NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

NBER Publications by Ririn Purnamasari

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Working Papers and Chapters

June 2013Ordeal Mechanisms In Targeting: Theory And Evidence From A Field Experiment In Indonesia
with Vivi Alatas, Abhijit Banerjee, Rema Hanna, Benjamin A. Olken, Matthew Wai-Poi: w19127
Economic theory suggests that, when designing aid programs, ordeal mechanisms that impose differential costs for rich and poor can induce self-selection and hence improve targeting (“self-targeting”). We first re-examine this theory and show that ordeal mechanisms may actually have theoretically ambiguous effects on targeting: for example, time spent applying imposes a higher monetary cost on the rich, but may impose a higher utility cost on the poor. We then examine these issues empirically by conducting a 400-village field experiment within Indonesia's Conditional Cash Transfer program. Targeting in the program is usually conducted by automatically enrolling candidates who pass an asset test. We compare whether instituting an ordeal mechanism, where villagers come to a central applicatio...
February 2013Does Elite Capture Matter? Local Elites and Targeted Welfare Programs in Indonesia
with Vivi Alatas, Abhijit Banerjee, Rema Hanna, Benjamin A. Olken, Matthew Wai-Poi: w18798
This paper investigates the impact of elite capture on the allocation of targeted government welfare programs in Indonesia, using both a high-stakes field experiment that varied the extent of elite influence and non-experimental data on a variety of existing government transfer programs. Conditional on their consumption level, there is little evidence that village elites and their relatives are more likely to receive aid programs than non-elites. However, this overall result masks stark differences between different types of elites: those holding formal leadership positions are more likely to receive benefits, while informal leaders are less likely to receive them. We show that capture by formal elites occurs when program benefits are actually distributed to households, and not during the ...

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