NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

NBER Working Papers by Benjarong Suwankiri

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Working Papers

December 2014The Welfare State and Migration: A Dynamic Analysis of Political Coalitions
with Assaf Razin, Efraim Sadka: w20806
We develop a dynamic political-economic theory of welfare state and immigration policies, featuring three distinct voting groups: skilled workers, unskilled workers, and old retirees. The essence of inter- and intra-generational redistribution of a typical welfare system is captured with a proportional tax on labor income to finance a transfer in a balanced-budget manner. We characterize political-economic equilibrium policy rules consisting of the tax rate, the skill composition of migrants, and the total number of migrants. When none of these groups enjoy a majority (50 percent of the voters or more), political coalitions will form. With overlapping generations and policy-determined influx of immigrants, the formation of the political coalitions changes over time. These future changes ar...
December 2009Migration and the Welfare State: A Dynamic Political-Economy Theory
with Assaf Razin, Efraim Sadka: w15597
We develop a dynamic politico-economic theory of welfare state and immigration policies, featuring three groups of voters: skilled workers, unskilled workers, and old retirees. The welfare-state is modeled by a proportional tax on labor income to finance a demogrant in a balanced-budget manner to capture the essence of inter- and intra- generational redistribution of a typical welfare system. Migrants arrive when young and their birth rate exceeds the native-born birth rate. We characterize political-economic equilibrium policy rules consisting of the tax rate, the skill composition of migrants, and the total number of migrants, in terms of demographic and labor productivity characteristics. We find that political coalitions will form among skilled and unskilled voters or among unskilled a...

Published: Assaf Razin, Efraim Sadka, and Benjarong Suwankiri, MIGRATION AND THE WELFARE ST ATE: POLITICAL-ECONOMY , FORMATION POLICY MIT Press, October 2011.

March 2009Migration and the welfare state: Dynamic Political-Economy Theory
with Assaf Razin, Efraim Sadka: w14784
We develop a dynamic politico-economic theory of welfare state, featuring three groups of voters: skilled workers, unskilled workers, and old retirees. The welfare-state is modeled by a proportional tax on labor income to finance a demogrant in a balanced-budget manner to capture the essence of inter-and intra-generational redistribution of a typical welfare system. Migrants arrive when young and their birth rate exceeds the native-born birth rate. We characterize political-economic equilibrium policy rules consisting of the tax rate, the skill composition of migrants, and the total number of migrants, in terms of demographic and labor productivity characteristics. We find that political coalitions will form among skilled and unskilled voters or among unskilled and old voters in order to b...

Published: MIGRATION AND THE WELFARE ST ATE: POLITICAL-ECONOMY , FORMATION POLICY MIT Press, October 2011. Book Review: Sharun W Mukand, Journal of Economic Literature 2012, 50 ( 3 ) , 791–794, American Economic Association

Contact and additional information for this authorAll NBER papers and publicationsNBER Working Papers only

 
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