NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

NBER Working Papers by Steven Shavell

Contact and additional information for this authorAll NBER papers and publicationsNBER Working Papers onlyInformation about this author at RePEc

Working Papers

December 2014A Simple Model of Optimal Deterrence and Incapacitation
w20747
June 2014A General Rationale for a Governmental Role in the Relief of Large Risks
w20192
February 2014Risk Aversion and the Desirability of Attenuated Legal Change
w19879
December 2012Costly Litigation and Optimal Damages
with A. Mitchell Polinsky: w18594
September 2012A Fundamental Enforcement Cost Advantage of the Negligence Rule over Regulation
w18418
July 2010Corrective Taxation versus Liability
w16234
The Corrective Tax versus Liability As Solutions to the Problem of Harmful Externalities
w16235
October 2007On Optimal Legal Change, Past Behavior, and Grandfathering
w13563

Published: Steven Shavell, 2008. "On Optimal Legal Change, Past Behavior, and Grandfathering," Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 37(1), pages 37-85, 01.

Eminent Domain Versus Government Purchase of Land Given Imperpect Information About Owners' Valuation
w13564
December 2006Mandatory Versus Voluntary Disclosure of Product Risks
with A. Mitchell Polinsky: w12776
November 2005The Theory of Public Enforcement of Law
with A. Mitchell Polinsky: w11780

Published:

  • Shavell, Steven and A. Mitchell Polinsky. “The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law.” Journal of Economic Literature 38, 1 (March 2000): 45-76.
  • Polinsky, A. Mitchell & Shavell, Steven, 2007. "The Theory of Public Enforcement of Law," Handbook of Law and Economics, Elsevier.

Liability for Accidents
w11781

Published: Shavell, Steven, 2007. "Liability for Accidents," Handbook of Law and Economics, Elsevier.

May 2005Contracts, Holdup, and Legal Intervention
w11284
September 2004The Appeals Process and Adjudicator Incentives
w10754

Published: Shavell, Steven. "The Appeals Process and Adjudicator Incentives." Journal of Legal Studies 35, 1 (January 2006): 1-29.

March 2004Minimum Asset Requirements and Compulsory Liability Insurance As Solutions to the Judgment-Proof Problem
w10341

Published: Shavell, Steven. "Minimum Asset Requirements And Compulsory Liability Insurances As Solutions To The Judgment-Proof Problem," Rand Journal of Economics, 2005, v36(1,Spring), 63-77.

November 2003On the Writing and the Interpretation of Contracts
w10094

Published: Shavell, Steven. "On The Writing and The Interpretation Of Contracts," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 2006, v22(2,Oct), 289-314.

May 2003Economic Analysis of Accident Law
w9694
Economic Analysis of Property Law
w9695
Economic Analysis of Contract Law
w9696
Economic Analysis of Litigation and the Legal Process
w9697
Economic Analysis of Public Law Enforcement and Criminal Law
w9698
Economic Analysis of the General Structure of the Law
w9699
Economic Analysis of Welfare Economics, Morality and the Law
w9700
April 2003Fairness Versus Welfare: Notes on the Pareto Principle, Preferences, and Distributive Justice
with Louis Kaplow: w9622

Published:

February 2003Economic Analysis of Accident Law
w9483

Published: Shavell, Steven. Economic Analysis of Accident Law. Harvard University Press, 2007.

November 2002Minimum Asset Requirements
w9335

Published: Shavell, Steven. "Minimum Asset Requirements And Compulsory Liability Insurances As Solutions To The Judgment-Proof Problem," Rand Journal of Economics, 2005, v36(1,Spring), 63-77.

December 2001Moral Rules and the Moral Sentiments: Toward a Theory of an Optimal Moral System
with Louis Kaplow: w8688

Published: Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, 2007. "Moral Rules, the Moral Sentiments, and Behavior: Toward a Theory of an Optimal Moral System," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 115, pages 494-514.

May 1999Reconsidering Contractual Liability and the Incentive to Reveal Information
with Lucian Arye Bebchuk: w7106

Published: "Reconsidering Contractual Liability and the Incentive to Reveal Information" Stanford Law Review, Vol. 51, No. 6, pp. 1615-1627 (1999).

March 1999The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law
with A. Mitchell Polinsky: w6993

Published: Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 38, no. 1 (March 2000): 45-76. citation courtesy of

Any Non-Individualistic Social Welfare Function Violates the Pareto Principle
with Louis Kaplow: w7051

Published: Kaplow, Louis and Steven Shavell. "Any Non-Welfarist Method Of Policy Assessment Violates The Pareto Principle," Journal of Political Economy, 2001, v109(2,Apr), 281-286.

February 1999Corruption and Optimal Law Enforcement
with A. Mitchell Polinsky: w6945

Published: Polinsky, A. Mitchell and Steven Shavell. "Corruption And Optimal Law Enforcement," Journal of Public Economics, 2001, v81(1,Jul), 1-24. citation courtesy of

Rewards versus Intellectual Property Rights
with Tanguy van Ypersele: w6956

Published: Shavell, Steven and Tanguy Van Ypersele. "Rewards Versus Intellectual Property Rights," Journal of Law and Economics, 2001, v44(2,Oct), 525-547. citation courtesy of

Economic Analysis of Law
with Louis Kaplow: w6960

Handbook of Public Economics, Auerbach and Feldstein, eds., 2001,forthcoming.

November 1997On the Superiority of Corrective Taxes to Quantity Regulation
with Louis Kaplow: w6251

Published: Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, 2002. "On the Superiority of Corrective Taxes to Quantity Regulation," American Law and Economics Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 4(1), pages 1-17, January. citation courtesy of

On the Disutility and Discounting of Imprisonment and the Theory of Deterrence
with A. Mitchell Polinsky: w6259

Published: Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 28, no. 1 (January 1999): 1-16. citation courtesy of

February 1996Threats without Binding Commitment
with Kathryn Spier: w5461

Published: Steven Shavell & Kathryn E. Spier, 2002. "Threats Without Binding Commitment," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 0(1).

January 1994Should Employees be Subject to Fines and Imprisonment Given the Existence of Corporate Liability
with A. Mitchell Polinsky: r1839

Published: International Review of Law and Economics, Volume 13, No. 3, pp. 239-257,(September 1993)

December 1993Should Liability be Based on the Harm to the Victim or the Gain to the Injurer?
with A. Mitchell Polinsky: w4586

Published: Journal of Law, Economics & Organization, Vol. 10, No. 2 (October 1994)pp. 427-437

September 1993The Efficiency of the Legal System versus the Income Tax in Redistributing Income
with Louis Kaplow: w4457

Published: Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. XXIII, no. 2, pp. 667-681, (June 1994).

March 1993Accuracy in the Assessment of Damages
with Louis Kaplow: w4287

Published: Journal of Law and Economics, vol. XXXIX, no. 1, pp. 191-210, April 1996. citation courtesy of

October 1992Accuracy in the Determination of Liability
with Louis Kaplow: w4203

Published: Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. XXXVII, pp. 1-15, (April 1994). citation courtesy of

September 1992Optimal Cleanup and Liability After Environmentally Harmful Discharges
with A. Mitchell Polinsky: w4176

Published: "A Note on Optimal Cleanup and Liability After Environmentally Harmful Discharges," Research in Law and Economics, 1994, Vol. 16, 17-24.

March 1992Suit Versus Settlement When Parties Seek Nonmonetary Judgements
w4012

Published: Journal of Legal Studies, January 1993, Vol. 22, No. 1, 1-13. citation courtesy of

October 1991Private Versus Socially Optimal Provision of Ex Ante Legal Advice
with Louis Kaplow: w3868

Published: The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, Vol. 8, No. 2, pp. 306-320,(1992). citation courtesy of

August 1991Optimal Law Enforcement with Self-Reporting of Behavior
with Louis Kaplow: w3822

Published: Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 102, no. 3, pp. 583-606, (June 1994). citation courtesy of

May 1991Information and the Scope of Liability for Breach of Contract: The Rule of Hadley V. Baxendale
with Lucian Arye Bebchuk: w3696

Published: Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol. 7, No. 2, pp. 284-312, Fall 1991. citation courtesy of

December 1990Individual Precautions to Prevent Theft: Private Versus Socially OptimalBehavior
w3560

Published: International Review of Law & Economics, September, 1991, Vol. 11, No. 2, 1 23-132.

September 1990Enforcement Costs and the Optimal Magnitude and Probability of Fines
with A. Mitchell Polinsky: w3429

Published: Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 35, No. 1, (April 1992), pp.133-148 citation courtesy of

January 1990A Note on Optimal Fines When Wealth Varies Among Individuals
with A. Mitchell Polinsky: w3232

Published: The American Economic Review, Vol. 81, No. 3, pp. 618-621, (June 1991). citation courtesy of

August 1989A Note on Optimal Deterrence When Individuals Choose Among Harmful Acts
w3061

Published: "A Note on Marginal Deterrence When Individuals Choose Among Harmful Acts" International Review of Law & Economics, September, 1992, Vol. 12, 345-355.

Specific Versus General Enforcement of Law
w3062

Published: Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 99, no. 5 (1991): 1088-1108. citation courtesy of

June 1989Legal Advice about Acts Already Commited
with Louis Kaplow: w3005

Published: International Review of Law and Economics, Vol. 10, No. 2, pp. 149-159, (1990). citation courtesy of

October 1983Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety
w1218

Published: Shavell, Steven. "Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety." Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 13, (June 1984), pp. 357-374.

Uncertainty Over Causation and the Determination of Civil Liability
w1219

Published: Shavell, Steven. "Uncertainty Over Causation and the Determination of Civil Liability." Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 28, October 1985, pp. 587-609. citation courtesy of

A Model of the Socially Optimal Use of Liability and Regulation
w1220

Published: Shavell, Steven. "A Model of the Optimal Use of Liability and Safety Regulation." Rand Journal of Economics, Vol. 15, No. 2, (Summer 1984), pp. 271- 280.

July 1982The Optimal Use of Fines and Imprisonment
with A. Mitchell Polinsky: w0932

Published: Polinsky, A. Mitchell and Steven Shavell. "The Optimal Use of Fines and Imprisonment." Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 24, (1984), pp. 89-99. citation courtesy of

Torts in Which Victim and Injurer Act Sequentially
w0939

Published: Shavell, Steven. "Torts in Which Victim and Injurer Act Sequentially." Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 26, (October 1983), pp. 589-612.

September 1981The Social versus the Private Incentive to Bring Suit in a Costly Legal System
w0741

Published: Shavell, Steven. "The Social versus the Private Incentive to Bring Suit ina Costly Legal System." Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 11, No. 2, (June 1982), pp. 333-340.

Pigouvian Taxation with Administrative Costs
with A. Mitchell Polinsky: w0742

Published: Polinsky, A. Mitchell and Shavell, Steven. "Pigouvian Taxation with Administrative Costs." Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 19, No. 3 (December 1982) , pp. 385-394. citation courtesy of

August 1981On the Design of Contracts and Remedies for Breach
w0727

Published: Shavell, Steven. "On the Design of Contracts and Remedies for Breach." Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 97, (February 1984), pp. 121-148.

April 1981Suit and Settlement vs. Trial: A Theoretical Analysis under Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs
w0662

Published: Shavell, Steven. "Suit and Settlement vs. Trial: A Theoretical Analysis under Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs." Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 11, No. 1 (January 1982) pp. 55-81.

1981The Optimal Tradeoff Between the Probability and Magnitude of Fines
with A. Mitchell Polinsky: r0136

Published: Polinsky, A. Mitchell and Shavell, Steven. "The Optimal Tradeoff Betweenthe Probability and Magnitude of Fines." The American Economic Review, Vol. 9, No. 5, (December 1979), pp. 880-891.

September 1980Strict Liability Versus Negligence
r0084

Published: Shavell, Steven. "Strict Liability Versus Negligence." The Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. IX, (January 1980), pp. 1-25.

Contact and additional information for this authorAll NBER papers and publicationsNBER Working Papers onlyInformation about this author at RePEc

 
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