS CONSTRUCTION (KUZNETS), 1869-1950<sup>a</sup>



<sup>a</sup> Broken lines connect values for periods corresponding to census intervals.  
SOURCE: Table A-1.

occupation. In addition, cross-classifications of age and color-nativity permitted an estimation of natural increase and migration components of change in total population and labor force. Where expert analysis has led to revision of the raw census data for a particular characteristic, use has generally been made here of the refined series, though some discrepancy is consequently introduced between this characteristic and others in their over-all rates of change. Details regarding sources and methods and the data underlying charts are given in Appendix A.

#### THE NATURE OF LONG SWINGS IN POPULATION AND LABOR FORCE

What is the picture of the demographic swings which emerges when the evidence from this and other studies is pieced together? From data on nationwide swings by component of change and color-nativity, spatial characteristics, and economic aspects, the following generalizations seem warranted for the nation as a whole:

1. The growth of both population and labor force has been characterized by roughly synchronous long swings since at least 1870 and probably since early in the nineteenth century. The swings were typically of substantial amplitude and averaged approximately fifteen to twenty-five years in duration, as shown in Figures 2, 3, and [102, 103, 107, 159, 163].


2. Until 1920, swings in both series arose very largely from corresponding movements in immigration.<sup>2</sup> Recently, however, fertility has assumed a more important role for population swings, and participation-rate change for labor force movements (Figures 2 and 3).

3. The color-nativity components of population and labor force reflect the typically predominant influence of immigration in the swings. Historically the swings are most apparent in the growth of the foreign-born population and labor force. Recently, however, the native-born category has become important—both the native white and nonwhite components [102, 103].

Examination of various spatial components of the national aggregate reveals the following points:


<sup>2</sup> However, evidence of swings is apparent in fertility and mortality [32, 103] (see Chapter 4).

FIGURE 2  
 AVERAGE GROWTH RATE OF POPULATION BY COMPONENT OF CHANGE, QUINQUENNALLY, 1870-1955



SOURCE: Table A-2.

FIGURE 3  
 AVERAGE GROWTH RATE OF LABOR FORCE BY COMPONENT OF CHANGE, DECENNIALLY, 1870-1950



SOURCE: Table A-3.

1. The swings have typically been a nonfarm, nonagricultural phenomenon. Relatively high positive conformity is apparent in the growth of the total population residing in nonfarm areas, both urban and rural, and in metropolitan areas (SMA's), old and new. Relatively high positive conformity is also apparent in the *number* of urban places and SMA's, and, holding the number of places or SMA's in a given size class constant during each decade, in the growth of the aggregate population in towns and villages and in cities or metropolitan areas of small, medium, and large size. The swings are also evident in the growth of the labor force in nonagricultural industries and in urban areas, see Figures 4, 5, and [59, 119-121].<sup>3</sup>

2. The growth of farm population, of the population in rural areas taken as a whole and in rural territory outside of metropolitan areas, and of the agricultural and rural labor force typically either fails to conform or conforms inversely (Figures 4 and 5). A possible exception, which is of greatest quantitative importance in the pre-Civil War period, is population and labor force growth in new agricultural areas. These magnitudes appear to conform positively while these areas are being settled [176, pp. 1-18 to 1-23; 131].

3. The swings in growth of nonfarm population and nonagricultural labor force are widely diffused geographically, typically occurring at about the same time in the various regions and geographic divisions of the country. When *total* population or labor force in a region or division fails to conform, this is almost always due to the discordant behavior of the farm or agricultural component of the total, as shown in Figures 6 and 7.<sup>4</sup>


The generalizations above regarding positive conformity relate to broad classes of population and labor force. It is less true that any given city or metropolitan area, or even the urban population of a single state, will consistently show every long swing. Thus broad, general stability in the spatial incidence of the swings is accompanied by variability in individual cases.

4. The contrasting behavior of population growth in farm and

<sup>3</sup> Unless otherwise specified, nonagricultural labor force is the reference series for statements in this chapter regarding conformity of decennial series to the long swings pattern.


<sup>4</sup> Important contributions at the state and local level have been made by Gordon [77], David [42], and Smolensky and Ratajczak [147a].

**FIGURE 4**  
**AVERAGE GROWTH RATE OF POPULATION BY RESIDENCE, DECENNIALLY, 1870-1950**




SOURCE: Table A-4.

**FIGURE 5**  
**AVERAGE GROWTH RATE OF LABOR FORCE BY AGRICULTURAL-NONAGRICULTURAL SECTOR AND URBAN-RURAL RESIDENCE, DECENNIALLY, 1870-1950**




SOURCE: Table A-5.

**FIGURE 6**  
**AVERAGE GROWTH RATE OF**  
**URBAN POPULATION BY GEO-**  
**GRAPHIC DIVISION, DECENNIALLY,**  
**1870-1950**



SOURCE: Table A-6.

**FIGURE 7**  
**AVERAGE GROWTH RATE OF NON-**  
**AGRICULTURAL LABOR FORCE BY**  
**GEOGRAPHIC DIVISION, DECEN-**  
**NIALLY, 1870-1950**



SOURCE: Table A-7.


nonfarm areas suggests the possibility of long swings in *internal* migration, and this, indeed, is the case. Estimates of the over-all rate of net interstate migration of the native-born population, available by decade since 1870, exhibit high positive conformity to long swings. Much cruder estimates which I have made for rural and urban areas show that rates of rural net out-migration and urban net in-migration of the native-born population also tended to conform positively. When the four major regions are studied separately, one finds that while the secular levels of the rates necessarily differed according to whether the area in question was on balance a supplier or recipient of migrants, the same pattern of decennial fluctuation in native-born net migration rates—interregional, rural, and urban—usually occurred in each. At the level of individual states, however, net migration rates—available for the total population but not rural and urban separately—conformed less consistently [59, 158-160, 163].

5. In both the interstate and rural-urban migration estimates, the white component of the native-born population shows positive conformity to long swings throughout the entire period, and the Negro component, from 1920 on. An interesting feature of the Negro migration before 1910 is that the interstate movement tends if anything to move inversely, but the substantially larger rural-urban flow conforms positively to the swings. On balance, therefore, the evidence at the subnational level indicates that roughly synchronous fluctuations occurred in internal as well as external migration, and that, typically, all three color-nativity classes—foreign-born white, native white, and Negro—participated in migration swings throughout the period since 1870.

The figures for the main industrial and occupational components of the nonagricultural labor force reveal additional economic characteristics of the swings:

As shown in Figure 8, the swings appear with high regularity in the same industrial sectors, namely, construction; transportation; trade; finance, insurance, and real estate; professional services and amusements; domestic service; and personal services. Manufacturing and forestry and fishing show no consistent pattern, and mining tends to move inversely, but the patterns for these particular sectors may be

**FIGURE 8**  
**AVERAGE GROWTH RATE OF LABOR FORCE BY INDUSTRY, DECENNIALLY,**  
**1870-1950**



SOURCE: Table A-8.

obscured because of the level of aggregation involved and the intermittent nature of the observations. Finer industrial detail and more frequent observations suggest a more complex pattern for manufacturing (discussed in connection with Figures 10 through 12 below).

The occupational data, which are available only from 1900 on, show quite consistent swings for both the total white collar group and its components, but only for the total of the manual and service workers.<sup>5</sup> The movements shown by a number of major occupational groups appear to be determined by the industrial pattern, specifically, by the relative weight in each occupational class of the nonconforming manufacturing sector, on the one hand, and the positively conforming construction, trade, and service sectors, on the other.

### CAUSES OF MIGRATION SWINGS

Since nationwide swings in population and labor force growth before World War I were predominantly due to swings in immigration, a closer look at the immigration waves provides a useful starting point for the more general cause-effect analysis of demographic swings undertaken in Chapter 3.

The flow of migrants between two geographic areas is influenced by a variety of factors at origin and destination, such as current and expected economic opportunity, rates of labor force entry, transfer costs, the volume of previous migration, as well as noneconomic conditions such as language and culture, war, and political revolution. All of these factors and more determine the level of migration at a given time, but they need not all fluctuate in order to generate migration swings over time. What interests us here is whether there is evidence that the observed immigration waves were repeatedly associated with fluctuations in the same factor(s), and particularly whether they were initiated by changing conditions in the United States or in the areas of origin? This question is important in clarifying not only the causes of the waves in demographic growth but also the originating role, if any, of these waves in the swings in economic growth.

The answer appears to be that, typically, the swings in im-

<sup>5</sup> See Kaplan and Casey [97a].

migration were a response to corresponding swings in the demand for labor in the United States.<sup>6</sup> The evidence is as follows:

In the United States, turning points of long swings in output growth typically preceded those in the rate of immigration, suggesting that immigration was responding to changed conditions in the United States rather than abroad (Figure 9, [4]).<sup>7</sup> If new circumstances in the areas of origin were the source of the immigration swing, then, other things remaining unchanged, one would expect immigration to initiate a corresponding movement in the growth rate of GNP, and thus to move concurrently rather than lag behind it.

During long swings in the U.S., a rising immigration rate was typically preceded by a rising rate of growth in hourly wages and, as far as the limited evidence goes, a declining unemployment rate; a falling immigration rate tended to follow a decline in the growth rate of hourly wages and a rising unemployment rate (Figure 9). Since the growth of the U.S. labor force from domestic sources, whether from demographic factors or participation-rate change, showed but slight evidence of long swings before World War I (Figure 3), the implication is that immigration waves were one of several symptoms of common origin, namely, alternating tightness and slack in the labor market associated with swings in the growth of labor demand. The immediate stimulus to migration was probably changes in unemployment conditions (Chapter 6, [96]).


There is a substantial similarity in the timing of out-migration waves from diverse areas of origin—different parts of Europe, Canada, Latin America, Asia, and even the rural sector within the United States [54, 103]. This observation is consistent with the view that these areas were responding to a common external stimulus such as swings in labor demand at destination. It is difficult to explain in terms of conditions in the originating areas, unless these areas were themselves subject to forces generating common swings.

<sup>6</sup> This conclusion differs from that of Brinley Thomas for the period before 1870 [156]. Albert Fishlow [66, pp. 200–203] has also questioned Thomas' analysis, and criticized the reliability of the underlying railroad building series he uses.

<sup>7</sup> Analysis of the pre-Civil War period has been significantly aided by the newly developed estimates of GNP and components by Robert E. Gallman, who has himself commented on the long swings apparent in the series. I am grateful to Professor Gallman for making available his preliminary estimates. See [74a, 74b].

FIGURE 9

AVERAGE ANNUAL RATE OF CHANGE IN AGGREGATE PRODUCTION, AGGREGATE CONSTRUCTION, AND WAGE RATE; AND AVERAGE LEVEL OF IMMIGRATION RATE AND UNEMPLOYMENT RATE, NBER REFERENCE CYCLES, 1834-1914



Investigation of the possibility that common forces generated concurrent swings in areas of origin indicates that, within Europe, although there is evidence of a cross-section association among countries between the *secular* rate of overseas emigration and the rate of labor market entry from demographic sources (as reflected in the rate of natural increase twenty years prior to emigration), there is no evidence that the emigration *swings* were responding to similar swings in the rate of labor market entry. Rather, while swings in the latter did occur, countries tended to coincide in their peaks and troughs in emigration rates despite differences in those in their rates of labor market entry. Similarly in the U.S. rural sector, there is no evidence of a systematic fluctuation in rates of labor market entry from demographic sources which could be held responsible for the waves in rural out-migration [54].

Evidence regarding a common movement among European countries in economic opportunity, as measured by agricultural or industrial swings, is mixed [104, 133]. If there was any such movement regularly associated with the U.S. swing, and it should be emphasized that the evidence on this is unclear, it was probably a common swing in industrial conditions, conforming *positively* to the U.S. swing. The U.S.

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*Legend for Figure 9*

- I Rate of change of aggregate production, percentage per year.
  - 1. Nonperishable commodity output, 1860 dollars (Callman).
  - 2. Index of industrial and commercial production, 1899 weights (Frickey).
  - 3. Gross national product, 1929 dollars (Kendrick).
- II Rate of change of aggregate construction, percentage per year.
  - 4. Gross new construction, 1860 dollars (Callman).
  - 5. Index of physical volume of construction (Abramovitz).
  - 6. Gross new construction, 1929 dollars (Kuznets).
- III Rate of change of wage rate, percentage per year.
  - 7. Money daily wages, Erie Canal (Smith).
  - 8. Real hourly wages, manufacturing, 1957 cents (Long).
- IV Alien immigration rate, per thousand total population per year.
  - 9. Gross immigration.
  - 10. Net immigration.
- V Unemployment rate, percentage of civilian labor force.
  - 11. Manufacturing and transportation (Douglas).
  - 12. Civilian labor force (Lebergott).

NOTE: To facilitate visual comparison of the series, vertical lines have been drawn through the long-swing peaks and troughs of the rate of change in aggregate construction, and the area from peak to trough has been shaded.

SOURCE: Table B-2, except series 10 and 11, Table A-9.

farm sector does clearly show a positively conforming movement in agricultural opportunity (as measured by per capita real farm income), arising from a corresponding swing in farm product prices.<sup>8</sup>

A case might be made that positively conforming movements in economic opportunity in areas of origin could generate common out-migration waves by providing financing for relocation and thus initiate U.S. nonfarm swings. However, a substantial proportion of European emigrants, at least at the end of the nineteenth century, appear not to have financed their own migration, but to have relied on funds provided by relatives or friends who preceded them [169, p. 119; 96, p. 77]. As for the U.S. farm sector, even if the swing in agricultural opportunity did provide financing for migrants, it would seem that this agricultural income swing was itself the result rather than the cause of the nonfarm swing. This is because the swing in farm product prices, which is responsible for the positively conforming movement in agricultural opportunity, is evidently a reflection of a swing in the domestic nonfarm demand for food and materials. In other words, the nonfarm economic boom generated a swing in the demand, not only for labor (with a resulting migration wave) but also for U.S. farm products (with a corresponding movement in farm prices and income).

In the U.S., the influence of fluctuations in demand conditions is apparent too in the age data on interstate migration. For every cohort, the migration rate at ages 25-29 exceeded that at ages 35-39. However, a cohort going through the peak migration ages, 25-29, during a long-swing depression showed a substantially lower migration rate than one reaching these ages during a long-swing boom. Ten years later, at ages 35-39, when the long-swing stage encountered by each cohort tended to be reversed, their order with regard to migration rates was likewise reversed. This suggests that a cohort's

<sup>8</sup> This statement is based on an analysis of the conformity with the aggregate output series in Figure 14 of indexes for the following three series: real farm income, 1869-1929; farm prices, 1834-1929; and farm output, 1834-59 and 1869-1929. The first was derived in the same way as the series in Appendix C, Table C-9, column 2. For the other two indexes, the source from 1869 on was [151]. Prior to 1869 [187, series E-2] was used for price; for output, Gallman's unpublished annual estimates of the output of perishable commodities was used.

migration propensity at ages 25-29 was sometimes significantly deferred until demand conditions became more favorable [59].

It is sometimes claimed that the waves of immigration to the U.S. originated in catastrophic events in Europe, such as famines, revolutions, pogroms, etc. Thus the surge in emigration from Ireland and Germany in the late 1840's and early 1850's has been attributed to famine and political events. Doubtless, it is sometimes possible to identify such occurrences in connection with high or rising emigration. But to establish the argument, it is necessary to show that when emigration was low or falling, events such as these were *not* occurring, and therefore that pressure for emigration was less. As a crude test of this, I drew on Thorp's business annals for each of eight countries: England, 1820-1914; France, 1840-1914; Germany, 1853-1914; Austria, 1867-1914; and Russia, Sweden, Netherlands, and Italy, 1890-1914. In the fifth paragraph of the yearly entry for a country, Thorp lists "various non-economic phenomena which may have exerted influence upon the conditions of business. Political events, epidemics, and natural catastrophes are the chief subjects of note" [164a, p. 105]. I counted first the *total* number of entries under this head falling in periods of high versus low migration (also rising versus falling migration was used), and then repeated the procedure, counting only obviously "push" entries, such as riots, famines, "distress," "anxiety," war, and mobilization. In both cases the results were the same—if anything, more entries for catastrophic events occurred in periods when emigration was low or falling than when it was high or rising. Thus it seems doubtful that the recurrent migration waves originated in the intermittent occurrence of such events.

This is not to say that such events had no influence on the migration pattern if demand conditions in the United States were favorable. On the contrary, as between two long swings characterized by a similar movement in the demand for labor, the response induced would vary from one country to another (as well as between Europe and the U.S. farm sector), not only because of irregular events such as these, but also because of secular developments with regard to transport costs, the geographic diffusion of economic growth, and so on. The point is that labor demand conditions in the United States were the

systematic factor initiating an upsurge, though the amplitude and composition of the response depended upon the particular supply conditions prevailing at the time.

### EFFECTS OF MIGRATION

While surges in population and labor force growth associated with immigration appear to have been the result rather than the cause of swings in the rate of economic growth, this does not mean that the demographic movement did not play an important functional role in such swings. Rather, the evidence since at least 1870 suggests that the flow of foreign and internal migrants responding to an upswing in labor demand itself generated a wave of urban development.<sup>9</sup> The rise in aggregate demand associated with the population movement sustained the long upswing and may have been an important factor accounting for its prolonged duration.

Since the data supporting this view relate largely to industrial structure, it is pertinent first to identify those industries most dependent on final urban consumer demand. A clue to their identity is provided by ranking the industries in the fifty-sector input-output table for 1947 [61] according to the percentage of gross output flowing directly to households.<sup>10</sup> The highest one-third are as follows:

|  |   |
|--|---|
| Food and kindred products                | Trade   |
| Tobacco manufactures                     | Communications                                  |
| Apparel                                  | Finance and insurance                           |
| Furniture and fixtures                   | Rental  |
| Leather and leather products             | Personal and repair services                    |
| Radios                                   | Medical, education, and nonprofit organizations |
| Miscellaneous manufacturing              | Amusements                                      |
| Transportation other than rail and ocean | Eating and drinking places                      |
|  | Government                                      |

To these should be added residential construction, not separately distinguished in the table, and industries in the manufacturing sector

<sup>9</sup> Isard's early work emphasized this effect of the demographic movement during long swings [92, 93].

<sup>10</sup> A preliminary estimate by William C. Whitney of a similar table for 1899 yields virtually the same list of industries at that date.

closely related to it such as lumber products; stone, clay, and glass products; and plumbing and heating supplies. In the absence of special constraints this group of industries would be expected to respond most sensitively to changes in demand caused by swings in the urban consuming population arising from migration. Is this the case?


It has already been noted that the nationwide data show positively conforming swings both in urban population growth and the *non-manufacturing* sectors listed above (cf. Figures 4 and 8). Further evidence of this association was found in data for the individual geographic divisions as well. Thus, approximate estimates of the construction and trade labor force in each division, 1870-1950 (derived from the census reports on the principal occupations in these industrial activities), show fluctuations conforming closely to those of the urban and SMA populations.

What of the subsectors of *manufacturing* listed above? In order to get at a level of industrial detail more comparable to that of the input-output study, I used Alba Edwards' 100 or so industry-occupation series on labor force covering the period 1870-1930 [173, pp. 104-112]. Classifying these series according to conformity of movement with the nonagricultural total reveals that a group of industry titles much like those listed above from the input-output table conform positively. Although in Edwards' data the manufacturing labor force as a whole does not show conformity, the subsectors dependent on construction and urban consumer demand do. One activity prominent in Edwards' data, printing and publishing, though missing from the input-output list, ranks only slightly below the industries listed there. Industries appearing in the input-output list but which do not show up particularly in Edwards' detailed labor force data are typically those with special output constraints such as government or industries relying substantially on extractive activity, e.g., manufacture of food products.

These findings are in line with what we would expect about the nature of the industrial response if swings in migration to urban areas generated concurrent movements in product demand. In the preceding section we found that immigration swings typically lagged behind swings in the growth rate of nonagricultural output as a whole. Together, these findings suggest a more elaborate pattern in the industrial

FIGURE 10

AVERAGE RATE OF CHANGE OF BURNS' CONSTANT-PRICE-BUILDING PERMITS AND STANDARD-TREND CYCLE,<sup>a</sup> KUZNETS' GROSS CONSTRUCTION IN 1929 PRICES, AND MALE POPULATION OF WORKING AGE, DECADES ENDING IN 0 AND 5, 1870-1950




NOTE: To facilitate visual comparison of the series, vertical lines have been drawn through peaks and troughs of the rate of change in the standard trend cycle.  
SOURCE: Table A-10.

<sup>a</sup> Both of Burns' series are trend-adjusted.

FIGURE 11

AVERAGE TREND-ADJUSTED RATE OF CHANGE OF SELECTED BASIC COMMODITY SERIES, DECADES ENDING IN 0 AND 5,<sup>a</sup> 1870-1930




NOTE: See note to Figure 10.

SOURCE: Table A-11.

<sup>a</sup> Broken lines connect values for decades ending in 0 (i.e., census intervals).

FIGURE 12

AVERAGE RATE OF CHANGE OF TOTAL MANUFACTURING CAPITAL IN 1929  
PRICES, BY SELECTED MAJOR MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES, 1880-1961



NOTE: To facilitate visual comparison of the series, vertical lines have been drawn through peaks and troughs of the rate of change in all manufacturing.  
SOURCE: Table A-12.

structure of long swings than that revealed by the decennial census data in Figure 8. Among the positively conforming industries, some are moving with the growth rate of nonagricultural output, but others, more closely dependent on construction and urban household demand, either lag or, if turning concurrently, do so sluggishly. Although observations on labor force are too infrequent to discern this finer pattern, evidence of it is apparent in output and capital data, as follows:

1. The turning points in Burns' series on building permits coincide almost perfectly with those in Kuznets' series for gross construction and male population of working age. However, they lag behind those in Burns' "standard trend cycle," a series which reflects the consensus of movement of basic unfinished industrial commodities (Figure 10).

2. This lag characterizes a number of Burns' individual commodity series other than building permits, series closely related to construction or final urban consumer demand (Figure 11, right panel). Even among the industrial commodity series conforming to the standard-trend cycle there are several in which construction demand figures more prominently, and these tend to turn sluggishly reflecting the imprint of that demand (Figure 11, left panel, see pig iron, rails, cement).

3. In Creamer's data on growth of real capital stock in manufacturing, long-swing turning points in forest products; stone, clay, and glass products; and printing and publishing tend to lag behind those in the metals industries and in manufacturing as a whole (Figure 12). The identity of the *leading* manufacturing industries indicated by Creamer's capital data is the same as that suggested by Burns' commodity series, namely, the "capital goods" industries. All in all, the data suggest, then, that an upswing in the capital goods industries and industries closely related to them is followed by a surge in industries depending on construction and urban household demand as a gradually tightening labor market induces migration to urban centers.