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PRUDENTIAL SUPERVISION

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
**EDITED BY
FREDERIC S. MISHKIN**

Prudential Supervision

What Works and What Doesn't



**A National Bureau
of Economic Research
Conference Report**



Prudential Supervision

What Works and What Doesn't

Edited by **Frederic S. Mishkin**

The University of Chicago Press

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