

The 2012 NBER/NSF/CEME Conference in General Equilibrium and Mathematical Economics

Registration

Friday, September 28: 12:00pm in Wylie Hall 329

All talks will take place in Wylie Hall 005

Conference Program

Friday, September 28: 1:15 pm

Opening remarks and welcome by Dean Larry Singell

Friday, September 28: 1:30pm-4:00pm

Chair: Bob Becker

International Monetary Policy I: Coordinated Action, **M. Hoelle** (Purdue University)

Refining not-too-tight debt constraints, V. F. Martins-da-Rocha and **Y. Vailakis** (University of Exeter)

Time consistent Markov policies in dynamic economies with quasi-hyperbolic consumers, L. Balbusy, **K. Reffett** (Arizona State University), L. Wozny

Group all-pay contests as volunteer's dilemmas, **I. Topolyan** (Mississippi State University)

Efficient wage bargaining in a dynamic macroeconomic model, V. Böhm and **O. Claas** (Bielefeld University)

Friday, September 28: 4:30pm-6:30pm

Chair: Sascha Baghestanian

The effect of options on coordination, **L. Araujo** (Michigan State University) and B. Guimaraes

Codes of conduct, private information, and repeated games, **J. I. Block** (Washington University in St. Louis) and D. K. Levine

A common value auction with bid solicitation, **S. Lauermann** (University of Michigan) and A. Wolinsky

Government-issued fiat money: Why is there money? **R. M. Starr** (University of California San Diego)

Saturday, September 29: 8:30am-10:30am

Chair: Alessandro Citanna

Output contingent securities and efficient investment by firms, **L. Braido** (EPGE/FGV Rio) and V. F. Martins da Rocha

Confessions of rational investors, **H. Polemarchakis** (University of Warwick)

Financial economics without probabilistic prior, **B. Cornet** (University of Kansas, Lawrence, Kansas, USA and Paris School of Economics, Universite Paris 1) and F. Riedel

Foundations for optimal inattention, **A. Ellis** (Boston University)

Saturday, September 29: 11:00am-12:30pm

Chair: Anne Villamil

Bayesian model of risk and uncertainty, **N. I. Al-Najjar** (Northwestern University) and J. Weinstein

An axiomatization of subjective mean variance utility under ambiguity, **X. Qu** (University of Cergy-Pontoise)

Implementation under ambiguity: The maximin core, Z. Liu and **N. Yannelis** (University of Iowa)

Saturday, September 29: 12:30am-1:30pm

Lunch

Saturday, September 29: 1:30pm-3:30pm

Chair: Frank Page

Mechanism design in large games: incentives and privacy, M. Kearns, **M. M. Pai** (University of Pennsylvania), A. Roth and J. Ullman

An incentive efficient market for mechanisms in large Akerlof economies, **A. Citanna** (Yeshiva University) and P. Siconolfi

Optimality in a large two-stage market game, **T. Hu** (Northwestern University) and N. Wallace

Myopic Agency, **J. Y. Zhu** (University of Pennsylvania)

Saturday, September 29: 4:00pm-6:30pm

Chair: Larry Chen

Dichotomic uniform-price models, **A. Carvajal** (University of Western Ontario) and M. Weretka

Point-rationalizability in large games, **H. Yu** (Ryerson University)

On sufficiently diffused information and finite-player games with private information, M. A. Khan and **Y. Zhang** (Shanghai University of Finance and Economics)

On the comparative statics of equilibrium points, **R. Amir** (University of Arizona)

Coherent price systems and uncertainty-neutral valuation, **P. Beißner** (Bielefeld University)

Saturday, September 29: 7:15pm

Whither general equilibrium theory? Some informal remarks, **A. Khan** (Johns Hopkins University)

Dinner at the Bloomington Convention Center, 302 South College Avenue Bloomington, IN 47403

Sunday, September 30: 8:30am-10:30pm

Chair: Filomena Garcia

The cost of diversity: public good provision and redistribution, **N. Allouch** (Queen Mary, University of London)

A revealed preference test for weakly separable preferences, **J. K.-H. Quah** (Oxford University)

Household formation and markets, H. Gersbach, **H. Haller** (Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University) and H. Konishi

Specifying nodes as sets of actions, **P.A. Streufert** (University of Western Ontario)

Sunday, September 30: 11:00am-1:00pm

Chair: Subir Chakrabarti

Correlation of types in Bayesian games, **L. De Castro** (Northwestern University)

Time and no lotteries: A simple axiomatization of maxmin expected utility, **A. Kochov** (University of Rochester)

Equilibrium in international asset and good markets, **S. Bosi** (EPEE, University of Evry Patrice Fontaine Eurofidai, CERAG, University Pierre-Mendes-France) and C. Le Van

Global imbalances and taxing capital flows, C. A. E. Goodhart, **M. U. Peiris** (ICEF, NRU Higher School of Economics, Moscow) and D. P. Tsomocos

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